

The central theme of this comparative study of the position of native trade in Indonesia is the appearance of foreign traders both Asian and European. New sources of information, e.g. the original documents in the Dutch East India Company Archives as well as Portuguese, English and a few native sources have enabled the author to supplement and to criticize the economic aspects of the sociological studies of B. Schrieke and J. C. van Leur, and to establish a basis for comparison. Although a critical historical research has partly confirmed the general conclusions at which they had arrived, also in respect of an earlier period not dealt with by them in detail, it became apparent that in particular Van Leur's antithetical tenets had to be revised.

The book falls into two distinct parts. Thanks to the great interest displayed by the Portuguese on their first contact with Asia it has been possible to compile an accurate and comprehensive account of trade in the Malay-Indonesian region before the arrival of the Europeans. Special attention has been given here to the rise of the commercial port of Malacca and its development into a central market. The author has succeeded in compiling a fairly reliable account of an Asian trading community at the time when it had been hardly affected by European penetration. This account includes a summary of the nature and amount of the shipping and commercial traffic concentrated on Malacca, the routes followed and the share held in it by East- and West-Asians, with special reference to the Indonesian Archipelago. Trade with places other than Malacca is also discussed.

In dealing with the later period, in the second part of her book, when the stress shifts to the European element, the author has attempted first of all to ascertain the impact of the European expansion on Asian trade, rather than to overstress the European point of view. So as to arrive at a more independent judgment, a description of the effect of the Portuguese upon trade and traffic

ASIAN TRADE AND EUROPEAN INFLUENCE

**ASIAN TRADE
AND EUROPEAN INFLUENCE
IN THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO
BETWEEN 1500 AND ABOUT 1630**

BY

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Aan de nagedachtenis van mijn man

PREFACE

Now that this study is completed and I wish to make due acknowledgment to all those who have in any degree contributed towards its realization, my thoughts turn in the first place to the one to whom this book is dedicated. It is a great grief to me that he who took such an intense interest in my work has not lived to see its conclusion. It was he who in the beginning urged me to venture upon this course of study and whose encouragement helped me in moments of despondency. The high standard which, with his keen and critical judgment, he set for his own work, was an example to me, and I shall strive to maintain it in my future studies.

Not only did he help me to lay the foundation of my knowledge of archive science, but he was also my guide in a field new to me in many respects, that of Asian maritime trade. His wide knowledge of medieval European trade in the Baltic area led me to compare and contrast the two worlds of East and West and thus helped me to obtain a deeper insight into the differences and similarities between the various problems involved.

I am greatly indebted to Prof. Dr. J. M. Romein, who has followed the progress of my studies with great interest all these years, and on whose help and support, sometimes in very difficult circumstances, I have always been able to rely. His unceasing encouragement, his frequent good advice, and his critical judgment have been of exceptional value to me. For all this, I tender him my warmest thanks.

Besides Prof. Romein, I would make special mention of Prof. Dr. W. F. Wertheim, whose critical comments and extensive knowledge of the relevant literature have been of much assistance to me. I am also indebted to Prof. Dr. J. E. van Lohuizen-de Leeuw and to Prof. Dr. T. S. Jansma, who have spared no pains to help me in the completion of my task.

I must also express my appreciation of the kindness shown by Prof. C. R. Boxer of London University (King's College) in reading and criticizing the Dutch text of my thesis. His wide knowledge of the Portuguese period in Asia has been of much benefit to me.

I am very grateful to Mrs. M. B. Quast for undertaking the arduous task of translating the lengthy Dutch manuscript into English, and to Mr. D. A. S. Reid and Prof. Dr. P. N. U. Harting for checking the translation.

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INTRODUCTION

The extremely important propositions about the commercial traffic of the Indonesian Archipelago advanced by B. Schrieke in *The Shifts in Political and Economic power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the sixteenth and seventeenth century* and by J. C. van Leur in *Indonesian Trade and Society*¹ inspired the present author to undertake the research which led to the writing of this book. Both Schrieke and Van Leur, however, started from sociological premisses. To supplement their work and to form a basis for comparison, an account is given here of the historical development of this trade, seen from a historical instead of from a sociological standpoint. This was made possible by new sources of information becoming available to augment those already at hand. In the main, therefore, this book is a comparative study of the position of native trade in Indonesia before and after the coming of the Europeans, the central theme being, of course, the appearance of foreign traders, both Asian and European, in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. A completely integrated picture proved to be an unattainable ideal, owing to the nature of the sources of information. Besides referring to previously published sources, we also drew on original documents in the Dutch East India Company records, a desirable if not an essential procedure and one which neither Schrieke nor Van Leur was in a position to follow. Portuguese, English, and a few native sources were also consulted, in so far as the latter were available in translation.

Thanks to the great interest displayed by the Portuguese on their first contact with this strange new world of the East Indies – the most valuable expression of this interest being Tome Pires' *Suma Oriental* – it has been possible to compile quite an accurate and comprehensive account of trade in the Malay-Indonesian region during the early period, that is to say just before the coming of the Europeans. But, later on, too many matters were assumed to be common knowledge for the Europeans to enlarge upon them. This circumstance determined

the structure of the present work, which falls into two distinct parts. But even when dealing with the period in which the stress shifts once more to the European element, we have avoided, as far as possible, considering this European expansion from a European point of view and have, instead, attempted to ascertain its impact on Asian trade. Particular attention will be devoted to the destruction of the spice trade, which was the most important branch of independent Asian trade in the Malay-Indonesian area, and to the repercussions this had on the economy of the Spice Islands, the seaports of northern Java, Bantam, and the ports of eastern Sumatra. The part played by conflicting European views and policies in the survival of independent Asian trade will also be demonstrated.

While the present research confirmed in part the results of the studies made by Schrieke and Van Leur – also in respect of a period earlier than that which they dealt with in detail – it nevertheless became apparent that, in particular, Van Leur's sometimes very antithetically postulated theses required rectification. Professor Wertheim has justifiably drawn attention both at home and abroad to Van Leur's studies,² and several scholars have already written about the value of Van Leur's work.³ Romein supported Wertheim's largely laudatory opinion⁴ while pointing out some shortcomings in the studies,⁵ but Locher, Boxer and Coolhaas subjected them to harsher criticism.⁶ Perhaps Coolhaas based his criticism too much on one work about the 18th century⁷ in which Van Leur's findings, according to Coolhaas, were insufficiently documented. For that matter, most of the documents relating to that period are still unpublished, in contrast to the position with respect to the first half of the 17th century, about which a large number of published documents were at Van Leur's disposal. The study relating to the 18th century is said to demonstrate the same defects as attached to Van Leur's treatment of the Portuguese period,⁸ in respect of which he was certainly not properly documented. Whatever esteem he may feel for Van Leur, Professor Boxer has already pointed this out in several of his publications.⁹

When Van Leur wrote his doctor's thesis in 1933–1934, he apparently lacked the time to consult the Portuguese sources, although he certainly realized the value of doing so.¹⁰ His original intention was to give a sketch of a 16th century Indonesian shipping port and to compare its development with the growth of a west European trading town in the Middle Ages.¹¹ He may have been inspired to do this by several historical studies of towns which were written from an economic point

of view at the beginning of the 20th century. But he must soon have realized that it was impossible because of a lack of suitable material. The sources which he did have at his disposal mainly supplied data about the business of the Company in the first half of the 17th century. It was difficult enough to extract adequate information from these documents about the trade of the Asians themselves, in fact this was only possible after prolonged research among widely dispersed and sometimes quite fortuitous data. But it was really only the European sources which qualified as material for this study as the economic element does not play an important part in such native sources as exist at all in accessible form, so that we are entirely dependent on what the Europeans had to say about the trade and industry of the peoples with whom they came into contact. There can be no question of a study based on precise statistical data. The person who enters this territory lacks practically all the aids which an economic historian has at his disposal where European history is concerned and, to quote a somewhat austere pronouncement by Professor C. H. Philips, he is carrying on "single-handed a guerilla warfare in the jungle."¹² Van Leur did not eschew this struggle and thanks to his great originality and the wide extent of his reading, he was still able to achieve remarkable results which have already proved extraordinarily fruitful.

At a time when the historical scene in Indonesia was still entirely dominated by the colonial point of view and Indonesia was regarded quite simply as the Dutch East Indies,¹³ he had the inspiration of allowing his vision to swing the full half circle from the European to the Indonesian angle. That at approximately the same time and independently of him others also took up the same position¹⁴ in no way detracts from his merit. For a better understanding of the native backgrounds against which Company business was enacted, we have to go back to the colonial historians of the 19th century. Although they themselves were probably largely unaware of it, historians like De Jonge and Van der Chijs were still being influenced by the ideas of Enlightenment, which held that non-Europeans also had a part to play in world events. In 1864, in his description of *De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië* (The Rise of Dutch Authority in the East Indies), De Jonge interpolates a comprehensive sketch of the Asian peoples, including an account of their shipping trade before the advent of the Europeans.¹⁵ For the rest he wisely confines himself to Company business, but also emphasizes this quite definitely in the title of his work. As late as the middle eighties of the last

century, when describing the struggle between the Company and the Bandanese, Van der Chijs tried to show some understanding of the Company's Asian opponents.¹⁶

In this connection mention may also be made of Van Limburg Brouwer, who was fascinated by the Asian philosophers and Asian religions and whose novel *Akbar* is still worth reading. He was a civil servant employed in the General State Archives in The Hague and in the course of his work made hundreds of extracts from documents in the Company records.¹⁷ His abstracts do full justice to the Asian element and his regrettably scanty annotations throw more light on the Asian side of things than on Company business proper. But in the late 19th, early 20th century when Dutch authority appeared to be so firmly established in Indonesia, the influential colonial historians, of whom Stapel and Gerretson must be considered extreme examples, were not concerned at all with the Asian side of things. The former was by no means an out-and-out conservative but he was completely caught up in Company concerns. His work in this field is certainly of inestimable value, including his editing of the description of the Dutch East India Company by the Company lawyer, Pieter van Dam. But he was handicapped in writing his actual historical studies on Indonesia because he looked at everything from a much too exclusively European point of view,¹⁸ as is particularly apparent in his treatment of the Company's conflict with Macassar.

Two world wars brought European ascendancy in Asia to an end. In Van Leur's works, which were written before the second world war, one of the first symptoms of a new trend in world history can be seen, namely the decline of European influence in Asia.¹⁹

In addition to Van Leur's change from the Eurocentric to the Indocentric viewpoint, and closely connected with it, was the important fact that Indonesia – which had become isolated from her Asian environment because of Dutch colonial historiography – began once more to play a part in the history of southeast Asia, although Van Leur nevertheless still underestimated the influence of that Asian environment on Indonesia.

Van Leur's views on Indonesia and Asian trade owe a great deal to Schrieke, and the studies of the English economic historian W. H. Moreland on India²⁰ must have provided him with many important ideas. Schrieke was the first to make a general survey of native trade in Indonesia.²¹ He, too, drew exclusively on previously published sources dating from the early days of the Company. These *Prole-*

gomena were intended as a preparatory study for his real objective, a sociological study of the peoples of Sumatra. The nature of his subject meant that the influence of Europeans and foreign Asians on trade in Indonesia fell largely outside his province, even though he did devote a lot of attention to the problem of the Islamization of the archipelago. If, therefore, Schrieke's studies were of great value to Van Leur and if the latter derived much from them, he, in his turn, must have had an influence on Schrieke's later work.

The studies of Max Weber²² were of great importance for the formation of Van Leur's sociological views. By applying to Indonesian societies the method Weber had used for characterizing Indian and Chinese societies, Van Leur had at his disposal a working method which was ideal for dealing with the material in question and which certainly provided him with a deeper insight into the structure of native society. But he could not completely avoid the danger associated with this method, namely that of regarding the concept of a "type" too much as a representation of reality and too little as a hypothesis which still has to be verified by that reality. In particular, his overemphasis on the peddling character of Asian shipping trade does less than justice to the richly variegated trade which will be described later with special reference to the commercial town of Malacca. Moreover, the great stress he lays on the peddling – that is to say, rather primitive – character of Asian commerce,²³ brings Van Leur into conflict with one of his own most important theses, namely, that up to the beginning of the 19th century, Asian and European trade were on an equal footing in Asia. Another objection to the term "peddling trade" is that it has to include not only the real pedlars, the hawkers of merchandise of little value, but also the dealers in luxury articles, merchants who were very well provided with capital, while it leaves out altogether the carriage of bulk cargoes which, as we shall see, was just as important a branch of trade in Asia and one in which both travelling and established merchants were engaged. There can be no doubt that, on the one hand, Van Leur attaches too much value to the luxurious nature of the Asian merchants' wares²⁴ while, on the other hand, he underestimates the status of the merchants themselves.

In describing Asian maritime trade at the end of the 16th century, Van Leur contrasts it sharply with the world trade carried on by Europeans in the 19th century,²⁵ a comparison which makes it difficult to form an accurate appraisal, by the standards of the time, of the nature and density of this 16th and early 17th century Asian com-

mercial traffic. A better object of comparison would be the commercial traffic of western Europe as it was at that time, provided we do not lose sight of the fact that in Asia the distances were so much greater and the centres of population situated so much further apart than in Europe. In Asia, as in Europe, trade was not carried on predominantly in luxury articles, but so-called bulk goods were already being transported over fairly long distances. It is true that bulk transport was less spectacular in Asia than in the much more intensively navigated and heavily populated area of western Europe. But the same obtains in Asia as in Europe: the greater the distances, the more the luxurious character of the merchandise predominates. When we deal with the internal commercial traffic of the Indonesian Archipelago, we shall see just how important this bulk goods transport was.

Van Leur's views about the peddling character of Asian trade are linked with his controversial thesis about the expansion of Islam.²⁶ In his efforts to present the Moslem traders in Indonesia as "little men" without any spiritual or economic influence, he sees politics as the guiding force behind the acceptance of Islam, because the Indonesian princes and notables embraced Islam for purely political motives. Apart from the fact that he greatly underestimates the spiritual element, he fails to appreciate the importance of the economic motive. Thanks to Pires' *Suma Oriental*, we are now well informed about the conversion of Malacca and also of the small Moslem states on the coast of Java;²⁷ in the latter, in particular, the influence of the Islamic traders is quite evident. And these people were by no means all socially insignificant: as late as 1634 Philip Lucasz, a Company official, speaks of the wealth of those merchants from western Asia,²⁸ and this certainly applied to an earlier period too. Moslem missionaries, including various Arabs, also appeared in their company. Moreover, it was quite possible for the two qualities, commercialism and religious zeal, to be combined in one person. According to Pires, who was in a position to know, most of the small Moslem states on the north coast of Java had actually been founded by Moslem traders,²⁹ and so the original Javanese Hindu princes had not, as Van Leur assumes, embraced Islam because of political and religious antagonism to the inland Hindu state. In fact the only seaport ruler of Javanese origin, the 'king' of Tuban, actually remained on friendly terms with the Hindu ruler of the inland state.³⁰ The influence of the Moslem centre of Malacca also seems to have been of great importance, and this influence was certainly more economic than political in character,³¹ even

though political motives also played a part in the conversion of this city.

Even when the foreign Moslem merchants did not manage to get all the power into their own hands, they frequently succeeded in obtaining influential positions in the state, particularly positions closely connected with commerce which could be made to serve their own commercial ends.³² Most of the *shahbandars* whom we shall encounter in the Indonesian Archipelago are foreigners.³³ When a merchant from abroad obtained sovereignty, the basis of his power was land tenure rather than commerce. Not one of the coastal states could exist on trade alone; all of them relied on an agrarian hinterland. Malacca was the only exception to this rule, but then, as a market town, Malacca was also in an unusually favourable position.

Van Leur sees a big gulf between the Asian trader and the native upper class. Social classes were indeed widely separated, as we shall see in the case of Malacca. But even for a foreigner, it was by no means impossible to climb from the lowest social stratum to the highest positions in the land, which meant that admission to the ranks of the nobility was not out of the question.³⁴

On the other hand, Van Leur makes too little distinction between the merchants who conveyed the goods by sea and the middlemen who bought and resold them in the ports. Nor must we attach too much importance – as Van Leur does – to the isolation of the Asian markets.³⁵ We shall see that, particularly where maritime trade was concerned, the markets were connected with one another by regular sea routes,³⁶ and that veritable emporia sprang up at the junctions. This is bound to have had an effect on price formation and we do indeed find a relationship between prices at trading ports which were in communication with one another.³⁷

In this introduction it is not feasible to submit all of Van Leur's numerous propositions on various facets of Asian commercial traffic to critical examination. For that reason only a few, more general, problems have been indicated here. Where suitable, and in particular where criticism of points of detail is concerned, divergent opinions are indicated in the notes. That leaves us with only one of Van Leur's more controversial theses: the limited influence of European trade in Asia; a thesis which is the more striking because, as we have seen, he lays so much stress on the peddling character of Asian trade. To counter-balance this, he introduces the "political-capitalistic" figures of the prince and his officials and nobles, representing them as more nearly equal opponents of the Europeans.³⁸ Besides that, Van Leur credits

patrician merchants with a certain amount of economic influence.³⁹ In his opinion these factors made Asian trade equal to that of the western Europeans. But can this trade, carried on chiefly by the prince, really be compared with its western counterpart in the 16th and early 17th centuries? Unquestionably, this was the period when the symptoms of modern capitalistic society were beginning to manifest themselves in western Europe. Were such symptoms already distinguishable in 16th century Asia? Let us consider only a few. For example, the various forms of partnership with *commenda* already changed into a *societas maris* in which both parties supplied capital and shared in the risk; maritime trade, moreover, where the owners of ships were ceasing to engage in trade themselves, where the captain was becoming the salaried functionary of those who instructed him, and where the crew were really in the service of the owner of the ship and the cargo. Further, had a breach already appeared in the system of family trading in Asia, a distinction between business and housekeeping? Were there any signs at that time of a more modern form of accountancy, had a start been made with modern banking – the credit system of which renders international traffic in goods and currency possible? ⁴⁰ And, perhaps most important of all, was there in Asia an autonomous commonalty with a right to protection of person and property and therefore secure against the whim of an arbitrary sovereign? These factors, after all, were what made the new developments in Europe possible, developments which began to characterize other aspects of life in 17th century Europe too: a consequence, as Romein puts it, of European departure from the general human pattern which had previously prevailed in both continents.⁴¹ These are all questions which in the following study will certainly not be answered in the affirmative, at least as far as the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago is concerned, and they should also be gone into more deeply before they can be answered in a positive sense in respect of the other Asian lands.

Asian trade was not predominantly a peddling trade, but neither was it, like the western European trade of the time, a shipping trade carried on mainly by independent citizens. Van Leur, too, very properly drew attention to this fact.⁴² Great structural differences characterized the many social milieux in Asia, including those in the Malay-Indonesian area. Contemporary western Europe was much more uniform in this respect. All over the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago the local ruler had a predominant share in trade and shipping, but the more primitive the society, the more he promoted his own interests with the

assistance of traders who had mostly come from abroad. It was only in the international centre of Malacca, which was one of the best developed trading ports in the area in question, that individual merchants had a certain amount of influence, inconsiderable though this was, compared with their position in western Europe.⁴³

Side by side with the trade carried on by the ruler and his officials, therefore, we see a richly variegated trade taking place in luxury articles as well as mass products, either in direct shipping and commerce or in the form of partnership.⁴⁴ Can the concept "peddling trade" entirely cover commerce of such magnitude? The nobility's share in this trade, which Van Leur still credited with a certain importance, was extremely small, at least as far as the Malay-Indonesian area was concerned. One gains the impression that what Van Leur meant by the "cheap" peddling trade was carried on more especially by the natives themselves, while the trade which demanded greater reserves of capital was, in so far as it was not pre-empted by the ruler and his officials, conducted by merchants from abroad. In the Indonesia of this period there are no signs of the formation of a native middle group carrying on trade on its own account.

Technical development also figures in Van Leur's evaluation of western European activity in Asia, and although he attaches considerable importance to it he still underestimates its scientific character. The rapid initial success of the Portuguese was to no small extent determined by their technical superiority, and that superiority had a scientific foundation.⁴⁵ Certainly in some parts of Asia the level of scientific knowledge was no lower than in Europe – after all western knowledge of mathematics was mainly Arabic in origin – but in Asia, unlike Europe, there was no connection at all between science and technics, which meant that scientific results were not tested by experimental technology. It was precisely this which gave the Portuguese on their first appearance in Asia an advantage which should not be underestimated.⁴⁶

Moreover, whatever its defects, during the period of expansion Portuguese commercial traffic was organized on a higher level than its Asian counterpart. Adequate proof of this is provided by the centralization of Portuguese Asian trade in one port of assembly and despatch, which was governed, moreover, by a highly organized bureaucracy acquainted with separate civil and military administration, even if this organization did not always work efficiently in practice.⁴⁷ The commercial power of the Portuguese system should

certainly not be underestimated. Undoubtedly, too, the new Portuguese demand stimulated production in the Asian lands.⁴⁸ New branches of trade sprang up. Countries which had previously been unacquainted with one another's products, were brought into contact with one another, thanks to the Portuguese system of goods transport. Moreover, Asian efforts to escape from Portuguese influence led to changes in the traffic routes, so that new Asian trading centres came into existence.

In the beginning, especially, the Portuguese must have developed a very aggressive and powerful force of attack which took the Asians by surprise and which they only learned to resist in the long run, after they had adopted much of Portuguese technical science and strategy.

Finally a new element, and one which should not be underestimated, was formed in Asia by the private Portuguese traders who, although they became part of the Asian milieu, undoubtedly left some trace behind them of their European extraction.

Van Leur is unwilling to see the emergence of a new element until the period of Dutch expansion sets in.⁴⁹ At least, he recognizes Dutch military superiority⁵⁰ but because he is still attempting to credit the Asians with a certain degree of equality in this respect too, he under-rates the modern elements⁵¹ which are clearly distinguishable in the organization of the Company, the structure of which may certainly be considered as a more highly organized form of trade than the partnership still generally current at that time in Asia and Europe in general. Naturally in the first half of the 17th century it is still too early to speak of the Dutch – that is to say Dutch politically dominated – East Indies, but nevertheless, economically, the Company represented a power factor in the Indonesian Archipelago with which due reckoning had to be held, and which seriously disturbed or even utterly destroyed various aspects of the native economy.⁵² The demonstration of this point is, in the opinion of the author, one of the most important results of the present study.

The degree of tenability of Van Leur's thesis that it was only about 1800 that Europe began to outstrip the East, due to western industrialization and the development of modern capitalism, can only be established after thorough research including an investigation of 18th century relationships in Asia. The present study only purposes to show that as early as the first half of the 17th century, thus a good deal earlier than Van Leur is inclined to assume, European ascendancy was beginning to manifest itself, even though – let it be readily admitted –

this was not yet so everywhere or in every respect. This ascendancy was to become increasingly apparent during the 18th century and in this connection mention may be made, although it is out of order here, of the changes which, from the beginning of the 18th century on, transformed Java into a producer of bulk goods for the European market, a change which had set in long before the industrialization of western Europe. The degradation of Asian shipping to the status of coastal trade in Indonesia also began long before 1800, quite apart from the Buginese "piracy" which kept cropping up in the Malay-Indonesian area.

For that matter, Van Leur makes too little allowance for the difference in the degree of influence exercised by the Dutch in Indonesia and in the rest of Asia, so that he applies findings which may be valid for India to the situation in the Indonesian Archipelago, as, for example, when he speaks of eastern trade in goods and money dominating western, which was certainly not the case in Indonesia in the first half of the 17th century.

The last two chapters are also intended to supplement the views of Van Leur on the trade of Bantam and of Schrieke on the Javanese ports. Van Leur has already indicated the Asian background to the struggle in Bantam between the native administrators and the Company.⁵³ Particular consideration will now be given to the part played by the Chinese in this conflict in view of the powerful position they occupied in the commercial life of Bantam. Moreover, this offers an incentive for further investigation into the role of the Asian traders from abroad, as neither Schrieke nor Van Leur have depicted their activities and influence in sufficient relief against the native background.

Thanks to the fact that hitherto unpublished records were drawn on for this research, new data were also discovered relating to the towns of eastern Java and their trade. Van Leur's desire to be better informed about these very towns,⁵⁴ an impossibility on the basis of the material which had then been published, could therefore be fulfilled, though even now only in part.

One last word about the time element in this study: it covers only the 16th century and the first three decades of the 17th century. And as regards geographical limitations, the trading centres of Achin and Macassar, which at that time were still independent, fall outside its scope. It is, however, intended to carry out further research on these two ports, especially as Schrieke has already laid a firm foundation as

far as Macassar is concerned. After all, among the principal themes of his *Prolegomena* were accounts of how the Javanese ceased to be regarded as a trading people, how their land became preponderantly agrarian, and how Macassar developed into a centre of trade. A description of the two ports of Achin and Macassar, however, would have increased the range of this study considerably and would, moreover, have taken it up to the end of the 17th century. Its aim has been a description of maritime trade in the Indonesian Archipelago and the changes brought about in that trade by the Europeans, for the compass of research could thus be kept relatively small and still allow the inclusion of a critical appraisal of Van Leur's views.

If the critical note has predominated, let the reader remember that criticism does not exclude appreciation. The author is not blind to the many positive elements contained in Van Leur's writings, and least of all to the importance of the problems he poses. Without his work, this study could not have been made.

I. TRADE AND TRAFFIC IN THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO AND THE MALAY PENINSULA PRIOR TO THE 15TH CENTURY

Lying as they did between the Indian Ocean and the China Seas and thus forming the division between two regions which were geographically, anthropologically and economically distinct, the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago had been destined from time immemorial to play an important role as a transition area. Not only were they transit countries for the products of East and West, they were also a meeting ground for merchants coming from either direction. Even the opposing wind systems met here, the monsoons of the Indian Ocean on the one hand and the trade winds of the China Sea on the other, so that ships were obliged to rest for a period before the next favourable wind enabled them to proceed on their voyages. Moreover, these regions produced many goods for which there was a ready market, and of these, gold, tin, spices, and certain valuable kinds of wood were in the greatest demand. Finally there were plenty of good harbours and roadsteads where incoming and outgoing ships could find safe anchorage. Ports grew up in these places and with their development the local inhabitants who had formerly engaged chiefly in fishing expanded their activities to take part in coastal and deep-sea navigation as well.

As long as the trading voyages from West to East and vice versa followed the coastline as much as possible, traffic must have tended to centre on the north of the Malay Peninsula where goods could be transhipped across the narrowest part of the isthmus.¹ But presumably as both the Chinese junks and the ships from western Asia became more seaworthy, and as knowledge of navigation increased, the half-way pause could be made at a point further south.

In the last 40 years much research has been done on the history of Çrivijaya, and the results achieved have sometimes been spectacular, particularly those arrived at by the French scholar Coedès^{1a} whose work has been called "a romance of scholarship."² It is only with the rise of this kingdom, around the beginning of the 11th century, that

Chinese and Arab sources begin to reveal the specific role of the Malay-Indonesian area. For hundreds of years the main centre of this celebrated Buddhist kingdom of Çrivijaya was on the site of latter-day Palembang, and in some ways it may be regarded as being the predecessor of Malacca. Since Çrivijaya exercised authority over a large part of the east coast of Sumatra and also over part of the Malay Peninsula, it had control over the Malay Straits – just as Malacca did at a later period. In fact Çrivijaya's authority is reputed to have extended even further and since west Java was a vassal state,³ the Sunda Straits must have come under its control as well. On the Malay Peninsula the sphere of influence extended into Ligor, which was situated near the isthmus,⁴ and also included the old commercial centre of Kedah.⁵ But Çrivijaya's real strength lay in its possession of both sides of the Malay Straits.

A staple came into existence here either in the natural course of events or imposed by force.⁶ A Chinese source from the beginning of the 13th century⁷ gives a detailed summary of the merchandise handled in Çrivijaya. The products brought by the Ta-che (the western Asians) or exported by Çrivijaya included not only turtles, camphor, valuable kinds of wood, spices such as cloves and cardamon,⁸ pearls, perfumes, ivory and coral, but also woollen and cotton cloth. These goods were exchanged for gold, silver, porcelain, silk, rhubarb, sugar, iron, rice, etc., products which came chiefly from the Far East but partly from the Indonesian region itself. Luxury products predominated, but even in these early days there were some bulk goods and as traffic grew heavier the cargoes included a steadily increasing proportion of the latter type of goods. Oddly enough, the Chinese summary of Çrivijaya's market products makes no mention at all of pepper – a commodity which was later to assume such prominence in the economy of the states of Sumatra.

Owing to the paucity of sources, various problems regarding Çrivijaya's trade remain unsolved. One wonders, for example, whether the goods brought from the West by Persians and Arabs and from the East by the Chinese were already being transhipped in the ports of Çrivijaya. Even before the 10th century Persians and Arabs used to make long voyages to China from the Persian port of Siraf and later from the Arabian district of Oman on the Persian Gulf.⁹

Probably Indian traders and navigators also took part in these long voyages. But care should be taken not to form an exaggerated idea of the number of navigators and traders nor of the frequency with which the voyages (which were of extremely long duration) were made.¹⁰

Moreover, while the Arabs and Persians did undoubtedly make these long expeditions, it is questionable whether they remained in one and the same ship for the entire voyage. Perhaps even in these very early days (as was certainly the case later on) they took advantage of opportunities for sailing in ships which offered good connections with other ships.¹¹

Dynastic struggles in the Baghdad caliphate during the 10th century must have had an adverse effect on this early Arab-Persian commercial traffic with China.¹² Yet the shipment of spices from Indonesia to the West must have continued, for although the commercial emporium of Siraf fell into a decline, its place in the Persian Gulf area was taken first by Quais (Kish) and then, after the beginning of the 14th century, by Hormuz. The state of war in the interior does not seem to have caused permanent obstruction of the trade routes¹³ and merchants soon found ways of reaching the Mediterranean Sea with their caravans. In Syria, Aleppo became a commercial centre.

It was not only along the valley of the Euphrates that the stream of eastern products flowed towards the West. These goods also reached Europe and North Africa via Egypt,¹⁴ where the kingdom of the Fatimites had achieved great prosperity since the 10th century, and there was a caravan route from Egypt to Syria, so that merchandise from the East could reach Damascus and the ports on the Syrian coast by that route, too. As the northern caravan routes became less safe, the route over the Red Sea and through Egypt increased in importance and further stimulus was provided by the ever-growing demand in Europe for eastern products, particularly spices, in consequence of the more intensive contact with the East resulting from the crusades.

Persians and Arabs visited the ports of Çrivijaya, and probably Indians went there too. The Chinese are also reputed to have undertaken long voyages westwards, right past the Malay Peninsula and into the Indian Ocean, but they did not use this route before the 9th century¹⁵ and even after that the Chinese traffic cannot have been heavy. They are actually said to have sailed as far as the Persian Gulf,¹⁶ but when this Persian-Arab-Chinese trade had flourished for only a short time¹⁷ the Chinese began to terminate their voyages at the ports on the west coast of India, where they found sufficient demand for the goods they had brought with them and where they could take on return cargoes of the merchandise they themselves required, particularly pepper from the Malabar coast. Did they also carry some of the

spices from the Indonesian area, or were these transported in Indian ships exclusively, and did Malays from Çrivijaya have a share in this trade? No less important is the question of how the spices were shipped from the production areas of the Moluccas and Banda to Çrivijaya. Later on, the Javanese played a big part in this branch of the trade, but were they already doing so at this early stage, and might there be a connection here with the rise of the state of Singhasari? All these are problems to which it will be very difficult to find a solution.

Besides acting as an intermediary, Çrivijaya carried on trade and shipping on its own account and, if the sources are to be believed, these activities covered a much wider field than those of any other commercial state in Indonesia or Malaya at any time later on: after all, merchants from Çrivijaya used to visit Chinese ports¹⁸ and they were also to be found in the coastal districts of East Africa.¹⁹

It is also uncertain whether there was any agrarian basis to Çrivijaya's commercial prosperity, and the Chinese source quoted by Ferrand is too late to be of any help in this matter, besides being too vague.²⁰

Side by side with internal causes, the monopolistic position adopted by Çrivijaya,²¹ the heavy duties it levied on foreign shipping and its use of force to compel ships to visit its ports, must all have contributed towards the kingdom's downfall.²² The first attacks from abroad were made by Java and Coromandel, and probably both of these countries were trying to shake off the burden of the monopoly.²³ Periods of war, however, alternated with periods of peaceful co-existence. In the middle of the 9th century members of the same dynasty (the Çailendras) had ruled over the kingdoms of both Java and Sumatra,²⁴ but when this dynasty came to an end conflict seems to have sprung up again between the two states,²⁵ undoubtedly in consequence of economic as well as political rivalry since it is safe to assume that, even at that time, the spice trade was a factor of importance. The predatory expeditions made by the Colas against Çrivijaya in the 11th century led to the re-establishment of closer relations between Çrivijaya and Java.²⁶

Probably economic causes were also at the root of the conflicts between the Colas and Çrivijaya in the 11th century.²⁷ There was a busy sea route between the Cola kingdom in South India and Kedah on the Malay Peninsula, which was subject to Çrivijaya. In later days, close economic relations also existed between Çrivijaya and the Coromandel coast of southern India, which supplied the Malay-Indonesian area with textiles.

These maritime expeditions of the Colas had no lasting effects. But

from that time on, throughout the entire 12th century, two spheres of influence existed side by side in the Indonesian Archipelago, namely those of the Sumatran and Javanese kingdoms, with the latter apparently predominating more and more.²⁸ As early as the second half of the 12th century, a Chinese source places the commercial prosperity of Java above that of Çrivijaya.²⁹ Can this have been because the weakening of Çrivijaya's monopoly had made the passage through the Sunda Straits and the Straits of Malacca to the ports of northern Java safer for merchant shipping?

In the 12th and 13th centuries, as a result of large-scale migrations of peoples on the Asian mainland,³⁰ Thais from the Menam basin and Burma pushed down into the Malay Peninsula. The territory of Çrivijaya began to disintegrate. Consisting, as it did, of a loose string of rather isolated trading posts scattered along the fringe of vast areas of tropical jungle, this kingdom was highly vulnerable and could easily be attacked and conquered.³¹

By the end of the 13th century the whole of the Malay Peninsula was lost to Çrivijaya.³² But even the Thais were only partially successful in imposing their authority upon these regions.³³ The result was a sort of vacuum which facilitated the establishment of new sources of power. In Sumatra the main centre of Çrivijaya shifted further inland and slightly northwards to the site of latter-day Jambi.³⁴

The current view is that in the second half of the 13th century during a campaign (1275-1292) conducted by Kertanagara, the last of the Javanese kings of Singhasari, this land of Malayu was subdued by the Javanese.³⁵ Perhaps Javanese authority also spread over part of the Malay Peninsula³⁶ but there it must have come up against the Thais, even though the Javanese probably retained a foothold for some time on the very tip of the peninsula.³⁷ It is said that Sunda (which Chau Ju-Kua still considered part of the kingdom of San fo ts'i, that is to say, Çrivijaya) also became subordinate to Kertanagara.³⁸ The concept of Javanese expansion coupled with military campaigns and the subjection of dependent territories is disputed by Professor Berg³⁹ on the grounds that Javanese historical sources are based to such a large extent on myths, but in taking this stand he fails to make allowance for the Chinese accounts of Javanese expansion. In Kertanagara's activities Professor Berg sees a sort of Holy Alliance policy directed against the impending Mongol invasion. He regards the Pamalayu (the date of which he estimates at about 1292)⁴⁰ as a measure to ward off Mongol incursions, and, according to him, the Javanese campaigns

against Pahang (the Malay Peninsula) and Tanjung-Pura in Borneo should also be looked upon as attempts at establishing a system of defence in the archipelago. But Professor Berg's views have aroused serious criticism.⁴¹ However that may be, the activities of Kertanagara in Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula can only have been of a temporary nature. This had also been pointed out by Professor Krom, who maintains that Javanese suzerainty was primarily a matter of a sphere of influence and that the lands which were subject to the Javanese kingdom were more or less free in the conduct of their own affairs.⁴² Whether the Javanese expedition was directly responsible for the fall of Crivijaya, a view upheld especially by Nilakanta Sastri,⁴³ or whether, as Coëdes maintains,⁴⁴ the kingdom had already begun to disintegrate earlier for different reasons, it is at any rate certain that the ancient Sumatran kingdom split up into a number of separate states. In the interior, the kingdom of Malayu, which must have recognized Javanese supremacy,⁴⁵ held its own for a while. Adityawarman, the ruler of this country, was related to the reigning house in Majapahit and at one time belonged to the Javanese corps of dignitaries.⁴⁶ In the long run the boundaries of Malayu corresponded more or less to those of the future territory of Minangkabau.⁴⁷ Along the east coast of Sumatra a number of small harbour principalities came into existence and Samudra-Pasè, whose ruler was converted to Islam, soon became the most important of these.

By this time, however, the control of the straits by a single powerful country was a thing of the past. The commercial centre of Crivijaya had degenerated into a pirate state (the future Palembang) and fallen into the hands of Chinese corsairs who joined forces with the people who had practised piracy in the Malay Straits of old. Crivijaya had always tyrannized over foreign shipping⁴⁸ but now it turned to outright piracy and rendered the sea route so unsafe that it retained little attraction for foreign merchants.

When Marco Polo sailed past the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula in 1292, the countryside was utterly desolate and deserted⁴⁹ and all traces of Javanese occupation seemed to have vanished. But at this very spot, past which the Chinese ships used to sail, a settlement soon sprang up. This was Tumasik, the coastal town which according to Rouffaer may possibly have been founded by Malays driven out of a former settlement and perhaps joined by Javanese remaining behind after Kertanagara's campaign, or by refugees from the disturbances in Java which preceded the foundation of the kingdom of Majapahit.⁵⁰

But the fortified town of Tumasik, like Palembang on the opposite coast, was a veritable nest of pirates. Various Chinese appear to have settled there and mingled with the native population. The Chinese navigator and writer ⁵¹ who supplied these details about Tumasik has also left an account of the piracy which was so typical of these parts, an account which would undoubtedly be equally applicable to the obscure beginnings of Malacca: "Everything the inhabitants of Tumasik possess is a product of their plundering of Chinese junks. When these ships go to the western sea [this was the period when Chinese ships were still navigating the Indian Ocean], the inhabitants of Tumasik allow them to pass unmolested, but when they return the Tumasik pirates are lying in wait for the heavily laden ships in the narrows of the Malay Straits and they fall upon them there with some 200 to 300 ships. The only remedy against these attacks is for the Chinese ships to sail in convoy." It is possible that Tumasik came under Javanese influence,⁵² as passages in the *Sejarah Melayu* and the annals of Pasè seem to indicate.⁵³ Perhaps it was destroyed by the Javanese in a punitive expedition against the pirates. In any case the name of Tumasik disappears and is replaced by that of Singapore.⁵⁴ A ruler dependent upon Siam is soon established there ⁵⁵ and there is no further sign of any Javanese influence.

In north Sumatra the harbour principalities already mentioned underwent rapid development, thanks to a flourishing pepper export trade. While the 12th century Chinese source quoted earlier does not include pepper in its list of Çrivijaya's products ⁵⁶ (unless we are to take cardamon as meaning pepper), quite soon after that it was being intensively cultivated on the mountain slopes of northern Sumatra.⁵⁷ Pepper constituted one of the chief export products of the seaports of Samudra-Pasè and Pidië,⁵⁸ two towns which were then beginning to achieve prosperity. The pepper attracted numerous foreigners. Indian traders from Gujarat and Bengal appeared in Pasè, while the Chinese visited the port too and commercial relations existed with Java. It is possible that the up-and-coming kingdom of Majapahit managed to curb piracy in the waters of the archipelago and that this led to a revival of trade. But the idea that Majapahit possessed the naval strength necessary for taking such action, and that this was coupled with a subordinate attitude on the part of the countries subject to Java, cannot be reconciled with the views of Professor Berg, who is unwilling to assume that Majapahit, any more than the kingdom of Kertanagara, extended its authority outside the territory of Java itself.⁵⁹

We are indebted to Ibn Batuta, the Moslem traveller and geographer from North Africa, for his description of the small, north Sumatran kingdom of Samudra-Pasè in the mid-14th century. It was governed by the ruler of the port, who levied duties on merchants entering his kingdom but whose authority did not extend any further inland.⁶⁰

It is uncertain whether Pasè also took an active part in trade. A passage in the writings of Ibn Batuta stating that he came across a junk belonging to the sultan of Pasè in China would seem to indicate that Pasè had long-distance shipping of its own. Ibn Batuta's credibility is sometimes called into question, however, and it is doubtful whether he himself ever visited China.⁶¹ Early 15th century Chinese sources do state that embassies from Samudra-Pasè brought tribute to China,⁶² but the junks themselves may have come from the port of Malacca, which was then in the process of growth and which was also obliged to send tribute to China. At the beginning of the 16th century Pasè had no ship-building industry of its own and its junk traffic depended entirely on Malacca, which was where the Pasè merchants used to buy their junks.⁶³

Pidië, situated to the north of Pasè, was also a pepper-exporting port where brisk commercial traffic developed, attended by fierce competition.⁶⁴ Like Pasè, Pidië later succeeded in holding its own against Malacca as an independent port.

The rise of the north Sumatran ports was directly connected with the introduction of Islam, which followed upon the great religious movement in the previous centuries throughout the mainland and along the coasts of India. There was a great increase in Moslem shipping eastwards across the Indian Ocean, and Arab commercial settlements were established on the east coast of Africa and the west coast of India. These Arab trading colonies became centres of Islamization, and through intermarriage with native women a mixed population of Moslem faith grew up in the ports. In their turn, the descendants of these mixed marriages carried Mohammedanism to other places. On the Indian mainland Mohammedanism also spread to the coast from the North. At the beginning of the 14th century, the sultanate of Delhi expanded as far as Gujarat, the important commercial region on the west coast. This land was conquered and Islamized but towards the end of the 14th century it achieved independence and became a separate kingdom (1396). Gujarati shipping fell largely into Moslem hands, for although the Hindu element remained very important in trade as such, the Hindu traders themselves did not undertake trading voyages

in Moslem ships. Great importance is attached to the part played by Gujarat in converting the north Sumatran ports and the rest of the Indonesian Archipelago to Islam, on account of the busy shipping and commercial traffic Gujarat conducted with these regions. But of course other influences must have been at work too. Even before Islam gained the upper hand in Gujarat there were signs of Mohammedanism in north Sumatra, while ambassadors from Malayu who visited the Chinese court in 1291 were said to bear Moslem names.⁶⁵ And from Marco Polo's record of his voyages we know that Perlak in north Sumatra was converted to Islam in 1291.⁶⁶ Some years later the kingdom of Samudra-Pasè had also been Islamized, as appears from the tombstone, dated 1297, of Samudra's first Moslem ruler, Malik-al Saleh.⁶⁷ According to the *Suma Oriental* of Tomé Pires, Pasè was Islamized by people from Bengal⁶⁸ and, in view of the close relations which had formerly obtained between Çrivijaya and Buddhist Bengal, this is not impossible, as Bengal had in fact been converted to Islam by the end of the 12th century.⁶⁹ On the other hand, Marrison, who does not mention Pires, holds that influences from southern India played an important part in the conversions.⁷⁰ Pires' account of the process of Islamization supplies complete confirmation of Schrieke's views on the connection between Islamic propaganda and the establishment of foreign rule,⁷¹ although Schrieke obtained his material from other sources.

But the Arabs must have been no less influential than the Gujaratis and Bengalis in spreading the doctrine, for although Arab ships probably no longer sailed in the eastern half of the Indian Ocean, the Arabs themselves were to be found in Indian ships as traders and preachers.⁷² But, whoever may have been ultimately responsible for the Islamization of north Sumatra, in the 14th century Pasè was a centre of Mohammedanism. According to the Malay annals, at the time Ibn Batuta visited the little country its ruler was an extremely fervent disciple of Mohammed who surrounded himself with believers from all over the Moslem world and carried on religious discussions with them, thus turning his court into a centre of theological studies.⁷³ One of Java's famous *Walis*, Sunan Gunung Jati, came from Pasè with the object of converting the island.⁷⁴ It is well known what an important part Pasè played in the Islamization of Malacca.

While Islam was spreading through Sumatra from the 14th century onwards, in Java Hinduism was experiencing a final revival in the kingdom of Majapahit. We have already mentioned the possibility of

large-scale maritime expansion. But this presupposes that Javanese shipping was at an advanced stage of development, with junks and swift, light, sailing ships. Tradition has it that even in very early days Javanese ships used to sail over a very wide area.⁷⁵ So apparently these ships were not destroyed by Çrivijaya or, if so, a very rapid revival must have taken place in the shipping industry.

The current theory is that Java was the supreme authority in a large part of the Indonesian Archipelago and that Majapahit carried on the imperialistic policy of the kingdom of Kertanagara, a policy embodied in the person of the regent, Gajah Mada,⁷⁶ in particular. On Java itself Sunda was subdued⁷⁷ and there was no longer any question of relations between Sunda and Palembang.⁷⁸ Majapahit is also reputed to have extended its influence eastwards to cover Bali and perhaps Sumbawa too.⁷⁹ The discovery of an ancient Javanese dedicatory inscription in Singapore may, perhaps, be taken as an indication of Javanese influence there.⁸⁰ Mention is made in Chinese sources of the dispatch of Javanese troops to Pu-ni (Brunei)⁸¹ and also of the castigation of Malayu (which was subordinate to Java) by Majapahit.⁸² The north Sumatran ports are also said to have recognized Javanese authority.⁸³ Perhaps they had to pay tribute to Java just as they had been obliged to do to China for a short while in the first half of the 15th century. But the Javanese hegemony was not a very far-reaching one. Krom, too, has emphasized the looseness of the connection between Majapahit and the subordinate countries, which were left more or less free in the conduct of their own affairs. It must, therefore, have been largely a matter of a sphere of influence. But the Javanese fleet may have had effective control over the seas and been able to put an end to the temerity of the Malay and Chinese pirates who had not only established themselves in Palembang (which had replaced Çrivijaya) but, as we have already seen, were also making the south coast of the Malay Peninsula unsafe. Javanese troops are supposed to have occupied Palembang in 1377,⁸⁴ although the revolt of Chinese settlers helped by corsairs from Fuking and Canton⁸⁵ prevented them from gaining outright mastery of the port. But perhaps the fairway was protected to such an extent as to make commercial traffic along Sumatra's east coast possible.

As long as piracy rendered the latter route so unsafe, shipping from western Asia must have reached the Javanese seaport towns via the west coast of Sumatra and the Sunda Straits. For that matter, the traders from western Asia must long have been acquainted with this

route by which spices and sandalwood could be obtained, since they used to go the same way to the camphor port of Baros and to Priaman and Tikku, the ports of gold-exporting Minangkabau. We do not know whether Çrivijaya was in a position to monopolize the spice trade entirely, nor whether her influence over west Java, and thus possibly in the Sunda Straits, was connected with such a monopoly. But in any case that influence was non-existent in the 14th century and there can have been no impediment to shipping in the Sunda Straits.

Brisk trade developed between the pepper ports of north Sumatra and the seaport towns of northern Java, and, as was later the case with Malacca and the Javanese seaports, this trade must have been based on the export of foodstuffs from Java and the barter trade in spices – nutmeg and mace from the Banda Islands and cloves from the Moluccas as well as pepper from north Sumatra. This latter product would find a market among the Chinese in the ports of northern Java.

Majapahit is reputed to have extended its authority as far as the Moluccas,⁸⁶ no doubt with the object of making certain of the supply of spices from Banda and the Moluccas. This expansion may have been accompanied to some extent by the levying of tribute but it must also have been effected through the exchange of foodstuffs, particularly rice. Fertile Java produced more rice than was required for domestic consumption while the spice producing areas on the other hand were very poorly provided with it. At this time, perhaps, Tuban served as the staple for the tribute that had to be paid, which would account for the renewed prosperity of the town. Later on, after its conversion to Islam, Tuban still maintained close relations with the Hindu kingdom and the aristocratic capital bore little resemblance to a commercial town.⁸⁷ Grise, Demak and, somewhat later in the 15th century, Japara, were much more commercial in character.

The spices, however, attracted numerous foreigners to the Javanese seaports at this particular time when trade was no longer impeded by the monopoly of Sumatran Çrivijaya and when the commercial centre of Malacca had yet to reach full development. The trade of the north Javanese towns may have been stimulated by an increase in the power of Majapahit, but the growing commercial traffic also brought Islam to the country. The new doctrine was spread by the Moslem traders, some of whom may have been Bengalis who came there from the seaport towns of north Sumatra, and by the merchants from western Asia who reached the Javanese towns via the Sunda Straits and whose numbers may have included Gujaratis from Cambay, and Arabs sailing

in the Gujarati ships, and perhaps also people from southern India. As we have seen, Moslem preachers also took passage in the ships. Barely tolerated at first because they were foreigners, in the course of time they attained important positions in foreign trade. They prospered and grew rich and in some places, assisted by bands of followers who manned their junks, they succeeded in seizing power by dislodging the Hindu ruler and setting themselves up in his place.⁸⁸ But there were also instances of peaceful conversion when the native ruler adopted the new doctrine in good time, Tuban being a case in point.⁸⁹ Although according to a Chinese source from the beginning of the 15th century the native inhabitants of Java were still heathen at that time,⁹⁰ Islam gained ground among them too. The process of Islamization must have been accelerated still more by the close economic ties which developed between the Javanese seaports and the new commercial centre of Malacca, which had also been converted to Islam and was in the process of expansion.⁹¹ The fact that the Gujaratis now stopped sailing to the north Javanese ports via the Sunda Straits is also connected with the rise of Malacca. The Gujarati ships now sailed no further than Malacca, although many a merchant from Gujarat or from other parts of western Asia must have continued visiting the Javanese ports in Malay or Javanese ships. But direct shipping had come to an end and Pires mentions the remains of Gujarati ships, which had been lying in Grise for almost a century, as objects of unusual interest.⁹²

These Moslem parvenus in the Javanese seaports must have included Chinese converts to Islam as well as western Asians and Malays, and Pires gives a rather characteristic account of how they, and the second generation in particular, tried to adapt themselves completely to their Javanese environment: "However, brought up among the bragging Javanese, and still more on account of the riches they have inherited from their antecessors [Cortêsão's translation of Pires *amtecesores*], these men made themselves more important in Javanese nobility and state than those of the hinterland; and each of them revered in his land as though he were something much greater."⁹³

The change of faith and the shifts in power in the Javanese seaports had a definite effect on the disintegration of the Hindu kingdom, which was already on the decline owing to internal disputes among the Hindus themselves.⁹⁴ By the beginning of the 15th century Chinese foreign policy was no longer taking Java seriously into account.⁹⁵ The Javanese coastal districts, where the Moslem rulers with the exception of Tuban made themselves independent of Majapahit,⁹⁶ were already

lost. In their turn, the Javanese seaports began to implement a policy of expansion which came to fruition in the course of the 15th century when Palembang, Bangka, and some places on the south coast of Borneo came under the hegemony of the north Javanese seacoast towns, while 16th century Amboina (which by that time was rich in cloves) displayed obvious signs of Javanese influence.⁹⁷

It is remarkable that when the Europeans first became acquainted with Java nothing was left of its long-distance sea trade at all and Javanese shipping was restricted to the Indonesian Archipelago and its immediate vicinity. Was this perhaps a consequence of the major rôle played by foreign merchants in Javanese commercial traffic ever since the 14th century? The rise of the commercial centre of Malacca may also have had an effect on this.

Finally, one is struck by the significant part played by the Chinese in the archipelago in the 14th century. We have seen how the Malay-Indonesian area was a resting place for Chinese *en route* to the West. Probably Chinese established themselves there permanently in Çrivijaya's heyday. In this connection, Coedès draws attention to a remark made by the Moslem writer Edrisi in 1154, stating that when revolts led to very disturbed conditions in China some of the people of that country transferred their trade to Zabag (Çrivijaya) and its dependent territories and entered into business relations with the local inhabitants.⁹⁸ The land of San-fo-ts'i, as Çrivijaya is called in Chinese sources, must have been well known to the Chinese because of Çrivijaya's many business connections with China.⁹⁹ And when Çrivijaya degenerated into the pirate stronghold of Palembang the pirates themselves were Chinese.¹⁰⁰

Peaceable Chinese merchants used to visit the pepper port of Pasè, possibly even before the rise of Malacca. Ibn Batuta mentions that gold ingots from China were in circulation there alongside the native coins of tin,¹⁰¹ and his description of the way the native houses were furnished is also indicative of Chinese influence.¹⁰²

Relations of very long standing also existed between China and Java, as the many archeological finds of Chinese earthenware¹⁰³ and coins indicate. Javanese missions visited the Imperial Court with the tribute which China claimed from the southern "barbarians",¹⁰⁴ and Chinese merchants and colonists went to Indonesia from China in search of pepper and valuable kinds of wood. A punitive expedition which China undertook against east Java at the end of the 13th century had not affected commercial relations.¹⁰⁵

To the towns of Java the Chinese brought porcelain, silken materials and yarns, musk, gold, silver, iron, beads, and vast quantities of their small copper coins, by means of which they conducted a lucrative trade with the Javanese.¹⁰⁶ Numerous Chinese settled in Java where they helped to found the Javanese seaports and stimulated their growth to such an extent that the foundation of a port like Grise, for example, is attributed in Chinese sources to Chinese enterprise.¹⁰⁷

Since the Javanese ports lay on the Chinese route to the Spice Islands, and since the coveted spices could be obtained in these ports in profusion, it is probable that the Chinese went to Timor for sandalwood but seldom visited the actual Spice Islands. Confirmation of this theory may be found in the fact that these islands receive only very sporadic mention in Chinese sources.¹⁰⁸

When, however, a new commercial centre, Malacca, came into existence on the Malay Straits, the Chinese must have reduced their trade with the Javanese ports considerably, at least that would seem to be the implication of Pires' remark that in his day (circa 1515) Chinese merchants had not been seen in the Javanese ports for the past 100 years.¹⁰⁹ But although the Chinese shipping trade to Java was reduced in volume, Chinese establishments in the towns continued to exist and the Chinese continued to have a large share in Javanese trade.

The most striking feature of the general picture of trade in the Malay-Indonesian area at the end of the 14th century was the absence of *one* central commercial town. There were various ports where trade was carried on but in none of them, apparently, were conditions sufficiently favourable to make development into a commercial metropolis possible.

II. THE RISE OF MALACCA

The most outstanding feature of the period now following, which ended with the coming of the Portuguese to Asia, was the concentration of commerce in the Malay-Indonesian area and of shipping from East and West on one central point. For a variety of reasons the commercial town of Malacca rapidly achieved prosperity.

According to the *Sejarah Melayu* ¹ (the version of the Malay chronicle which was written in the early 17th century) and also according to Malay legends of much earlier date to be found in the works of the Portuguese writers – legends older, perhaps, than the version of the Malay Annals in the “Raffles” M.S. reputedly drawn up about 1536 – there was a close connection between the foundation of Malacca and the downfall of Çrivijaya.² Tomé Pires was the first Portuguese writer to acquaint us with this tradition. The events which he relates had taken place 140 years previously and so, of course, their accuracy could no longer be checked, but he too tries to establish a connection between Çrivijaya and Malacca.

A fugitive prince from Palembang, possibly of Javanese descent and married to a Javanese princess, who probably fled his country because of a Majapahit attack on Sumatra (after 1377, therefore),³ is reputed to have settled in Singapore after murdering the Siamese ruler who was in authority there. The basis of the future trading state was a small pirate stronghold which, as a result of a punitive expedition by the Siamese, moved a little later on to the place where Malacca was to rise, after a halfway post had been set up on the river Muar.⁴ Malacca's obscure and rather shady beginnings, based as they were on piracy, are plainly distinguishable through the mists of tradition. The most faithful followers of the founder of the Malay dynasty seem to have been the Celates,⁵ the proto-Malay coastal population ⁶ who used their small, light boats for fishing and piracy.⁷ According to Pires, some of the Celates became the nobles of the new state.⁸

Pires' account of the piracy engaged in by the Celates agrees with a report in Chinese sources about a mysterious watering place for passing ships, which was also a market, on one of the five islands southeast of the mouth of the Malacca river, a pirate stronghold which was just starting to conduct trade on a legitimate basis. At a later stage the trading activities must have been transferred from the islands to the mainland.⁹

The new settlement soon experienced a great influx of newcomers who mingled with the original inhabitants. But as only a very small section of the population engaged in farming, and agricultural land therefore remained confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the town and closely bordered by tropical jungle, Malacca became largely dependent on other regions for her food supplies.

Thanks to the reports in Chinese sources, we can form some idea of what early 15th century Malacca was like. It is still a pretty primitive community which Ma Huan describes.¹⁰ The bridge over the Malacca river which gives the town its special character seems to have been already standing. This bridge, so famous in later days, with its long row of little shops like an eastern Ponte Vecchio, was the meeting place of the merchants. The vast majority of the population were simple fishermen who lived in primitive pile-dwellings on the river bank and went fishing in little boats every bit as primitive as their houses. Special provisions were already being made to encourage foreign trade. Chinese merchants who went there with their junks found storage sheds inside a wooden enclosure which had gates that could be locked and a watchtower where a watchman with a bell kept guard at night against trouble.¹¹ Ma Huan, and also Fei Hsin writing somewhat later (1436), commends the honest and upright character of the inhabitants¹² although in view of the special measures required to prevent robbery and surprise attacks, there must have been some undesirable elements among the foreigners who flocked there from far and wide.¹³ The sole export was tin, which was mined in the mountains of the interior and smelted into blocks.¹⁴

Pires' account of this early period in Malacca's history leaves one with the impression that the development of the settlement into a central market town took place according to some sort of plan.¹⁵ Peace and order were essential, and also a reasonable understanding with the neighbouring states. But at the same time Malacca felt itself to be Çrivijaya's successor and as such had to strive to gain control of both sides of the straits. This policy was determined by strategical objectives

coupled with the desire to obtain export products for trading purposes and to ensure continuity of food supplies.

On the Malay Peninsula, Pahang was conquered for use as an advanced base against Siam, and later a branch of the Malaccan dynasty ascended the throne there.¹⁶ The country had to pay a certain weight in gold as its yearly tribute.¹⁷ In the years which followed, supremacy was also established over Trengganu, which lay to the north of Pahang, and over Kelantan. Malacca did not dare to take issue against powerful Patani, which was inhabited by Malays but where Siamese influence was strong.¹⁸

Treaties were concluded with various tin-producing places such as Klang, Selangor, Perak, Bernam, Mangong and Bruas, by the terms of which they had to supply the Malaccan sultans with a certain amount of tin each year.¹⁹ These places were also of some importance as far as Malacca's food supplies were concerned. The inhabitants used to take their products to the port in small coastal proas. Malacca's dominion over the tin districts brought her into conflict with Kedah, which laid claim to a certain amount of authority in those parts.²⁰ Although Kedah itself managed to evade the clutches of Malacca's imperialism, it nevertheless lost its authority over the tin districts.²¹

A prerequisite for the safety of foreign trade entering the port was the suppression of piracy in the Malay Straits. Very early the straits of Singapore and the island of Bintang in the southern part of the peninsula came under Malacca's authority. The Celates had their headquarters there and the sultans of Malacca made use of these people and their small, light craft and forced them to serve in the fleet for part of each year,²² which did much to increase security in those regions. But even so, the Celates did not abandon their former profession entirely.²³

Far more dangerous, however, than Malacca's old allies, the Celates, were the pirates from the little state of Aru on the opposite coast of Sumatra who undoubtedly belonged to the same family of "sea gypsies." They gave the Malay Straits a bad name among foreign traders and played havoc along the coasts of the Malay Peninsula.²⁴ The "king" of this small state lived some distance inland and directed the pirate expeditions of his many small, but fast-sailing, vessels from the security of the inaccessible, marshy interior. The proceeds of these expeditions went partly to the king and partly to his subjects, who had helped to finance the pirate armada.²⁵ Because of Aru's proximity this piracy constituted a great danger and was highly inconvenient to

Malacca and for that reason the Malaccan rulers made earnest endeavours to subjugate Aru, but without lasting effect.²⁶ At the beginning of the 16th century the Aruan pirates were as notorious as ever²⁷ and the Portuguese could not do much about them either. Malacca's expansionist policy met with more success in the lands between the Rokan and Jambi rivers, especially in Kampar, Siak and Indragiri.

As far as Malacca was concerned, Kampar was the most important of the little states on the opposite coast of Sumatra because via this country it was possible to control the export of pepper and gold from the Minangkabau hinterland and at the same time it formed a *point d'appui* for further expansion North and South.²⁸ Kampar was conquered outright, although later on it obtained a government of its own with some measure of independence. Victory over Siak gave Malacca control of the Siak gold supply.²⁹ Economically speaking, Siak as the principal port of Minangkabau probably retained some degree of independence but when the Portuguese arrived it was still paying tribute to Malacca in the form of gold.³⁰ Indragiri was also obliged to submit to Malaccan imperialism, but the bond there was much slacker.³¹

Malacca also extended her authority to the islands lying between the Malay Peninsula and the coast of Sumatra. There the Riau-Lingga Archipelago with its very warlike population was subjugated.³² The tribute which Malacca exacted from the subordinate states consisted partly of products for re-export and partly of able-bodied men. The latter especially were supplied by the seafaring peoples – the Celates, the population of Rokan (which had formerly belonged to Aru) and the very aggressive Orang Laut of the Riau-Lingga islands.³³ They formed the crews of the Malaccan war fleet by means of which Malacca implemented her policy of expansion.

It was easier for Malacca to control her dependencies on Sumatra than those on the Malay Peninsula because the big rivers in Sumatra made it possible to penetrate further into the interior of the countries concerned. As had been the case in Pahang on the Malay Peninsula, a son of the Malaccan royal family was placed on the throne of Kampar to strengthen Malaccan influence there. However, since the accession to a throne was largely a matter of palace intrigue at the court of the sultans of Malacca, not much reliance could be placed upon the loyalty of the new rulers.³⁴

The rest of Sumatra remained outside Malacca's direct political influence, however close economic ties might become.

The nascent port tried to live at peace with the large countries of South and East Asia. To counterbalance the Siamese who, having unified their country and founded the new capital, Ayuthya, were thrusting steadily southwards, Malacca's ruler tried to link up with China, and it is actually in Chinese sources that the name of Malacca is mentioned for the first time (1403).³⁵ Subordination to China had the advantage that the tribute exacted was reciprocated by gifts and marks of honour, whereas Siam levied its tribute in gold but gave nothing in return.

This was the time when China, which under the Ming dynasty had recovered from the Mongol domination, was undertaking a policy of expansion in a southerly direction coupled with the establishment of commercial relations.³⁶ Ambassadorial missions under the leadership of the eunuch Cheng-Ho visited Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago. These missions even penetrated as far west as the Persian Gulf. A huge war fleet with thousands of soldiers was required to lend force to China's pretensions.³⁷ When Cheng-Ho reached Malacca in 1409 he raised the country to the rank of a Chinese vassal kingdom.

Intermarriage between Malays and Chinese, particularly in the higher social classes, played a part in the history of the rise of Malacca.³⁸ The important share held by the Chinese in the trade of the port will be discussed later.³⁹

In sending ambassadors to the Celestial Kingdom, the Malaccan rulers were assuring themselves of the protection of a powerful but, fortunately, remote sovereign. In the long run, as their power and prestige increased, the Malaccan sultans adopted a more independent attitude towards China. Tribute missions were discontinued in the course of the 15th century, and it was only when danger threatened from the Portuguese that tribute was once more paid to China and the Malaccan sultan sent urgent appeals to China for help.

The Malaccan rulers also tried to remain on friendly terms with Siam, which represented much more of a threat than China because it was nearer at hand, but they only succeeded in doing so in the very early days when Siam considered that it had nothing to fear from the still unimportant settlement.⁴⁰ Dependent as it was on food supplies from Siam,⁴¹ Malacca recognized its authority and Siamese immigrants even appear to have settled in the new commercial centre. But in the

long run conflict proved inevitable when Malacca's efforts to consolidate its trading position in the Straits and its correlated expansion on the Malay Peninsula, brought it up against the imperialistic aspirations of the Thais in a southerly direction.

The state of war which existed with Siam during the greater part of the 15th century does not seem to have caused a complete break in commercial relations, and probably trade continued with occasional interruptions.⁴²

The relationship with the Javanese of Majapahit was an extraordinarily delicate one. In view of its own completely inadequate food production, it was, quite literally, a matter of life and death for Malacca to induce Javanese traders to visit the port, particularly when food supplies from Siam proved unreliable. Moreover, if Malacca wished to attract international trade it had to be sure of a regular supply of spices, and these were in Javanese hands. Its efforts in this direction determined Malacca's attitude towards the commercial town of Pasè, which up till then had been of the utmost importance as far as Javanese commercial traffic was concerned.

The Malaccan rulers sent the tribute demanded of them to the Javanese Hindu ruler⁴³; at the same time, however, they began to intrigue against the government of Majapahit in the seaports of northern Java, which had begun to break away from the Hindu kingdom in the course of the 15th century. These towns were infinitely more important to Malacca than the good will of the Hindu ruler (who was withdrawing deeper into the interior) and so Malacca, which had turned Mohammedan by that time, became an ally of the north coast Javanese in their struggle against the Hindu kingdom of Majapahit. Malacca encouraged Moslem missionaries to propagate their doctrine in the Javanese ports.⁴⁴

Before the Javanese began to visit the Malaccan market regularly brisk commercial traffic had been carried on between the Javanese seaports and the north Sumatran pepper port of Pasè. Ever since the rise of this small harbour-principality, the Javanese had taken their rice and spices there and brought back cargoes of pepper in return. The vassal relationship, probably dating from the time of Majapahit's campaign in Sumatra,⁴⁵ was strengthened – in spite of the fact that Pasè's ruler was Moslem – by a firm treaty of friendship with the Javanese Hindu kingdom,⁴⁶ which guaranteed supplies of spices to Pasè as well as providing a market for its pepper. The Javanese probably sold the latter product to the Chinese, some of whom visited

Pasè themselves while others went no further than the Javanese ports. The Javanese merchants enjoyed a very privileged position in the port of Pasè and were exempted from import and export duties, while they could also count on good, lucrative, return freights.⁴⁷

The ruler of Malacca, which was then in the process of development, tried to entice the Javanese junks to his port too. If we are to believe Pires, he did not employ the old forcible methods of Çrivijaya and Tumasik to make the Javanese call there. On the contrary, he tried to achieve his ends by peaceable means through remaining on a friendly footing both with nearby Pasè, which was still too strong for Malacca,⁴⁸ and with Majapahit, whose decline was not yet so complete that it could no longer prohibit or prevent the sailing of the Javanese ships. He attempted to obtain a share of Pasè's trade by making the necessary promises of advantageous terms for Pasè's own merchants. At the same time, however, he was obviously aiming at attracting not only Pasè's products, in particular gold and pepper, but also foreign traders to Malacca.

But Pasè was an Islamic centre and its ruler a fervent Moslem and zealous proselytizer. He made his compliance with Malacca's request dependent upon its conversion to Islam.⁴⁹

To Malacca, however, a change of faith meant an important break with its tradition, which was so closely associated with Buddhist Çrivijaya. Moreover, it would not do to affront Majapahit too deeply. Pires' rendering of the story of this change of faith makes it clear how much resistance and hesitation had to be overcome.⁵⁰ But Pires' version is a critical appreciation and quite unemotional compared with the fantastic miracle-conversion of Malacca's ruler described in the Malay traditions of much later date.⁵¹ Meanwhile the Malaccan ruler had not ceased his efforts to earn the goodwill of the Javanese traders, and even before his definitive conversion to Islam Javanese junks were beginning to set course for Malacca instead of for Pasè. In any case, the harbour of Malacca was more conveniently situated and more sheltered than that of Pasè and perhaps market conditions were better. Perhaps, too, Malacca already had a larger population than Pasè, which would mean a better market for Javanese rice. Chinese junks also started calling at Malacca instead of at Pasè.⁵² Rich Moslem merchants, Bengali and Arabs, moved from Pasè and established themselves in Malacca.⁵³ They maintained business connections with their old place of residence and the town undoubtedly derived some advantage from this fact. But part of their capital assets and some of

their business connections went with them to Malacca. Yet Pasè and the more northerly situated Pidië remained indispensable to Malacca because of their pepper exports. Moreover Pasè was a port of call for traders who did not touch at Malacca and so Malacca could profit from the commercial activity of these traders via Pasè.⁵⁴ The port of Pidië was important to Malacca not only for its pepper but also for the rice which it supplied.

Malacca had sound reasons, therefore, for remaining on good terms with Pasè.

Together with the Moslem merchants, Mohammedan preachers came to Malacca, especially Arabs renowned for their knowledge of doctrine.⁵⁵ The Hindu ruler of Malacca put no obstacles in the way of his new Moslem subjects who were contributing so much to the commercial prosperity of his kingdom. On the contrary, he promoted their establishment and permitted them to practise their religion and to build mosques, and he also granted them jurisdiction over their own affairs. Their personal influence on the sovereign was probably not inconsiderable and this, combined at least to a like extent with commercial and political necessity (especially in connection with the struggle for independence from Siam and Java), ultimately brought about the sultan's conversion to Islam, probably before the second quarter of the 15th century.⁵⁶ The Malay population rapidly followed their ruler's example and Islam found general acceptance.⁵⁷ In its turn, Malacca became a centre for the propagation of Islam.

Under later sultans Malacca even became a centre of Mohammedan culture, and Moslem literature, mysticism and law were studied in "the eye of the sun."⁵⁸ Its policy of expansion caused the dissemination of the new culture in the conquered territories on the Malay Peninsula and the east coast of Sumatra. The intensity of conversion was determined by the degree of Malacca's political influence. In a land like Indragiri, where the political ties with Malacca were much looser than in the other subordinate states, Islam took much longer to penetrate.⁵⁹

Malacca's trading activities caused Mohammedanism to spread over a still wider area, and in this connection it seems that commerce was actually a very important factor in the Islamization of the archipelago. For example, Malacca played an important part in the conversion of the Spice Islands although the Javanese seaports, which had themselves turned Moslem under the influence of Malacca,⁶⁰ were also partly responsible for this change of faith.

In sultan Mudhafar's time (died c. 1456) the fame of Malacca had

already spread to western Asia. The lords of Aden and Hormuz and the rulers of Cambay and Bengal sent letters and gifts and encouraged their merchants to set up business in Malacca.⁶¹ The connection must have been religious and commercial rather than political because when Malacca needed help against the Portuguese the sultan appealed in the first instance to China.⁶²

Shortly before the town fell into Portuguese hands in 1511, Malaccan trade reached its peak, an amazingly rapid development taking less than 100 years. For there was a world of difference between the rather primitive community described in Chinese sources at the beginning of the 15th century and the commercial emporium depicted by the Portuguese writers at the end of that same century.

In order to give an accurate picture of trade at the end of the 15th century, separate treatment is required. We shall have to consider not only the bearing and density of the commercial traffic but also the organization of trade and the circumstances under which it occurred.

The above summary is intended only to present the historical background against which the prosperity of the most important commercial emporium in southeast Asia at the end of the 15th century should be seen.

III. MALACCA AT THE END OF THE 15TH CENTURY

STRUCTURE OF TRADE TRADE AND TRADERS IN MALACCAN SOCIETY

At the end of the 15th century hundreds of merchants from Arabia, Persia, India, Further India, and China, as well as from the Indonesian regions closer at hand, flocked together every year in Malacca, which was then the centre of inter-Asian trade. Like a rich and colourful pageant under the blazing tropical sun, this busy eastern market made an indelible impression on the first Europeans who visited Malacca. It is worth while turning to the almost lyrical descriptions of people like Duarte Barbosa and Tomé Pires.¹ "There is no doubt" writes the latter "that the affairs of Malacca are of great importance, and of much profit and great honour. It is a land that cannot depreciate, on account of its position, but must always grow. No trading port as large as Malacca is known, nor any where they deal in such fine and highly-prized merchandise. Goods from all over the East are found here; goods from all over the West are sold here. It is at the end of the monsoons, where you find what you want, and sometimes more than you are looking for." But it is as if Pires already foresees the fate that lies in store for Malacca: "Wherefore a thing of such magnitude and of such great wealth, which never in the world could decline, if it were moderately governed and favoured, should be supplied, looked after, praised and favoured, and not neglected." ² Most of her native rulers upheld these principles and under their rule Malacca enjoyed unparalleled prosperity.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the original Malay population, which consisted largely of fishermen, had become mixed with a great many foreign elements. Some of the foreign traders set up business only temporarily in Malacca; others, however, established themselves there permanently.

Chinese, Javanese, Klings, Bengali, Arabs, Persians, and Gujarati, to mention only the most important, regularly visited the Malaccan markets. The Gujarati in particular came in large numbers. As the most able seafarers of those days and in that part of the world, they

manned the ships of Gujarat, which was the most important trading country on the west coast of India.

Besides the seamen, there were the actual traders, merchants in a large way of business who had undertaken the journey with considerable capital or valuable cargo, factors of prominent foreign merchants who stayed at home themselves and carried on their business by proxy, and, finally, lesser traders who had embarked with small freights only.

As for the merchants established in Malacca, the large-scale traders were to be found chiefly among the Klings and Javanese. They sometimes succeeded in acquiring positions of considerable power if they were authorized to act as the representatives of their countrymen who stood under their own jurisdiction.

The original population and the foreign traders from overseas all lived in separate residential districts, as the Portuguese author Godinho de Eredia relates in his description of Malacca in his own day (early 17th century). But this arrangement clearly goes back to the days of the sultans.³ To the North of the Malacca river lay Upeh, the big commercial quarter, itself consisting of two separate districts, in one of which lived the people who came from northwestern Asia, and in the other people from the East – Chinese, as well as Javanese from Tuban and Japara and from west Java and Palembang. Javanese from the port of Grise in northern Java lived in the district of Ilir, which was situated to the South of the river. As the principal purveyors of foodstuffs, the Javanese had a bazaar at the mouth of the river for the sale of their commodities. Since most of the merchants also had accomodation for selling their wares in front of their houses, the two districts of Upeh and Ilir, seen from the sea, stretched out along the coast like one long bazaar.⁴ As of old, the Malay fisherfolk were housed in the district of Sabak in the marshy lands along the river.

The harbour itself enjoyed a good reputation.⁵ Lying in the narrowest part of the Straits of Malacca and accessible in any monsoon, it was free of storms and therefore more sheltered than ports like Samudra-Pasè and Pidië on the east coast of Sumatra, which were exposed to the northeast trade winds. And having no dangerous shallows like those off Singapore, it provided a naturally safe anchorage for foreign shipping in any kind of weather.⁶

The monsoons and trade winds enabled traders from East and West to meet one another in Malacca. Although the Indian ships could leave Cambay from January onwards, the best time for them to sail was in March⁷ when they could avail themselves of the northeast monsoon.

The later time was probably chosen as a rule so that traders from elsewhere (who also had to depend on favourable winds) could still embark in Gujarati ships. Only a short time could be spent in Malacca because it was necessary to be back on the Indian coast again by the end of May before it was sealed off by the southwest monsoon. From May to the end of October, while this monsoon was blowing in the Indian Ocean, the arrival or departure of ships was impossible.

During the last months of the old year, the first of the new, the Chinese arrived in Malacca with the northeast trade wind. If they were early, they could go on to Java after discharging part of their cargo in Malacca. So the Chinese had a longer respite than the Indians, but they too had to leave Malacca by the end of June in order to sail back with the southeast monsoon.⁸

Ships from Java, also making use of the southeast monsoon, appeared in Malacca between May and September.⁹ They then had to wait until January so as to return with a favourable northwesterly wind, although this was sometimes possible as early as December or even the end of November. During their stay in Malacca the Javanese bartered their wares for goods brought by Indians, Chinese, and people of other nationalities. This explains why Malacca was a stapling port. The merchandise had to be stored for part of the year for resale to customers arriving later. It also explains why trade on a considerable scale came into being among the merchants established permanently in Malacca.

The period of greatest activity on the Malaccan market seems to have been between December and March, when ships were arriving from western Asia and the Far East. During the rest of the year, Javanese and other traders from the Indonesian area helped to keep the commercial centre busy.

As we have already seen, the town's economic basis was a narrow one. On top of the fact that there were few domestic products suitable for export, the amount of land given over to agriculture was all in the immediate vicinity of the town¹⁰ and was totally inadequate to meet the needs of the steadily expanding population.¹¹

There was no industry worth mentioning in Malacca. Through contact with the mercantile community, some development took place in handicrafts such as woodwork and the forging of arms, but the resulting products were chiefly for the home market and not for export.

Apart from gold and tin, which came as tribute from the subordinate states,¹² Malacca's only domestic product was fish. An extensive

trade, particularly in dried and salted varieties, was carried on throughout the whole archipelago, but even then a large proportion of the fish came from the east coast of Sumatra.¹³

From time immemorial, of course, the Malay fisherfolk had been acquainted with shipbuilding, and an abundance of raw materials for this industry could be obtained from the dense forests on the peninsula.¹⁴ The crews for the sultans' navies were provided by the Celates, the seafaring peoples on the coast of Malaya who have already been mentioned for the important part they played in the foundation and development of the state of Malacca. According to the Annals, their fleets sometimes consisted of forty to a hundred three-masters,¹⁵ but these reports are undoubtedly exaggerated and, for ease in manoeuvring, the ships must have been chiefly small, light, fast-sailing vessels. They were used exclusively for waging war and did not go beyond the Malay Peninsula or the opposite coast of Sumatra. The large cargo vessels or junks with holds came mostly from Pegu, which also supplied junks to Java.¹⁶ The Malaccan shipbuilding industry was apparently not capable of constructing deep-sea vessels, for when sultan Mansur Shah planned to make a pilgrimage to Mecca he had very large junks, suitable for the long sea voyage, built in Pegu and Java, both lands being renowned for their excellent shipbuilding.¹⁷ This would also seem to explain why when Godinho de Eredia made his survey of Malay shipping at the beginning of the 17th century he only came across small, light ships in Malacca, vessels with two masts and oars, which did not voyage beyond the coasts of the Malay Peninsula and the neighbouring islands. These ships were not strong enough for the ocean-going trade, from which Eredia concluded that the Malays did not sail upon the ocean at all.¹⁸ We know from Pires, however, that in the time of the sultans there was definitely a Malaccan shipping trade and that this extended westwards to Coromandel and perhaps also to Ceylon and from there to Bengal, Pegu and Tenasserim, and eastwards over even greater distances as far as the ports of China.¹⁹ But most of these junks must have been of foreign construction. A century of Portuguese monopoly policy apparently put an end to the Malaccan junk trade. Yet it is odd that in the sources up to, and including, Eredia there is no tradition at all of long distance shipping of a national character. This is yet another indication that the Malaccan junk trade was chiefly in the hands of the foreign merchants established in Malacca and that the Malays did not build these ships themselves, even though they provided the crews and the sultans were sometimes the owners of the ships.

Malacca's prosperity was based entirely on trade. For its convenience there was a regular governing body and a good judicial system which managed to guarantee a fairly large degree of legal security. The requirements of the foreign merchants were met by looking after the port²⁰ and by building warehouses which, because of the danger of fire, were frequently underground cellars.²¹ The streets were wide, but in this town with its predominantly wooden houses and thatched roofs – only the better-class houses had tiled roofs – the danger of fire was ever present. Fixed customs duties, fixed weights and measures, and coinage, all served the same purpose – the furtherance of the economic activity of the port.

The accepted coinage in Malacca was tin.²² Gold and silver were also used for exchange transactions, not as coinage, however, but as marketable merchandise.²³ These coins bore the name of the reigning sultan while the coins of previous sultans also retained their validity. Moreover, foreign coins from Cambay, Hormuz and Pasè were also current in Malacca.²⁴ Although money changing is not specifically mentioned in the sources, it is fair to assume that it must have been practised in Malacca since Varthema (who is not entirely reliable, however)²⁵ counted 500 money-changers in one street in Pidië alone! Pires gives a very detailed summary of the standard weights and measures in Malacca.²⁶ For various goods there was a fixed scale of weights.²⁷

Whether the codification of the Malaccan port regulations should also be seen in the framework of these measures for the promotion of trade is a question which would certainly require further research. The western form of the codification, the very fact that this law has been codified at all (something rare in Asia)²⁸ naturally gives cause for reflection. On the other hand this law contains many elements which are confirmed by historical data from Pires and other writers, so that it seemed legitimate to extend the research to cover such provisions as are not contradicted by other contemporary sources relating to Malaccan trade at the end of the 15th century. On some points, moreover, this law provides a valuable addition to what Pires has to tell us about the structure of Asian trade.

The bureaucratic organization which created the conditions for economic prosperity must have grown up slowly, although tradition ascribes it to Malacca's second ruler.²⁹ Because of the importance of various offices connected with trade, and in view of the fact that Pires supplies details which are not mentioned by any other writer,³⁰ his

account of the governing organization may be summarized briefly as follows.

There were various important offices which will be described presently. One which was not permanent but occupied only on special occasions was that of the *Paduca Raja*. Pires compares him to a Portuguese captain-general, a kind of viceroy to whom all the other officials were subordinate, but when there was no *Paduca Raja* ³¹ the *bendahara* was the highest official in the land. According to Albuquerque, the office of *Paduca Raja* could sometimes be combined with that of *bendahara*.³² This *bendahara*, a sort of Prime Minister, was in the first place Chancellor and Lord of the Treasury, but also Chief Justice for all civil and criminal affairs. He could condemn people of all ranks to death; not even noblemen or persons of foreign nationality were outside his jurisdiction. But before passing sentence he was obliged to inform the ruler, and together they reached a decision on the case after consultation with the other two high officials, the *laksamana* or Admiral of the Fleet, and the *tumenggung*, a legal official. So supreme jurisdiction was not exclusively in the hands of the ruler of Malacca.

The *bendahara* families were so respected that various sultans married into them and, thanks to the influence and support of these powerful officials, the sons of such marriages usually retained the upper hand in questions of succession even though other sons of the sultan had a better claim to the estate. This in turn served to increase the power of the *bendahara* "kingmaker".

The *laksamana* or Admiral of the Fleet had command of all the naval forces at sea and was of particular importance in wartime. The crews of the various ships were under his jurisdiction. At the same time it was his task to safeguard the king, and all the nobles and court officials owed him obedience. The *tumenggung*,³³ whose authority only extended to the town of Malacca, had charge of the guard and jurisdiction over the town. All criminal cases came before him in the first instance and from there went on to the *bendahara*. The *tumenggung* was a very important personage as far as trade was concerned since he received all the import and export duties. According to Albuquerque, the *tumenggung* also had jurisdiction over foreigners.³⁴ In the Annals the *tumenggung* appears as a sort of Minister of War ³⁵ and Justice. At court he was in charge of all ceremonies and official receptions, in which capacity the foreign merchants must have come to know him best because of their audiences at court,³⁶ while they could also be summoned to appear before him if they infringed the laws of Malacca.

Officials whose duties were also limited to the port were the four *shahbandars*,³⁷ and they, too, were of the greatest importance as far as trade was concerned. Separate *shahbandars*, chosen from among the foreigners themselves,³⁸ were appointed to represent the merchants of the various nations. Thus there was a *shahbandar* for the Gujarati (the most senior in rank) and another for the Klings, Bengali, Peguans and inhabitants of Pasè jointly, while a third looked after the interests of the Javanese, the inhabitants of the Moluccas, Banda, Palembang, Borneo and the Philippines, and a fourth acted for the Chinese and the people of the Liu-Kiu Islands. Although Pires does not mention the Japanese by name, these may have been included among the inhabitants of the Liu-Kiu Islands.³⁹ The *shahbandar*'s primary task was to look after the merchants of his particular nation, while the market places and warehouses were also under his management. He kept a check on weights, measures and coinage, and adjudicated in disputes between the ships' captains and the merchants in any ship of the nation he represented.⁴⁰

This Malaccan bureaucracy seems to have worked efficiently and led to quite a considerable degree of legal security. The foreign merchant felt safe in Malacca, even though there were numerous evasions of regulations and frequent instances of the corruption of individual officials. But Malaccan trade was so lucrative that the merchants could well afford the extra costs with which they were confronted in the way of bribes, extra levies, gifts and other forms of corruption. These abuses were certainly no worse in Malacca than in other ports and therefore were not in themselves a reason for the merchants to avoid Malacca.

Pires gives us a general idea of the pattern of trade⁴¹ even though many questions still remain unanswered through lack of data and the fact that Pires' phrases are sometimes capable of more than one interpretation since his language is not always distinguished by its clarity. The general trend is quite obvious, however, the purpose of all the regulations being to expedite trade as much as possible so that return freights could be sent in the following season and so that long voyages, to China for example, would not take longer than one year.

Pires has left an account of the procedure followed when a ship entered the port of Malacca, and a detailed description has also been preserved in the Malay maritime code.

Irrespective of his share in the cargo, the *nakoda* or captain, who was also in charge of all business affairs, always conducted all the negotiations in a foreign port unless the owner of the ship was on board

too, in which case the owner was in charge and the captain took second place. But in the smaller ships the *nakoda* was usually the owner as well, while in the larger ships he usually stood proxy for the absent owner.⁴²

When big ships came to Malacca, the junks from the Far East and the 100–400 ton dhows from the West, they were discharged immediately. At toll barrier and landing-stage there had to be a certain amount of military display to impress the foreign visitors.⁴³

The *nakoda* then applied to the *shahbandar* of his particular nation, who presented him to the *bendahara*. The *shahbandar* allotted him a warehouse for the temporary accomodation of his goods and supplied him with elephants for transport.⁴⁴ Warehousing space, therefore, was provided for the foreign merchant by the authorities. The captain of the ship was forbidden to do anything without the *shahbandar*'s authority and failure to comply with this regulation could result in a court summons.⁴⁵

Before a start could be made with the actual trading, customs duties had to be paid. To decide the amount of these, the goods had to be weighed and measured in accordance with the Malaccan system of weights and measures. Duties were fixed separately for each group.

The countries of western Asia – Arabia, India, Ceylon, right up to Pegu and Siam – paid import duties of 6%.⁴⁶ Pegu and Siam, however, although paying duties on merchandise, were only required to make a gift when importing foodstuffs. This was also true of all the lands on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula south and east of Tenasserim, and on the north coast of Sumatra (Pasè and Pidië), that is to say of all the territories which supplied Malacca with food.

Apart from customs duties, gifts had to be made to the king, the *bendahara*, the *tumenggung*, and the *shahbandar* of the land of origin of the ship in question. All these gifts together amounted to 1% or 2% of the value of the goods to be imported. The size of the gifts was fixed by the *shahbandar* and this was a good arrangement as far as the merchants were concerned since the *shahbandar* of a particular nation would not readily overcharge his fellow countrymen. Sometimes the merchants gave even more than was required so that the *shahbandar* would propitiate the king and his officials to an even greater extent. Foreign merchants from the West, and Malays, too, who wished to settle permanently in Malacca, had to pay 3% in duties and on top of that there was a royal tax of 6% on western Asians and 3% on Malays.⁴⁷

For the big ships from the West there was yet another possibility of avoiding extortion, theft, or corruption on the part of the officials

entrusted with looking after the merchandise. When a ship tied up in the port with a cargo of which the approximate value was known, a group of merchants made up of 5 Klings and 5 members of any other nationality appeared before the head of customs, the *tumenggung*. These merchants assessed the value of the ship's cargo as a whole, in accordance with fixed standards, and received the customs duties, that is to say the committee as such did so but the actual receiver must have been the *tumenggung*. In particular this procedure was followed in respect of the big Gujarati dhows, the minimum value of which Pires estimated in his own currency at 21,000 cruzados. 6% of the value had to be paid in duty and this meant that all debts were then cleared as the 6% also covered the gifts.⁴⁸ Since the cargo of one ship might consist of very many different types of articles, for each of which separate duties had to be paid and separate gifts made, and all of which had therefore to be valued separately, the method of a committee of merchants simplified matters considerably, provided a guarantee against fraud, and made for much quicker business transactions.

For the territories to the East of Malacca, the Indonesian Archipelago included, another arrangement was in force.⁴⁹ The merchants from those parts paid no duties on their merchandise but simply gave gifts to the king and his officials. These gifts represented quite a large sum of money, equal in fact to the value of the customs duties imposed upon merchants coming from the West. Malaccan officials were entrusted with making the valuations.

China gave more valuable gifts than any other country owing to the large number of merchants who travelled in the Chinese junks. It sometimes happened that an entire junk was sold in Malacca and then, too, a fixed sum in gold was given as duty on the ship.

At a later period, however, duties of 5% seem to have been imposed on ships coming from the East as well, in so far as their freight did not consist of foodstuffs. For all foodstuffs coming from the Indonesian area and the rest of eastern Asia gifts alone continued to be paid.

No duties at all were paid on exports from Malacca by ships either from the West or from the East. But 1% weighage had to be paid on all incoming and outgoing merchandise and the king had appointed special officials to collect this money.⁵⁰

A duty which more closely affected the internal trade of Malacca and one with which the foreign merchant was not directly concerned was that attached to the issue of licences for selling goods on the street, that is to say in the bazaars, in the booths on the bridge, or in the streets in

front of the houses. These licences were a source of income for the Malaccan officials but the money they realized was also used to defray the costs of a hospital for the poor,⁵¹ an institution which was undoubtedly a necessity in the international environment created by the foreigners who flocked to Malacca from far and near.⁵²

The sums levied in Malacca seem to have been on the high side, yet they prove moderate when compared with those in neighbouring lands. In Pegu, for example, there was an import duty of 12%, with gifts and bribes in addition. All these levies caused considerable sums to flow into the treasury of the Malaccan sultans and it is not surprising that at a later period Malacca's European overlords maintained this system of customs duties with only minor modifications.⁵³

Once the duties had been paid, the merchandise could be sold freely. But in order to combat the forcing-up of prices by mutual agreement, the Malaccan merchants had an arrangement whereby a price for the goods was decided upon in consultation between the prospective buyers (some 10 or 20 merchants for each party of goods) and the owner of the goods (whether he happened to be the *nakoda*, a member of the crew, or one of the merchants who was sailing in the ship).⁵⁴ The goods were bought at the price agreed upon and then divided among the group of buyers in proportion to the share each had in the purchase. In Malacca, therefore, price formation was not entirely free, as it was in many other parts of Asia, but neither was the price dictated from above by the sultan. The Malaccan method meant that business was transacted quickly under conditions which were very favourable to the Malaccan merchants, while the vendors had no cause for dissatisfaction either. It was an established custom that the first ship to arrive was also first to be discharged.⁵⁵ In this way the sellers disposed of their merchandise quickly and, since prices were generally well known in Malacca, they were not underpaid either. The whole system was aimed at reducing to a minimum the time required for doing business. The local merchants themselves played a part in this organization and had some hand in the imposition of the customs duties, for which there were fixed rules and fixed rates. Here too we see efforts being made to promote swift and efficient settlement. A committee of merchants was on guard against inflation. It could be said therefore that in Malacca the merchants did have some effect on the course of trade. But no data have been preserved about any recognized types of organizations among the merchants themselves, if indeed such organizations existed at all.

The Malay traders could now proceed to deal in the goods they had bought, either by shipping them to various places in the Indonesian Archipelago or by selling them in the streets and bazaars of Malacca.⁵⁶ Our only source of information about the organization of purely Malaccan trade, the activity in the ships at sea and trade on arrival in a port, is the Malay maritime code.⁵⁷ A summary follows of the main provisions of this code in so far as they confirm or supplement Pires' own account.

Of those on board,⁵⁸ the captain or *nakoda* may be the actual owner of the ship or else the owner's representative. In small ships the former is usually the case. If the owner makes the trip himself, the captain is relegated to second place. In the Malay maritime code the titles of owner and *nakoda* are interchangeable.⁵⁹

The captain has sovereign rights on board his own ship. He has to enforce the law and decide all business affairs.⁶⁰ His power is not absolute, however, since he has to consult the entire ship's company before calling at any port⁶¹ and to confer with the *Mawla Kiwi*, the representative of the merchants making the voyage, about every business transaction.⁶²

The ship's crew is made up of various ranks – navigators, officers, petty officers and seamen, all of whom have different duties. The seamen may be slaves or freemen. Apart from the actual crew, there are some other people on board who have to work their passage.⁶³

The merchants, or *Kiwis*,⁶⁴ are not obliged to do any work on board at all, nor are the passengers who are carried from one port to another for a certain fare.⁶⁵

The *nakoda* can trade in his own goods, or with money or goods which merchants who have stayed at home have entrusted to him for the purpose of buying cargo. When trading commences in a port, the *nakoda* has priority in conducting business for the first 4 days.⁶⁶ Then it is the turn of the *Kiwis* for 2 days, and only after that the turn of the crew, without distinction as to rank. No one is allowed to offer a higher price than the captain and if a sale is concluded without his knowledge he is entitled to take possession of the goods in question on payment of the cost price. This provision applies particularly to the sale of slaves and luxury articles. In the case of female slaves the captain is not even required to refund the cost price.⁶⁷

The captain and those who give him his orders probably control a large part of the tonnage. But apart from the captain the merchants making the voyage also have a share in it.⁶⁸ This share consists of a

number of cargo compartments or *petaks*. In all, however, the *Kiwis* never have more than 7 or 8 *petaks* at their disposal, as can be deduced from the provision in the maritime code relating to the customs duties which have to be paid by the *Kiwis*.⁶⁹

The *Kiwis* may carry on trade in three different ways: 1) by buying the right to one cargo compartment in the tonnage of the ship; 2) by supplementing the captain's capital with a certain sum of money and thus acquiring a proportionate share in the cargo; 3) by taking 7 or 8 *petaks* as their share in the tonnage. For 4 of these *petaks*, however, they pay nothing at all, on condition that if the voyage is a successful one they pay a duty of $3\frac{1}{4}\%$.⁷⁰ The law is not quite clear on this point since from 1) and 3) one might conclude either that *one* cargo compartment is the same as 7 or 8 *petaks* or else that 1) and 3) refer to two completely different methods of calculation. The latter hypothesis is probably the correct one because, while it is true that the original text of the code dates back to the end of the 15th century, the various copies of it contain elements dating from later periods. The size of the *petaks* must have varied, however, with the size of the ship. Pires must have had fairly large cargo compartments in mind since 2 or 3 men are needed to look after 1 *petak*.⁷¹

The *Mawla Kiwi*, who represents the merchants' interests before the captain, is allowed half a cargo compartment of grain.⁷²

Apart from the customs duties which are required on all 8 of their *petaks*, the *Kiwis* have to contribute towards the fitting-out of the ship.⁷³ Besides the *nakoda* and the *Kiwis*, the crew – who receive no wages – have a part share in such trade as is done.⁷⁴ The *Ma'lim*, or first mate, is the only one who has a $\frac{1}{2}$ *petak* share in the tonnage,⁷⁵ but he may also have given the *nakoda* money for trading purposes. If he leaves before his contract has expired he owes the captain compensation and, moreover, the captain is not required to refund the proceeds resulting from the use of the *Ma'lim*'s capital.⁷⁶

The other members of the crew have no share in the tonnage but they do have a share in the cargo. In the big ships this share amounts to 2 *koyan* for the freemen and 1 *koyan* ⁷⁷ (1 *koyan* equals 800 *gantang*) for the slaves, who in this case are placed on the same footing as the seamen. In the smaller ships freemen and slaves receive 600 and 300 *gantang* respectively.⁷⁸ The share of the crew, therefore, is quite small in relation to the size of the cargo as a whole.

Like most European maritime codes, the Malay law contains provisions about throwing cargo overboard in the event of danger during

a heavy storm.⁷⁹ This had to be done in proportion to the individual share held by each person and arrangements must have been made about this beforehand. Although Malay ships mostly confined their voyages to the archipelago, they did sometimes go to Coromandel, Bengal, and China, and while they were probably smaller than the Gujarati dhows and Chinese junks which visited Malacca, they must have been seaworthy and capable of making long voyages. The provisions relating to the presence of women on board confirm this. In the Macassar code, which was adapted from the Malaccan code, there are no such provisions; the Macassar ships were much smaller again and did not go outside the archipelago.

The Malay maritime code thus provides information about the way trading was organized on shipboard but its reproduction cannot be entirely free from European influence. It is questionable how far the provisions reflect the real state of Asian shipping. What is quite obvious, however, is the important part played by the *nakoda* in business as a whole. The *nakoda* is sometimes the owner of the ship and sometimes the representative of the owner who had remained at home. The captain does not receive a salary from the owner, but he has a share in the profits, the details of the relationship between owner and *nakoda* however still escape us. There must also have been some sort of contract relationship between the captain and the merchants who made the voyage with him. These merchants, or *Kiwis*, helped to pay for fitting-out the ship. The captain and the accompanying merchants have a share in the tonnage of the ship, the crew (with the exception of the first mate, who also has a share in the tonnage) have a share in the cargo alone. The members of the crew do not receive fixed wages but are allowed to do some trading instead. Although they have some hand in deciding whether a call shall be made at a given port (they have to be consulted about this), they are otherwise completely under the captain's authority. The *nakoda* may let the cargo space and in that case he leaves the transaction of business to the lessees although he retains the right to sell his own merchandise first. He himself trades with his own goods and money and also with goods and money belonging to third parties. The suppliers of money and merchandise may remain at home but they are just as likely to make the voyage too. The *nakoda* has to consult the leader of the accompanying merchants about trade, but this provision probably applied chiefly to the goods given in *commenda*. Although these details are rather vague, it is obvious that commerce on such a scale cannot be called a predominantly peddling

trade. It forms a richly variegated pattern in which huge quantities of bulk goods such as foodstuffs and textiles alternate with smaller – sometimes very small – quantities of valuable products, and sometimes of cheap ones too.

The long distance goods, which were luxurious in character, took up very little space, and were transported over various routes, were primarily goods also found outside the Indian Ocean, goods, that is to say, which were shipped to or from Europe and to or from the Far East. But alongside this there was considerable traffic in bulk goods over relatively long distances throughout the entire Indian Ocean and the China Seas. The value of the luxury products might far exceed the value of the bulk goods, of course, and this raises the question of whether a travelling merchant dealing in such luxury articles, jewels and so on, can properly be called a pedlar. The dealers in articles of this sort must have been mostly western Asians coming from places so far away that goods of high value were the only ones worth carrying. The name of pedlar hardly seems applicable to them. Real Asian peddling could still be observed on the Kuwait dhows at the beginning of the 20th century, and we find a description of these in Villiers,⁸⁰ but then it should be remembered that in these modern times traffic in both bulk goods and luxury products had fallen into different hands.

However vague the details about Asian shipping and trade may be, it is still clear that in 16th century Asia shipowning was not yet distinct from trade. At that time the shipowner in Asia was not in an independent position and the costs of transport, for example, were still not entirely his responsibility. The captain did not receive a salary from the people who gave him his orders but he did have a share in the profits. Nor were the members of the crew employed by the owner of the ship and cargo; they did not receive fixed wages but they did have a share in trade.

The pattern of trade which the maritime code depicts in detail is confirmed in broad outline by Pires' *Suma Oriental*.⁸¹ He too mentions the two types of trading described above: 1) in which the owner of the goods rented cargo space and 2) in which the *nakoda* was provided with goods or money for trading purposes. But Pires has still more to teach us, for from him we can learn something about the profits which could be made in this sort of trade, even though his text is not always quite clear and it is sometimes difficult to decide whether he is referring to *commenda* or to private trade.

When a cargo compartment is hired for personal use in the Java

trade⁸² (by which Pires means trade to the ports of eastern Java), a list must be made out beforehand of all that is loaded in the compartment and on return to Malacca 20% of the value of the goods shipped must be paid to the owners of the junk, in addition to a gift of part of what is brought back to Malacca. When goods to the value of 100 *cruzados* have been loaded (Pires gives his example in Portuguese currency), a profit of 200% will have been made by the time the ship returns from the Java coast, out of which the debt to the owner must be paid.

It is also possible, however, to send 100 *cruzados*' worth of merchandise with the *nakoda* at sender's own risk.⁸³ The captain sails to Java at the beginning of January and returns between May and September when the sender receives 140%. According to the Malaccan regulations, payment in goods or money can be made up to 44 days after the ship's arrival in Malacca. This is a long period, particularly for those foreign merchants who have given money or goods to the *nakoda* but who, because of the monsoons, have to leave Malacca before the 44 days have elapsed. Perhaps this points to the existence of letters of credit or of factors who remained behind to take receipt of the goods or money.

For shippers established in Malacca, payment in money was less profitable than payment in goods. This was because merchandise in general had a tendency to become dearer. After the monsoon, when ships had ceased to arrive at the port, a commodity shortage used to develop and this led to price increases which meant that the goods could easily be sold at a profit. It was the usual thing in Malacca, unless payment in money had been especially agreed upon, to accept merchandise in payment for goods or money given in *commenda*.⁸⁴

As far as the Sunda trade was concerned, the profit on goods given in *commenda*, amounting as it did to 50%, was greater than in the case of trade to the towns of eastern Java. This was because the *nakoda* could bring slaves and pepper back from Sunda, commodities which were in great demand.⁸⁵

Commenda trade to four ports in Borneo (only one of which, Tanjung Pura,⁸⁶ is mentioned in Pires by name) yielded 50% profit, the risk again being borne by the supplier of money or goods. The voyage to these places was a fairly easy one. In this case, too, payment had to be made within a period of 44 days. Pasè, Pidië and Kedah furnished 35%. This was a safe voyage and an easy one.

Commenda to Siam and Pegu yielded 50%, at shipper's risk, but if a hipper loaded return cargoes himself, or had them loaded for him, he

could make a profit of 200%. When all duties had been deducted there still remained a profit of 100% and sometimes more. The voyage took eight or nine months however.

Goods or money shipped in *commenda* to Bengal and Coromandel might show a profit of 100% but sometimes only of 80% or 90%. These voyages were made every year. But a merchant who loaded his own cargo to both places could sometimes make 300% profit.

Trade to China could also be remunerative. It appears from Pires that *petaks* were always hired for this (at any rate he does not mention the possibility of *commenda*). A profit of 300% could be made on goods which were in demand and could be sold quickly.

In one of the versions of the maritime code there is a provision relating to compensation in general. This has to be paid when somebody makes a *commenda* undertaking and then fails to keep to the agreement, by going to another country instead of the one agreed upon, for example, and then sustaining a loss, or by bringing back goods other than the ones stipulated and these goods being damaged. In an eventuality like this the supplier of the *commenda* articles is entitled to have the money which he has invested refunded.⁸⁷ The giving of goods or money in *commenda* was thus a lucrative business with huge margins of profit depending upon the intensity of the demand for the goods and the duration of the voyage. But merchants who loaded their own merchandise could make even larger profits.

Considerable capital was required for fitting-out and loading the ships, which accounts for the part played by the rulers and highly-placed officials. Pires describes this in detail but the most common form of trade was the passive one of *commenda* although the sultans did fit out ships themselves, too. In such a case the actual business was done by the merchants who represented the sultans' interests or by the *nakodas*. In Malacca the king was one of the most important charterers of junks⁸⁸ and Pires even asserts that he had a share in every junk that left the port.⁸⁹ The king derived considerable profit from chartering since he was more privileged than all the other merchants as regards cargo space. But it was also a profitable business for the merchant who was acting under the king's orders⁹⁰ since he was not only exempt from all duties but also had a share in the business which was to be transacted with the goods or money belonging to the king. If he was a bondman he could obtain his freedom in this way and he was treated with honour and esteem when he returned to Malacca from his trading voyages.

The king had special officials attached to the customs office to take receipt of the goods obtained by *commenda* and to sell them again. He himself might own junks which he would send out with factors on board and carrying goods belonging to other merchants as well as his own merchandise. Pires relates that sultan Mudhafar built junks and sent them to sea with merchants and merchandise aboard.⁹¹ A ship belonging to the last sultan of Malacca, which was captured by the Portuguese after the fall of the town, had a cargo belonging to the king which consisted of Coromandel cloth to the value of 12,000 to 15,000 *cruzados*. Apart from that, the ship contained a cargo of cloths belonging to Coromandel merchants established in Malacca. We do not know the value of the parcel of cloths because the King of Portugal could lay no claim to that part of the cargo. The *nakoda* of the junk was a Chetti ⁹² merchant from Malacca.⁹³

Shipowning and trade brought great riches to the sultans of Malacca and their fortunes were further increased by the copious incomes derived from the customs duties imposed on the goods brought to Malacca and offered there for sale. The fortune of sultan Alu'ud-in was estimated at 140 *quintals*' weight in gold.⁹⁴ The rulers of Malacca used their wealth to build palaces and mosques, to run extensive harems, and to maintain courts of great splendour characterized by very complicated ceremonial worked out in minute detail.⁹⁵ But at the same time they obviously invested some of their wealth in the development of the port.

Apart from the sultans, the kings of Pahang, Kampar, and Indragiri, who were under Malaccan suzerainty, also participated in Malaccan trade.⁹⁶ They had factors in Malacca and through them invested money in the Malaccan junks in the form of *commenda*. Moreover they collected tolls at the mouths of the rivers in their territory. As far as can be ascertained, however, their contribution to Malaccan trade was almost entirely passive. They do not appear to have acted as shipowners themselves.

The nobility was a feudal community, Malay in origin, which held fiefs for the purpose of exploitation.⁹⁷ The peasant population of these fiefs were subservient to the nobility. The nobles were the warriors and used to lead the peasants into battle.⁹⁸ When Albuquerque describes the Malay grandees he calls them "stouthearted men, who found the greatest pleasure in discussing military affairs",⁹⁹ a state of mind which is reflected again and again in the Malay Annals. Their manner of living was hardly affected at all by the commercial environment in which

they lived, although it served to advance their love of luxury and display. And if the members of the ruling class remained Malay in outlook and morals, with a deeply-rooted contempt for everything commercial, commerce was still indispensable to them because it was the source of their wealth, and their love of luxury and ostentation were satisfied by the exotic products it provided. Undoubtedly some members of the Malay nobility had an eye to the possibilities of trade and its requirements. An example of this is provided by one of the most important personages in the Annals, the *bendahara* Tun Perak, who is not mentioned at all by Pires but who is represented by the author of the Annals (himself a member of the family of the Tamil *bendaharas*, which was hostile to Tun Perak) as the guiding light of Malacca's expansionist policy under three successive sultans.¹⁰⁰ And since Tun Perak must have handled the reins of the Malaccan government to a not inconsiderable extent, and thus must also have been responsible for the many measures which were taken to promote trade, he certainly cannot have been unaware of the value of this trade.

A Malay nobleman who runs truer to type is the hero of the Annals, the *laksamana* Hang Tuah.¹⁰¹ He was born among the proto-Malay Jakuns and was a renowned military hero who was involved in countless adventures and who used to set out on his warlike expeditions from the island of Bintang opposite Singapore, at the head of a band of his fishermen-tenants. Pires' remark that the Tamil comptroller of the exchequer,¹⁰² or *bendahara*, was one of sultan Mansur Shah's favourites – "people who have risen from nothing" – may be an indication that some of the élite among the original population really felt hatred and animosity for the foreign merchants. Further proof of this may perhaps be found in his scepticism as to the loyalty felt by the sultan's subjects towards their ruler "because in trading-lands, where the people are of different nations, these cannot love their king as do natives without admixture of other nations." ¹⁰³

The highly-placed officials were more active in trade than the nobility and their ranks included people from the commercial classes, some of whom were even of low descent. *Bendahara* Tun Mutahir, who was a Kling by birth, was a famous man but unfortunately most of the details we possess about him are taken from the Malay Annals, so that we do not know what form his commercial undertakings took. He exploited his position to such advantage, however, that even the Annals depart from custom for a moment and, in a song of praise to

their author's mighty ancestor, they tell of the continued success of Mutahir's trading operations.¹⁰⁴ As Wilkinson, the annotator of the Annals, very properly remarks: "No wonder", since he had authority over all the other traders.¹⁰⁵ He was so well disposed towards foreign traders in general and those who came from the west in particular that, as the latter approached the harbour, they used to pray to God that they might re-encounter the *bendahara* who had impressed them so favourably on previous occasions.¹⁰⁶ The merchants established in Malacca seem to have been less enthusiastic about this high Malaccan official who, together with his brother, had monopolized the highest functions in the state. Undoubtedly he was a remarkable man (although he is accorded only a subordinate rôle in Pires' version of the story) but his lust for gain and his arrogance, corruption, vanity and pride were not forgiven him, and indeed they must have generated an intense hatred towards this man whose own ancestors were merchants. In the Annals he appears as a dandy who changes his clothes four or five times a day and, surrounded by lifesize mirrors, makes a selection from an elaborate array of robes and turbans. Among his equals he prided himself on his position, and both imposed heavy taxes on the merchants established in Malacca and was high-handed and impolite in his dealings with them.¹⁰⁷ When considering Tun Mutahir's commercial success, however, it should be remembered that we are dealing with a man who came from the same environment as the foreign merchants. He really belongs more to the type of patrician merchant sketched by Van Leur. Even though he may have acquired all the habits of the Malay aristocracy, he is not truly representative of this class. The humiliating treatment to which he subjected the leading merchants of the town was probably largely due to a desire to conceal his own obscure origin.

That apart from the sultans and high officials Malacca also contained very wealthy merchants who could afford to fit out ships all by themselves is shown by the report that some of them could even equip and load as many as 3 or 4 ships. The available sources on Malacca do not reveal whether less wealthy merchants could combine to fit out ships, as was then the case in western Europe where several persons used to combine to build a ship and thus justify our use of the term part-ownership of ships. Nor do we know whether *petaks* could be rented jointly. Our data relate chiefly to the giving of goods and money to the *nakoda* in *commenda*, and it is not clear whether this could also be done on a joint basis. We should not draw too many conclusions

from Pires' description of merchants boarding the ships together ("in companies") for their trading voyages overseas, or at least it should not be taken as meaning that any relationship in the nature of a contract existed between these people. The Asian data do not indicate that *commenda* was developing into a *societas maris* with common risks and both parties contributing capital, a form of trade which was already known in western Europe.

The group of important merchants in Malacca included some very rich and powerful people, in particular Javanese merchants and Hindu merchants from southern India. Barbosa's criterion of a very rich merchant is someone who can buy the cargoes of 3 or 4 ships carrying all sorts of valuable goods and then load his ships with goods from his private stocks of merchandise.¹⁰⁸ The *bendahara* Ninan Chata (Chetti?), also mentioned by Barros in his *Da Asia*, who originally stood high in Portuguese favour, was one of these powerful merchants.¹⁰⁹ Pires describes the trade carried on with the Moluccas by the Hindu, Curia Deva.¹¹⁰ Most writers of those days are unanimous in acclaiming the business talent displayed by the Hindus. Pires praises it highly when discussing Hindu trade in Cambay¹¹¹ and he probably thought equally well of the Hindus in southern India and also of those established in Malacca. He compares them with the Italians of his day in their knowledge and the way they handled their merchandise. Their business tactics were on a high level and he comments on their efficient system of bookkeeping. None of the Moslem merchants in Cambay could compete with them in commercial ability and Pires advises young Portuguese who wish to become clerks to apprentice themselves to the Hindu merchants of Gujarat "because the business of trade is a science in itself."¹¹² Thomas Bowrey who became acquainted with Hindu traders in the second half of the 17th century expresses himself equally enthusiastically: "Those that are tradesmen are very ingenious and those that are accomplished merchants are very accute and the most excellent arithmeticians [arithmeticians] in the world."¹¹³ In Malabar, overseas trade was entirely in Moslem hands and, according to Pires, the merchants employed "heathen" *nairs*¹¹⁴ who accompanied them on their voyages. The *nairs* helped the Moslems in their business administration and could calculate even better than the Moslems themselves.¹¹⁵

We learn about the appearance and habits of the patrician Hindu merchants in Malacca from Barbosa's *Book*. They were wealthy and well-fed: "There are here also merchants of Choromandel, who are very corpulent with big bellies, they go bare above the waist and wear

cotton clothes below.”¹¹⁶ Besides town houses which served as their places of business, they owned country residences, some of them veritable pleasure gardens surrounded by orchards and gardens with ornamental lakes, and “possessing many slaves, with women and children in separate quarters, but all obedient to the orders of the head of the family, these merchants led a very pleasant life there. Cultured and well-educated, they practised music and the arts of love.”¹¹⁷

Both Barros and Pires paint a grimmer picture of the important Javanese merchants.¹¹⁸ Characteristic of the position which they might occupy in Malaccan society is the power exercised by the Javanese, Utimuti raja, who had many slaves and a fortified settlement in Upeh. Barros holds that only the sultan possessed more goods and slaves than this Utimuti raja who, after the city changed hands, became one of the most dangerous opponents of the Portuguese. Compared with him, the Javanese who had authority over his fellow-countrymen in and around Grise was only a minor figure. Utimuti raja exploited his position shamelessly, according to Barros at least.¹¹⁹ He compelled the merchants who owed him obedience to sell him goods at prices he fixed himself and he forced all the slaves he could lay his hands on to enter his own service. Since he controlled rice supplies to Malacca and the stocks of this article in the city itself, he had a powerful weapon at his command for protecting his own interests.

Pires estimates the number of Moslem Gujarati in Malacca at one thousand,¹²⁰ a large figure and one which should be regarded with some scepticism. Some of these people, too, possessed considerable capital but Pires does not give any examples of individual commercial success as he does in the case of the Hindus and Javanese, and we may therefore assume that the Gujarati were mostly smalltime traders. This must also have been the case with the Parsees, Bengali, and Arabs, whose number is estimated by Pires at not less than three thousand.¹²¹ Could a distinction perhaps be made in Malacca, too, between those who were mainly engaged in trade outside Indonesia and those who limited their activities to trade within the confines of the archipelago?

Many an emigrant from Bengal must have settled in Malacca, for Pires notes that a great many Bengali lived there, both men and women. They were simple folk, most of whom earned their living not as merchants but as fishermen or tailors, although their workmanship did not have a very good name.¹²²

In spite of all the display of power and wealth and although they

had their own jurisdiction, when all was said and done the foreign mercantile community in Malacca was still completely at the mercy of the ruler, who could lay claim to their daughters for his harem¹²³ and to their estates after death.¹²⁴ How utterly different from the position at that time in western Europe where the important merchants were citizens with autonomous rights and civil freedoms.

There were no strong ties between the foreign mercantile community and the Malay élite, although a foreign merchant might become an official and marry into the Malay aristocracy. When the sultan fled after the fall of the city in 1511, he was accompanied by only a very few merchants and these, moreover, made all haste to return when they saw that the Portuguese were dealing reasonably with the merchants who had remained behind in the city.¹²⁵

The seafaring element in Malacca was made up largely of Moslem Gujarati and of Malays living in and around the town. Most of the shipping in the Indonesian Archipelago must have been in the hands of the latter group. They manned the ships which carried the goods originally imported into Malacca on to other parts of the archipelago, and brought back the barter commodities – pepper, cloves, nutmeg, and sandalwood – from the production areas of Sumatra, western Java, the Moluccas, and Timor. While the owner of the greater part of the Moluccas fleet in Malacca was a Hindu merchant from Coromandel,¹²⁶ most of his crews must have been native Malays. Thanks to them, Malay became the *lingua franca* of the archipelago and, in addition, they must have been partly responsible for the spread of Islam.¹²⁷ The Malays may also have been engaged as carriers by other foreign merchants.

As a rule, the important merchants did not sail with their merchandise themselves. They could put their goods in charge of factors in the ships, or the *nakoda* might undertake to sell the goods for them. In the latter case the *nakoda* had a large share in the commercial activity. It is uncertain, however, from what section of the population the *nakodas* came. Were they Malays, or were they, too, of foreign nationality? That the seafaring element held a respected position in the community is proved by the ceremonial at the court of the sultan, which permitted well-known *nakodas* to sit in the presence of the sultan in the audition chamber, or *Sri balei*.¹²⁸

The sources give few indications of the extent to which Malays participated in actual trade. Pires mentions Malaccan merchants several times but it remains uncertain whether he is referring to merchants of

pure Malay descent or to foreign merchants established in Malacca, or perhaps, in view of the extensive mingling of races, to the descendants of foreign merchants and Malay women. An example of this last group was Pate Cuçuf, the son of a Malay woman and a Javanese merchant in Malacca, and himself also a merchant in Malacca.¹²⁹

Pires has nothing to say, however, about the existence of any important merchant entrepreneurs of Malay stock engaged in regular business like the many merchants he knows of this type among the Klings, Gujarati and Javanese. The sultans' trade cannot be called continuous, it tended, in fact, to be occasional in character.¹³⁰ Barbosa is equally non-communicative on the subject of Malay commercial activity and mentions only foreigners in this connection.¹³¹ Nor can we find the slightest reference to commercial activity conducted entirely by Malays in Godinho de Eredia's accounts,¹³² but this may simply be an indication that Malay trade had shifted to areas beyond the reach of the Portuguese. We know how important Malay shipping from Macassar became later on, at the beginning of the 17th century.¹³³

As to the lower sections of the Malay population, Eredia's hardly flattering opinion about them has been preserved.¹³⁴ He considered that they lacked enterprise and industry and that they wanted to do no more than the minimum amount of work necessary to keep them alive. They lived from hand to mouth, and when they had earned some money they preferred to spend it at once on pleasure, or to gamble it away, rather than to put it to one side – an attitude of mind which would certainly not make for good business. They practised only a few unimportant forms of handicraft and remained dependent upon imports from abroad for supplies of food and clothing.

They were seamen of some consequence but Malay trading activity must have been limited chiefly to the passive participation on the part of the sultans, who profited from the presence of merchants of foreign nationality in their port. In comparison with the very intensive traffic from abroad, Malacca's own shipping (a considerable part of which was in foreign hands, moreover) was of little importance. A very rough indication of the way matters stood is provided by a report from a Portuguese source written shortly before the town fell into Portuguese hands. Out of 120 ships entering Malacca, 30 belonged to residents and 90 to foreigners.¹³⁵ Active participation in commercial enterprises by lower-class Malays must have been very slight, for while as seamen they probably did some peddling we have seen that the crews of ships were only allowed to take an extremely small part in trade.

There is a great contrast, then, between the Malay fisherfolk in their primitive pile dwellings in the swamp and the affluence exhibited by the sultans, the nobles, and the foreign merchants. The Malays caught a glimpse of this other world only when the sultan showed himself to his people on state occasions, or when foreign ambassadors and prominent foreign merchants came to pay their respects to the sultan ¹³⁶ in colourful processions complete with elephants and white and yellow umbrellas and the beating of drums and the blowing of trumpets and flutes.

This is how Malacca appears to us in the era of the sultans, a cosmopolitan environment where primitive conditions and poverty are coupled with great luxury, a melting-pot of peoples of many races at very different cultural levels. Above all, however, a market of exceptional importance for all South and East Asia.

IV. THE COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC OF MALACCA AT THE END OF THE 15TH CENTURY

ITS BEARING AND DENSITY

The main junctions on the old trade route from western Asia to Malacca were Aden¹ on the Arabian coast near the entrance to the Red Sea, Hormuz on the Persian coast, and, in India, the trading centres in the kingdom of Gujarat, the latter in particular being of the greatest importance for direct communications with Malacca. On the Malabar coast lay Calicut, a very important shipping port which seems, however, to have had no direct contact with Malacca. All these ports owed their origin to the fact that they served as transshipment centres and intermediate stations on the long sea route from West to East Asia and back. Shipping in the Indian Ocean was wholly dependent on the monsoons for it was impossible to traverse the entire Indian Ocean in a single monsoon.² As traffic increased and became better organized, the sea route was divided up into "stages" and the transshipment centres and markets already mentioned came into being. Thus Arab shipping began to be mainly confined to the western half of the Indian Ocean. Pires makes this quite clear and partial confirmation is also provided by Arab nautical texts which have come down to us in the *Mohit* (bahr-i Mohit means "encircling sea"). These were drawn up in Gujarat in the middle of the 16th century by the Turkish admiral Sidi Ali Celebi, commander of sultan Soliman's fleet against the Portuguese.³

Although the *Mohit* was drawn up in the middle of the 16th century as a Turkish version of earlier Arab texts,⁴ it largely reflects the state of knowledge at the end of the 15th century, that is to say just before the arrival of the Portuguese, so that as a source of information it is practically contemporary with Pires' writings. It is obvious from these works that Arab navigators had only a faulty knowledge of the territories East of Cape Comorin;⁵ as regards the seas in the Arabs' own areas, however, they are of the greatest importance and were written when Arab nautical knowledge was at its peak.

GUJARAT

But the Indians, like the Arabs, must have had a vast and empirical fund of nautical information at their disposal and, armed with this, ships sailed from the west coast of India in northwest, west, and southeasterly directions. The Gujarati ports in particular boasted an extensive fleet of merchant shipping. Like all Arab, Persian, and Indian craft, the Gujarati ships were designed to meet the requirements of the Indian Ocean and its monsoon winds. They were vessels which ran well before the wind, fast freighters with large cargo holds, but capable, too, of manoeuvring against the wind.⁶ During their construction no rivets were used, instead the planks were lashed together with rope made from coconut fibre, a more suitable material for fastenings than iron, which would rust in the damp of the tropics.⁷ Although such a method of fastening planks together need not detract from the sturdiness of construction, these ships could not, in fact, stand up to heavy storms. They were especially exposed to the risk of storms if they did not reach port before the monsoon started blowing. Marco Polo's condemnation of the ships of Hormuz is a case in point: rather than entrust themselves to these vessels, he and his fellow-voyagers chose to follow the long and dangerous overland route to Cathay.⁸ A great number of reports dating from later times have also been preserved about the many disasters suffered by these "Moorish" ships.⁹ Perhaps this is one reason why the Indians later tried to persuade the Europeans to allow Indian goods to be carried in European ships.¹⁰

The sea route between the Red Sea and Gujarat was used by both Arab and Indian ships, and it was by this route, via Egypt, that European goods reached Indian ports and, in the other direction, spices were carried to Europe. Gujarat therefore became very important as a transshipment centre for the goods traffic.

Like the Turks and Armenians, the inhabitants of Cairo, Mecca, and its port of Jidda, Aden, and Hormuz could not reach Malacca in a single monsoon and they therefore sailed with a favourable wind to Gujarati ports such as Surat, Randar, Diu, and Daman, taking large quantities of valuable merchandise with them.¹¹ From the West, via Aden, came the European goods, carried to Egypt in Venetian galleons and taken on from there by the merchants of Cairo.^{11a} There were precious metals, arms, glass and glassware, beads, coral, quicksilver, vermilion and other dyes, copper nails, and coloured woollen cloths.¹²

Some of these goods were sold at once in Aden, the great commercial centre in the northern half of the Indian Ocean and the meeting place of Asian merchants.¹³

To Gujarat, too, came merchandise from Arabia and Syria and from the east coast of Africa; large quantities of opium, precious metals like gold and silver, pearls, rosewater, raisins, carpets, and horses; also seeds and grains.¹⁴

Some of these articles from Europe, East Africa and western Asia fell into the luxury class and, with the exception of horses and carpets, were of small bulk. The dyes such as madder and indigo, raw materials for the textile industry, and the seeds and grains, were not of a luxury character and fell into the category of bulk goods.

The merchants from Hormuz, the export port of Persia, which had a mixed Persian-Arab business community,¹⁵ brought horses, pearls, gold, silver, copper, silk, and alum to Gujarat.

The purpose of all this trade was to obtain in Gujarat the spices which were brought there from more easterly regions, in particular the Malay-Indonesian area.

As for the goods produced in Gujarat itself, the most important products were textiles, and some twenty different kinds of these were made. Other exports included cornelian beads, indigo, opium, soap, earthenware, and foodstuffs such as grain, butter, and dried and salted meat. Part of the merchandise brought to Gujarat from the West found a market there, but another part and the produce of Gujarat itself, textiles in particular, went further East to be used in barter for obtaining the spices more cheaply nearer the source of production.

While shipping in the western half of the Indian Ocean was conducted by both Arabs and Gujarati, the traffic between Gujarat and Malacca was almost exclusively in Gujarati hands: "Cambay chiefly stretches out two arms, with her right arm she reaches out towards Aden and with the other towards Malacca as the most important places to sail to and the other places are held to be of less importance."¹⁶

The Gujarati ships bound for Malacca, whose crews must have been mainly Gujarati – they were known as accomplished seamen¹⁷ – also carried a very international company of travelling merchants. These merchants used to join forces in Gujarat and make the crossing in very large groups. Some merchants, however, established themselves permanently in Gujarat and sent out their factors from there.

Besides the people already mentioned from Cairo and Aden, Abyssinians used to take ship in Gujarat. Further there were Arab merchants

from the Arab trading-posts in East Africa, people from the districts around the Persian Gulf and from the port of Hormuz, and also merchants from places deeper in the Persian interior such as Khorasan and Shiraz. Added to all these were Turks and Armenians. In India itself merchants came down to the coast from the Deccan.¹⁸ As for all the merchants who swarmed into Cambay, some arrived by sea and some came overland.

Most of the traders in Gujarat who came from western Asia, were Moslems, while the country's shipping, which was considerable, was also largely in Moslem hands. Owing to the variety of people who poured in from far and near, the Moslem section of the population of the Gujarati ports had a strongly cosmopolitan character, this being true, too, of the other Moslem settlements on the west coast of India. Besides Arabs, Persians, and Turks, the Moslem immigrants in Gujarat included prisoners and converts from eastern Europe who sometimes rose to occupy high positions in the state.¹⁹

Thanks to this near-eastern element in Gujarat, close cooperation existed between the two great powers at the gates of Asia – Egypt and Turkey – and this was to be an important factor in their collaboration against the common enemy – the Portuguese. Many foreigners served in the army of the Gujarati sovereign.²⁰ The Turkish method of waging war was adopted, and also the use of firearms – a technique which, owing to the close relations existing between Malacca and Gujarat, likewise spread rapidly in Sumatra. But much more important in its consequences was the fact that at the same time Gujarat formed one of the links in the conversion of Malacca and the Indonesian area to Islam,²¹ although of course direct connections also existed between Malacca and Arabia, which was the cradle of Islam. Various Arabs, including both merchants and Islamic preachers journeying with them, used to travel in the Gujarati ships to the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago.²²

In spite of the fact that Mohammedanism predominated, the Hindu element was still pretty strong in Gujarat. The sovereigns of Gujarat owned only a narrow strip of land hemmed in by Hindu Rajput tribes. Although Pires is not wholly explicit about the share of Gujarati trade held by Moslems and Hindus respectively, it yet appears that Hindus still played rather an important part in the commerce of Gujarat.²³ With their great aptitude for trade, Hindus were especially active as suppliers of money and goods and as brokers but, hampered as they were by ritual precepts, they could not themselves embark in Moslem

ships for fear of coming into contact with unclean persons. These restrictions did not affect the population of southern India where shipping was still partially in Hindu hands and tied to certain castes. Among the Hindus in the Gujarati ports were very distinguished and prosperous people with contacts all over Asia, who carried on their business through factors. Their talent for trade has already been discussed in connection with their co-religionists in Malacca.

The Gujarati traders, Moslem and Hindu alike, extended their communications eastwards as far as Hainan in South China. The Gujarati contribution to the prosperity of the Javanese seaport towns will be discussed later.²⁴ They accumulated vast fortunes and Barbosa gives a remarkable account of the great luxury and culture of the merchants of Randar, a port a little to the north of Surat. These people made private collections of the most beautiful and costly Chinese porcelain and exhibited them in their homes just as it was customary for prosperous Europeans to do in the 18th and 19th centuries.²⁵

It was Malacca, however, which was the main port of transhipment for products arriving from the Far East, and yet this did not lessen the significance of Gujarat as far as the commerce of Malacca was concerned. Each of these trading countries was absolutely indispensable to the other: "Malacca cannot live without Cambay, nor Cambay without Malacca, if they are to be very rich and prosperous if Cambay were cut off from trading with Malacca, it could not live, for it would have no outlet for its merchandise." ²⁶

Every year around March, four ships sailed from Gujarat to Malacca carrying cargo valued by Pires at about 15,000 to 30,000 *cruzados* per ship ²⁷ (converted into his own Portuguese currency). Moreover the port of Cambay also sent one large ship separately each year, the freight of which was worth at least 70,000 to 80,000 *cruzados*. The cargoes of these ships consisted largely of Gujarati cloths and of other goods which have already been listed as imports to Gujarat.²⁸ Only very small quantities of the luxury products from Europe and the Near East can have reached Malacca via all these intermediate ports of call. It is true that the foreign merchants brought an assortment of some forty kinds of goods, but their chief wares were still Gujarati textiles. Pires also mentions rosewater, opium, and incense, all typical products of the Near East but not of Europe. Carpets and agrarian products like seeds and grains also came to Malacca from Gujarat.²⁹

Some of the merchants from western Asia made their purchases in Malacca and went no further; others sent goods on from there by factors to more distant parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, or else they embarked in Malay or Javanese ships and disposed of their goods themselves.

In Malacca, the merchants who had come from Gujarat and other ports further West became the buyers of a large proportion of the spices which had been brought there – cloves, nutmeg and mace from the Spice Islands – as well as of valuable woods like sandalwood from Timor – and of gold from Sumatra, camphor from Borneo and Sumatra, and tin from the Malay Peninsula. Products from the Far East such as porcelain, musk, and silk, also found a ready market among them, and white damask in particular was much sought after. Bird feathers from the eastern half of the Indonesian Archipelago found their way as exports to the Turks and Arabs, who greatly coveted them as plumes. The value of these homeward cargoes is estimated by Pires at 21,000 *cruzados* per ship, at the very least. That his estimate does not err on the high side is proved by a report from another Portuguese source. When the Portuguese factor, Ruy de Araujo, was staying in Malacca in 1510, that is to say shortly before the town became Portuguese, one of the big Gujarati ships was wrecked with a cargo worth 60,000 *cruzados* and a ship's company of 250 persons. A large part of the cargo was made up of 2,000 *bahar* of cloves, mace, and nutmeg, and 1,000 *bahar* of sandalwood and lac.³⁰

The return route from Malacca was via the Maldivé Islands but now, too, traffic focussed on Gujarat. Although junks from Malacca participated to some extent in the trade with the Coromandel coast and Ceylon,³¹ there is no evidence that they sailed any further West. While Ibn Batuta found only ships from the west coast of India in Aden,³² Barbosa mentions the presence there of ships from Bengal and even from Sumatra and Malacca.³³ It could only have been in the second half of the 14th century, therefore, that ships from those eastern parts began to make their way to Aden. But Barbosa's statement is not based on personal observation and is not very acceptable. He knew the Malabar coast and its environs very well, but he did not himself visit Aden.³⁴ Pires gives a better description than Barbosa of the commercial traffic of Aden³⁵ – a congregation of individual traders who had come to Aden by various routes and via various intermediate stations to barter their wares, just as traders from Aden extended their business journeys in the same way via various transshipment centres and

intermediate stations to places as far afield as Pegu, Bengal and Malacca.

Although there were various other important trading towns on the west coast of India, they had no direct contact with Malacca. Merchants from such places therefore made their way to ports which did maintain direct communications with Malacca in order to embark from them. This was the case with the famous commercial centre of Calicut in the kingdom of the Samudri on the Malabar coast. A number of Gujarati also maintained factors in this port.³⁶

COROMANDEL

There was direct shipping between the Coromandel coast and Malacca and in view of the great importance to the Malay-Indonesian area of textile exports from Coromandel traffic must have been very heavy, for, just as was the case with Gujarat, printed cotton cloth manufactured in Coromandel in cheap and more expensive varieties ³⁷ was much in demand among the inhabitants of the Indonesian Archipelago, the Malay Peninsula and Further India.

In spite of the importance of the traffic between Coromandel and Malacca, Pires provides very little data about it. From other Portuguese writers ³⁸ we know that at the beginning of the 16th century Pulicat was an important trading centre with a good seaport, where both Moslem and "heathen" merchants lived. Moreover, various merchants from other parts also came to the Coromandel coast to embark for Malacca.

Although the Malabars were good seamen – the Portuguese were to have a great deal of trouble with them and they live on in the history of Portuguese expansion as formidable pirates – they were chiefly proficient in coastal trade and did not like to venture too far on the open sea.³⁹ They sailed north to Gujarat, west to the Maldive Islands – where they bought cowries ⁴⁰ and coconuts –, east to Ceylon and Coromandel. They maintained brisk maritime and commercial traffic with the various ports on both sides of the Indian Peninsula, a traffic which was entirely in Moslem hands.⁴¹ To the ports on the Coromandel coast, the Malabars carried the products of their own country – pepper being the most important ⁴² – and also goods which they had bought elsewhere. In times of famine, a consequence of the large-scale droughts which occurred periodically in Coromandel, they were the suppliers of great quantities of rice and coconuts which they bartered for shiploads of slaves, the victims of the famines.⁴³

The Malabars also brought merchandise from Gujarat to Coromandel and on that coast they formed into companies for the voyage to Malacca on the Coromandel ships.⁴⁴ Coromandel shipping was in the hands of Moslems and Hindus alike.

Pires estimates that three or four ships sailed annually from Coromandel to Malacca and that the cargo of each ship represented a value of 12,000 to 15,000 *cruzados*. This is not counting the cargo of one or two large ships from the seaport of Pulicat, each of which alone was worth about 80,000 to 90,000 *cruzados*.⁴⁵ One wonders whether these very large sums can in fact be accurate. But Ruy de Brito mentions still higher ones.⁴⁶ The cargoes of the ships from Pulicat consisted entirely of cloth, even at this early date some thirty different varieties including very expensive fabrics.⁴⁷ Pires considers this trade so important that he really cannot make up his mind which people should be regarded as the principal traders in Malacca and, contradicting himself, gives the credit sometimes to the Gujarati and sometimes to the Klings.⁴⁸

Like all the statistical data of 16th century writers, the figure Pires gives of a thousand Gujarati merchants established in Malacca and four to five thousand Gujarati seamen ⁴⁹ is probably on the high side, but since the Gujarati had their own *shahbandar* in Malacca they were probably more numerous than the Klings. But, on the other hand, the Klings included the wholesalers proper, men with plenty of capital, stocks of goods and shipping assets.

In Malacca, the Coromandel merchants bought white sandalwood, camphor, alum, pearls, pepper, nutmeg, mace, and cloves. Only small quantities of the latter three spices were taken to Coromandel. As opposed to conditions at a later period, there was apparently no market yet for these products in the interior of southern India. Further, the Klings bought gold, large quantities of copper, a little tin, and some Chinese merchandise such as raw white silk, damask, and brocade. They must also have bought some more ordinary materials, however, for everyday use. The Klings carried on business in Malacca from October to January and then sailed home again.⁵⁰ The merchant fleet comprised more ships on the homeward voyage than on the outward one and sometimes there were as many as ten of them. Evidently vessels had joined it, undoubtedly belonging to Klings established in Malacca; ⁵¹ after all we know from Pires that these merchants owned many ships,⁵² which they probably sent back to Coromandel at their own expense.

BENGAL

There was also direct trade between Bengal and Malacca. The business community of Bengal was made up of many different groups and there were a great many foreigners among them, such as Arabs, Parsees, Turks, and Abyssinians.⁵³ People from the west coast of India were also in the habit of coming to Bengal, particularly merchants from Chaul, Dabhol and Goa. In Bengal these merchants formed into companies again for the journey on to Malacca. Sometimes they had already done this in Calicut on the Malabar coast.⁵⁴ Here too, therefore, it was a case of trade being carried on in a number of "stages".

Every year four or five ships sailed from Bengal to Malacca and the Sumatran port of Pasè. The ships of Bengal included dhows – fast, light, sailing vessels similar to those of the Arabs and inhabitants of the west coast of India – and also a much heavier type of ship, large sized junks built on the Chinese pattern.⁵⁵ At least one or two ships in the latter category came to Malacca each year with cargo worth 80,000 to 90,000 *cruzados*.⁵⁶

Fertile Bengal, with its extensive rice, sugarcane and cotton plantations, its vast herds of horses, cows and sheep and its abundance of fish and fowl, supplied the neighbouring countries with large quantities of foodstuffs, and so to Malacca, too, came rice, sugar, dried and salted meat and fish, preserved vegetables and candied fruits like ginger, oranges, lemons, figs and cucumbers. Moreover, Bengal had a highly developed textile industry fed by bumper cotton crops.⁵⁷ The white fabrics of Bengal were renowned; they were woven in about twenty different varieties and because of their very fine texture they were much in demand throughout the whole of the East and later in Europe too. The finest kinds of all were used by the Moslems especially for their turbans. The coloured materials were for domestic use only and were not exported. Large profits were earned on these exports to Malacca but no less lucrative were the return freights, smaller in volume it is true, but consisting of articles of high value. Profits of 200% to 300% were not infrequent, in spite of the export tax of 3½% in Malacca and the very high import duties of approximately 35% which were levied in Bengal.⁵⁸

The merchandise the Bengali shipped out of Malacca included large quantities of camphor from Borneo (and perhaps some from Sumatra too) and of pepper; also cloves, mace, nutmeg, sandalwood, pearls, silk,

and white porcelain. This porcelain probably came from China, and green porcelain from the Liu Kiu Islands (Japan?). Copper was also exported, and tin, lead, quicksilver, some opium which had come from Aden and had evidently been brought via Gujarat to Malacca, white and green damask, carpets, Javanese krisses and swords, and much more.⁵⁹

Because it could offer a much greater variety of merchandise, the market in Malacca was more advantageous for the Bengali traders than that in Pasè, where they could only exchange their wares for pepper and silk. Moreover, the difference between the value of gold and silver in Malacca and Bengal was a source of profit to clever merchants. In Bengal gold was worth $\frac{1}{6}$ more than in Malacca, whereas silver was worth $\frac{1}{5}$ or $\frac{1}{4}$ less than in Malacca.⁶⁰ The Bengali used their own money in Malacca and took foreign currency back with them, on which they could make a profit.⁶¹ In Bengal cowries were much in demand as small currency and there it was even possible to obtain a greater number of articles for them than for gold.⁶² The import of cowries to Bengal was therefore also profitable. They came from the Maldiv Islands and probably reached Malacca via Coromandel.

CEYLON

While Pires does not mention direct trade between Malacca and the island of Ceylon, we find in Barbosa that, as well as ships from Bengal and Coromandel, a few ships came to Ceylonese ports from Malacca to purchase elephants, cinnamon, and jewels.⁶³ The island had few ships of its own and these apparently did not call at Malacca. According to Pires, the Ceylonese merchants only traded along the coast of India from Cambay to Bengal carrying on this trade mainly from Colombo.⁶⁴

PEGU

Among the states to the east of Bengal on the gulf of the same name, Pegu⁶⁵ – which was noted for its shipbuilding – carried on direct and fairly extensive shipping with Malacca and the Sumatran ports of Pasè and Pidië. Each year in the month of February, 15 or 16 large Peguan three or four-masted junks sailed from Pegu to Malacca, as well as some 20 to 30 ships with long hulls but shallow draught and thus little cargo capacity.⁶⁶ All these ships began to arrive in the harbour of Malacca in the month of March and continued to arrive there

throughout the whole of April. The great abundance of timber in the neighbourhood of Pegu, above all near the port of Dagon (Rangoon) had given rise to an intensive shipbuilding industry, for many of the Peguan junks which brought produce to Malacca did not return to Pegu but were sold on the spot. Pegu also supplied ships to Sumatran and Javanese ports.⁶⁷

The produce imported from Pegu consisted partly of luxury articles such as precious stones, rubies from Arakan, silver, musk, lac, and benzoin, and partly of foodstuffs. The latter included butter, oil, salt, onions and garlic, but rice and cane sugar – both of which were cultivated on a large scale in Pegu – were the most important items.⁶⁸ Products from Pegu known throughout the whole of the East were the Martaban jars used for transporting all sorts of preserved goods.⁶⁹

In Malacca, the prices of the imported goods were fixed by seven or eight Malaccan merchants, after which the Peguans could proceed to sell their merchandise.⁷⁰ In the main, they themselves bought Chinese goods: earthenware, a coarse red kind in particular; textiles, including some patterned fabrics especially manufactured in China for the Peguans; seed-pearls, quicksilver, copper, vermilion; small quantities of spices such as cloves, nutmeg and mace; some gold and tin, which might or might not be in the form of coinage. Cowries from the Maldiv Islands and from Borneo also found their way via Malacca to Pegu.⁷¹

At the beginning of July the Peguans left Malacca for Pasè, where they loaded up with pepper. Then in August they sailed back to their own country in such of their ships as had not been sold.⁷²

In their turn, merchants from Malacca also carried on trade with Pegu,⁷³ and in particular with Martaban, a large commercial town with a dangerous harbour which could only be entered with the help of pilots.⁷⁴

It is not clear from Pires' account whether these Malaccan merchants embarked in the returning Peguan ships or undertook the voyage in their own ships. Goods were also sometimes given in *commenda*.⁷⁵

Heavy duties (12%) were imposed in Pegu and these were augmented by gifts and bribes.⁷⁶ It is remarkable that in spite of this many people from western Asia still visited the ports of Pegu; the Gujarati sending one ship annually.⁷⁷ This direct trade between Gujarat and the Peguan ports of Martaban and Dagon left out Malacca entirely. The Gujarati brought textiles to Pegu and the other goods already mentioned as coming from Cambay. From Pegu they took lac, which

was produced there, but they tended just as much to buy the goods which the Peguans had imported from Malacca. These therefore reached Gujarat in a roundabout way and cost the Gujarati a good deal more than they would have done if they had bought them themselves in Malacca. The margins of profit were apparently so great that competition was still possible between the goods bought in Malacca and those bought in Pegu.

KEDAH

Pires and Barbosa differ about exports from the old trading centre of Kedah, situated on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula and tributary to Siam.⁷⁸ The trade of this port was almost entirely passive and the town had no large junks of its own. Pires, who goes into greater detail and seems to be better informed than Barbosa, does not mention any direct trade between Kedah and Malacca. Only the tin districts dependent on Malacca bought gold in the Kedah market. It is not clear what the inhabitants of the tin districts did with the gold, because it did not come to Malacca, or at least these districts are not listed among the territories exporting gold to Malacca.

The close proximity of the two ports, however, strongly affected prices in Kedah and Malacca. Both were visited by Gujaratis and the textile prices tallied exactly.⁷⁹ The Gujarati who called at the Siamese port of Tenasserim with one ship annually, also went to Kedah to take on pepper, which this country produced in limited quantities. After they had bought tin in the tin districts of Bruas, Selangor and Minjam, they made for the Sumatran ports of Pasè and Pidië to load more pepper.

Besides gold, Kedah furnished some 400 *bahar* pepper annually.⁸⁰ A small quantity of this was taken by the Gujarati but as a rule most of it went to China and – according to Barbosa – to Malacca.⁸¹ This last can only have been possible when Siam and Malacca were at peace.

It was in fact possible to ship goods in *commenda* from Malacca to Kedah,⁸² probably via the ports of Pasè and Pidië which carried on direct trade with Kedah. From there, part of the merchandise from these places was re-exported to China via the Siamese ports on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula.

Since her own shipping was limited to coastal trade,⁸³ Kedah was largely dependent for imports and exports on the foreign merchants who visited the port.

SIAM AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF FURTHER INDIA

The relations between Malacca and Siam have already been discussed. Although the countries were at war for long periods at a time, in the intervals of peace business connections seem to have been re-established and both Pires and Ruy de Brito speak of quite considerable shipping taking place between them.⁸⁴ In times of peace, Siam supplied food-stuffs to Malacca on a large scale as, for that matter, Pegu and Bengal did too. Some thirty junks used to carry rice, salt, dried fish, arrack, and vegetables to Malacca.⁸⁵ Then either from or via Siam came lac, benzoin sappan wood, lead, tin, silver, gold, ivory, cassia fistula,⁸⁶ dishes cast from copper or gold rings, set with rubies and diamonds, and lastly a large quantity of cheap, coarse, Siamese cloth.

The main articles which the Siamese imported from Malacca were the market products mentioned several times already in connection with Malaccan trade. Proof of how the producer adapts himself to the wishes of the consumer is furnished by Pires' remark about Coromandel cloth being specially manufactured to suit the fashions of Siam.⁸⁷ Large numbers of male and female slaves⁸⁸ were bought by the Siamese and an extensive trade in this human merchandise must have been carried on in Malacca.

Because of its geographical position, Siam had much more in common with the East than with the West, the only port of any size on its Indian Ocean seaboard being Tenasserim.⁸⁹ From this port, trade was carried on with western Asia, and with the Gujarati in particular, but business connections also existed with Bengali and with the Sumatran ports of Pasè and Pidië.⁹⁰ Siam was thus a competitor of Malacca but not to be compared with it in size or importance. When, however, Malaccan trade declined because of European interference, Tenasserim, which lay outside the European sphere of influence, was to acquire great significance for Asians as a port of transhipment.

Because Siam was near Further India and China, a large proportion of its trade was based on these lands,⁹¹ while many inhabitants of Further India and many Chinese used to visit Siam. The Chinese enjoyed great privileges in Siamese ports and were less heavily taxed than other foreign merchants.⁹² The Moslems were not popular in Siam although Moslem merchants were established in the seaports.⁹³ Siam also maintained business relations in the Indonesian area, thus with Palembang and places as far away as Sunda in Java, and perhaps

even with other islands in the Indonesian Archipelago; ⁹⁴ proof that in spite of the dominating position of Malacca in the Malay-Indonesian area, some branches of active trade could still be carried on independently, even though this trade cannot have been very frequent nor of any great volume.

The ports along the east coast of the Malay Peninsula were under the nominal jurisdiction of Siam, ⁹⁵ in so far as they were not points of controversy between Siam and Malacca. The local rulers, however, were virtually independent. These regions owed their importance largely to pepper cultivation, the output of which was estimated by Pires to be about 700 to 800 *bahar* per year. ⁹⁶ The ports owned many junks and traded not only with the countries of Further India, Cambodia, Campa and Cochin China, but also with the Malay-Indonesian area, primarily with Malacca but also with Pasè, Pidië, Indragiri, Palembang, Sunda, and the towns of northern Java. ⁹⁷

Direct shipping between Malacca and these countries of Further India can only have been sporadic, ⁹⁸ however, since they, too, traded more with China. But business relations did exist with the Malay-Indonesian area. People from Further India who had embarked in Chinese junks calling at the ports of Further India en route for the Malay-Indonesian area, or in Malaccan ships returning from China, used to put in an appearance at the Malaccan markets. There they sold their merchandise: aloe wood from Campa, their own food products, gold, silver, and some Chinese goods. From Cochin China, moreover, came raw and woven silks. ⁹⁹ Conversely, these countries of Further India constituted a market for Malaccan goods. Although exports from Malacca to Further India were not on a large scale because, as we have said, the trade of Further India was centred more on Siam and China, Malacca still did some trade with those regions. Thus there was a market for Minangkabau gold in Campa, – and, for that matter, in Cochin China also – and sometimes this gold reached Malacca again by a roundabout route. ¹⁰⁰ But besides Minangkabau gold, sulphur from Solor came to Cochin China via Malacca. ¹⁰¹ Pires carefully records all the products of the Malaccan market which could be sold in these countries. ¹⁰²

CHINA - JAPAN - THE PHILIPPINES

The relations between Malacca and China have already been discussed several times in passing. We saw how Chinese trade with the West was of decided importance for the development of the seaport principalities on the Straits of Malacca. Originally these served the Chinese as ports of call for stocking up with water, victuals, and trading commodities before they set out on expeditions to the Far West of the Indian Ocean. As the hegemony of trade in this ocean passed into the hands of the Moslems, the Chinese ships began to disappear. There is probably a connection here, the more so as the Chinese government had little interest in foreign trade. After the Mongol domination, there was a strong reaction in China to all foreign influence. The big maritime expeditions fitted out by the Ming Dynasty at the beginning of the 15th century do not disprove this as they probably originated with one single group, the eunuch party at court, against the will of the civil authorities.¹⁰³ But the principal aim of these expeditions was no doubt to lend force to China's claims against the barbarian kingdoms.¹⁰⁴ After the final voyage China again withdrew, and prohibitions against foreign trade rapidly followed. These measures were to some extent inspired by a desire for protection against attacks on the Chinese coast by Japanese pirates¹⁰⁵ whose ships made the China Sea unsafe in the 14th and 15th centuries. Many Chinese had joined these Japanese¹⁰⁶ and to prevent this happening the Chinese government restricted navigation as much as possible. A factor of equal importance was undoubtedly the government's tendency to prevent precious metals from leaving China, as these were being exported by the merchants on a large scale.

The local governors of the seaports could grant exemption from the Chinese prohibitions on trading but the cost of obtaining this was so high that people preferred to make clandestine voyages. But although Chinese traders were henceforth seldom seen in the Indian Ocean, they continued to visit the business centre of Malacca and the rest of the Indonesian region.

Technical factors, too, must certainly have played a part in the disappearance of Chinese shipping from the Indian Ocean. Since Chinese shipbuilding was of a very high standard,¹⁰⁷ the Chinese ships were of unusually solid construction, sturdy and massive in build with hulls that were almost square. As far as speed and manoeuvrability

were concerned, the lighter Arab and Indian craft must have been much better adapted to wind and weather conditions in the Indian Ocean than the heavy, unwieldy, Chinese junks, even though the Arab and Indian dhows were less proof against storms and hurricanes. The Chinese ships, which Marco Polo had already described in the 13th century,¹⁰⁸ had double planking riveted together with iron bolts. When a ship had to be repaired, it was the custom to fit the new planks on top of the old ones. Thus there might well be six layers on top of one another, one reason why the ships were difficult to manoeuvre and ultimately no longer seaworthy.¹⁰⁹ Apart from that, they were certainly big enough for they could easily carry 300 men or more. They were propelled by sails made of bamboo mats as well as by oars, for these ships, too, made regular use of the trade-winds. They put out to sea with the north wind and returned with the south wind. Like the Arabs and Indians, the Chinese had nautical appliances at their disposal; for example, they were acquainted with the polarity of the magnetic needle and its deviation.¹¹⁰

Chinese ships had either one or more decks, and, as a rule, the space below was divided into a great number of small, partitioned-off cabins which were rented to the merchants on board.¹¹¹ Besides these cabins, the larger ships also had watertight compartments separated by bulkheads in the hold for the bulk cargo.¹¹² Big ships sometimes had several such holds and if a ship sprang a leak the goods could be transferred from one hold to another. The big ships were generally accompanied by a number of smaller ones with crews of 60 to 100 men and these smaller ships, which could sail faster, frequently had to tow the bigger ones.¹¹³ The sturdy build of the Chinese ship enabled it to weather the strong typhoon winds of the China Sea and it also rendered the Chinese seamen less defenceless against attacks by the many pirates who made the coasts of China and the Malay Peninsula unsafe. We saw how the rulers of Malacca tried to rid the sea of these pirates, at least in the neighbourhood of their seaport. This had a very good effect on trade and, with the approval of the Chinese suzerain and in spite of the prohibitions obtaining in the Chinese state, Malacca became for the Chinese a centre of trade and the terminus of their voyages to the West.

The tribute which Malacca had to send to the court in Peking at regular intervals already represented trade of a sort. It included pepper, valuable kinds of wood, jewels and precious stones, and the highly coloured ornaments made from the plumage of the exotic

birds of the Moluccas, offerings which were reciprocated with equally valuable Chinese goods.¹¹⁴

A very large assortment of the most varied merchandise was brought by the Chinese junks to Malacca. It included musk, rhubarb, camphor, pearls, a small amount of gold and silver, large amounts of raw and woven silk, expensive fabrics such as damask, satin and brocade, and cotton materials, the trade in which was conducted from China by Chinese wholesale merchants.¹¹⁵ Then there were goods the quality of which Pires does not rate very highly, such as alum, salpetre, sulphur, copper, iron, large quantities of copper utensils, cast iron kettles, and the familiar products of Chinese handicraft – lacquered boxes, elaborate cabinets, fans and fancy hair ornaments, and many worthless trinkets such as copper bracelets, for example. Each cargo also included an enormous quantity of porcelain and pottery – plates, dishes, cups, and bowls.¹¹⁶ Another bulk product which came from China to the Indonesian area was salt, a very remunerative article, apparently, for in China the salt merchants and salt-duty farmers belonged to the richest sections of the population.¹¹⁷ An affirmative reply to the question “Are you a salt merchant of some consequence?”¹¹⁸ was positive proof of a man’s solvency.

As far as the market products of Malacca were concerned, pepper was particularly in demand among the Chinese, who also obtained it from the Sumatran ports of Pasè and Pidië, and from Patani, which was situated on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula. Very large profits were made, as a *quintal* of pepper which was bought for 4 *cruzados* in Malacca could be sold in China for 15 or 16 *cruzados*.¹¹⁹ Nowadays there is no longer much demand for spices in China but in the 16th century and earlier pepper consumption was very high, just as it was in contemporary Europe.¹²⁰

Pires states that ten junk-loads of pepper from Malacca could be sold annually to the Chinese, at least if there were enough ships to transport it. Evidently, however, the number of junks coming to Malacca sometimes fell short of this figure. In 1510, Ruy Araujo also records the annual arrival of 8 to 10 junks but, according to Brito, only 4 went there in 1513.¹²¹

Apart from pepper, the Chinese bought some other spices and drugs, ivory, incense, tin, valuable woods like sandalwood, cornelian from Cambay, and woollen materials. But in comparison with pepper, these goods were not very important to the Chinese.¹²²

In Malacca, the interests of the Chinese and the people from Further

India and the Liu Kiu Islands were looked after by a *shahbandar*, a gentleman who found his function an abundant source of income. As we have already seen,¹²³ the Chinese who sailed to Malacca paid no duties there but instead made a gift, the size of which was fixed by the *shahbandar*.¹²⁴ The Chinese were heavily taxed by this official but they resigned themselves with a good grace to "the custom of the country" as Pires euphemistically calls this chicanery. Undoubtedly they did so because their profits could easily permit of that, in spite of the fact that on departure they had already been heavily taxed by their own authorities for obtaining permission to sail in the direction of Siam, Java, Malacca, and Pasè¹²⁵ – provided, at least, that they had not undertaken the voyage clandestinely.

Equally profitable was the trade Malacca did in China, and junks belonging to merchants established in Malacca appear to have sailed there regularly,¹²⁶ while it was also possible to send goods or money in *commenda* from Malacca to China.¹²⁷

Foreign trade was only permitted in a few places in China, although there was never a prohibition there on the foreign ships bringing tribute from countries "that were impressed by the virtue of the celestial court." ¹²⁸

In Canton, among other places, there were special departments for the inspection of incoming merchant shipping.¹²⁹ As foreign merchants were not allowed in Canton itself because the Chinese rulers stood in fear of enemy attacks on the coast, ships had to anchor off some islands which were 20 to 30 miles distant from Canton and where each foreign nation had its permanent anchorage. The anchorage of the Malaccan merchants was much more favourably situated for carrying on trade with the mainland than that of Siam.¹³⁰ Since private trade was forbidden in respect of a large number of commodities, a good deal of the trading went on via government authorities. The merchandise was divided into categories covering fine and coarse goods respectively.¹³¹ The fine category, which was the more valuable, was stored in government warehouses, and licences were required for making sales.¹³² The holder of a licence could sell the goods at fixed prices and in fixed quantities – after payment of the requisite customs duties, however. Goods in the coarse category could be sold without a licence, provided duty had first been paid on them, too.

When the junks arrived, the governor of the district notified Canton, and Cantonese valuers came to appraise the goods. They did this, however, in consultation with the Chinese wholesale merchants.¹³³

The duties which were imposed were very high: 20% on pepper, no less than 50% on dye-wood, and 10% on other merchandise. A fixed tonnage tax on the whole ship might also have to be paid. Yet Pires does not consider these duties excessive in relation to the large profits which the Malaccan merchants made upon their goods in China and, according to him, there was no extortion.¹³⁴ The valuers were themselves merchants or were accompanied by merchants, and evidently they acted on their own account as well as for the government. They were the receivers for customs duties but they themselves bought pepper, which fell into the category of goods that could be traded in freely.¹³⁵ In their semi-official function, this group of valuers also brought along the goods which the Malays had to take back with them in the correct quantities and the proper assortment. At the same time, they victualled the Malaccan ships, again according to Pires, without swindling them. Nevertheless, the profits which the merchants made on the transport of merchandise and provisions from the mainland to the ships' anchorage were not inconsiderable and varied between 30% and 50%. There is bound to have been some sort of arrangement between these Chinese merchant-valuers and the semi-official price-fixing committee of merchants in Malacca.¹³⁶

Proof that people did try to evade the official channels is provided by the accounts of unfortunate experiences with the smaller merchants who apparently came to the Malaccan ships to hawk their wares in secret.¹³⁷

In China there was a fixed scale of weights, and payment for goods might be made in money as well as in kind. For small purchases such as foodstuffs small currency was used, for more valuable articles gold and silver coins.¹³⁸

Apart from the Chinese, other inhabitants of the Far East showed up in Malacca, mysterious people who are referred to in Portuguese sources as Gores or Guores and whose origin is disputed. Boxer's view that the Gores should be taken to mean the Japanese¹³⁹ is corroborated by what Pires has to say about their character, their behaviour, and the nature of their merchandise.¹⁴⁰ But Pires considered them to be middlemen only and made a definite distinction between them and the Japanese who, according to him, did not conduct any overseas trade.¹⁴¹ Pires held that the Gores came from the Liu Kiu Islands, which at that time included Taiwan. They came to Malacca each year with two or three ships. Sometimes they did business there in collaboration with the Chinese, sometimes they acted on their own

That they were from Taiwan is made probable by the fact that they carried on regular trade with the Chinese port of Fuchow in the province of Fukien, unless this port functioned as intermediate port.¹⁴² But whether the Gores were, in fact, Japanese or inhabitants of the neighbouring islands,¹⁴³ it is in any case certain that they maintained communications with Japan and conveyed Japanese merchandise to Malacca. This merchandise consisted of silk, costly fabrics, porcelain, copper, gold dust and silver dust, swords and many other types of weapons, coffers and boxes inlaid with gold leaf, fans, and paper, in short all the typically Japanese products, but also rice, onions and other dried vegetables such as pulses.¹⁴⁴

From Malacca they took the same products as the Chinese. They bought large quantities of Bengal fabrics and they were very fond of Malaccan wine, a heady variety in particular.¹⁴⁵ The Gores took the Malaccan goods back to China and Japan and traded them there for gold and copper which they then offered for sale again on the Malaccan market.¹⁴⁶

Pires praised their honesty in trade and rated them above the Chinese in this respect. They were very reticent about their personal affairs and allowed no one to gain an insight into the affairs of their own country.¹⁴⁷ They succeeded in keeping their secrets extraordinarily well.

Noteworthy is their attitude to the slave trade. They did not buy slaves and would have died rather than sell any of their own people into slavery.

They were quite prepared to supply goods on credit, but in other ways they were not easy people to deal with. If they were cheated, they did not hesitate to demand what was owing to them with their swords in their hands. As far as their appearance went, Pires found them better and more smartly dressed than the Chinese and with lighter skins.¹⁴⁸

The Gores did more trade with the Philippines than with Malacca. Six or eight of their junks went there each year; ¹⁴⁹ most of the trade in the Philippines, however, was in the hands of the Chinese.¹⁵⁰

The inhabitants of the Philippines traded in Malacca with two or three junks at the most. They took there poor quality gold, forest products and foodstuffs, some of which had been bought in Borneo. Philippine trade with Malacca reached a peak during Pires' stay there because one of the highly-placed Malaccan functionaries, the *tumeng-gung* appointed by the Portuguese, came from the Philippines, and he

did much to encourage his fellow-countrymen to come to Malacca.¹⁵¹ The Philipinos brought practically the same products to Malacca as the inhabitants of Borneo, and in Malacca, therefore, no distinction was made between merchants from the two regions.

South of the Philippines, we come to the Indonesian world proper. Trade in these parts was strongly influenced by the pull of the commercial metropolis of Malacca. Yet the trade of the various ports also had independent significance. In the framework of Malaccan trade, therefore, only a brief description will be given of the traffic centred on the port itself. Trade in the Indonesian area independent of Malacca needs to be dealt with separately.

SUMATRA

Malacca stood in very close economic relationship to her dependencies in Sumatra. The tribute levied by Malacca in products, above all in gold and in able-bodied men, has already been discussed.¹⁵² Of all the vassal states, Indragiri as the principal port for Minangkabau had the most trade. From Minangkabau, Indragiri obtained its gold stocks and sent cloth there in return. According to Pires, the population was used to trading and a large number of merchants came to Indragiri because its port was easily accessible, the mouth of the river being so wide that even big junks could moor there.¹⁵³ Trade in the other dependent states such as Kampar and Siak was less well-developed¹⁵⁴ although, according to the Portuguese Ruy de Brito, various merchants were established in Kampar.¹⁵⁵ Gold and pepper from the hinterland came down the rivers to these countries, too, and they in turn supplied forest products such as honey, wax and lignum aloe, and foodstuffs. The latter in particular were produced by Siak, which was almost exclusively agrarian. The inhabitants of the coastal states sold their domestic products in Malacca, carrying on this trade in small coastal proas. In the Malaccan market they bought Coromandel and Gujarati cloth for resale in the Sumatran interior.

In Minangkabau, which in Pires' time had not been converted to Islam,¹⁵⁶ there were two goldmines which were jealously preserved from Moslem influence.¹⁵⁷ But part of the gold from these mines, the output of which is said to have been 2 *bahar* per year, went via the tribute-paying coastal states and through trade channels to Malacca.¹⁵⁸ This supply of "the metal which God chose"¹⁵⁹ was very important for the commercial town of Malacca and probably made it the biggest gold

emporium in the Asia of those days.¹⁶⁰ Gold came to Malacca from Siam and Patani as well as from Sumatra, and it was brought by the Gores too. The poorest quality came from Borneo.¹⁶¹ The total amount of incoming gold was estimated by Ruy de Araujo in 1510 at 10 *bahar*.¹⁶²

Malacca actively combatted the piracy practised at her expense by the coastal population of several of the smaller coastal states of Sumatra – Aru, for example¹⁶³ – but at the same time the pirates supplied Malacca with large quantities of a much coveted delicacy, the *troeboek* or salted shad roe.¹⁶⁴ In later days, this product was exported from the east coast of Sumatra, where large schools of the fish occurred at a certain time of year, and it was in great demand throughout the whole archipelago. The salt for preparing it was supplied by the seaports of northern Java, an example of raw materials for an industry being transported over a fairly long distance. In the 17th century, Bengkalis was an important centre of this fishing industry.¹⁶⁵ This region did not share the fate of Malacca and for a long time it remained outside the sphere of European influence. In the 16th and 17th centuries it was ruled over by Johore, which was the place to which the rulers of Malacca had retreated. The export of shad roe was considered so important that the sultan had placed Bengkalis under his direct authority and appointed a *shahbandar* there.¹⁶⁶

Piracy, fishing and trade were all closely connected in these small coastal states of Sumatra. Noteworthy were the markets for stolen goods, chiefly slaves, which were held in some of the states.¹⁶⁷ Rokan, Rupert and Purim were all tributary to Malacca, but Aru remained outside her direct dominion.

The trade of Pasè and Pidië in so far as it was based on Malacca has already been discussed.¹⁶⁸

Further south on Sumatra's east coast, in Jambi and Palembang, Malacca came up against Javanese influence. Nevertheless, brisk trade existed between Malacca and Palembang in particular, and Palembang was one of the most important suppliers of foodstuffs to the port. Ten or twelve junks used to come to Malacca annually, loaded with rice, garlic, onions, meat and wine, forest products such as rattan, honey, wax and benzoin, and also cotton and a small amount of gold and iron. Moreover, Malacca obtained many slaves from Palembang. All these wares were bartered for large quantities of the coarser sorts of cloth which had been bought from the Gujarati and the Klings.¹⁶⁹ It is not clear whether the rice Palembang exported to Malacca was a domestic product or had first been imported to Palembang.

bang by foreign merchants, Javanese in this case, and then re-exported to Malacca. All these countries of Sumatra were dependent on the Malaccan market for their supplies of textiles: "when things were in the order they used to be, they all [i.e. the Sumatrans] came to Malacca, mostly to bring the merchandise from the whole island,¹⁷⁰ and to take the cloth and other merchandise to their own countries according to the custom of each." ¹⁷¹

Trade in the lands to the south of Palembang was wholly concentrated on Java, to be precise, on west Java (Sunda) exclusively.¹⁷² Sunda was still Hindu at this time and Islam had not penetrated to the coastal districts of south-east Sumatra – yet another proof of how closely the spread of Mohammedanism was connected with trade.

None of the ports on Sumatra's west coast, not even the newcomer, Achin, had direct business connections with Malacca, although no doubt trade was carried on in the Malaccan market via middlemen in the products of those lands, including camphor bought in Baros by the Klings.¹⁷³

JAVA

Since the trade of Java will be dealt with separately,¹⁷⁴ only a brief description follows here of the traffic with Malacca. As this commercial centre attracted more and more shipping and trade, the direct trade with the ports of Java carried on by western Asians and merchants from the Far East began to come to a standstill. In consequence of the withdrawal of Chinese and Gujarati trade to Malacca, the Javanese ports lost their independent trade with East and West and became intermediate ports for traffic that was concentrated more and more exclusively on Malacca and that was based on trade in food products, spices, and valuable kinds of wood.

As far as supplying foodstuffs to Malacca was concerned, western Java was certainly just as important as the ports of northern Java. We have seen that before the rise of Malacca traffic from western Asia used to follow a route via the Sunda Straits.¹⁷⁵ The rise to prosperity of the west Javanese ports may be attributed to the western Asians and to the Chinese who came there to collect pepper. But subsequently these ports too, like those of northeast Java, became intermediate ports for traffic with Malacca.

Every year, two or three junks left Malacca for the ports of Hindu Sunda to buy slaves, rice and pepper.¹⁷⁶ Pepper was already being cultivated there on a fairly wide scale and Pires estimated the output

at 1,000 *bahar* per year.¹⁷⁷ There were various ports along the coast of western Java, including Bantam,¹⁷⁸ which at that time, however, was far from being the busy trading centre it became at the end of the 16th century. Much more important at that time (the beginning of the 16th century) was Sunda Kalapa,¹⁷⁹ two days' journey from the place where the court had its residence, the city of "Dayo," Dajeuh, or Pajajaran,¹⁸⁰ in the inland Hindu state in west Java. Ships came here from Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, east Java and Malacca. But this well-run port, the stapling point for domestic products, also sent out ships of its own, a number of which sailed to Malacca laden with foodstuffs and pepper. The slaves which Sunda exported came both from the country itself and from the Maldivé Islands, in fact Sunda seems to have carried on quite a brisk traffic with the Maldivé Islands.¹⁸¹ Both the import and export of slaves was carried on in Sunda. It is noteworthy that even at this early date coarse, woven cloth was already being exported to Malacca.

A large proportion of the imports of this west Javanese port did in fact consist of Kling and Gujarati woven cotton cloths. But besides cloth, numerous other commodities from the Malaccan market could be sold in Sunda, such as areka,¹⁸² rosewater, pachak,¹⁸³ seeds from Cambay, etc.¹⁸⁴

There were very close business relations between Malacca and the coastal towns of middle and east Java. The increasing importance of the state of Demak may well have been associated with the fact that it exported to Malacca rice and food products grown in the interior. The great prosperity of the port of Japara was due, in part, to a similar reason¹⁸⁵ and it is significant in this connection that the ruler of Japara had originally come from the commercial environment of Malacca.¹⁸⁶

As for the seaports of northern Java, Cheribon, which lay further west, was also in close touch with Malacca. Pati Kadir, leader of the rebellion of the Javanese in Malacca against the Portuguese after the death of Utimuti raja, withdrew to Cheribon after his defeat, where he became a prominent figure.¹⁸⁷

Of the greatest importance for Malacca was its connection with Grise, the port which controlled the import of spices from Banda and the Moluccas. Although Pires does not express himself too clearly here either, his version of affairs seems to point to a combined Javanese-Malaccan-Moluccan trade. Each year eight junks used to sail together from Malacca and Grise to Banda and the Moluccas. Half of the ships

came from Malacca and half from Grise.¹⁸⁸ The Javanese ruler of Grise who, together with a Hindu merchant in Malacca, largely controlled this spice trade, had also originated in the commercial environment of Malacca.¹⁸⁹ But besides the wholesale trade, there was also a retail trade which seems to have been even older in origin and which was still being carried on when the Dutch arrived in the archipelago at the end of the 16th century. Merchants from Malacca, sailing as *Kiwis*, passengers, or members of the crews of the big junks, embarked with their merchandise – mostly cloth – for Java. In Java they sold their best textiles for cash (Chinese copper coins),¹⁹⁰ and other trivia, and then went on to Sumbawa (Bima).¹⁹¹ There they bought cheap cotton cloths with the merchandise which they had brought with them from Java and exchanged these and the cash for nutmeg, mace, and cloves in the Spice Islands.¹⁹² Pires' description of this trade corresponds in detail with that left to us by the Dutch.¹⁹³ Pires must have the retailers in mind when he mentions the slender capital involved in this trade, in contrast to the large sums accumulated by the wholesalers.¹⁹⁴ This was evidently a very lucrative trade. Large profits were made on the spices in Malacca since a *bahar* of cloves, for example, could be obtained in the Moluccas at a cost price of 500 *reis*' worth of merchandise and sold in Malacca for 9 or 10 *cruzados* when the supply was plentiful and for as much as 12 *cruzados* when cloves were scarce (1 *cruzado* equals 480 *reis*).¹⁹⁵ Pires' figures, however, date from the time when the Portuguese had already been in power in Malacca for a couple of years, and they may thus have been affected by the greater Portuguese demand. Pires has nothing to say about the export of rice from Grise; it is possible that rice was taken from Bima to the Spice Islands.

In close association with the trade being carried on from Malacca and Java, Islam spread throughout the Spice Islands. Proselytizing reached its peak in the course of the 16th century as part of the Moslem stand against Portuguese penetration.^{195a}

BORNEO

The trade route from Malacca to the Philippines went past the west coast of Borneo and, like the Philipinos, the inhabitants of Borneo used to take their products to the Malaccan market, taking advantage of the appropriate monsoon winds for their voyages out and back. In 1514, Ruy de Brito records the yearly arrival of 3 junks from Borneo;¹⁹⁶

it is not clear, however, which port they came from. Pires has an even vaguer notion of the island and in most cases when he mentions Burney or Burnee he means the port of Brunei alone.¹⁹⁷

As for the products exported by Brunei, Brito and Pires mention foodstuffs like meat, fish, rice, and sago, and forest products like honey, wax, rattan, and pitch. Cowries, too, came from Brunei to Malacca, where they were resold to Pegu.¹⁹⁸ Camphor was a valuable product and Pires estimated that 2 or 3 *bahar* of it were exported annually.¹⁹⁹ It was exported via Malacca to the states on the west coast of India in the form of powder packed in rattan canes.²⁰⁰ Gold also came from Brunei, but it was not of very good quality.²⁰¹ According to Pires, it had been bought in the Philippines and the surrounding islands²⁰² but as Pires takes Borneo for a large number of islands this gold dust probably came from the interior of the country itself. Brito also mentions the export of pearls from Borneo to Malacca.²⁰³

In Malacca, the traders from Borneo bought Kling and Bengali cloths. They also bought quantities of coloured glass and cornelian beads from Cambay and Chinese copper bracelets.²⁰⁴ In exchange for these trinkets and cloths they obtained gold dust from the tribes established in the interior of Borneo "in the islands where gold is."

Lawe²⁰⁵ and Tanjung Pura²⁰⁶ in the diamond districts on the south coast of Borneo carried on trade with Malacca at the beginning of the 16th century.²⁰⁷ But they concentrated more on Java than on Malacca. Besides diamonds, Lawe and Tanjung Pura exported gold and foodstuffs to Malacca and took mostly Kling and Bengali cloth in exchange. Black benzoin from Palembang reached the ports of southern Borneo via the Malaccan market.²⁰⁸ The *commenda* trade from Malacca to these ports has already been discussed.²⁰⁹

CELEBES

Sailing in light but well-constructed ships, the inhabitants of Celebes also came to Malacca.²¹⁰ Pires was the first European to describe these people – well-built, stalwart warriors, speaking a language of their own. But he knew as little about the shape of their island as he did about Borneo, since he took Celebes for a large collection of islands. Pires knew the inhabitants of this still entirely heathen land as great pirates, who sailed around in their many, swift, light proas looking for plunder and rendering the seas around their island and the Moluccas unsafe. They are even reputed to have voyaged as far as Pegu and they

also roamed around the coasts of Java, Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. But we have already seen that Pires makes no distinction between all these seafaring peoples in the Indonesian Archipelago "The Javanese call them Bugis and the Malays call them this and Celates."²¹¹ These pirates took their women with them on their expeditions. Against the fast-sailing pirate proas only armed junks were safe;²¹² all lighter ships were easy prey. They had regular markets for their booty where they sold the slaves they had captured. But the principal meeting place for the Malay pirates must have been the permanent thieves' market near Pahang. Nearer the Moluccas, similar opportunities were to be found in Sumbawa or Bima,²¹³ while the greatest source of vexation to the *bona fide* trade in Malacca must have been the markets in Aru, Arcat²¹⁴ and Rupert.

The Bugis, whom Pires encountered in Malacca, were honest merchants – at least at that moment. Like the Borneans, they brought many food products such as well-hulled rice, and some gold. Barbosa, moreover, mentions the long broadswords and other articles made of iron which they sold.²¹⁵ In Malacca, the Bugis bought Gujarati, Bengali and Coromandel cloth and large quantities of benzoin and incense.²¹⁶ Although the great commercial expansion of Macassar in the first half of the 17th century was largely due to the merchants who flocked there from abroad, Macassar had long known extensive shipping activity, and trade too, at least in a primitive form. The traffic of the foreigners could thus develop around an existing nucleus. Schrieke's theory that the inhabitants of Macassar concerned themselves only with agriculture, is disproved by Pires' account.²¹⁷

LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS

The Lesser Sunda Islands with their abundance of good drinking water and food supplies served the Malay and Javanese merchants as places of refreshment on their expeditions to the Moluccas.²¹⁸ Here, as we have seen, they exchanged the cloth they had brought with them from Malacca and Java for the coarse cloths suitable for the barter trade in spices in the Moluccas.²¹⁹

Sumbawa or Bima supplied the Malaccan merchants with the brazil or dye-wood which was exported from Malacca to China, where it was still in demand although it was of poorer quality than the Siamese wood.

Because of the wide-spread practice of abduction, the slave trade flourished throughout the whole area of the Lesser Sunda Islands.

The island of Solor, by which Pires undoubtedly meant Flores, was of importance to the foreign merchants because of the sulphur found there. This was sold, via Malacca, to places as far away as Cochin China.

But the greatest attraction of all was the island of Timor where sandalwood grew in great abundance. It seems to have been known to the Chinese at very early times and their ships periodically made their way there to load the valuable cargoes.²²⁰

The Malays and Javanese did not lag far behind the Chinese as this wood also found a market in India. It was used there for ointments and perfumes and it played a large part in cremation ceremonies and sacrifices. In Europe it was an apothecary's ingredient.²²¹ According to the Malaccan merchants, this wood was only obtainable on Timor and so they had a saying that "God made Timor for sandalwood, Banda for nutmeg, and the Moluccas for cloves."²²² These products of the Sunda Islands were obtained in exchange for cheap Gujarati cloths, articles made of iron, such as swords, axes, knives, and nails, and for coloured beads, porcelain, tin, quicksilver, and lead.²²³

Although the inhabitants of the Lesser Sunda Islands visited the nearby coastal districts of Java in small boats, they did not extend their expeditions to the port of Malacca, and the Malaccan merchants had to go themselves to fetch the products from the islands.

When considering the course and density of this commercial traffic as a whole, both within the archipelago and outside it, we are struck by the existence of fixed routes and ports of call and, above all, by the division of the sailing route into regular crossings. If we count up all the ships Pires listed as arriving in Malacca, we obtain a yearly figure of about 100 big ships, their countries of origin and the nature and value of their cargoes being as follows: From Gujarat 4 ships worth 25,000 to 30,000 *cruzados* each and one other ship laden chiefly with cloth worth 70,000 to 80,000 *cruzados*. The return freight worth approximately 21,000 *cruzados* per ship. From Coromandel 3 or 4 ships, the cargoes of which consisted mainly of cloth, worth 12,000 to 15,000 *cruzados* per ship, and also 1 or 2 large ships worth 80,000 to 90,000 *cruzados* each. The number of ships returning to Coromandel was greater than on the outward journey. From Bengal 4 or 5 ships including 2 junks worth 80,000 to 90,000 *cruzados* each and 2 or 3 dhows, each with a value of 20,000 *cruzados*. From Pegu 15 or 16 junks and 20 to 30 smaller cargo ships. Here the outward cargo was larger than the return freight and the bulk goods sent to Malacca were

mainly foodstuffs. In Malacca some of the ships were sold and others returned to Pegu with goods of small bulk. From Siam came 30 junks with foodstuffs. China sent 8 to 10 junks at the most, the Japanese (or Gores) 2 or 3 ships, and the Philipinos the same number. With the exception of Palembang, which sent 10 or 12 junks to Malacca, carrying foodstuffs there and cloth on the return voyage, the Sumatran ports confined themselves to coastal trade and used proas for this. From Sunda came 2 or 3 junks, while Malacca's Moluccan trade required 4 junks, and 3 junks came annually from Borneo. Pires arrives at the same total as Empoli, who also records the arrival of about 100 large ships and 30 to 40 smaller ones in the port of Malacca each year.²²⁴ According to Empoli, the harbour was so big that some 2,000 large and small ships could lie there together, a considerable number and one which would certainly include a great many proas of various sizes.

V. TRADE IN THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO NOT CENTRED EXCLUSIVELY ON MALACCA

I. THE SUMATRAN PORTS

Pasè and Pidië have already been discussed in connection with the fact that they were two of the small states which managed to remain independent of Malacca.¹

Although neither of these places could compare in importance with Malacca – “ten towns like Pasè could be made from one town like Malacca”² – they held their own as pepper-exporting ports. Pires estimates the pepper output of Pasè at about 8,000 to 10,000 *bahar* per year,³ and of Pidië, which was even more prosperous than Pasè at the beginning of the 16th century, at about 6,000 to 10,000 *bahar* per year, or as much as 15,000 *bahar* when there was a bumper crop.⁴ This would seem to indicate that pepper was intensively cultivated in northern Sumatra at the beginning of the 16th century. For purposes of comparison it may be pointed out that in Bantam, which was an important pepper-exporting port at the end of the 16th century, the quantity of pepper which could be loaded in Bantam was estimated at 1,600 *bahar*.⁵ It is not clear where the pepper came from but probably pepper bought from other regions, the Lampongs, for example, was not included in the figure of 1,600 *bahar*. When Paulus van Caerden concluded a treaty with the sultan of Achin in December 1600, the latter undertook to deliver 1,800 *bahar* in a period of 4 months.⁶ In the 18th century the entire pepper production of the Indonesian Archipelago averaged 9,000 *bahar* per year, with a peak output of 19,000 *bahar* in 1724.⁷ These are comparative figures which, in default of better ones, only go to show that Pires’ figures seem pretty much on the high side. Pires’ contemporaries, however, quote equally impressive figures. Giovanni da Empoli, for example, reports that at the beginning of the 16th century 60,000 *cantaars*, that is to say, 6,600,000 pounds of pepper, were exported⁸ (1 *cantaa*r equals 110 pounds).

Pidië, situated at the mouth of the passage between the Sumatran coast and the Malay Peninsula, attracted a great many foreign merchants. The state was usually involved in a trade war with Pasè

and, like Pasè, exported in addition to pepper, silk ⁹ and benzoin and gold from the interior. It may be assumed that silk culture had been introduced by the Chinese.

Of the foreign merchants who came to the Straits of Malacca – Gujarati, Klings, Bengali, Peguans, Siamese, and people from Kedah and Bruas – some traded in Pasè, some in Pidië, and the rest in Malacca.¹⁰ Pires only states the number of ships calling at Pidië, namely two a year from Cambay, two from Bengal, one from Coromandel and one from Pegu. Ships also called there from Trang, Tenasserim, Kedah, and Bruas on the Malay Peninsula.¹¹ In Pidië alone, therefore, there was a good deal of shipping, considering the proximity of the commercial centre of Malacca. It is unfortunate that there are no data on shipping entering Pasè, for this town, to an even greater extent than Pidië, must have been the staple for all the commodities from the adjacent territories.

We have already seen that neither Pasè nor Pidië had junks of their own; ¹² they had a number of small *lancharas* ¹³ and sometimes bought ships belonging to merchants from Pegu or Java.

Pidië originally exercised authority over a number of places between it and the northern tip of Sumatra. One such place was Lamori,¹⁴ which is also mentioned in Chinese sources and near which the subsequently so powerful kingdom of Achin grew up. Pires was the first to mention the name of Achin. At that time it was still a pirate state, but its ruler was already Moslem and a man of some authority – a '*homem cavaleiro*' among his neighbours.¹⁵ He attempted to increase his power at the expense of those neighbours in general and of Pidië in particular and employed some 30 or 40 *lanchara*-type vessels for his activities at sea. The country produced rice and other foodstuffs, but only a little pepper, and at that time it still did not conduct much trade.¹⁶

In between Pidië and Pasè lay some small states which were more or less tributary to them. They produced pepper, silk, and foodstuffs, and some gold. Most of the products went to the two important ports, although Peguans sometimes traded with the smaller states direct.

The trade of the pirate states on the east coast of Sumatra, with their slave markets and thieves' markets, was only of local significance. Gold, foodstuffs, and forest products were exported to Pasè or Pidië. Perhaps a small proportion of these products also went overland to Baros, which was a Gujarati port of call on the west coast of Sumatra.

On the east coast of Sumatra, Javanese influence extended into Jambi, which was subordinate to the Moslem north-Javanese coastal

territory of Demak.¹⁷ There was a Javanese governor in Jambi, its inhabitants had intermarried with the Javanese, and the country produced foodstuffs, *lignum aloe* and gold.

Palembang, which was situated further south, was more fertile than Jambi¹⁸ and Javanese influence there was even stronger. After it had been conquered by Moslem Demak (which would thus appear to have carried on the expansionist policy of the kingdom of Majapahit),¹⁹ the former rulers of both Jambi and Palembang were maintained in authority, but as Javanese governors dependent either upon Demak or upon the Javanese inland kingdom of Dayo, which was still in existence at that time.

A great many products reached Malacca via Palembang, and Palembang, moreover, traded extensively with Pahang. No details are to be found in Pires about direct trade between Palembang and Java, but in view of the relations between these two countries at a later date, trade must have been heavy, and presumably rice was already being exported by Java to Palembang.

Palembang later became very important not only to Javanese and Malaccan merchants but also to the Chinese, who went there to buy the pepper they so dearly coveted.²⁰ Pires, however, did not include pepper among the products of Jambi and Palembang at the time he was writing.

Palembang was later to pay most cruelly for the assistance which it gave, even though unwillingly, to Pate Unus of Japara in his struggle against the Portuguese. The entire fleet of Palembang was destroyed in the defeat suffered by the Javanese leader in his expedition against Malacca. All the members of the nobility were killed and the land was laid waste by the Portuguese.²¹

Of the islands off the Sumatran coast, Bangka was subordinate to the ruler of Japara.²² Its people were seafaring and, like the islands of the Lingga group, it was thickly populated, although the defeat of Pate Unus left its mark here too, see Pires' report about the decline in population. Bangka yielded the same products as the mainland, namely foodstuffs, forest products, cotton, and iron,²³ but Pires does not mention tin in this connection.

Further south, on the east coast of Sumatra, lay Tana Malayu, the region in which the Paramesvara, the founder of Malacca, was said to have been born. This country was also under Javanese influence. Cotton was intensively cultivated there and the rest of its products were the same as those of the other east coast areas of Sumatra.

Still further south, Tulang Bawang and Sekampung ²⁴ (districts of Lampong) had more contact with the Sunda coast districts of west Java,²⁵ where the inhabitants were also still entirely "heathen." These districts supplied huge quantities of cotton and, like the coastal ones further north, some gold, forest products and a great deal of food such as rice, meat, fish, wine, and fruit. Moreover, good quality pepper came from there, which would lead one to suppose that the cultivation of pepper had already reached an advanced stage of development in these parts in the early 16th century, even though the output of cotton still far exceeded that of pepper.²⁶ There were no foreign merchants established in the country but the natives used to take their wares to Java themselves.²⁷

On the west coast of Sumatra, Pires mentions the kingdom of Andalas (probably approximating to present-day Benkulen), and also the small seaport principalities of Priaman, Tiku, Baros, Singkel, Melabah [Melabeuh?] or Daya.²⁸ In the north, the last-mentioned principality had a common frontier with Achin.²⁹ There was brisk commercial traffic between western India and the four little states first mentioned, a relationship of very long standing.³⁰ But by the end of the 15th century Gujarati had taken the place of the Tamil merchants who used to visit these principalities in the 11th century.³¹

Every year from one to three Gujarati ships laden with cloths used to visit these ports to barter the cloths for the products of the Minangkabau hinterland, the area lying between the coastal countries of east and west Sumatra and extending from Arkat and Baros in the north to Jambi and Priaman in the south. As we have seen, a large part of the gold from Minangkabau went to Malacca, but on the west coast it was in demand among the Gujarati, who also bought the other products of the region such as lignum aloe, camphor, benzoin, silk, wax, honey and many foodstuffs. There is no record of pepper exports at this time from Tiku and Priaman, places which were later to assume so much importance in that connection. Apart from the region inland of Pidië and Pasè, pepper culture seems to have been confined to Singkel ³² on the northwest coast of Sumatra, which was visited by traders from Pasè. A little was also grown in the southeast, in the region that did a lot of trade with Sunda.³³

Of the small states on the west coast of Sumatra, Priaman was still heathen in Pires' time and conflicting rumours were current about the conversion of Tiku, while Pires has nothing at all to say about the religion of the people of Baros. Besides their contacts with western

Asia, these little states also had relations with Java and in particular with Sunda in the western part of the island. Among other things horses were shipped from Priaman to Sunda.³⁴

Many of the goods which the Gujarati bought on the west coast of Sumatra were resold by them in Java. Probably the lands on the west coast had no shipping worth mentioning of their own and were largely dependent on the foreign merchants for the disposal of their wares.

The small heathen kingdom of Singkel, which still had savage cannibal tribes (Bataks) in the interior, exported benzoin, silk, and a little pepper and gold.³⁵ Pasè traded to this country and the inhabitants themselves sailed in their small boats to the coasts of Baros, Tikus, and Priaman. The kingdom of Malabeuh or Daya bordering on Achin in the north, had the same wild tribes in the interior as Singkel. It provided a market for the coarse Gujarati cotton which was shipped there from Pasè and Pidië.³⁶

2. THE SPICE-PRODUCING AREAS: THE MOLUCCAS AND BANDA

Spices were exceptionally important trading commodities in the Asia of those days. Although Tomé Pires never visited the Moluccas and Banda himself, he was the first European to furnish us with reliable data about these places, data which he had collected in Malacca and in the Javanese spice port of Grise, which he had visited personally.

The Spice Islands can be divided into several groups, starting with Banda, the group which supplied nutmeg and mace. In Pires' day, the clove-growing islands of Amboina and its larger neighbour Ceram were still of little consequence. The Moluccas, on the other hand, which also produced cloves, were very important indeed, the principal islands in this group being Ternate, Tidore, Makian, Batchan, Motir and Gilolo (Halmahera).

Even before the coming of the Portuguese, spices were an important staple on the Banda islands. The largest island, Banda, from which the whole group took its name, had four harbours and produced the most mace. The island of Neira owed its importance largely to the Javanese traders. The other islands had no harbours, but transported their products to the main island.³⁷

Pires' figures relating to the output of mace and nutmeg on Banda seem to be on the high side, namely about 500 *bahar* of mace and some

6,000 to 7,000 *bahar* of nutmeg.³⁸ But these quantities apparently represent the maximum output of a so-called "big" harvest which occurred only once every seven years. We even find Pires' estimate of 6,000 *bahar* repeated in the reports of the Dutch navigator, Reyer Cornelisz., and he was writing at a time when harvests were certainly not as large as formerly.³⁹ On the whole, the figures Pires quotes for ships seem more reliable than those for products, especially when compared with data from the beginning of the 17th century. Perhaps he depended on native data for his information about the quantities of products and Reyer Cornelisz. may have got his figures from the same source. The accuracy of such data would be much more difficult to check than the number of ships arriving and departing. It has been suggested that these high figures were an effort on Pires' part to convince the Portuguese government of the importance of trade in Malacca,⁴⁰ but contemporaries such as Empoli, Ruy de Araujo and Urdaneta share his opinion. In fact, in comparison with those of the first two, Pires' figures actually appear very moderate.⁴¹

The various spices stood in a certain ratio to one another as regards value. In the early 16th century one *bahar* of mace was worth 7 *bahar* of nutmeg. Gradually, however, the price of nutmeg fell in relation to the price of mace and in 1603 the ratio was only 1 : 10.⁴² This tendency was apparently one of long standing for as early as 1500, approximately, the Bandanese tried to combat it by stipulating that mace could only be sold if a certain quantity of nutmeg were sold at the same time, in the ratio of 7 *bahar* of nutmeg to 1 *bahar* of mace. The Bandanese preferred to lose the nutmeg altogether rather than sell under other conditions.⁴³ Barbosa had already reported the burning of nutmeg to preserve the ratio of values.⁴⁴ The value of cloves also fell in relation to mace. At the beginning of the 16th century the ratio was even,⁴⁵ but by 1603 it stood at 7 (mace) : 10 (cloves).⁴⁶

Pires gives the price of 1 *bahar* of mace as 3 to 3½ *cruzados*,⁴⁷ according to the quality of the goods for which the mace was exchanged. Even at the time Pires was writing, however, this price must already have been affected by the competition between Portuguese and Asian traders which caused prices to rise in the Banda islands.

For some foodstuffs and textiles, the Bandanese were wholly dependent upon imports. Apart from spices, coconut palms and some fruit, there were no agricultural crops in the islands.

Sago came to Banda from the East, notably from the Aru and Kai Islands, in exchange for textiles which the Bandanese, in their turn,

had obtained from the Javanese and Malays in exchange for spices. Rice and other foodstuffs brought by the Javanese and Malays were consumed by the Bandanese themselves. Because of the spices grown for export the needs of the Bandanese had increased, since it was unprofitable to grow their own rice when this could only be done at the expense of spices. For textiles, moreover, they were utterly dependent on imports from abroad. Thus spices lay at the very centre of their existence because only through them could they obtain food and clothing.⁴⁸

Sago was so important to Banda that in Pires' time it was used for making payments.⁴⁹ From the fact that in 1603, according to a Dutch memorandum written in that year,⁵⁰ the standard circulating medium in Banda was nutmeg, one might deduce that the importance of the Banda nutmeg trade had greatly increased in the 16th century.

Apart from sago, the inhabitants of the Kai and Aru Islands also brought gold to Banda and a luxury product, namely dried parrots and birds of paradise. These were bartered by the Bandanese for textiles and so, via the Bengali merchants, they ultimately came into the hands of Turks and Persians who used them for the plumes on their headdresses.⁵¹

In Pires' account of the trade carried on by foreigners with the Banda islands, there is a tendency to attribute more importance to the supplies brought in by the Portuguese than to those of the Malay and Javanese traders, undoubtedly in order to show up the Portuguese in as favourable a light as possible to the Bandanese. The idea was that from the Portuguese the Bandanese could buy much more valuable goods – such as Gujarati, Bengali and Coromandel cloth – at prices which were low. It stands to reason however that the Malays and Javanese did not bring only “old pots, trinkets and beads from Cambay”⁵² but, as Pires admits elsewhere for that matter, good quality cloth as well, which made the captains of the junks objects of veneration to the local inhabitants and gave them so much power that they “used to take command of the country and bought as they wished as long as they stayed there and they used to fix a price for the people in the country.”⁵³ Rice must also have been imported, although Pires does not mention this.

It should be borne in mind that the Portuguese, who carried on direct trade with Banda, took good quality cloths there from western Asia, while the coarser varieties of cloth from the Sunda islands were brought to Banda by the petty Malay and Javanese traders. A wholesale merchant such as the Javanese ruler in Grise, however, would buy in

Grise, and probably in Malacca too, the more expensive kinds of cloth from western Asia for the purpose of exporting them to Banda and the Moluccas.⁵⁴ For there was a market for these cloths in Banda as well. There and on the other Spice Islands fine materials were not only used as clothing but were also collected as treasure, in the same way as copper gongs, ivory, and fine porcelain.⁵⁵ The coarser sorts were also indispensable to the Bandanese as these were needed to meet the requirements of the traders bringing sago from the islands further east, from Halmahera to New Guinea.⁵⁶

Evidently the Bandanese also undertook trading voyages of their own at the beginning of the 16th century. The more detailed accounts of these voyages date from a later period, but since Pires includes the Bandanese in his list of peoples calling at Malacca,⁵⁷ and since, moreover, there was a *shahbandar* in Malacca to look after the interests of Bandanese and some other merchants,⁵⁸ we must conclude that such trading voyages were already being made to Malacca at the beginning of the 16th century.⁵⁹ The Bandanese were not very good seamen, however. Their ships had only wooden anchors and were mostly manned by slaves, and at the slightest sign of danger the crew used to desert the ship and try to swim to safety. Small wonder then that their voyages to and from Malacca were of long duration and that many ships were lost on the way.⁶⁰

Unfortunately Pires tells us very little about the social and governmental institutions of the Bandanese people at the beginning of the 16th century. Unlike the fuzzy-haired inhabitants of neighbouring Ceram,⁶¹ they had straight black hair,⁶² which might indicate inter-marriage with Malays, Chinese or Javanese. The population lived in villages and were governed by elders. At the beginning of the 17th century the Bandanese fled from the Dutch to the interior, but a century before that they had also had a fortified village in the mountains to which they used to retreat with their possessions and merchandise in the event of enemy raids on the coast.⁶³ Part of the coastal population and in particular the section of it engaged in trade, was already converted to Islam which, according to Pires, had begun to make its influence felt in the Banda group some thirty years previously.⁶⁴ It is not clear whether we should assume that the Moslem merchants mentioned by Pires as living on the coast were middlemen originally coming from other parts of Asia. Later on, western Asians do indeed play an important part in the conclusion of trading agreements, and the Mullahs also have considerable political influence.⁶⁵

Cloves from the five Moluccan islands – Ternate, Tidore, Makian, Motir and Batchan – were also of great importance as far as trade in the Indonesian area was concerned.

Unlike the Banda islands, the Moluccas had no merchant shipping of their own. Their oar-propelled *kora-koras* were used only for making war on other islands of their own group. Ternate owed its authority over the islands to the fact that it possessed the most *kora-koras*. The inhabitants had no junks, however, or other ships with boards which would have been capable of carrying cargo.⁶⁶ For the transportation of their produce they were dependent on the foreign merchants who came to the country to collect it. In the early 16th century the Bandanese seem to have done a good deal of intermediary trading and they used to resell the Moluccan cloves to the Javanese and Malays⁶⁷ in the Banda islands.

Islam began to spread through the Moluccas even earlier than in the Banda islands,⁶⁸ which goes to show that the export of cloves was not exclusively in Bandanese hands but that Malays and Javanese also visited the Moluccas. For that matter, Islam did not gain many adherents there. Only the rulers and a small section of the population (probably the people who had most contact with the foreign traders) were converted, and neither the king nor his subjects proved very orthodox Moslems.⁶⁹

According to Pires, the island of Makian had the best harbour in the Moluccas. It was a meeting place for foreign merchants who went there with their junks,⁷⁰ and cloves were taken there from the other islands. Only Ternate exported its own cloves. Makian was in some way subordinate to Tidore, which was hostile to Ternate. Pires estimates that the clove crop in Makian amounted to about 1,500 *bahar* per year, and the island produced foodstuffs as well. The proportion of Moslems was smaller in Makian than in Ternate.⁷¹

Only two or three ships could anchor in Ternate at a time but, thanks to his patronage of foreign merchants, the ruler was able to carry on a lucrative trade.⁷²

It is possible that their participation in commerce helped the rulers in the Moluccas to consolidate their sovereignty. At the beginning of the 16th century, the possession of half the island of Motir apparently ensured the ruler of Ternate⁷³ of an adequate supply of food for the needs of his own subjects. In view of the figures for the other islands Pires' estimate of the size of the annual clove crop cannot be correct; probably it amounted to 1,500 *bahar* as in Makian.⁷⁴

Goods also reached Ternate from elsewhere; for example, iron axes, swords and knives came from the Banggai Archipelago, and from other places some gold, ivory, coarse native cloth, and the luxury product, dried parrots.⁷⁵

Tidore had no port at all where deep-sea ships could anchor. According to Pires, the island produced some 1,400 *bahar* of cloves a year.⁷⁶ Food crops were cultivated (Pires does not state what kind but sago was produced in these parts, especially on Halmahera) and more food supplies came from Motir, half of which island belonged to Tidore and the other half to Ternate.⁷⁷ Although the sultan of Tidore had already embraced Islam, most of his subjects were still heathen. The island of Motir was entirely heathen and not even the representatives of the rulers of Ternate and Tidore who governed the two halves of the island were Moslems. Apart from its function as a supplier of food, Motir's importance lay in the fact that it produced 1,200 *bahar* of cloves annually.

Of the Batchan group of islands, only Batchan itself produced cloves – about 500 *bahar* a year. Food supplies for Batchan had to be brought from the other islands.⁷⁸ Here too almost the entire population was still heathen but the ruler, who was closely connected with Ternate, had probably gone over to Islam. According to Pires, the islands had good ports and the people used to engage in trade.⁷⁹ Clove culture was of recent origin and it was only in the last 10 years that people had begun to cultivate the clove trees which grew wild on the island. This implies that people were no longer content to pick cloves in the woods at random and had begun instead to grow cloves in plantations. Later on, cloves were to be even more intensively cultivated in these parts.

Pires had also heard rumours that cloves were beginning to be cultivated on the big island of Gilolo (Halmahera) as well. Certainly the island already possessed many wild cloves⁸⁰ which were exported via the port of Gilolo.

Pires estimates the average total output of the 5 Moluccan islands at 6,000 *bahar* per year. It is true that Rebello quotes the same figure, but the other Portuguese writers differ about the amount of the total output.⁸¹

The clove trade was based entirely on barter, the cloves invariably being exchanged for goods. While the Portuguese maintained this system, the Dutch introduced payment in money – a change which proved detrimental to their own interests.⁸²

Pires' vague note on the ownership of the spice trees throws no light on this problem. The clove trees were in the possession of the natives, who brought the cloves to the sea coast.⁸³ Whether the trees were common or private property, in how far they were the property of one definite section of the population, namely, the nobles, and to what extent they were the property of the king, are all questions which it will be advisable to answer later when we are dealing with the period which is better documented. The fact that the king of Ternate had allowed foreign merchants to enter his country shows how very important, even at that early date, the merchants must have been to the economy of the islands.⁸⁴

Like the Banda islands, the Moluccas were dependent upon imports from abroad, but to a lesser degree. Food crops were grown only in Motir and, to a lesser extent, in Tidore and Makian. Moreover there was a close interplay of factors, that is to say, more spice trees meant less agriculture, and vice versa. The following quotation by a Dutch navigator might well apply to the Moluccas: "those inhabitants are but ill-rewarded. For in spite of all the work they do in collecting the cloves they enjoy only a very sober standard of living because the foodstuffs which have to be brought here from far distant places cost them the greater part of their income." ⁸⁵ Profits were reaped only by the foreign middlemen, the native rulers, and the port officials who collected the customs duties.

Chinese as well as Malays and Javanese came to the Moluccas. Fourteenth century Chinese sources indicate that the islands were known ⁸⁶ even though cloves were not being produced in large quantities at that time. The inhabitants were glad to sell their products to the Chinese. The fact that the Chinese brought Javanese cloth to the Moluccas as well as silver, iron, ivory, beads, and blue Chinese porcelain dishes and cups, indicates that they took the same route as the Javanese.⁸⁷ The inhabitants of the Moluccas gave higher prices for Chinese porcelain than could be obtained anywhere else. After the 14th century the sources make no further mention of direct Chinese trade and Schrieke assumes that the Chinese could not hold their own against Javanese and Malay competition. This was certainly one reason but, apart from that, the Chinese could get all the spices they wanted in Malacca. For that matter they no longer visited the port of Grise either. The higher cost of spices in Malacca would be offset by the greater length of the voyage to Grise or the Moluccas. Apparently the Chinese did not even resume their voyages to the Moluccas when

Malacca surrendered to the Portuguese.⁸⁸ Is it true that when the Dutch arrived in the Moluccas they came across a great many Chinese there, men who played an especially important rôle in trade as interpreters and valuers.⁸⁹ These Chinese may have come to settle in the Moluccas from the Philippines.

The Chinese never visited Banda, Amboina or Ceram at all. Apparently there was no demand among them for nutmeg and mace and the islands were too far distant for them to go there for cloves.

The Chinese used to set out for the Moluccas from Malacca or the Philippines. At the beginning of the 16th century, Ceram and Amboina were of little importance as far as trade in the Indonesian area was concerned. Some cloves (probably still uncultivated ones) went from these islands to the Banda group. Pires, at any rate, knows their inhabitants only as "gente de cabello revolto bestial"⁹⁰ who did not carry on trade or cultivate crops.

3. TRADE IN BORNEO, CELEBES AND THE LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS

Borneo

In the chapter on the commercial traffic of Malacca, mention was made of the trading connections of the port of Brunei, situated on the north-west coast of Borneo.⁹¹ It must certainly have been due to Malaccan influence that Mohammedanism spread there at the beginning of the 16th century. The ruler had recently turned Moslem and probably those of his subjects who were merchants were Moslem as well.⁹² As in so many islands in the Indonesian Archipelago, the mercantile population of the ports was more or less cultured while the people who lived in the interior and purchased the beads, copper bracelets and similar knick-knacks which had been bought in Malacca were still utterly primitive.

Brunei must have been visited by Chinese merchants long before the 16th century, for Chinese sources contain many detailed references to the native products and to the Chinese goods imported there (silver, red gold, coloured satin, ivory boxes, ironwork, etc).⁹³ The king of Brunei was even reputed to be of Chinese descent. It is impossible to ascertain how much of this is true, but in any case at the beginning of the 16th century Chinese influence was strong there and many Chinese were settled in the port.⁹⁴

The royal administration of the port was at a remarkably high level

and was in the hands of a hierarchy of disciplined port officials reminiscent of the Chinese system.⁹⁵ When a ship entered the port gifts were sent to the king. A chief writer was in charge of negotiations, assisted by a second writer, chief assistant, second assistant and an official for checking weights and measures.⁹⁶ This description taken from a Chinese source is confirmed by Pigafetta, who also comments on the great number of royal writers.⁹⁷ Even in the early days a good deal of trade may have been done, but the period of greatest prosperity must have come after the Portuguese conquest of Malacca when the foreign merchants turned their attention to Brunei and other places because of the interference and extortion to which they were subjected by Portuguese officials in Malacca.

The trade carried on with Malacca by the diamond belt on the south coast of Borneo has also been discussed earlier, but Lawe and Tanjung Pura really had more to do with Java than with Malacca. Since the days of Majapahit, Java had exercised a certain hegemony there. By the beginning of the 16th century Majapahit's place had apparently been taken by Japara, and Pate Unus, the famous ruler of Japara, had established his authority over these places. Pires even asserts that the grandfather of Pate Unus came from Lawe and says of him that "with very little nobility and less wealth" he emigrated to Malacca, married a Malay woman and began a prosperous business career which was continued by his son and grandson, who transferred the business to Java.⁹⁸

Gold and foodstuffs were exported from Lawe and Tanjung Pura as well as diamonds. Moreover, the Javanese procured junks from these and other places on Borneo just as they did from Banjarmasin somewhat later on. In Java itself the Borneans sometimes sold the junks which they had brought to the island laden with merchandise. Pigafetta who described these vessels in the second half of the 16th century, estimated that their tonnage was the same as that of the Spanish ships of his time.⁹⁹ He must have had a small type of Spanish ship in mind for at the end of the 17th century Valentijn estimated that some of the Bornean ships (which he called proas) were 40 to 50 feet long and 8 to 10 feet wide.¹⁰⁰

Tanjung Pura, which was also subordinate to Japara, carried the same products to Java and Malacca as Lawe. Apart from their connections with Japara, both places also maintained communications with the west-Javanese port of Sunda Kalapa.¹⁰¹

Later sources contain data about places in Borneo like Sambas,

Banjarmasin and Sukadana but the 16th century sources do not mention them at all.

Celebes

Celebes was still entirely heathen at the time Pires was writing and he had only a very vague idea about its trade.¹⁰² He mentioned that the Bugis traded to Malacca, Java, Borneo, and all the places lying between Pahang and Siam. There was little – and sometimes nothing at all – to distinguish this “trade” from piracy.

The Lesser Sunda Islands

The Lesser Sunda Islands like Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa ¹⁰³ were large-scale producers of rice and other foodstuffs such as meat and fish. For the rest, they manufactured the coarse cloth bought by the Javanese and Malay merchants for the Moluccas trade. Horse breeding was carried on,¹⁰⁴ especially in Sumbawa and Timor, and horses were also exported. Besides that, slaves were in great demand, particularly female ones, and there was a brisk trade carried on in these throughout the islands. The natives brought their wares in small ships, long narrow canoes, to the eastern tip of Java. As has already been stated, Malaccan traders came to Sumbawa to collect sappan wood (brazil wood or red dye-wood) and they also called at the island of Solor for the sulphur obtainable there.

From ancient times the Chinese had made voyages to Timor, where they could obtain the valuable sandalwood which they used especially for preparing perfumes and incense. But the rise of Malacca must have brought about a decline in this direct trade too. A Chinese source from the mid 14th century (Wang Ta Yuan)¹⁰⁵ gives a description of the sandalwood trade carried on by the Chinese, who could obtain this product in exchange for silver, iron, porcelain, textiles, and coloured silk. But Rockhill, Wang Ta Yuan's editor, points out that 15th century Chinese sources contain no new data about this trade and that therefore there cannot have been much contact between the Chinese and Timor during the early Ming era. It seems probable, therefore, that at that time the Chinese obtained their sandalwood via the Malaccan market exclusively.

In Timor there were a great many trading settlements,¹⁰⁶ all under separate chiefs. A much later Chinese source from the beginning of the 17th century (Wang Ch'i tsung – 1618), but one which is probably based on earlier data, gives a description of the way in which trade was carried on.¹⁰⁷

The chiefs had some sort of supervisory function, for when foreign merchants arrived the chief and his entire retinue went to the market place, where the inhabitants had gathered to barter their wood with the foreigners. Duties had to be paid, but not very heavy ones. No trading took place in the chief's absence "for fear of disturbances". It is not clear whether this is meant to imply that the chief had some sort of priority right of sale. Besides sandalwood, Timor exported large quantities of wax and honey, and the slave trade flourished there too. According to Barbosa, the country also produced a certain amount of pepper.¹⁰⁸

The islanders did not possess any junks for exporting their own products¹⁰⁹ but Malaccan and Javanese traders came to collect the goods.¹¹⁰ As mediums of exchange they brought cloth, axes, knives, swords, nails, porcelain, tin, quicksilver, lead, and coloured beads.¹¹¹

4. THE JAVANESE SEAPORTS

As a source of information about trade in the Javanese coastal towns, Tomé Pires' *Suma Oriental* is of exceptional value since his knowledge was based on personal observation and research. Pires furnishes us with details which rectify and supplement the ideas obtaining previously. Those ideas were based on less detailed material, and when Schrieke was formulating his conclusions it was on that material that he had to draw. The data supplied by Pires relate to the political and dynastic history of Java (to which de Graaf has devoted special attention in his study of Tomé Pires' *Suma Oriental*),¹¹² but equally to the economic history of this extremely important part of the Indonesian Archipelago.

A rough outline of the development of trade in the Javanese seaports in the period prior to the beginning of the 16th century has already been given in the previous chapters. When the Europeans came to know Java, Javanese shipping was confined to the Indonesian area, the Philippines, the Malay Peninsula, and Further India.¹¹³ Yet at that time the Javanese still had well-constructed ships,¹¹⁴ some they had built themselves and others bought from Peguans on the Malaccan market.¹¹⁵ Moreover the southeast coast of Borneo also supplied Java with cargo ships.¹¹⁶

At the beginning of the 16th century Javanese shipbuilding still enjoyed a good reputation, so that when Albuquerque left Malacca in 1512 he took some 60 skilled Javanese shipwrights with him.¹¹⁷ But

production seems to have been limited to small, fast-sailing war proas and cargo ships of small tonnage. Later on, Lasem in particular, situated between Tuban and Japara and close to the Rembang teak forests,¹¹⁸ became a centre of this shipbuilding industry.

Javanese shipping was in a sorry state after the disaster it suffered when the fleet of the united Javanese seaports was destroyed during the conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese. Pires' deeply pessimistic utterances about Javanese shipbuilding in his day, to the effect that the industry was still not in a condition to build ten junks in as many years,¹¹⁹ should, of course, be considered in the light of this event, but at the same time it should be remembered that even in those days some of the Javanese ships were of foreign origin and had to be obtained in Portuguese Malacca which was especially hostile to Japara at that time.

Javanese shipping must have recovered in the course of the 16th century in view of the situation when the Dutch arrived in Indonesia at the end of that century. But small ships were still the rule in the Javanese seaports. The big junks which could carry up to 400 tons were all concentrated in Japara, which had resumed friendly relations with Malacca and now supplied the city with foodstuffs as before.¹²⁰

The art of navigation was also fairly well developed among the Javanese, and from the fact that Albuquerque sent his king a copy of part of a nautical chart of the navigational area of the Indian Ocean made by a Javanese skipper,¹²¹ it must be assumed that the Javanese were acquainted with the use of charts.¹²² When they first encountered the Javanese, the Dutch gained the impression that nautical charts were unknown to them. But, then, on their first visit the Dutch were not given a chance to see any large Javanese ships and they did not see charts being used in any of the small Javanese coasters with which they did come into contact.¹²³

To the native Indonesian seamen living in a tropical climate with clear starry nights, compasses would be less indispensable than charts. Varthema's somewhat dubious remark that during his voyage from Borneo to Java in 1506 he observed the use of a compass by the native skipper of his ship¹²⁴ is offset by the declarations of the Dutch who sometimes make a point of stating that the native seamen whom they took on board as guides did not know how to use a compass. When Admiral Steven van der Haghen made his first voyage to Indonesia, part of his cargo of merchandise consisted of several hundred compasses in cases of every conceivable design from simple wooden ones to

beautifully painted examples and others made of metal, which he tried to dispose of to Indonesian navigators, but there was no demand for them at all and they had to be taken back to Holland still unsold.¹²⁵ Yet this was not necessarily due to ignorance of the use of the instrument, for the Javanese might have learned about it from western Asians or from the Chinese.

It may therefore be concluded that the Javanese not only possessed well-built ships but also had navigational aids to enable them to transport the produce of their fertile island over fairly long distances, although the design of their ships cannot have been very suited to navigation on the Indian Ocean.

It must, however, have been mainly owing to economic factors that the Javanese confined their shipping in the 15th and 16th centuries to the area of the Indonesian Archipelago and its immediate vicinity. Bumper rice crops enabled Java (where production far exceeded domestic consumption) to ship its surplus to other countries.¹²⁷ Since the Spice Islands, on the other hand, were very poorly provided with foodstuffs, their inhabitants must long have been accustomed to barter their valuable spices for Javanese rice. Through this, as we have already seen, a brisk intermediary trade had sprung up in the north Javanese ports.

One of the oldest commercial towns in Java was Tuban, whose record of overseas trade goes back to the 11th century¹²⁸ and where a Chinese expedition landed at the end of the 13th century in a vain attempt to conquer the island.¹²⁹ This town undoubtedly owed its great commercial prosperity to the Majapahit policy of overseas expansion which resulted in Tuban being made the port of departure for sea voyages to the Moluccas – as the survival of various Moluccan place names incorporating the name of Tuban indicates.¹³⁰ A proportion of the tribute from subject countries is sure to have reached the Majapahit capital via this port, bringing great wealth and prosperity to Tuban and its ruler. Even after the conversion of the native ruler to Islam, which took place some time before the middle of the 15th century¹³¹ and was probably due to Arab influence,¹³² close communications were maintained with the Hindu kingdom. This was exceptional since the conversion of the other rulers of coastal territories in Java invariably led to a break with Majapahit. The Mohammedanism of Tuban's ruler was not strictly orthodox in character; "no firm believer in Mohammed" is Pires' verdict.¹³³ Nor were his subjects any more orthodox. A proportion of them remained "heathen"

and, as was customary in commercial towns in Asia, these people lived in a separate part of the town.¹³⁴ Yet Tuban is not depicted as a real commercial town and trading centre either in Pires' description dating from the beginning of the 16th century or in the accounts of the Dutch navigators written nearly a century later.¹³⁵ It did not even possess a proper harbour where ships of fairly heavy draught could anchor, only open roads at quite a considerable distance from the town.¹³⁶ Primarily, Tuban owed its prosperity to the fact that it was the port for the Hindu capital which, especially after the coastal rulers had been converted to Islam, had no outlet left on the coast. A state of war usually existed between the Hindu ruler and Surabaya.

Surrounded as it was by a thick wall, Tuban was a court capital which could not easily be captured. Within the outer wall, the various noblemen possessed fortified courts of their own which housed their dependents. Pires seems to have been very much impressed by the soldierly spirit of these people: "Knights more than any of the other Javanese."¹³⁷ but he has nothing to say about any commercial activity or shipping assets.¹³⁸ Yet by the end of the 16th century the inhabitants had managed to combine commerce and shipping with an aristocratic way of living in which hunting and tournaments featured prominently. At the beginning of the 16th century, apparently, trade in Tuban was of a more passive variety. The people then possessed neither junks nor other, smaller, cargo vessels.¹³⁹ In this case, the complete absence of ships can have had no connection with the defeat suffered by the Javanese naval forces off Malacca. Particularly strong arguments against such a theory would be the lack of religious zeal displayed by the ruler of Tuban and the fact that because of his friendship with the Hindu kingdom he was distrusted and hated by the Moslem kings of the other ports.¹⁴⁰ Like his Hindu suzerain, the ruler of Tuban seems to have tried immediately to establish friendly relations with the Portuguese.¹⁴¹ This is further indicated by the fact that Pires says nothing about Tuban giving help to Pate Unus while he does record the assistance given by Grise (which had such disastrous consequences as far as Grise's merchant fleet was concerned). The reason why Tuban did so little trade at the beginning of the 16th century may well have been the near monopoly of the spice trade held by Grise in close collaboration with Malacca shortly before the fall of the latter town.

That Pires' description of Tuban is based on personal observation is clear from its close analogy to the accounts left by the Dutch after they had called there in 1599. Although a century divided them, the bar-

barians (whether black-haired or red-haired) were all equally impressed by the display of luxury and the parade of elephants, horses, dogs, and women of the harems.¹⁴²

Yet Tuban was only a small place really, harbouring no more than a thousand residents within its walls.¹⁴³ It did own some of the surrounding territory, bounded by Rembang on the West and Sedayu on the East, but its abundant supplies of food products such as rice, fruits, wine (probably palm wine) and meat, must have come from the interior along routes connecting the Hindu capital with the coast.¹⁴⁴ In wartime Tuban could supply the Hindu kingdom with some six to seven thousand fighting men.¹⁴⁵

The rich variety of products from the Moluccas which had formerly attracted the western Asians had likewise drawn a great many Chinese to the ports of Java. At the beginning of the 15th century Chinese sources list Tuban as an important port in which numerous Chinese from Canton and Chuangchow had settled.¹⁴⁶ Pires does not mention these settlers at all and neither do the Dutch later on. Had they by that time transferred their activities largely to Grise, or had they been completely absorbed into the native Javanese population through losing contact with their land of origin when Chinese shipping to the ports of Java practically ceased after the beginning of the 15th century?

More important than Tuban at the beginning of the 16th century was the port of Grise, which was favourably situated, with a naturally sheltered harbour, on the channel running between the island of Madura and the mainland of Java. Chinese sources claim that the town was founded by Chinese on a deserted strip of coast.¹⁴⁷ If this is so it must have been founded some time after the first half of the 14th century since a Chinese source dated 1349 makes no reference to a settlement on that part of the coast.¹⁴⁸ The settlement flourished and rapidly achieved prosperity, and between 1425 and 1432 the number of inhabitants was estimated at 1,000, the wealthiest members of the community being Chinese. The ruler of Grise was himself a native of Canton and in 1411 he sent ambassadors to the Chinese court with letters and tribute.¹⁴⁹ Is the ruler of the whole community meant here, or only the leader of the Chinese? Because a great many other foreigners – Gujarati, Bengali, and natives of Calicut – seem to have settled in the place,¹⁵⁰ and among these the western Asians rapidly succeeded in attaining a dominant position. Probably the Chinese were either supplanted by the last mentioned group or

they became assimilated with the western Asian and native Javanese population.

Mohammedanism, which was propagated by the western Asians, also lent considerable force to their activities and from early times Grise was a centre of missionary activity. The first Moslem apostle of Java, Malik Ibrahim (d. 1419), a merchant who, according to tradition rose to be a *shahbandar* – the first step on the road to complete sovereignty¹⁵¹ – is reputed to be buried very near Grise. On a mountain a little to the southwest of Grise one of the spiritual leaders of Islam established himself. This was the ecclesiastical ruler of Giri, whose power was to increase in the course of the 16th century until he came to wield spiritual supremacy over all Java.¹⁵² Tradition has it that this spiritual leader was closely associated with commerce. There is even a legend about an enterprising tradeswoman who had charge of the education of the first Giri ruler, conducted large-scale business operations and, like an eastern “woman of Staveren”¹⁵³ dispatched her ships from Grise to all points of the compass, to Bali, to the Moluccas, and even to Cambodia.¹⁵⁴ There is also an obvious link with the trading centre of Malacca, since the father of the Giri ruler had settled in that town as a merchant and teacher of Moslem doctrine.¹⁵⁵

It is remarkable that Pires¹⁵⁶ was not even aware of the existence either of this first ruler of Giri, who bore the title of Sunan (Sunan Prabu Satmata) and reigned until 1511,¹⁵⁷ or of his successor, Sunan Dalem.¹⁵⁸ The only governors of Grise known to Pires were the two influential men who held sway over the city – which was divided into two parts by a small river. One of these men was Pate Cuçuf, who had authority over the larger area (which also contained the greater number of inhabitants), and the other was Pate Zeynall, who ruled over the remaining part.¹⁵⁹ Although the rise to power of both men was closely connected with trade, the status of Zeynall (who was apparently the longer established of the two, “the oldest of all the pates of Java,”¹⁶⁰ related to the rulers of Sedayu and Japara and a fellow warrior of the pate of Demak), had already become that of nobleman-landowner. He was continually engaged in a fierce struggle with his neighbour¹⁶¹ and the two adversaries only made brief truces at harvest time or when junks bound for the port were sighted, proof that the interests of both rulers remained agrarian as well as commercial. Unlike Cuçuf, Pate Zeynall seems to have had no ships of his own.¹⁶² As a champion of the cause of Islam, all his energies were directed towards waging war against his “heathen” enemies in the interior.

Pate Cuçuf, then, must be regarded as a younger intruder, closely associated with Malacca and by birth part Malay. Thanks to his business connections, he managed to obtain a virtual monopoly of the Moluccan spice trade. Pate Cuçuf's father, Pate Adem, who came from Grise (witness the landed property he seems to have owned there)¹⁶³ had been established for some considerable time in Malacca as a merchant. There he married a woman from a prominent Malay family, who was related to both the *bendahara* and the sultan of Malacca himself. The issue of this marriage was Pate Cuçuf who, on attaining adulthood, also carried on business in Malacca. But the family had not broken off all relations with the country of origin,¹⁶⁴ and on his father's death Pate Adem returned to Java to take possession of the estates his family appear to have owned in the Grise area. Pate Cuçuf followed his father to Java and continued to trade with the Moluccas from there.¹⁶⁵ Curious confirmation of Pires' account is provided by a passage in the Malay Annals which also discusses the period spent by Pate Adem (here called chief of Surabaya) in Malacca, even though the account in the Annals takes the form of a romantic love story and anything that might serve to remind the reader of the more materialistic side of Pate Adem's residence in Malacca is omitted.¹⁶⁶

We have already seen how closely Grise's Moluccan trade was associated with that of Malacca.¹⁶⁷ But the assistance given by Pate Cuçuf to Pate Unus on the latter's attempt to recapture Malacca from the Portuguese resulted in the destruction of Cuçuf's fleet of large cargo-carrying junks,¹⁶⁸ and the disaster was all the worse because the ships could no longer be replaced by junks built in Pegu. It appears, however that Cuçuf still had fast war-proas at his disposal which could sail along the coast and attack potential enemies.

In spite of this blow to Grise's trade, Pires nevertheless feels called upon to give an almost lyrical description of the port: "the great trading port, the best in all Java, the jewel of Java in trading ports where the ships at anchor are safe from the winds, with their bowsprits touching the houses; among the Javanese it is called the rich people's port, and under Pate Cuçuf's patronage many foreign merchants have settled in the country." ¹⁶⁹ Nearly a century later the Dutch, like Pires, also praise this exceptionally good harbour and their description corresponds very closely indeed to his: "for it is an almost sheltered harbour, at a stone's throw from the city walls large ships can lie in 12 fathom of water." ¹⁷⁰

Grise was a staple for cloth from the West and spices from the

Moluccas, and soon after the fall of Malacca direct trade with East and West must have been re-established. In particular the Moslem Gujarati who at first avoided the hostile Portuguese Christian centre of Malacca began to make their way again to the ports of northern Java via the Sunda Straits, and so, when the Dutch arrived, they were still in time to witness the commercial prosperity of Grise.

Judging by the fact that Chinese had settled there ¹⁷¹ at the beginning of the 15th century Surabaya used to engage in a certain amount of mercantile activity, but by the beginning of the 16th century its trade was being carried on via the port of Grise.¹⁷² Possessing neither large nor small cargo ships, the ruler based his authority exclusively on land tenure. In Pires' time he was highly respected by his Moslem colleagues on the coast of Java because of his military qualities, and he acted as a sort of sentinel against danger from the eastern tip of Java where the inhabitants were all still Hindu. Apparently he could also hold his own from a military point of view against the Hindu kingdom inland. As in the other Javanese coastal states, food crops were grown in this country and the ruler exported them via Grise. But apparently he was not averse (or, rather, his subordinate army chiefs were not averse) to piracy, for the country might not have any cargo ships but it did possess war-proas.

Sedayu, situated between Tuban and Grise, was also an agrarian state and feudal in structure. Its coast was a bad one for landing on and being therefore little suited to trade it possessed no junks or cargo *pangajavas*. Although the ruler had already been converted to Islam, the population of the surrounding countryside was still largely Hindu.¹⁷³

There were no commercial towns in the small agrarian Hindu kingdoms on the eastern tip of Java for although these places were abundantly provided with foodstuffs, these seem to have been of a kind in which no trade worth mentioning was carried on. Male and female slaves from these parts, however, were sold throughout the entire archipelago. Inhabited by warlike peoples – the ruler of the kingdom of Balambangan was a famous general – these small Hindu kingdoms carried on a continuous struggle with Moslem Surabaya.¹⁷⁴

Madura, which was still completely "heathen", was also rich in rice and other food products. Horses were bred, and cloth manufactured for domestic use. Although the country was predominantly agrarian, trade in foodstuffs and slaves does seem to have been carried on with the nearby Sunda Islands in small *lancharas*. This trade resulted in

some gold entering the country and so cloth could be imported to supplement domestic production. In spite of the fact that the island had not been converted to Mohammedanism, it lived at peace with neighbouring Grise.¹⁷⁵

West of Tuban the coast was under the dominion of newly-arisen Demak, which used to wage war against both Tuban and the Hindu kingdom inland. All this fighting turned the borderland between Rembang (which belonged to Demak) and Tuban into a desolate and depopulated countryside. Along the coast Demak extended its influence westward as far as Sunda, which was still Hindu in Pires' time, while outside Java itself Palembang and Jambi and the islands between the east coast of Sumatra and Borneo came under its dominion. Probably a connection can be shown between the rise of Demak and the great volume of foodstuffs exported (in particular, rice to Malacca),¹⁷⁶ a trade which brought great prosperity to the whole of the region.

The well-wooded district of Rembang, where shipbuilding had been carried on since ancient times, provided Demak with the ships it needed for trade. For that matter, Rembang supplied ships to other places too, but the rice and other foodstuffs must have been exported at first mainly via Demak and later via Japara.¹⁷⁷ Before the catastrophe which resulted in the destruction of Javanese shipping power, Demak had about 40 junks at its disposal for transporting goods to Malacca, while Malaccan junks also came to Demak to barter their cargoes of merchandise for foodstuffs. Demak was entirely dependent upon this trade with Malacca. It lay on a wide river, it is true, but junks could only enter the port at high tide.

Smaller and less populous Japara remained subordinate to Demak although its port was the more important of the two. It was probably due to this latter fact that, in its turn, Japara succeeded in extending its power even beyond the confines of Java and came to exercise a certain authority over Bangka and over Tanjung Pura and Lawe in Borneo.¹⁷⁸ The port of Japara was in a bay which could be entered by quite large ships so that it became an important port of call for ships trading from Java to the Moluccas. Exports were provided by the abundant rice crops of the hinterland which went to heavily populated Malacca and also to the Spice Islands. Its ruler, the well-known Pate Unus, adversary of the Portuguese, was, like the ruler of Grise, of mixed Malay descent and came from the commercial environment of Malacca.¹⁷⁹

Other dependencies of Demak besides Japara were Tegal and Semarang, both rice-exporting countries with some trade of their own conducted by merchants who had settled there. Both places possessed ports, although Pires had rather a poor opinion of the port of Semarang.¹⁸⁰

In Cheribon, however, which was situated on a river, there was a good port which junks could enter. In the hinterland, rice and other foodstuffs were produced.¹⁸¹ Cheribon was a fairly important commercial town which had been converted to Islam some 40 years before Pires' time by a parvenu from Demak. The future Moslem rulers of Demak were the direct descendants of this man. Close communications also existed between Cheribon and Malacca. The well-known leader of the Javanese settlement in Malacca Upeh, Pate Kediri, had come from Cheribon and he still maintained relations with his country of origin.

Pate Kediri was so much respected in his native Cheribon that the most important merchants of the town, some five or six of them, whose wealth was equal to his own, paid him homage, as, in fact, the ruler of Cheribon did too.¹⁸²

In his description of the coast Pires enumerates the junks each place had in its possession. This summary partly represents the situation before the catastrophic destruction of ships off Malacca and partly the situation as it was subsequently.¹⁸³ According to this, Cheribon had 3 or 4 junks and some *lancharas*, Losari 2 junks and 5 *lancharas*, Tegalr junk and some small *lancharas*, Semarang 3 junks and 4 or 5 *lancharas*, and Demak 40 junks. Pires does not give the number of junks owned by Japara before the catastrophe, but afterwards only 3 junks and 2 or 3 *pangajavas* were left.¹⁸⁴ Since Pires considers that before the disaster Japara was almost as powerful as Demak, it may be assumed that Japara had also owned a good many junks.

Pires' account¹⁸⁵ makes it clear just how drastic the defeat off Malacca was as far as Java was concerned. Pate Unus, whose war fleet consisted of ships requisitioned from all the Moslem ports, brought back only the 3 junks mentioned above. Moreover, the fall of Malacca meant that it was no longer possible to buy Peguan junks. As we have seen, the Javanese shipbuilding industry concentrated more on small ships than on large junks. Trade seems to have picked up again quite quickly however, and this factor had a favourable effect on the shipbuilding industry.

The fact that none of the Javanese ports imposed heavy duties was highly conducive to trade. In general the only import duties were

anchorage dues and payment of these had to take the form of a gift. For the rest, 4% duty was levied on merchandise sold inside the country.¹⁸⁶

To a large extent the Moslem rulers of the Javanese ports were descended from foreign merchants or slaves grown rich and powerful. Only in Tuban was the ruling house a native Javanese family which had been converted to Islam. As Pires describes it, the pattern of conversion to Islam was usually the following. Foreign merchants who had won respect and power were granted the right to build mosques. As a result religious teachers, or *mullahs*, entered the country and they, in their turn, attracted many Moslems from abroad. Those who had been in Java a long time became assimilated, and adopted the manners and customs of the old Javanese nobility.¹⁸⁷

In spite of the religious antithesis, the traditions of Hindu Majapahit seem to have exerted a strong attraction on the parvenus: "they speak of Guste Pate's affairs with great respect" ¹⁸⁸ (Guste Pate was the Hindu ruler of the inland kingdom).

Sunda, which was still Hindu, also possessed several ports.¹⁸⁹ The country, which was used to trading, owned quite a large number of junks and cargo *lancharas*, and the cubic capacity of the latter might amount to 150 ton.¹⁹⁰ Only a small number of Moslem traders was allowed to enter the country ¹⁹¹ for fear that they might usurp power "because the moors are cunning and they make themselves masters of countries by cunning, because apparently they have no power." ¹⁹² In Pires' time, however, many merchants had already settled in the border territory between Sunda and Java proper.

The Sunda ports were visited mostly by traders from the Indonesian Archipelago, from Palembang on the east coast of Sumatra and from Priaman on the west (horses were imported from Priaman). Traders also came from Lawe, Tanjung Pura, Malacca, Macassar, east Java and Madura.¹⁹³ The brisk commercial traffic carried on between Malacca and Sunda has already been discussed in reference to Malacca.¹⁹⁴

The chief port of the country was Sunda Kalapa,¹⁹⁵ two days' journey from Dayo,¹⁹⁶ the capital of the Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran, and "a magnificent port," the best harbour of those parts and staple for the products of Sunda. At this time (the beginning of the 16th century) pepper was already one of the most important of these products. According to Pires, the country inland of Sunda Kalapa supplied some 1,000 *bahar* of pepper a year and he considered it to be of better quality than Cochin pepper.¹⁹⁷ Sunda

Kalapa also traded in male and female slaves, some of whom came from the Maldiv Islands and some from Java itself. Regular shipping seems to have been carried on between Sunda and the Maldives.¹⁹⁸ But Pires considered rice to be an even more important export than pepper as far as Sunda was concerned and, according to him, it was even exported to east Java. Sunda was said to produce ten junkloads a year for export.¹⁹⁹ Besides rice, this country supplied a large number of other foodstuffs and also exported the coarse cloth manufactured locally to markets in Malacca and elsewhere.

According to Pires, Sunda also produced some gold. The remaining ports of Sunda were unimportant compared with Sunda Kalapa²⁰⁰ but small ships set out from them on trading voyages to the ports of southern Sumatra.

Bantam was a place which later became very well known and Pires rated it second only to Sunda Kalapa in importance, yet he says nothing about it beyond remarking that junks could anchor there, that trade was carried on from there with the Maldives and the west coast of Sumatra, and that its exports were rice, various other foodstuffs and pepper.²⁰¹

Thanks to Pires we can form a good idea of the pattern of trade in the coastal towns of northern Java. He shows us aristocratic Tuban, port of supply for the Hindu kingdom inland. He describes in detail the activity at the most important spice port, Grise, port of Surabaya and seat of operations for that typical spice-wholesaler Pate Cuçuf.

The ports of Demak, Japara and Cheribon owed their prosperity to the export of surplus food supplies from the hinterland, and Malacca with its growing population was indispensable as a market for these towns. Later, the role of Demak was taken over by Japara, which had a better harbour. The commercial influence of Malacca made itself felt in Grise, Japara and Cheribon. Foreign traders played a dominant part in the Javanese seaports (and perhaps everywhere else too) and it is impossible to overestimate the significance of the commercial centre of Malacca as far as the development of trade in the Javanese seaports was concerned. It was in Malacca that the merchants settling, or already settled, in the seaports of northern Java had learned their trade. Communications were maintained and we see that Malacca and Grise, for example, used to cooperate closely in the Moluccan trade.

Conditions were favourable for starting up business in the Javanese seaports. Duties were low and there, as in Malacca, law and order must have been maintained for the sake of the foreign merchants. We see,

too, how quickly the Javanese seaports recovered from their defeat by the Portuguese, coupled though this had been with the almost total loss of Javanese shipping.

Trade in western Java was confined mainly to the archipelago itself. There was a demand for the produce of this area, which was already cultivating extensive pepper crops and had a surplus of rice. But since the kingdom of Sunda was still completely Hindu, it was only in exceptional cases that the Moslem merchants could gain admission to the country for the purpose of settling there, and even then permission was only given for settlement in the border districts. Trade was not carried on with territories outside the archipelago, with the exception of the Maldive Islands which seem to have been visited regularly by ships from western Java going there to load slaves. During these voyages, ships probably called at the coastal ports of west Sumatra too.²⁰² Was this Javanese trade with the Maldives, which lay some considerable distance beyond the confines of the archipelago, a survival of trading voyages which had formerly been made over still greater distances?

We have practically no data at our disposal relating to the way trade was organized in the Javanese seaports or, for that matter, in the other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago. The more primitive the society, the greater the ruler's share in commercial affairs, which he conducted in close collaboration with foreign merchants of western Asian or Chinese descent. The adjective "occasional" is really no longer applicable to such trade.

VI. THE INFLUENCE OF PORTUGUESE EXPANSION ON ASIAN TRADE

When Albuquerque entered the Red Sea in 1513 he reported the fact to his king in the following words: ¹ "At the rumour of our coming, the [native] ships all vanished and even the birds ceased to skim over the water, so overcast was the Red Sea by our coming and so deserted." The imagery of this passage is fully in keeping with the heroic style of the *Lusiadas* and the Portuguese historians, but it is questionable in how far it reflected reality; certainly it was not applicable to the situation in the Indian Ocean.

Beyond any doubt the amazing rapid progress made by the Portuguese since Vasco da Gama's landing in Calicut in 1498 had made a deep impression upon the Orient; in particular, leading circles in the Moslem world and those groups concerned with the carriage of spices felt themselves to be threatened.

Yet care must be taken not to overestimate the effect, as is shown by the fact that Ibn Iyas, a resident of Egypt (the country which stood to lose most from the Portuguese) displayed very little interest in the Portuguese penetration into Asia.² Moreover, various Moslem seafarers, including a navigator as well known in his day as Ibn Madjid, used to cooperate with the Portuguese.³ But neither Ibn Iyas nor Ibn Madjid were prominent figures from a political point of view. The politicians, on the other hand, were well aware of the danger and sought to establish closer relations with other Moslem countries in order to resist the new enemy. Moslem coalitions were formed to drive the intruder out of the Indian Ocean. For the danger that threatened from the Portuguese was not only political and military in character; the economic and religious consequences might be no less serious.

From the political and military angle, the Portuguese aimed at using naval power to gain control over the Indian Ocean by occupying a number of strategic points which, once fortified, could easily be defended from the sea by armed men-of-war. It was Albuquerque who conceived this grandiose idea. But political and military aspirations

were closely linked with the economic goal, that of diverting the stream of merchandise, particularly the valuable spices, from Asia to Portugal via the Cape of Good Hope, thus cutting out the merchants from Asia and the Mediterranean area entirely. With truly visionary discernment Albuquerque must have been the first to see the vast possibilities inherent in the control of the Indian Ocean "the first man in history to evolve an organized system of trade on an oceanic scope and to arrive at an understanding of the proper principles of its defence as a special branch of naval science with rules of its own."⁴ Even though in the long run the maintenance of naval supremacy proved to be too much for the Portuguese, the better equipped northern Europeans were later to adopt the same tactics. They were driven to do so for that matter, by the undesirability, and indeed absolute impossibility, of developing the strength which would be needed to make permanent conquests on the mainland at the expense of the large countries of Asia.

To what extent the ideal behind the crusades (carrying the war against the infidels into the enemy camp and encircling Islam) was a motive force behind Portuguese expansion is still a subject of discussion.⁵ What the religious antithesis does serve to explain is the violence of the impact and the implacable and ferocious nature of the struggle. But the crusading motive must not be overemphasized. Jaime Cortesão rightly stresses the fact that in the early period of Portuguese expansion in Asia, the military aspect, which was concerned with obtaining the Asian spice monopoly and, in particular, the sole right to transport the highly valuable goods by sea, was the predominating one. The infidels were not the only target; Portuguese policy was directed just as surely against the Christian commercial town of Venice.⁶

The real efforts at conversion, the missionary work (Xavier), only developed on a large scale in the second half of the 16th century when the maritime empire of the Portuguese was already beginning to show signs of stagnation and decline. Because of its intolerant character this mission, which should be regarded as a consequence of the Counter-Reformation, failed in many ways to contribute towards the reinforcement of Portuguese authority, although for the converts (who in India and the Malay-Indonesian area were recruited almost exclusively from the lower Hindu castes and in Indonesia from among the primitive, animistic peoples of the eastern islands), the humanitarian aspect of Christianity must have been a point in favour of Portuguese in-

fluence. Perhaps this also explains the solidarity with which these converts defended Portuguese interests.⁷ The mission had no success with the Moslems, however.

As soon as the Portuguese arrived on the scene, Islam took up arms against the intruder. Egypt and Gujarat, as the two lands most threatened by the attack upon their monopoly (the one as transit country and the other as stapling centre for the spices) were the first to enter the fight. Later on, after the conquest of Egypt in 1519, Turkey as the successor of the Mameluk kingdom was at the centre of all future coalitions – coalitions which extended right into the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. Initially, however, the Portuguese achieved a great deal of success. Speed and the element of surprise were distinguishing features of their expansion in the Indian Ocean and these gave them a certain ascendancy, particularly after the sensational victory near Diu in 1509. Yet this had been preceded by a bitter struggle in the course of which the Portuguese even suffered a defeat. But everything points to a great intensity of purpose on the part of the Portuguese. We are struck by their concentrated development of power, their strategy, apparently well-planned and systematically carried out, which took close account of the way in which Asian trade was already organized when they arrived in the Indian Ocean and of the network of maritime trade routes linking the ports of departure and ports of call, the termini and stapling points for the merchandise coming from the various production areas. With the capture of Goa, of Malacca (in 1511), the occupation of Calicut and Hormuz, and the attempts to control the Red Sea and the Gulf of Cambay while the Portuguese flank was protected by the bases on the east coast of Africa,⁸ Portuguese expansion very quickly reached a peak.

What were the circumstances which made this possible? In the first place, of course, the Portuguese employed more advanced naval and military techniques and tactics because of the practical experience they had gained through more than fifty years of laborious reconnaissance of the stormy Atlantic seaboard of Africa. Furthermore, the practical experience of the Portuguese was supported and supplemented by their knowledge of navigation, which they had developed along scientific lines.⁹ This rational element giving direction to the Portuguese study of navigation (even though the latter was originally founded upon Arab principles) is also to be seen in the way the Portuguese governing bodies and the Portuguese commercial undertakings were organized. Both were directed towards the efficient solution of problems, at least

in theory, although traces of "feudalism" survived in the government institutions in particular. In her attempts to achieve greater rationalization and concentration of effort, early 16th century Europe must have been ahead of the Asian countries in and around the Indian Ocean, and this gave the Portuguese an initial advantage over their opponents. They also exploited the major conflicts of interest which were present among the Asians.

The establishment of a political sea power with an economic goal supported by a commercial organization operating from one central point and from one port of loading which linked both western and eastern Asia and therefore made centralized inter-Asian trade possible, was something quite new in Asia. In the beginning it was a state affair entirely, managed by officials of the crown. From the native producers and traders the king's factors purchased the special products which were reserved as a monopoly of the Portuguese crown and which were shipped from several local collecting points to Goa, the central collecting point¹⁰ from which they were sent to Portugal. Malacca was one of the local collecting centres in the Malay-Indonesian area.

In the long run, the Portuguese crown relinquished part of its monopoly by granting so-called "voyages" to deserving officials and institutions. These gave the recipient the right to carry on trade on his own account.¹¹

Private Portuguese merchants and native traders dealt freely in the products which fell outside the Portuguese monopoly, even though a check was still kept on native shipping by the issue of passes (safe-conducts). But in spite of this considerable smuggling was carried on in monopoly products because great defects attached to the system, defects which were inherent at the stage of cultural development reached by western Europe at that time. Portuguese expansion was characterized by survivals of a less rational era, such as lack of discipline, inefficient methods of control and, above all, the dominating factor of feudal relationships. But Portuguese accomplishments in Asia certainly do not deserve the utterly negative verdict passed on them by Van Leur.¹² His conclusions were based far too much on non-Portuguese literature and Dutch sources from the Company era when Portuguese power in the Malay-Indonesian area and along the coast of India was indeed showing signs of decline. Although Van Leur's judgment on Portuguese expansion relates primarily to the structure of the Portuguese empire and is therefore not concerned with moral appraisalment, the new elements are nevertheless underestimated

and so the better aspects of Portuguese expansion in Asia are left entirely out of account. Even among the Dutch opponents of the Portuguese we find approval expressed, not only of the way the Portuguese maintained the spice monopoly without totally destroying native economy but also of Portuguese missionary work among the natives.¹³ And although the former point was probably a consequence of their inability to enforce the monopoly, it yet remains a fact that the Portuguese never tried to monopolize Asian trade as a whole. The monopoly was confined to a few products only, chief of which were the spices. There were absolutely no restrictions placed on trade in food-stuffs, though admittedly this was because the Portuguese fully realized that such a policy was in their own interests. Local Asian coastal trade was thus left more or less undisturbed, and this applied to traffic along the coast of India as well as to that in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago.

In his excellent survey of the history of Portuguese expansion included in H. V. Livermore's symposium *Portugal and Brazil*, Professor Boxer firmly rejects Van Leur's views about the nature of the Portuguese enterprises in Asia, however favourable an opinion he may have about Van Leur's findings in other respects.¹⁴ He also submits a plea for the publication of the records still held in Goa, Macao, Lisbon, and Evora.¹⁵ Only then will a documented and objective survey of Portuguese activity in Asia become possible.¹⁶

In making an assessment of Portuguese activity in Asia, it should be remembered that, as regards both naval strategy and later commercial and political relations between Europe and Asia, it was the Portuguese who laid the foundations of the policies which were later adopted and carried even further by the northern Europeans.¹⁷ In their diplomatic relations with the native rulers and in the conclusion of contracts both Dutch and English followed the example set by the Portuguese. Like the Portuguese, the Dutch concentrated their Asian trade on one stapling centre and port of loading. There is remarkably close agreement between the Portuguese records relating to the salary of overseas officials¹⁸ and those of the later Dutch East India Company.¹⁹ The Portuguese even supply more details about employment records. The northern Europeans also adopted the system of passes introduced by the Portuguese on the strength of their claims to mastery of the seas, by which they reserved to themselves the right to confiscate the goods of anyone sailing the seas without their permission.²⁰ And even though it ultimately proved impossible to maintain

this naval supremacy, so that while the system of passes severely hampered native shipping it did not make it altogether impossible, the far better equipped northern Europeans did not adopt any different tactics. They too confined themselves mainly to the establishment of naval and military *points d'appui* from which they could keep a check on native trade and shipping and obstruct these as much as possible.

At the beginning of the 16th century the Portuguese concentration of power was not opposed by a united Asia, one of the very important reasons for the rapid success of the Portuguese.²¹ For that matter, the political and economic interests of the various countries did not run parallel in Europe either, but when the Portuguese introduced their policy of expansion European Christianity, in theory at least, was still intact. This fact restrained Venice, for example, from proceeding openly against Portugal in Asia and it also had an effect upon the conclusion of the pact between Spain and Portugal about the division of spheres of influence. The Reformation brought the schism here, too, and led to the activities of unscrupulous, northern European protestant competitors in Asia.

In Asia, apart from the division between the Moslem and the Hindu world, there were the divisions between the various trends and sects, of which those between the Sunnites and the Shi-ites were the most important. In her struggle against Sunnite Turkey, Portugal found an ally in Shi-ite Persia, and her attempts to destroy the trade monopoly of the Moslem merchants on the coast of India were supported by a large proportion of the Hindu population. The Portuguese supplied the Hindu rulers with firearms, and they imported horses from Arabia and Persia to the countries in southern India where these animals were not bred but where they were nevertheless indispensable to the Hindu rulers for resisting Moslem expansion on the Indian mainland. Because of this, the Maharajas became dependent upon the foreigners.²²

In the Malay-Indonesian area, too, closer relations were sought with the Hindu countries of Java. The Portuguese tried to get on a good footing with the Hindu merchants in this region, with the result that in the seaport of Malacca it was the Hindu element which promoted Portuguese settlement and which, after the conquest, occupied the foremost position in the commercial life of the port.

While Asia was so divided, there was great solidarity among the Portuguese and half-blood Portuguese, so that in spite of the vast distances and the loose structure of the empire, in times of danger the various Portuguese settlements came to one another's assistance.

This solidarity was shared by the native converts to Christianity.²³

Even more serious for the Asians than their lack of unity was the fact that they had no naval power like that of the Portuguese. The war fleets of the Portuguese were something quite new in the Indian Ocean. The Asians were no strangers to marine warfare but most of their battles must have been fought quite near the coast²⁴ since they were occasioned by the necessity of warding off onslaughts from pirates or attacks from the sea. But the Asia of those days was unacquainted with trade carried on by armed merchantmen with the object of obtaining and maintaining a monopoly. Most of the transport and most of the trade in the valuable products destined for the West was in the hands of Moslems who, it is true, occupied a powerful position. But they owed this position entirely to their commercial relations and they too were divided by conflicting interests. They carried on their commercial traffic in unarmed, lightly-built craft, the planks of which were generally lashed together. These ships could not carry heavy armament.²⁵ These were swift-sailing vessels designed to complete their voyages with the help of the periodically blowing monsoon winds. There was no powerfully centralized state authority behind this trade, nor did it have one clearly-defined aim. But the spiritual power of Islam endowed the Moslem world with great unity and strength. It made every Moslem merchant not only a follower of Islam but also a propagator of the doctrine and a defender of the faith. In the Indian Ocean and the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, therefore, it was Islam which offered united opposition to the Portuguese. But of all the Moslem countries, Turkey as the only western Asian state was also the only one which possessed a war fleet anything like the technical equal of the European navies and artillery which was not inferior to that of the West. As for the other countries of Asia, even such a powerful kingdom as that reigned over by the Great Mogul did not possess a war fleet; in later days this ruler was partly dependent upon the Europeans for sea transport.

In eastern Asia the Portuguese were not opposed by Islam; they were faced with an entirely different set of factors. The great Chinese kingdom was also predominantly a land power, yet China managed to preserve its territorial integrity against the Portuguese and, in the beginning, against the Dutch as well, and the reason for this, apart from the extensiveness of its coastline and its abundant supplies of manpower, was undoubtedly the sturdily built ships employed for defending its shores.²⁶ In armaments, however, the Asian states were

by no means a match for the Europeans. Attempts have been made to draw conclusions about the military strength of the Malay sultanate ²⁷ from the fact that the Portuguese captured 3,000 pieces of artillery in Malacca in 1511. But this strength seems to be more or less problematical. According to Godinho de Eredia, the weapons captured were all small arms which did not carry far and certainly not as far as similar European weapons. They came from foundries in Pegu and Siam, iron casting having been introduced into these countries from China. ²⁸ Godinho mentions only swords, lances, shields, and bows and poisoned arrows as the customary weapons of the Malays. In his own time, to be sure (late 16th century), the Malays were using "harquebuses and other shooting equipment, but only because of their trade with us." ²⁹ The bronze cannon that was part of the booty taken in Malacca ³⁰ had been presented to the sultan by the Samudri of Calicut who, thanks to the efforts of two gunners who had deserted from the Portuguese fleet of Vasco da Gama, had recently acquired a gun-foundry. ³¹ It was primarily the Italians and other southern and eastern Europeans who taught the Asians the western art of warfare and weapon manufacture. ³² All the Asians showed an interest in Portuguese naval technique, strategy, tactics and armaments, and they proved to be apt pupils. Europeans weapons became a highly coveted trading commodity, and they were even sold to the natives by Europeans although this was in the long run to the latter's own cost. ³³

Portuguese weapons were very popular with the Japanese for use in their civil wars. In particular the local gunsmiths used to copy the design of the European small arms, for cannon never decided the issue in the Japanese wars. ³⁴

The Asians thought just as highly of Portuguese navigation as of Portuguese methods of warfare, and European influence is apparent here too. In their initial reconnaissances of the Indian Ocean the Portuguese must have made the most of the knowledge and help of native seamen (including Moslems) which, remarkably enough, came to them from various quarters. ³⁵ It is astonishing how quickly the Portuguese became familiar with the geography and climatology of the Indian Ocean. As we have seen, ³⁶ the Asians were acquainted with sailing charts and sailing directions, and to no small extent the very rapid expansion of the Portuguese in Asia must have been due to their managing to procure these navigational aids, a more reliable method than depending on the spoken word, under which much treachery might be concealed. But if in the beginning the Portuguese profited by

the nautical experience of the Asians, the Asians, in their turn, were influenced by the better technical aids, nautical technique and navigational methods of the Portuguese, and this must have stimulated Asian maritime commercial traffic. At one period, for example, Japanese junks carried Portuguese navigating officers, by order of the Japanese government.³⁷ In this way the better local knowledge of the Chinese and Japanese pilots was supplemented by the theoretical and technical knowledge of the Europeans. Portuguese *roteiros* or sailing directions were translated into Japanese for the use of native helmsmen.³⁸ Asian shipbuilding was also subjected to European influence, and sturdier construction and heavier armament gradually enabled Asian ships to offer greater opposition to their enemies.³⁹ In the 16th and early 17th centuries the Asians underwent considerable European influence in the technical field. By the second half of the 16th century these factors must already have increased Asia's powers of resistance and enabled the Asians to defeat the Portuguese efforts to secure a monopoly.

Although at the beginning of the 16th century the Turks were the equals of the Portuguese in regard to military techniques, as we have already pointed out, they were still inferior to them in naval strategy and tactics. Moreover, when the Portuguese first appeared in Asia their fleet had greater homogeneity than the Turkish fleet, which consisted of very diverse elements, the crews being largely made up of Christian slaves and Christian converts to Islam.⁴⁰

But the Asians proved to be apt pupils in the sphere of strategy as well, at least the Portuguese began to find it increasingly difficult to gain their victories. We have only to think of the numerous attacks, highly dangerous to the Portuguese, which were made upon their base in Malacca. Only their navies enabled the Portuguese to hold their own, and even then their position was a precarious one. In land warfare their superior armament was of little avail, being, in fact less suited than the native weapons to fighting on tropical terrain. The Europeans, moreover, were confronted with greatly superior numbers of natives who were familiar with the countryside and accustomed to the climate. Thus throughout the entire 16th century Portuguese influence remained confined to a small area around the settlements on the coast. These could be defended by the Portuguese navy, it is true, but they were nevertheless very vulnerable because they were dependent upon Asians for their food supplies. In the second half of the 16th century the Asians went over to the counter-offensive.

The Asian traders coupled their greatly increased commercial activity with efforts to find routes beyond the reach of the Portuguese. This development showed up the defects in the Portuguese system even more plainly. The immense area which had to be controlled, with lines of communication stretching from the Red Sea to the China Seas, was too large for a small country like Portugal with its limited population. Simultaneous patrolling of both the western and the eastern half of the Indian Ocean and the China Seas which, owing to the monsoons, required two separate fleets, was too heavy a burden. Time and again the West had to be reinforced at the expense of the East, or vice versa. Furthermore, this meant that the financial demands on the Portuguese treasury were too heavy, which reduced the profits made on the monopoly products. The vast distances, moreover, made effective control of the governing apparatus impossible, and this led to corruption and insubordination.

Among modern historians of Portuguese expansion ⁴¹ there is a tendency to strike a more positive note as opposed to the generally held theory about a decline of Portuguese power in Asia. These modern historians point to the fact that the Portuguese managed to hold their own until 1637 without losing any really vital positions – with the exception, that is, of Hormuz, which was still very important at that time. The Portuguese did indeed defend their settlements with great resolution and sometimes with great personal courage, but is this not the stubbornness of character which refuses to surrender a cause even though it is already lost, an attribute which the Portuguese retain to this very day? For a closer approach to the truth of the matter we must go back to the sources. But it is worth noting that the documents which have been published up to now in the well-known series of *Documentos remetidos* ⁴² the so-called *Monsoon letters*, the correspondence between the king of Portugal and his viceroy in India, and the printed digests of the documents filmed in the records office in Goa, ⁴³ confirm the pessimistic verdict of Diogo de Couto's *Soldado Pratico*, ⁴⁴ a work rejected by adherents of the new theory on the grounds that it is too prejudiced. But through his daily contact with the documents in his capacity as archivist, and living as he did at the hub of Portuguese influence in Asia, Couto knew only too well what was going on among his fellow-countrymen. The correspondence – which, unfortunately, has only been preserved since the last quarter of the 16th century – between the administration in Europe (at that time the king of Spain) and the viceroy in Asia proves to be no more ele-

vating than Couto's writings. The number of letters and ordinances which reveal the faults of the Portuguese system is legion. Undoubtedly the government tried by all the means in its power to bring about an improvement in the situation, but as it was sometimes not sufficiently well versed in Asian affairs its ordinances failed in their objective. Furthermore, the central authority lacked the power to enforce the execution of its orders, as is illustrated by the manifold reiteration of all the regulations.

The material from the records chiefly reflects the failure of the governing apparatus in particular, but it probably still does not give a true picture of the actual situation, which possessed many other facets as well. At any rate, these documents fail to reveal the great reserves of vitality which enabled the Portuguese section of the population to hold out against the Asians and, after the latter part of the 16th century, against the so much better equipped northern Europeans until far into the 17th century.⁴⁵ Even less do they illustrate the powers of assimilation to the Asian milieu possessed by the Portuguese and more especially by the Portuguese half-bloods, or give a good idea of Portuguese commercial enterprise outside the state monopoly in the Asian world, factors which very definitely had a disintegrating effect on the maritime empire of the Portuguese but which, on the other hand, perhaps did more than the military undertakings to make the presence of the Portuguese and the influence of their language and religion still possible in 16th and 17th century Asia long after their political authority there was at an end.⁴⁶

The majority of the faults which led to the failure of the administrative apparatus and, in particular, of the system of control were present in the system right from the start but became more and more apparent as time went on. Even though it was regulated down to the last detail by numerous ordinances, the governing machine still functioned badly⁴⁷ because orders were executed wrongly or not at all.⁴⁸ In the long run the administration became terribly muddled,⁴⁹ so that the payment of salaries broke down, for example,⁵⁰ money was lacking for the necessary defence works⁵¹ and the defence of the empire was thereby undermined. Corruption, arbitrariness, nepotism⁵² in the granting of offices, private trading by officials and soldiers, and extortion of the natives grew steadily worse.⁵³ A concatenation of every possible abuse existed, about which the government could do practically nothing. In Portugal people were well aware of the connection between the decline of Portuguese authority in Asia and

the poor functioning of the administrative system. This is demonstrated by the writings of Antonio de Mascarenhas and Mendo da Moto, who apparently did not attribute the decline to the greed and cupidity of the individuals.⁵⁴

A very dangerous feature was the breakdown of justice, "o grande mal dos males, o mayor sobre todos,"⁵⁵ a consequence of the inferior quality of the judges and the lack of effective control. Moreover the circumstance that the higher ranks of the nobility and the priests fell outside civil jurisdiction was particularly unfortunate. Equally detrimental was the interference by the clergy in secular jurisdiction.⁵⁶ Portuguese prestige was damaged by licentiousness, and by acts of violence and piracy against native shipping, offences which were punished too lightly or not at all. The strong feudal element in Portuguese expansion gave members of the higher ranks of the nobility and their personal followers far too much influence in the government, the army, and the navy in relation to their ability. The viceroy could not assert his authority over them⁵⁷ and in any case he was too dependent upon their military experience.⁵⁸ The considerable independence enjoyed by the captains of the forts was very damaging as far as relations with the natives were concerned. They were not responsible to the viceroy⁵⁹ and could correspond with the government in Europe direct, leaving him out of the picture altogether. All that the viceroy had to do was to pass on the king's orders to the captains; he could not interfere with their administration, and his position was weakened still more by his short (three-year) term of office. The published documents contain innumerable complaints about these captains,⁶⁰ and the captains of Malacca seem to have been no exception to the rule.

The captains carried on extensive private trade in the Portuguese settlements and they used ships and guns belonging to the state for their own purposes, thus reducing the military value of the settlements.⁶¹ All incoming merchandise, including the monopoly products which were really supposed to be reserved for the crown, was bought up from the native producers for the purposes of this private trade, while the captains forced the native merchants to buy the merchandise offered by the Portuguese themselves at exorbitant prices.⁶² Only by making large gifts could the Asian traders obtain the passes enabling them to conduct their own trade.⁶³ The merchants were also subjected by the captains to numerous other unjust impositions,⁶⁴ forms of extortion which caused Asian shipping to shun the Portuguese settle-

ments and evade the Portuguese monopoly. To avoid the duties levied by the Portuguese, Asian traders started calling at ports where the Portuguese had not established any customs offices.⁶⁵ But this led to a drop in the proceeds from the customs duties for the Portuguese crown, which was already suffering considerable losses through the evasion of customs duties by the Portuguese private traders.⁶⁶ For these import and export duties were the greatest source of income to the Portuguese crown. The money realized could no longer cover the great outlays required in Asia for equipping fleets, building and maintaining fortifications, paying salaries and financing trade.⁶⁷

Through their private trade, moreover, the captains of the forts became financially dependent upon the Asian financiers with whom they had to conclude loans for the conduct of their commercial affairs.⁶⁸ Yet it is remarkable that the viceroy's verdict on these captains (among whom there was an old gentleman of eighty) as expressed in a letter to the king in 1616⁶⁹ was still quite favourable, as opposed to his views on the other high officials.⁷⁰

The most crippling circumstance of all, however, was the steadily increasing shortage of men and money⁷¹ which made it more and more difficult to find competent officials to fill the various posts. This evil made itself felt throughout the whole system from high to low and was intensified by the nepotism mentioned earlier which resulted in the wrong people being appointed to responsible positions.⁷² In the highest circles the viceroy no longer had good advisers at his side,⁷³ in the lower ranks, work suffered through inexperience and inefficiency.⁷⁴ Large numbers of Portuguese left public service. Their departure was legal when they went to live on their own money⁷⁵ (mostly gained through illegal private trade) or when they entered one of the many monasteries,⁷⁶ illegal when they deserted and entered the service of Asian rulers (which meant that the subjects of those rulers received instruction in European navigation and methods of warfare).⁷⁷ At best, most of the Portuguese and Portuguese half-bloods thought of nothing but their own private trade, at worst, of piracy, with all possible gradations in between. Many Portuguese even had no scruples about selling captured Asian ships to other Asian merchants.⁷⁸

The lack of men and money greatly reduced the military strength of the Portuguese empire.⁷⁹ It became difficult to provide the forts and fleets with sufficient soldiers and seamen, while the lack of money meant that wages were not paid – which led to desertion⁸⁰ – and also made effective inspection of the various fortifications impossible.⁸¹

In 1588 it was admitted that the Portuguese, since 1580 under Spanish government, were no longer capable of conducting an offensive war.⁸² Soldiers and *fidalgos* who refused to serve in the army were severely punished,⁸³ as were those who tried to return to Portugal without permission. The death penalty was introduced for desertion.⁸⁴ On the other hand, a general amnesty was declared for those who had already fled Portuguese authority, turned pirate, and were terrorising the seas and coasts, particularly around Bengal and Pegu, and thus discrediting the name of Portugal among the natives. The object of the amnesty was to persuade these deserters to return to public service.⁸⁵

The high death rate on board ⁸⁶ and the many shipwrecks,⁸⁷ caused by the fact that the ships were too big and too heavily laden, seriously reduced fresh supplies of manpower. Men of experience became increasingly scarce and ships with valuable cargoes were entrusted to young men who had only just arrived in Asia, in fact these young men were even given important positions as captains.⁸⁸

There was a big demand for skilled workers such as engineers, gunners, and navigating officers, but the demand could only be met by appointing foreigners – Flemings, Germans, and Italians, – to these key positions.⁸⁹ Moreover, more and more natives, both converts and non-Christians, were joining the army and the navy,⁹⁰ in fact before long natives were in the majority. Linschoten states that Abyssinians and Arabs served as sailors and seagoing personnel in the merchant ships engaged in the inter-Asian trade of the Portuguese.⁹¹ Linschoten's Arabs probably included Gujarati and people from other Indian countries. Later on, the Portuguese also employed Japanese labour.⁹²

To the shortage of personnel was added the disdain felt by the Portuguese in Asia generally for the humbler posts and activities.⁹³ They preferred not to hold a rank below that of skipper or mate, and even the chief boatswain was usually an Asian, who superintended the native seamen and treated them like slaves. This Asian would usually conclude a contract with the Portuguese captain of the ship by which he undertook to supply a certain number of sailors, whose maintenance and pay were then his sole responsibility. Some of the garrisons in the Portuguese forts might also be composed of Abyssinians under Abyssinian captains.⁹⁴

Native and half-blood converts to Christianity were even to be found in the organs of government ⁹⁵ and, because of the lack of recruits from Portugal, it was precisely on these groups of people that the

defence of the empire came to depend. Portuguese who had married in Asia and settled there (the *casados*) played an important role in the military organization and many forts were defended by them alone.⁹⁶ As opposed to the unmarried soldiers without fixed pay, their pursuit of private trade gave them an economic background which made their existence in 16th century Asia possible. It was in their own interests to defend Portuguese authority as long as possible.

It is difficult to ascertain how large a share the Portuguese private traders had in the total economic activity of Asia. But it cannot have been very large compared with the trade of the Asians themselves. The number of Portuguese in Asia never exceeded about 10,000.⁹⁷ Moreover the Portuguese private traders were subject to restrictions on the amount of capital they were allowed to invest, while the choicest part of Portuguese Asian trade was reserved for the Portuguese king and the high officials. Mostly, therefore, it was smalltime trade in the less valuable products with some smuggling in monopoly products on the side. For enterprising individuals private trade on a somewhat larger scale was not beyond the bounds of possibility, as is demonstrated by the ramifications of the business of a merchant like Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo,⁹⁸ but, taking Portuguese private trade as a whole, people like this man must have been an exception. Moreover this sort of trade had an ephemeral quality; it perished with the person of the trader. More profitable than most Portuguese private trade, because it could draw on greater financial reserves, was that carried on by the Portuguese clergy. The attraction which the clerical life held for many Portuguese was certainly not due entirely to religious considerations. By taking holy orders service in the army or the navy could be avoided, but under the cloak of religion it was also possible to carry on profitable trade, although, nominally, the idea must have been that such trade benefited not so much the individual as the Order as a whole, since the proceeds could be used to defray the expenses of the mission in Asia. The government tried to stop the surge to the monasteries by a prohibition on new foundations, but in vain.⁹⁹ Private trade flourished among the clergy ("the Church militant and mercantile").¹⁰⁰ Portuguese reports¹⁰¹ confirm Jan Huyghen van Linschoten's verdict on these bad conditions, a verdict which demonstrates clearly just how keenly the competition of these "clerical" merchants was felt in the commercial world of Asia. "The Jesuits are so cunning in trade, they traffic in bills of exchange and such-like, that they surpass all the secular merchants, so that in all India there is no place where there is

something to be gained but they have a hand in it, so that the other orders and religious bodies and also the ordinary people are starting to murmur greatly about it, and to loathe their avarice and closeness."¹⁰² Added to this was the growing intolerance, as well as a bitter fanaticism that manifested itself especially after the introduction of the Inquisition in the second half of the 16th century and was directed not only against Asians, both converted and unconverted, but also against Portuguese co-religionists.¹⁰³ Nor was Portuguese prestige helped at all by the disputes between the two religious orders, the Jesuits and the Franciscans. Of course the activities of the missions were beneficial in some respects, but corruption penetrated even to the *casas de misericordia*.¹⁰⁴ And all these abuses intensified the open and latent antipathies of the native population towards the foreign intruders. The intolerance which in Portugal had resulted in the banishment of that very important commercial element, the Portuguese Jews, made itself felt in Asia too.¹⁰⁵ People wanted to deport the converted Jews, the so-called *cristaos novos* who had established themselves in the Portuguese settlement,¹⁰⁶ and to send them back to Portugal. But from the fact that the Portuguese government was afraid that such a measure would cause a scandal ¹⁰⁷ it may be gathered that these Jews must have occupied an important position in Asia. This is not surprising when we remember what an important share they had in the sale of spices in Europe in the first half of the 16th century.¹⁰⁸ No more "voyages" were allowed to be sold to Portuguese Jews in Asia,¹⁰⁹ nor might the *cristaos novos* be appointed to official positions. This last measure, of course, applied to the unconverted Jews as well.¹¹⁰ The latter were even supposed to be denied entry to Asia,¹¹¹ but the numbers already established there were too great for existence in Asia to be made altogether impossible for them and they were still grudgingly permitted to carry on a little trade.¹¹²

The banishment of the Jews had a highly detrimental effect on the commercial development of Portugal itself and it is probably safe to consider this one of the reasons why Portuguese-Asian trade did not receive adequate support and stimulation from the mother country. In Asia, greater and greater inroads were being made upon the monopoly. The purchase of the monopoly products there still remained the business of the crown, but through donations of the so-called "voyages" part of the king's trade fell into other hands, although in the long run these "voyages" were sold or leased to the highest bidder.¹¹³ But when the goods were being purchased these buyers or lessees could

compete with the official factors of the king.¹¹⁴ They used to buy up the merchandise first at much higher prices than the natives obtained from the royal factors, a circumstance of which the Asian producers and middlemen naturally did not fail to take advantage.

In the second half of the 16th century the crown also left the transport of the Asian products from Asia to Europe and their resale in Europe to others. By the terms of the so-called Asia-contract, the contracting parties – some of them Portuguese but some also wealthy merchants from various other European countries – undertook to buy a certain quantity of spices from the king and to convey them to Europe. Apart from the Asia-contract, there was a Europe-contract which regulated the resale of the goods in Europe.¹¹⁵ Portuguese business houses were concerned in this side of the business, but they did the bulk of their selling in Antwerp. Moreover, very wealthy foreign commercial firms such as the Fuggers and Welsers had a large share both in the transport of the Indian goods from Asia and in their sale in Europe.¹¹⁶ They provided the principal exchange commodities for the Asian trade, especially the specie. For in Asia there was no market worth mentioning either for European industrial products or for European raw materials. Although industry and agriculture in Portugal itself had undergone little development, it should not be immediately assumed that this was an unfavourable factor with a direct bearing on Portuguese expansion in Asia.¹¹⁷ But metal for export to India had first to be imported into Portugal¹¹⁸ and it is precisely in that branch of trade that the steady growth of foreign interests can be observed. Moreover Portugal's commercial development was inadequate to enable her to keep the consumers' market for spices in her own hands. Although there was a considerable Portuguese mercantile colony in Antwerp, the Jewish element had a big share of the business at first, especially in the spice trade.¹¹⁹ Later, however, the foreign interests obtained a large share in these Portuguese-Asian undertakings as well. Studies like those of Kellenbenz¹²⁰ on the pepper trade show that research into the economic basis of Portuguese expansion can be most enlightening.

There was a big difference between the purchase price paid by the royal factors to the native producers and the sales price charged by the Portuguese crown to the European contracting parties¹²¹ who, in their turn, had their own profit to make on the East Indian wares. The high level of prices in Europe encouraged smuggling and private trade in Asia. Asian trade dodged the Portuguese monopoly by finding new

sea routes and ports, and side by side with the shipment of Asian products round the Cape of Good Hope goods traffic continued via the Red Sea and the Levant.¹²²

In the beginning the prices which the Portuguese gave for the East Indian products were, generally speaking, higher than those the native producers received from Asian merchants.¹²³ High prices in Europe, however, caused prices to rise in Asia too because of the failure of the Portuguese to enforce their monopoly. Since the government did not increase its purchase prices the result was that its agents received goods of poorer quality while better quality products reached Europe via the Mediterranean route,¹²⁴ and probably some went to Asian consumers as well. Undoubtedly, all this competition among buyers would be to the advantage of the native producers and middlemen and it must have stimulated and increased the production in Asia of goods which were of value in Europe. At the beginning of the 16th century the Portuguese were initially successful in obstructing the trade routes to the Red Sea and the Levant, so that the spice trade was dislocated for a time.¹²⁵ The Turkish conquest of the Mameluk kingdom in 1517 is even attributed to the severe economic decline suffered by Egypt because of the loss of the transit trade in spices.¹²⁶ Portuguese writers at the beginning of the 16th century mention a falling-off in supply of spices to the Red Sea, but at the same time it appears that a good many Moslem ships still managed to evade Portuguese control.¹²⁷ And the stoppage was certainly not permanent.¹²⁸ The Portuguese needed support from the Persians in their struggle against the Turks and they were forced to allow a fair amount of traffic to pass through the Persian Gulf. In this way eastern products could also reach the Levant.¹²⁹ Nor were their efforts at the permanent occupation of the Asian trading entrepot, Aden, any more successful.¹³⁰ This place fell into Turkish hands in 1538 but subsequently decreased considerably in importance. Mocha, also situated on the southwest coast of Arabia, became much more important,¹³¹ but the Portuguese did not have any influence there either.

As opposed to the theories advanced in earlier historical literature, modern research – in which connection special mention must be made of Fernand Braudel,¹³² Lybyer (whose study was published as early as 1915),¹³³ Lane,¹³⁴ and Gentil da Silva – has demonstrated that a revival of eastern trade took place in the second half of the 16th century. For the most part the authors mentioned above take the Mediterranean as their starting point. But the situation will also have

to be considered from the starting point of the Indian Ocean and of the Indonesian market centres, the prosperity and decline of which were so closely connected with the export trade in spices. Alongside the new route round the Cape, the older routes via Cairo and Aleppo continued to exist.¹³⁵ Of these, the Red Sea route was the more important to start with and less disturbed by war.¹³⁶ But Syria, too, especially at the end of the 16th century, became a very important centre for the export of spices to the West, and numerous Venetian merchants did business there, as they also did in Cairo.¹³⁷ Some even established themselves in Hormuz, just as if this town were not under Portuguese sovereignty.¹³⁸ The spice trade of the Venetians must have been very extensive.¹³⁹ On the basis of material from Portuguese and Venetian sources, Lane calculated that the quantity of spices exported from Alexandria to Europe circa 1560 was as great as at the end of the 15th century, or even greater, which indicates a big rise in Asian production and increased spice consumption in Europe. Moreover the statistics show that shipments from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea equalled and sometimes even exceeded Portuguese shipments via the Cape.¹⁴⁰

The best proof of the inadequacy of the military domination of the Indian Ocean by the Portuguese ¹⁴¹ is to be found in the continued existence of the Asian spice trade. They could control neither exports to the Mediterranean nor supplies from the production areas. For the latter, Malacca was of great strategic value. As Tomé Pires puts it: "Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice."¹⁴² This implied, of course, that that power must also be effective, but it was precisely in the second half of the 16th century that the Portuguese position in Malacca was so precarious. There was no longer any question of an absolute spice monopoly in Malacca, which was harassed on all sides by hostile neighbours and where, just as in the other Portuguese settlements, corruption and other abuses prevailed in administrative circles. In all strata of society, from high to low, Portuguese of pure and mixed descent carried on extensive private trade in their own interests. They also dealt in the Portuguese monopoly products which, like the spices handled by the Asian merchants, must have reached Europe mainly via the Mediterranean. Although the spices carried by the Portuguese around the Cape to Europe were possibly of a poorer quality because of the long sea voyage, and although there was a big difference between the low purchase price paid by the Portuguese in Asia and the high price they demanded in Europe (which meant that the spices shipped via the Levant and Italy could compete with

them),¹⁴³ these must have been factors of secondary importance as regards the competitive survival of the spice trade to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf side by side with that around the Cape. A much more serious threat to the Levant spice trade than Portuguese claims to monopoly was formed by the arrival of the Dutch and the British in the Indian Ocean and the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. The measures they adopted, so much more rigorous than those of the Portuguese, were to cause the Venetian spice trade to fall off considerably. Dutch sources dating from the beginning of the 17th century make it only too clear that one of the principal objectives of the United East India Company was to put a stop to the Asian trade via Aleppo and Cairo to Venice.

VII. PORTUGUESE MALACCA AND NATIVE TRADE IN THE MALAY-INDONESIAN AREA

A detailed survey of the development of native trade in the Malay-Indonesian area in the 16th century is impossible because of the lack of relevant data. Some general notes on the subject follow below, but this trade can only be seen against the background of Portuguese activity in Asia as a whole (as outlined in the previous chapter) and, further, against the more detailed background of Portuguese Malacca. Since the scanty data available come from Portuguese sources, Portuguese Malacca must serve as the starting point of our considerations as well as the background to them. Native trade comes within our range of vision only in so far as it came into contact with the Portuguese and was influenced by them.

We may take it that in the Malay-Indonesian area native trade as a whole was influenced only to a limited extent by the Portuguese and that, apart from a few changes in direction and scope, it retained the same general characteristics as during the Malaccan sultanate. With the following reservation, however, that during the Portuguese regime Malacca lost a lot of its value as a central market for the Malay-Indonesian area, since part of its trade was transferred to other ports which had only recently acquired significance. It is to these changes in particular that we shall devote our attention in the following pages.

The possession of the Malaccan emporium, the stapling centre for the spices from the Indonesian area, was vital to the Portuguese if they wanted to be sure of a regular supply of those spices. As a naval base Malacca was very favourably situated for exercising control over both the seas of the Malay-Indonesian area and the southern part of the Indian Ocean, and also for supervising Asian commercial communications and cutting these if necessary. It was, moreover, a good starting point for trade with the Far East.

Portuguese Malacca was in a much more vulnerable position than it had been in the time of the sultans. Only the town and a small area around it were in Portuguese hands. Surrounded by enemies on nearly

every side, here too Portuguese power depended primarily upon the fleet for protection. There was no question at first of the Portuguese dominating the straits, for the sultan who had been driven out of Malacca retained authority over his dependencies on the opposite shore and his fleets continued to render the straits unsafe.

Achin, which was of little importance at the time of the fall of Malacca, rapidly developed into a still more dangerous enemy than Johore. The food situation was extraordinarily precarious too because, just as in the time of the sultans, Malacca was almost entirely dependent upon supplies from outside. Since the Portuguese did not have enough ships or men ¹ to take over the transport of local supplies themselves, they were obliged to take immediate steps to revive the Asian commercial traffic which Malacca had known before 1511. Another consideration was that the tolls which could be levied on native shipping and trade in Malacca represented a considerable source of income to the Portuguese crown. Albuquerque's measures show that he was implementing a policy of attracting Asian traders to Malacca and his efforts in this direction were initially crowned with success. The capture of Malacca and the flight of the sultan gave the Portuguese considerable ascendancy at first in the Malay-Indonesian area. People everywhere were afraid of them, and from all sides Moslem and Hindu princes sent tribute embassies to the new rulers, under whom, moreover, they were hoping to continue the profitable trade which they had carried on under the sultanate. Economic motives certainly weighed heavily in the adoption of this attitude towards the intruder, since most of the Malay-Indonesian countries depended on Malacca not only as a port of supply and loading where they could sell their own goods and buy imports from the West but also as a large-scale purchaser of the foodstuffs they themselves produced.

In the first instance the Portuguese tried to establish closer relations with non-Moslems,² and so in Malacca itself they made use of the services of the Hindu merchants, and elsewhere of the help of the Javanese Hindu princes. They also maintained communications with Siam and other countries in Further India and sought contacts even further east as well, yet all the time the Moslems, with their important trading connections, remained indispensable to them. But resistance to the Portuguese was very strong among the Moslems of western Asia, in particular among the Gujarati who had so much to do with the transport of the spices. This was the reason for the anti-Portuguese

intrigues carried on by the Gujarati even before the fall of Malacca. Later on Gujarat continued to oppose the Portuguese intruders in close association with the Egyptians and the Turks.³ Other interested parties in the spice trade were the Javanese who had settled in Malacca. They were responsible for the dangerous riots which took place in the town after its capture and, in cooperation with their compatriots in Java itself, they prepared the great attack that was made upon the port. But the interests of the various mercantile towns of Java were not all the same and only those which handled the intermediary trade in spices felt themselves to be threatened. Moslem or non-Moslem, those towns which depended on Malacca for the sale of their food products tried to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Portuguese, and a large part of their commercial traffic was soon focused once more on Malacca. Echoes of this are to be found in Albuquerque's letters⁴ and in those written by Ruy de Brito, a captain of Malacca, dating from 1513.⁵ Tomé Pires' expectations as regards the future are characterized by the same optimistic note,⁶ although here of course it is possible to detect a slight tendency to represent the situation in as favourable a light as possible.⁷ In the list he gives of merchants who were returning to Malacca⁸ we can find most of the nationalities which we know traded there in the time of the sultans, including Chinese and Japanese.

Pires considered it vital for a revival of trade that active commercial intercourse should develop between Malacca and places lying outside as well as inside the archipelago.⁹ We have already pointed out that customs duties were important to the Portuguese crown since they could be used to defray occupation costs in Malacca.¹⁰

As food supplies from Java were held up at first owing to the rebellion of Utimuti raja and Pate Kedir (Javanese who had settled in Malacca) and to the attack made on the city by the Javanese fleet from the coastal towns of northern Java under the leadership of Pate Unus of Japara¹¹ (who had apparently managed to persuade large numbers of coastal Javanese to take part in this attack), the Portuguese encouraged the Peguans to visit Malacca as often as possible. They were provided with safe-conducts¹² and they continued for some time to supply the Portuguese with foodstuffs and remained their faithful friends.¹³ The reason why this food supply was so important to Malacca was that it provided the Moluccas and Amboina with food.¹⁴ It soon became apparent that Pires' optimism was not entirely justified, particularly when his fellow-countrymen failed to display a wise moderation in putting their monopoly policy into effect. For

peaceful commercial intercourse, moreover, stable conditions were necessary and these were just what Malacca, menaced on all sides by enemies, lacked most of all.

Malacca under the sultanate had been able to develop into a commercial centre thanks to good relations with the surrounding countries and to the fact that its possession of the land on either side of the water gave it control over the Malay Straits.

The exiled sultan (from now on usually called the sultan of Johore) still exercised authority over his territory, except for the very small area conquered by the Portuguese¹⁵ and he formed an alliance with those Malay states, such as Pahang and Perak,¹⁶ which were not under his direct authority. On the Malay Peninsula Johore's authority extended over a long strip of land on both the east and the west coast and over a chain of islands scattered along these coasts.¹⁷ The Celates (sea-gypsies) who inhabited these regions remained faithful to their old sultan¹⁸ and made themselves thoroughly troublesome to the Portuguese at sea. On the mainland, only Nanning of all the Minangkabau settlements situated near Malacca had come under Portuguese authority; the rest still recognized their former ruler. People from these settlements raided and plundered the countryside in the immediate vicinity of Malacca, which meant that supplies of foodstuffs brought overland for the daily needs of the town were also threatened.¹⁹ Since the sultan's fleet had survived the fall of Malacca, it could make the straits unsafe and obstruct Portuguese trade. But the Asian traders still established in Malacca also suffered heavy losses through this.²⁰ Moreover Asian merchants continued to visit the sultan's new capital, which was first situated on the island of Bintag, or Riau, near Singapore²¹ and later, after the destruction of Bintan by the Portuguese, was transferred to Johore on the Malay Peninsula.

An understanding dangerous to the Portuguese sprang up between the Malays and the disaffected Javanese in Malacca.²² At a somewhat later date the sultan succeeded in attracting to his port the Javanese junks which carried foodstuffs.²³ Thanks to its overlordship of the Sumatran and Malay countries on the peninsula, Johore at first retained control over supplies of export products such as pepper, tin, and gold. But the presence of the Portuguese in Malacca, meant that regular and direct communications with western Asia were broken, at least as far as the larger ships were concerned, although smuggling must still have taken place of course. Johore was therefore obliged to devote more attention to the East and it succeeded in interesting the

Chinese merchants in its exports. Portuguese Malacca suffered just as much from the obstacles which Johore laid in the way of Portuguese trade to and from China as from the sultan's policy of attracting the Javanese junks with provisions to Johore.²⁴

Yet the struggle against the Portuguese imposed a heavy burden on Johore. The repeated devastation of the capital, which necessitated its removal to several different sites,²⁵ the raids made by the Portuguese along the coasts of the Malay Peninsula,²⁶ the seizure of merchant ships en route to Johore, all were disastrous in their effect. The sultan tried to augment the trade of his country by imposing low duties and offering merchants high prices for the goods they brought while parting with his own exchange commodities at low prices.²⁷ But Portuguese Malacca, with its good accomodation and its great tradition of commercial activity, continued to exercise a strong attraction on many Asian merchants in spite of monopoly restrictions and forcible measures. By its very proximity Portuguese Malacca hindered Johore's development as a centre of trade. Chinese and Dutch sources do not think much of the arrangements made for trade in Johore, nor of the landing facilities, since trading had to take place on board the ships lying in the roads.²⁸ In Malacca, moreover, the native traders could still obtain goods from the West, especially Coromandel cloth.

But to the detriment of both Portuguese Malacca and Johore, a large share of the trade with the West was soon annexed by Achin, the small but rapidly developing pirate state, already known to Pires, which had formerly been subordinate to Pidië but which in a very short space of time had grown into an important harbour for commercial traffic with western Asia. Both Johore and Achin aimed at making their ports the scene of undisturbed contact between traders from East and West and this led to enmity not only with Portuguese Malacca but with each other as well.

As it thrust along the east coast of Sumatra, Achin came up against the dependencies of Johore. In the struggle for the hegemony which had now broken out and was to continue throughout the entire 16th century, weaker Johore was obliged to seek Portuguese support.²⁹ It was only because of this rivalry between her Asian opponents that, Portuguese Malacca managed to hold its own at all, and sometimes it only just managed to do so. Right through the 16th century Malacca lived under the continual threat of war with both neighbours, the situation being alternated only by open attacks and sieges. The

progress of the latter is related in detail by the Portuguese historians, but their economic foundation has to be deduced from nothing more than a few random remarks.

The peace concluded in 1536 between Malacca and Johore after the Portuguese had undertaken a destructive expedition against the Malay kingdom³⁰ was determined to no small extent by Achinese expansion. Trade in Malacca revived once commercial traffic was no longer obstructed by Johore. The Portuguese administration took advantage of the situation to send factors to territories under the authority of Johore. But large numbers of Portuguese private traders also took part in this commercial intercourse. In Patani, which was not subordinate to Johore but which the latter could easily have made it difficult for the Portuguese to visit, some 300 private traders appeared;³¹ the same phenomenon could be observed in Achin when peace was temporarily restored and about 80 Portuguese merchants went to try their luck there.³²

But peace did not last long between the Portuguese and Johore. In the second half of the 16th century, too, there were repeated conflicts arising out of commercial rivalry. The sultan forced Asian ships to visit his ports and pay duty there, which meant that Malacca was deprived of these duties. But from motives of personal gain the governors of Malacca did not scruple to play into the sultan's hands by encouraging this commercial traffic to Johore. They used to buy up in Johore the goods brought there by the Asian merchants, which, because of the low duties imposed by the sultan, were cheaper than in Portuguese Malacca where duties were high.³³ Just how important these conflicts between Portuguese Malacca and Johore were considered to be in Europe can be judged from the reports on the struggle in 1588 sent to the Fuggers, who must have profited from them when buying and selling the East Indian merchandise.³⁴ This is proof, too, that the commercial significance of Johore was certainly greater than one would suppose from Dutch reports on the situation at a somewhat later date.³⁵

Although the state capital of Johore Lama was destroyed by the Portuguese in 1587,³⁶ at the end of the 16th century Johore appears to have become so much stronger again that the sultan caused defence works to be erected in the immediate vicinity of Malacca.³⁷ To be sure, the Portuguese succeeded in destroying them, but they had difficulty in preventing Johore from rebuilding.³⁸ Johore also managed to hold its own against Achin, so that in 1599 Achin sent a delegation to

Goa for help.³⁹ When the Dutch appeared in the waters around Malaya, the actual ruler of Johore at that time, the brother of the reigning sultan, considered it advisable to seek the support of this new power.⁴⁰ This resulted in a temporary *renversement des alliances* in the area and brought Achin over to the Portuguese side.

Johore's strengthened position found expression in increased commercial activity carried on from the new state capital of Batu Sawar and based primarily on the export of pepper from its dependencies of Kampar and Indragiri.⁴¹ Moreover, a great deal of trade was done in Banda, whence came nuts, cloves and mace.⁴² The sultan of Johore promised the Dutch that they would certainly be able to load 5 or 6 ships a year in his country, a promise which was probably over-optimistic. Trade in diamonds was carried on with Borneo.⁴³ Of the non-valuable goods, fish was still an important product as far as Johore was concerned, and dried and salted varieties were exported to different parts of the archipelago just as in the time of the sultanate of Malacca. The reduced authority of the Portuguese in Malacca made it possible at this time (1605) for Gujarati to sell their textiles in Johore.⁴⁴

Johore's trade was not exclusively passive. Both Chinese and Dutch sources speak of Johore's shipping trade, even though mainly small craft were engaged in it.⁴⁵

From the passes the merchants of Johore requested from the Dutch (at a somewhat later period, it is true), it appears that trading voyages were made to Java, Macassar and Patani, and even to Cambodia and Siam.⁴⁶ The struggle with Achin and the conquest of Batu Sawar by the Achinese in 1613 caused the focus of this commercial activity to shift to the islands in the Malay Straits.

Portuguese relations with Achin were almost exclusively military in character, consisting, in fact, of the numerous battles and sieges recounted by the Portuguese historians. As for Achin's economic development in these years, we can only make guesses about it and draw some inferences from Dutch descriptions of the situation at the beginning of the 17th century. The rise of Achin must have been closely connected with its victories over the Portuguese⁴⁷ during which the modern western weapons were captured that gave it ascendancy over its Asian neighbours. Achin secured the pepper ports of Pasè and Pidië and also part of Minangkabau – the region in the interior which was rich in gold.⁴⁸ This gave it control over supplies of gold and pepper, export products which fostered its trade.⁴⁹ As the

unimportant little pirate state which Pires describes,⁵⁰ Achin can originally have exported very little else but fish and fish products – apart from booty. The fish, however, meant that Achin already had relations with western Asia since, apart from her own catch, some of the fish came from the Maldives and some from places lying further to the northwest.⁵¹ One of the first actions of the Portuguese was to try to put a stop to the catching and landing of the fish and at the same time to compel the foreign ships to go to Malacca.⁵²

Achin's drive along the east coast of Sumatra was temporarily halted by Johore's dependencies there. Probably it then turned its attention more to the west coast. Here pepper had come to be extensively cultivated, undoubtedly under the stimulus of traders from western Asia who wanted to avoid not only Portuguese Malacca but also Pasè and Pidië, which had come under Portuguese influence. Achin wanted to gain control of the pepper output of these regions and therefore subordinated the ports which exported the pepper from the Minangkabau hinterland, and demanded yearly tribute from them in the form of pepper. This was the situation when the Dutch arrived. A very important factor as far as Achin was concerned was its favourable location at the northern tip of Sumatra, which provided direct lines of communication with western Asia. Moreover, as a strict Moslem centre, it was the obvious choice for all those Moslem traders who did not want to call at Portuguese Malacca and found Achin a good port for bartering their wares. Cloth must have made up a large part of the cargoes these traders brought with them, and they probably took spices and other merchandise from the Malay-Indonesian area as return freights. Whether trade in products from eastern Asia was also carried on in Achin is not revealed by the scanty data relating to the 16th century. The big Chinese junks can hardly have traded with Achin direct because of the Portuguese control of the seas. The first Dutch accounts, dating from the beginning of the 17th century, report the arrival in Achin of ships from western Asia but not of Chinese ones. Rockhill and Groeneveldt's editions of Chinese sources prior to the 17th century have nothing to say about the presence of Chinese in Achin except that Ma Huan was acquainted with Lambri (always provided that Lambri is the same as Lamori).⁵³ Yet on their first visit to Achin the Dutch found various Chinese living there in a separate part of the city, which points to the existence of a Chinese colony of merchants and artisans. A Chinaman who spoke Spanish (perhaps a Manila tradesman who had strayed as far as Achin) supplied John

Davis with valuable information, probably about the Sino-Spanish trade in the Philippines. The Dutch, who did not trust their British senior pilot much, put an end to this relationship as soon as possible.⁵⁴

A couple of years later, Thomas Best reported the arrival in Achin of a Chinese junk from Bantam or Jacarta;⁵⁵ it may be assumed, however, that this vessel belonged to Chinese who were established in the port.

To avoid Portuguese attack Achinese and western Asian ships began following a new route that took them via the Maldives. Among the many islands of this group it was easy for the Asian merchant ships, which were accompanied, moreover, by armed Achinese galleys, to escape the cruising vessels of the Portuguese.⁵⁶ Johore no longer had any direct contacts with the West but Achin on the other hand derived much advantage from them. Shipping trade shifted in part from the Straits of Malacca and took the route along the west coast of Sumatra and through the Sunda Straits instead.

All this was very damaging to Portuguese authority and Portuguese trade, for it was by this route that the spices from the Malay-Indonesian area continued to reach the Mediterranean, thus evading the Portuguese monopoly and cutting out the voyage round the Cape of Good Hope.⁵⁷ In the years 1565 and 1566 a Venetian source reports the annual arrival in the Red Sea of about 50 ships from the kingdom of Assi in Sumatra, which, as we have already said, can perhaps be indentified with Achin.⁵⁸ Achin thus became an important junction for the sale of spices to western Asia and the import of goods from the West to the Malay-Indonesian area. At the same time, the use of this sea route meant that Achin maintained connections with Turkey, which had strong military and naval forces. Help was obtained from Turkey⁵⁹ and some of its military and naval techniques adopted. Besides being a port of loading for spices, Achin was important to Turkey on account of its exports of wood (probably sandalwood), a product which Turkey also obtained from the kingdom of Pegu.⁶⁰ The force of the economic motive underlying the antagonism between Achin and Portuguese Malacca is demonstrated by the fact that the Achinese offered to send the sultan of Turkey all the spice exports from the Indonesian area in exchange for his assistance in defeating Portuguese Malacca.⁶¹ Another member of the great coalition which was formed at that time was the Samudri of Calicut, who was also concerned in the spice trade to the West.⁶² In 1568 during one of Achin's attacks on Malacca, Malabars were reported to be serving in

the Achinese ships.⁶³ As for the Javanese trading ports, Japara took the same line as Achin but Demak refused to turn against Malacca. Japara had interests in the Spice Islands and thus formed yet another link in the chain of the traffic in spices.⁶⁴

Apart from direct attacks and sieges, which did a great deal of damage to Portuguese trade (fourteen of the twenty-five assaults which Portuguese Malacca had to endure in the course of its existence were made by Achin), the Asian attacks on their merchant shipping were just as harmful. But in this branch of hostilities the Portuguese succeeded in keeping their own end up. As soon as they had settled in Malacca they had begun to seize Achinese ships. They had won a bad name for themselves in western Asia as well, because as early as 1526, when peace still prevailed, they had captured a big ship loaded for Mecca.⁶⁵ A few years later they seized more Achinese ships loaded with valuable cargo off the coasts of Arabia.⁶⁶ The Achinese, for their part, used to aim primarily at Portuguese ships coming from Bengal and Pegu, falling upon them and plundering them while they were en route to Malacca.⁶⁷

It seems that in the brief intervals of peace the only Portuguese to try their luck in Achin were private traders. In Couto there is a report dating from 1529 which states that after the Achinese sultan had offered to make peace more than 80 independent Portuguese merchants sailed with their merchandise in a Portuguese ship to Achin in the hope of opening up new trade there, but it all came to nothing because the peace negotiations broke down.⁶⁸ Our scanty sources are silent on the subject of any further commercial relations. Only under the threat of the coming of the Dutch did the Portuguese try to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Achinese, with the object of preventing the Hollanders from entering into relations with Achin and carrying on trade there.⁶⁹ Ambassadorial missions were exchanged,⁷⁰ but when the Portuguese representatives arrived in the roads of Achin they found that two Dutch ships of De Houtman's fleet were already busy loading cargo. The Portuguese ambassador, a *casado* from Malacca who was probably already known to the king on account of the trade he carried on in a private capacity, and the Augustine monk accompanying him, who knew the language of Achin, managed to turn the Achinese ruler against the Dutch, with consequences fatal to the latter. But the friendship between Portuguese Malacca and Achin was not of a permanent nature, even though the Portuguese administration ordered the punishment of all "who have troubled the subjects of

Achin." ⁷¹ According to Pyrard, a few independent Portuguese traders still traded occasionally in Achin but their number was small for "they have no favour with the king and indeed never see him." ⁷² In view of the large share that the king had in commerce, this lack of royal favour can hardly have been conducive to the success of the merchants' trade. Thus as regards details of Achin's very important commercial development in the 16th century Portuguese sources let us down almost completely. Although the Dutch accounts date from the beginning of the 17th century they give us a somewhat better picture of Achin at the peak of its power.

As in the time of the sultanate, various native traders from the east coast of Sumatra continued to visit Malacca. And although most of the exports from Johore's dependencies must have gone to Johore itself, these countries still sent some pepper to Malacca, ⁷³ which became even more of a market for them after Achin's devastating attacks on Johore at the beginning of the 17th century. ⁷⁴

At first only a few Portuguese merchants used to visit the Sumatran ports ⁷⁵ but in the late 16th, early 17th, century the Portuguese began to trade actively with these places. The trade, which was carried on in small ships, centred particularly on Jambi. ⁷⁶ At that time Jambi had an annual output of from 40,000 to 50,000 bags of pepper (1 bag = approximately 50 pounds) ⁷⁷ which was bought up by the Chinese and these Portuguese merchants from Malacca. ⁷⁸ Javanese also bought pepper in Jambi and then resold it again in their own ports to the Chinese. ⁷⁹ The Portuguese brought cloth to Jambi and were therefore popular merchants. No import duty had to be paid on cloth in Jambi while an export duty of 10% was charged on pepper.

The growers themselves, or sometimes Chinese middlemen, used to bring the pepper grown in the Minangkabau back-country down the rivers to ports on either the east or the west coast, where it was bartered for cloth, salt, and other merchandise. In the early years of the 17th century, under the stimulus of Chinese and Portuguese demand and the patronage of the ruler, a great deal of pepper was exported via Jambi. ⁸⁰ Since the Chinese were trading in Jambi at the same time the Portuguese could get Chinese goods there as well as pepper. ⁸¹ The Chinese merchandise had been brought to the port in Chinese junks and the Portuguese bought it for use in their trade with Timor. In Jambi, moreover, they could exchange their goods for money, apparently also brought there by the Chinese. ⁸² When the Dutch tried to obtain a share of the profitable Jambi pepper trade they came up against strong

Portuguese opposition. The elder of the two reigning monarchs in Jambi was on the side of the Portuguese, and so were his nobles.⁸³ Rivalry among the Europeans, now augmented by British competition as well, caused the Jambi pepper trade to flourish and even led to Asian traders who were settled in Jambi carrying on an active export trade with the other coastal towns of Java.⁸⁴ Independent Portuguese merchants participated in this trade by chartering ships or taking shares in the cargoes and sending their slaves along as their representatives on the trading voyages.⁸⁵

After they had captured Malacca it was vitally important for the Portuguese to restore commercial relations with the towns of northern Java. We have seen that the Javanese wholesale merchant Utimuti raja and his son-in-law Pate Kediri who had settled in Malacca, and also the Javanese who were subordinate to them, had not submitted willingly to Portuguese authority.⁸⁶ We may take it that these Javanese had had a large share in spice exports to the West, but their rebellion and the attack made from Java by Pate Unus of Japara⁸⁷ ended in catastrophe for the united Javanese fleet. Pate Unus too, was descended from a Malaccan merchant who had seized power in Japara by force.⁸⁸ As the latter's grandson, Pate Unus was no doubt closely connected with the intermediary trade in spices. However that may be, he turned Japara into a flourishing port although, according to Pires, it remained under the nominal authority of Demak. But Pate Unus was in command of the attack on Malacca in which Demak also took part.⁸⁹ The defeat which the Portuguese inflicted upon the Javanese made them greatly feared for a few years. But fear alone could not make the Javanese rulers and notables cease their dealings with the Portuguese. Java, which was primarily agrarian, depended on Malacca's large population for the sale of its surplus of food products. And although the Moslem rulers of the seaports joined in Pate Unus' attack on Malacca, after the defeat their power had been so greatly reduced by the destruction of their ships⁹⁰ that they allowed the Portuguese to enter their ports peaceably and, just like the Hindu princes, paid homage to the new rulers in Malacca.⁹¹ When Joao Lopes de Alvim appeared in the Javanese seaports with his ships in 1513 he was well received, and Tomé Pires, who also took part in this voyage, had every opportunity to collect valuable data on the commercial possibilities of the various towns. Thanks to his report we can form a pretty good idea of what these ports were like.⁹² Unfortunately only very fragmentary data have been preserved about the rest of the 16th century. For a

more detailed account we must wait until the Javanese towns are visited by the Dutch.

Although at first the Portuguese looked for support to the Hindu rulers (who at the beginning of the period of Portuguese settlement in Malacca were still to be found in the eastern tip of Java, in the interior and, for a short while, in Sunda), they tried to maintain fairly good relations with the Moslem seaports as well. This was because they wanted to be sure of food supplies for Malacca. The Portuguese carried on trade in Grise until 1523 and the relationship there was so good that the ruler of the town even intervened on behalf of some Portuguese who had been taken prisoner in Madura.⁹³ Portuguese also appeared in Surabaya, which lies further south.⁹⁴ Grise was one of the first to acclaim the Portuguese, apparently hoping to conduct under them the same profitable intermediary trade in spices that it had known in pre-Portuguese Malacca. The Portuguese monopoly policy and Portuguese activity in the Moluccas must have rapidly dispelled this hope. By 1523 Grise was already unsafe for Portuguese ships⁹⁵ and direct contact ceased for a long time as a result of a punitive expedition by the Portuguese. Malacca had no contact with Tuban either, but Pires' impression of the relative unimportance of this port⁹⁶ is confirmed by Barros' account of the voyage of Antonio de Brito in 1521. Tuban was the first port De Brito touched, but Barros does no more than mention its name whereas he speaks of Grise as *the* big port of this region, through which there flowed a continuous stream of merchants and merchandise.⁹⁷ Unfortunately, because contact was only sporadic, Portuguese reports contain so few data about the Javanese coastal towns that it is almost impossible to draw any conclusions from them about the development of trade in these places. We are left completely in the dark about the relations obtaining between the various towns, but their interests must certainly have conflicted at times. In the middle of the 16th century, for example, Japara and Demak followed different economic policies.

Japara seems to have recovered rapidly from its defeat by the Portuguese. It developed into a very prosperous commercial town with connections overseas. Lawe and Tanjung Pura in Borneo, Bangka, and some other islands were under its influence and it seems to have had interests in Amboina as well.⁹⁸ Although the latter island was subordinate to Ternate, the native inhabitants called on Japara for aid when they were hard pressed by the Portuguese.⁹⁹ This was the time (16th century) when the well-known Queen of Japara was on the

throne, who, thanks to the Portuguese sources, stands out as something of a personality in 16th century Java. She was a bitter opponent of the Portuguese and went to war with them twice, in 1551 and in 1574.¹⁰⁰ The size of her fleet, particularly in 1574, may be an indication that this expedition, like that of Pate Unus, was a combined undertaking by several Javanese ports. It is hard to believe that Japara alone could have fitted out some 300 ships, including 80 large junks;¹⁰¹ unless in this passage Couto has succumbed to the temptation to make the opponents of the Portuguese out to be as formidable as possible or even beyond that.

It was not rice in the first place¹⁰² but spices which caused Japara to follow an anti-Portuguese policy. While rice was indeed one of its earliest export products,¹⁰³ spices must have occupied a position of equal, if not greater, importance in the country's economy. Its merchants maintained commercial relations with the other Javanese seaports, including Grise¹⁰⁴ where the spices could be bought. But Japara's direct influence in Amboina¹⁰⁵ was probably a factor of greater importance and profit than Grise as far as Japara's export trade in spices was concerned. If it had wanted to export rice to Malacca good relations would have had to be maintained with the Portuguese trading centre, and the Portuguese for their part would certainly have encouraged such exports. This situation did in fact arise in the second half of the 16th century when Japara became the export port for the inland kingdom of Mataram.¹⁰⁶ But earlier on Malacca's rice came from Demak,¹⁰⁷ the kingdom which extended its influence over a large part of the coastal region of Java during the first half of the 16th century. According to Pires, at the beginning of the century it was a flourishing trading centre, possessing a large number of merchant ships,¹⁰⁸ and it probably owed its prosperity and its expansion in Java partly to the export of foodstuffs to Malacca. In the second half of the 16th century Demak's role is reputed to have been taken over for a time by the kingdom of Pajang.¹⁰⁹ Couto's passage about the refusal of Demak (or perhaps of Pajang) to participate in the Achinese coalition against Portuguese Malacca¹¹⁰ in 1564 fits in perfectly with this policy of good relations with the Portuguese, a policy which was also to be followed by the kingdom of Mataram in later days. This passage is therefore not so "strange"¹¹¹ after all, and even if the murder of the Achinese envoys by order of the Javanese ruler is rather an odd story, it is but an extreme example of the apprehension felt by the biggest Javanese state about Achinese expansion.

So from the point of view of its own security as well, the Javanese kingdom had to observe caution in its dealings with Portuguese Malacca. But, on the other hand, while Demak (or Pajang) feared the power of Achin, the Portuguese conditions for making peace with Japara in 1574 indicate that they were apprehensive about contact between Achin and Japara. After all, one of the provisions stipulated that no Javanese might sail to Achin without a pass issued by the captain of Malacca,¹¹² seems to indicate that such voyages did sometimes take place. One wonders what the Javanese did in Achin; they cannot have engaged in political and military manoeuvres to bring the armed forces of both countries under a joint command, since each country waged a separate campaign against Malacca until both were repulsed – proof of how deeply Achin and Japara distrusted each other. Were they perhaps trying to establish direct contact in Achin with the shipping route to the West, with a view to exporting spices and importing cloth without having to take the Portuguese monopoly claims into account? It is certainly remarkable that in spite of the close dynastic ties binding the two countries,¹¹³ Japara followed such a completely different policy from Demak.¹¹⁴ This proves, perhaps, the supreme importance of economic motives. The wealthy commercial city of Japara was apparently strong enough to follow a separate line of conduct.

In the second half of the 16th century Japara was to come within the sphere of influence of the inland kingdom of Mataram, which thereby obtained an outlet on the coast. After that, Japara's exports did indeed consist mainly of rice from the agrarian interior,¹¹⁵ while trade in spices occurred chiefly in Grise, where it was carried on by local rulers and merchants. This was the situation as the Dutch found it on their arrival.¹¹⁶ Probably these circumstances had a lot to do with the growing influence exerted on Amboina by the Giri ruler. The motive behind this must have been the propagation of Islam, but in view of the close ties linking the spiritual leader with the commercial town of Grise,¹¹⁷ the relationship undoubtedly served Grise's spice interests as well. In the second half of the 16th century Grise appears to have experienced a period of great prosperity. The Dutch sources also testify to this.¹¹⁸ Traders from western Asia went there to load spices, carrying cargoes of cloth and sailing via the Sunda Straits so as to avoid the maritime control of the Portuguese. No less important was the Chinese trade. The Solo River, which provided good communications with the interior, was used for transporting the merchandise,

which comprised rice, cloth and Chinese goods.¹¹⁹ But although Grise's food exports must have been considerable, Pires places the importance of the spice trade above everything else.

In the long run the Portuguese restricted their official dealings almost exclusively to the eastern, Hindu, part of Java, but as their influence in the Moluccas declined (which meant that they were unable to enforce their monopoly), Portuguese trade of a private character gradually developed in the Moslem towns of Java. At first it was very limited in scope. When the Dutch first came to Grise, seven or eight Portuguese, mostly of mixed blood, inhabited a sort of lodge outside the town¹²⁰ where they bartered cloth imported from Malacca and other goods in demand among the Javanese for the spices. The Portuguese also found ready customers here for the coins known as cash, which they usually gave in *commenda* to Javanese skippers sailing to the Spice Islands.¹²¹ In the next few years there was a great increase in private dealing¹²² because it was the Portuguese government's policy to permit this trade in order to counterbalance Dutch activity.¹²³ In the other Javanese seaports, too, an occasional Portuguese, usually a convert to Islam, could be found, as in Cheribon,¹²⁴ Sedayu,¹²⁵ and Tuban,¹²⁶ for example. In the last-mentioned town one of these renegades rose to occupy a position of confidence at the ruler's side:¹²⁷ the Dutch even addressed him as governor.

Although the Portuguese had more contact with the eastern, Hindu, part of Java, information about this region is just as scarce as about the Moslem towns. On their voyages to Solor and Timor and the Spice Islands the Portuguese used to call at places along the coast, particularly at Panarukan, where they could take on provisions.¹²⁸ In 1526 no fewer than 20 junks from Malacca called at this port for food supplies.¹²⁹

There was a Franciscan mission there for a short while. It had been founded in 1580 by order of the captain of Malacca but, according to Eredia, by 1599 all the buildings had been destroyed and the Christians had disappeared.¹³⁰ The Dutch, however, found various Portuguese and their christianized slaves living in Panarukan. Every year some of the latter were taken to Malacca,¹³¹ so apparently the Portuguese carried on slave trading here. Other export products were Spanish pepper and striped cotton fabrics. Eredia's report about relations being broken off between the Portuguese and Panarukan is presaged by an account in the journal of the British navigator Thomas Cavendish, who landed on the Javanese coast in the vicinity of Panarukan in 1588. The British learned that a couple of Portuguese lived some

distance inland and carried on trade with the Javanese in cloves, pepper, sugar and similar products.¹³² These two Portuguese, the only ones in the vicinity, had seen no Europeans for eighteen months, which seems to indicate that they did not have much contact with Portuguese Malacca or their fellow-countrymen. The country of Panarukan abounded in food products, and the British were offered cattle, game, fruits and similar commodities, as well as sugar-cane, sugar in the form of cakes, coconuts, wine, brandy and much salt.¹³³

We have seen in Pires that when the Portuguese first arrived in western Java the Hindu inhabitants used to prevent the Moslem merchants from trading in their ports. The ruler at that time was a Hindu prince who entered into relations with the Portuguese ¹³⁴ in order to offset Islam which threatened from the coastal towns of northern Java. But the Portuguese failed to make the most of this opportunity for obtaining a foothold in western Java, and when they tried to re-establish contact some years later the new religion was already firmly entrenched there. This did not prevent the Portuguese, after an initially bad reception, from carrying on a profitable trade in pepper in the newly-prosperous port of Bantam. We are very ill informed about the origin and development of trade in this port which is mentioned so frequently in the Dutch sources. In this respect both native and Portuguese sources let us down more or less completely. Djajadinin-grat's study on the Sadjarah Banten is a fully documented examination of its political and dynastic history, the only treatment to which the material lends itself.¹³⁵ As regards trade, all that we have to go on are a few disconnected remarks by the Portuguese writers. The desire of the Sundanese to dispose profitably of their pepper apparently triumphed over their religious zeal, for as early as 1535 Couto reports that a cargo of spices, including pepper, was shipped to Portugal direct instead of via Goa.¹³⁶ In the sixties the pepper trade in Bantam was conducted by the Portuguese on the basis of a contract issued by the viceroy.¹³⁷ This contract mentions an annual delivery of 10,000 *quintals* of pepper from Bantam.¹³⁸ But to the Bantamese the ancient Chinese trade on Sunda was more important still. Couto mentions the yearly arrival in Bantam and other Sundanese ports of nearly 20 Chinese *somas* or junks which loaded some 30,000 *quintals* of pepper.¹³⁹ Lack of comparative material obliges us to accept the high figures quoted by the Portuguese writers at their face value. Perhaps the explanation of these huge quantities lies in the fact that pepper was also brought to Bantam from the neighbouring Sumatran countries, particularly from the

Lampongs where, as Pires had already stated, pepper culture was on the increase. Bantam's claims to the Lampongs may have been connected with its export requirements, and perhaps the same can be said of its efforts at expansion in the direction of Palembang, although pepper culture was not introduced there until later. In the latter part of the 16th century Portuguese trade of a private character profited in Bantam from the greater freedom consequent upon the weakening of the monopoly. In both Jacatra and Bantam the Dutch found various Portuguese merchants established.¹⁴⁰

The Portuguese managed to obtain a large share in the sandalwood trade of Solor and Timor, yet they did not succeed in monopolizing it entirely since the old-established Chinese trade continued to hold its own there.¹⁴¹ Apparently only the Chinese could supply these islanders with the goods they particularly liked, goods which could not be delivered by the Portuguese, the Javanese, or traders from other places.¹⁴² The Portuguese used to fetch about 1,000 *bahar* of sandalwood from the islands each year.¹⁴³ Unfortunately we have no way of knowing the quantity taken by the Chinese. The Portuguese also seem to have visited Bali, one of the Lesser Sunda Islands. The members of the first Dutch expedition came across a Portuguese who had been living in Bali for years but could not obtain the king's permission to leave "since each year junks come here from Malacca." This man, who had come to Bali with merchandise from Malacca, apparently served the ruler as intermediary or interpreter.¹⁴⁴

The spice-producing areas (the Moluccas, Ambon, and the Banda Islands) were the scene of the greatest Portuguese activity, and it was there that Portuguese influence on native trade and economy was strongest. Immediately after the capture of Malacca, the Portuguese had dispatched an exploratory expedition from Malacca to the Spice Islands by the traditional trade route via the coast of Java, making use of information supplied by a Malaccan merchant.¹⁴⁵ Pires has left a description of the condition in which they found the islands.¹⁴⁶ In the period between 1511 and 1522 they undertook regular trading voyages to these regions, calling sometimes at Amboina and sometimes at the Banda Islands or the Moluccas for the purpose of taking on cargo.¹⁴⁷

The struggle for Malacca and the subsequent catastrophe which befell the fleet of northern Java led at first to the native traders making fewer voyages to the islands. In 1515, according to Pires, the decline in shipping was so great that "for the last 3 years they have only gathered a few cloves because of the drop in navigation."¹⁴⁸ This

partly accounts for the good reception given to the Portuguese by the Moluccan rulers, who hoped that they would not only buy the island products but also help them in the fight against their rival. Both rulers claimed supreme authority over the other Spice Islands and Ternate, especially, extended its influence further and further afield in the course of the 16th century. Although this policy was later to bring it into conflict with the Portuguese, it hoped at first for Portuguese assistance. The presence of the Portuguese on Ternate and, above all, of the stone fortress they built there, gave the inhabitants of this island a certain amount of prestige among their neighbours.¹⁴⁹ The ruler of Gilolo, which was the most important of the small kingdoms on Halmahera and which was at war with Ternate when the Portuguese arrived,¹⁵⁰ was particularly impressed. Originally Halmahera had been the most important island in the Moluccas but the fact that it had no cloves to start with put it in an unfavourable position compared with the neighbouring islands where cloves did grow. This became particularly apparent when Ternate and Tidore, with Portuguese and Spanish help respectively, increased their authority on Halmahera at the expense of the king of Gilolo. The religious antitheses do not seem to have prevented the Moslem rulers of Ternate and Tidore from demonstrating their friendship for the Portuguese.¹⁵¹ Both islands contended for the presence of the Europeans on their territory and competed with each other for the privilege of supplying them with cargo.¹⁵²

When the Spanish expedition headed by Magellan arrived in the Moluccas shortly after the death of its leader ¹⁵³ and was well received on Tidore, the Portuguese faced up to this fresh competition by concluding a treaty with the sultan of Ternate. Thanks to the sultan's accomodating attitude, their first fort was built in the Moluccas in 1522. The treaty left the trade in cloves entirely in Portuguese hands for a fixed price of 800 *reis* per *bahar* to be paid in kind.¹⁵⁴ This price, which must have been a higher one than the Ternatans obtained from the Asian traders,¹⁵⁵ was yet another reason for the sultan to oblige the Portuguese. Moreover the Portuguese were granted the right to prevent any traders they came across in the Spice Islands from loading cargo before they themselves had loaded their own ships.¹⁵⁶

As we have already seen, Islam had penetrated to the Moluccas some fifty to eighty years before the coming of the Portuguese,¹⁵⁷ but was still largely confined to the merchants – probably of Malay and Javanese origin – who lived on the coast.¹⁵⁸ The first Moluccan ruler to

be converted to Islam was the king of Ternate, according to Barros, by reason of his marriage to a Javanese woman.¹⁵⁹ But it was precisely the Moslem merchants who felt their commercial position threatened by the Portuguese. Until then theirs had been the sole agency through which the sultan (without whom no trade could be carried on) could find a market for the products of the island, and now the Portuguese were taking their place. The merchants tried to prevent this happening and were even reputed to have brought about the murder of the king of Ternate.¹⁶⁰

At first, however, the Ternatan rulers continued to seek Portuguese assistance in obtaining more power in the islands,¹⁶¹ and especially in the neighbouring island of Tidore. Tidore was a clove island too, but cultivation there was of more recent date. The ruler was said to have moved his capital to the coast not so long before the arrival of the Portuguese for reasons connected with the growing volume of his country's trade.¹⁶²

Faced with the close political, but even more important economic, alliance between the Portuguese and the Ternatans, the sultan of Tidore associated himself with the Spaniards.¹⁶³ This led to a competitive struggle between Spaniards and Portuguese and their respective protégés which was to continue until far into the 16th century. Apart from the cloves which the king of Tidore supplied to the Spaniards, the latter managed to obtain cloves from other islands¹⁶⁴ by offering the native producers eight times as much as the Portuguese. This was naturally harmful to the Portuguese and led to hostilities against Tidore.¹⁶⁵ The conflicts among the Europeans themselves did not enhance their prestige, which had already suffered from the way in which many Portuguese misconducted themselves towards the native inhabitants, and from the corrupt administration of various Portuguese governors in the Moluccas.¹⁶⁶ To a considerable extent this served to intensify the influence of Islam upon the population.¹⁶⁷ Although the Spanish capitulation on Tidore which was followed by the treaty of Zaragossa (1529)¹⁶⁸ officially put an end to Spanish-Portuguese conflict in the Moluccas, there were repeated skirmishes until 1546. Only at the end of the 16th century when Portugal became a part of the Spanish empire (1580) did the presence of the Spanish in the Philippines serve to buttress Portuguese authority in the Spice Islands.¹⁶⁹

So although at first the Portuguese and the Spanish were welcome strangers on Ternate and Tidore, and although the Portuguese employed every means to secure the spice monopoly, native trade was still

not superseded. Javanese and Malays continued to transport the cloves and Ternatan notables had a large share in the cargoes of their junks.¹⁷⁰

At no time in the 16th century was there any question of the Portuguese crown having a working monopoly of spices in the Moluccas since, quite apart from the native spice trade which was indestructible, Portuguese officials and independent Portuguese traders took an active part in the trade too. The government had given the latter permission to buy cloves freely, provided they relinquished a third of them to the government at the trading post price, which, according to Castanheda, was fixed at 3 *pardaos* per *bahar*.¹⁷¹ This regulation, dating from 1535, did not work well in practice, however, since private traders bought the cloves at much higher prices than the specified one. Because of this the royal factors could buy hardly any more cloves for the government, or only poor quality ones.¹⁷² In the first quarter of the 16th century, moreover, Spanish competition in Tidore sent clove prices up still more. The attempts of the Portuguese government to force the buyers to hand over part of their purchases to the trading post at government prices were frustrated by the opposition of both traders and native producers.¹⁷³ Yet the government continued to lay claim to this third share, which in the course of the 16th century fell into the hands of the captains of the forts. In 1585 the government was still trying to reserve this share for the crown.¹⁷⁴

The Portuguese government's efforts to obstruct private trade by Asians and Portuguese resulted in sharp conflicts and certainly did not make for good relations with the natives. When the Portuguese insisted that the entire clove crop should be sold to the government the Ternatans retaliated by refusing to provide the Portuguese with any more food unless they were permitted to sell the cloves to whomsoever they pleased.¹⁷⁵

Portuguese trading voyages to the Moluccas were made on the basis of a contract concluded with a captain or an official who was due for some reward.¹⁷⁶ By the terms of the contract the costs of fitting-out the ship were paid by the crown and other expenses were for the account of the recipient. Part of the cargo was reserved for the crown and had to be taken to Goa, while the government moreover had a share in the cargo belonging to the private traders who also chartered the ship. Customs duties were supposed to be paid in Goa.¹⁷⁷ But corruption was so rife during unloading and transshipment in Malacca that the government suffered serious losses and in 1562 it prohibited the discharging of cargo in Malacca.¹⁷⁸

The expenses incurred by the Portuguese crown in the Moluccan trade were very heavy, being estimated at some 10,000 to 12,000 *cruzados* a year in the first half of the 16th century.¹⁷⁹ Unfortunately we cannot ascertain in what ratio this amount stood to the actual profits which the Portuguese crown derived from the spice trade. Portuguese administration was such that it did not provide an over-all picture of the financial situation and this fact coupled with the lack, even today, of published records (if these exist at all)¹⁸⁰ makes it impossible to learn exactly how much the goods received from the Indies realized. The central administration had neither a budget nor an accounting system for the settlements as a whole, while the accounts of the various trading posts were very badly kept, above all in the 16th century.¹⁸¹

What we do know is that the trade in spices carried on privately by the Portuguese must have been quite considerable. Some junks which were seized, belonging to Portuguese private traders in Malacca, carried cargoes of spices valued by Couto at some 100,000 *cruzados* per ship.¹⁸² There is, however, no means of checking this figure. According to Falcao, a person granted the privilege of making a voyage from Goa to the Moluccas could make a profit of 35,000 *xerafims*¹⁸³ (1 *xerafim*: 1 *cruzado* = 3 : 9.7).

The demand of both Portuguese and Asians for spices resulted in cloves being much more widely cultivated and in their introduction in the course of the 16th century on a steadily increasing number of islands, including Ceram and Amboina. Another consequence of the increased demand was that the cloves which had formerly grown wild were now cultivated in orchards, and undoubtedly this applied particularly to those islands where cloves had only recently been introduced. But the passage in Barros about the spice trees not belonging to anyone in particular must refer to wild cloves. Before the crop was harvested, the area was divided up according to the number of villages and communities, and each person might pick as many cloves as he could, the person who picked the most making the biggest profit.¹⁸⁴ A considerable part of the crop went as tribute to the ruler, who could thus provide the foreign dealers with large parcels of cloves at a time, while the nobility was also in a position to participate in this spice trade.¹⁸⁵ But in the Moluccas, as elsewhere, foreign traders must also have bought small quantities of the spices direct from the pickers themselves. In any case, to judge from an account given by Oviedo about a resident of the Moluccas who was taken with some of his

compatriots to Europe in one of the ships from Magellan's expedition, the native inhabitants seem to have taken an interest in the price the foreign merchants obtained when they resold the Moluccan products. The man in question displayed too much curiosity about the value of the Spanish money and the price at which the spices were sold.¹⁸⁶ So he was not sent back to his own land lest he should make his fellow-countrymen wiser than they already were.

We do not come across any Chinese among the foreign Asian merchants who visited the Moluccas in the 16th century although, according to Barros, the Chinese had been the first people to acquaint the inhabitants of the Moluccas with the value of the spices.¹⁸⁷ They used to barter cash and porcelain for the spices, and these commodities remained in great demand among the natives later on as well.¹⁸⁸ Published Chinese sources supply confirmation of this contact, for the second half of the 14th century at least.¹⁸⁹ Thereafter they contain no special references to the Spice Islands until the 16th century.¹⁹⁰ The Chinese merchants were very welcome in the Moluccas and the native population looked forward greatly to their arrival. Apparently they sailed to the Moluccas via the Javanese ports, for they brought Javanese cotton cloth as well as Chinese earthenware and porcelain, silver, ivory, beads, and iron.¹⁹¹ The disappearance of the "Chinese" Chinese from the Moluccas was perhaps not so much a consequence of Javanese and Malay competition¹⁹² (which must have existed previously as well) as of the fact that these Chinese settled permanently in the Javanese seaports and carried on their trade from there. After all, Grise is supposed to have been founded by Chinese settlers,¹⁹³ and the accounts compiled in China would not contain any reference to these expatriate Chinese. Moreover, in the 15th century the rise of the commercial centre of Malacca meant that the merchants coming from China were offered such a plentiful supply of spices via the Javanese intermediary trade that they no longer visited the Javanese ports themselves.¹⁹⁴ When Portuguese Malacca lost a lot of its attraction for them too, they did sail on to the Javanese ports. But they did not go as far as the actual Spice Islands. Apparently it was not worth the inconvenience of the extra journey to add to the competition already existing there between the Javanese and Malay merchants and the Portuguese. They did, however, continue to visit the sandalwood island of Timor. Only when the Portuguese monopoly had been completely destroyed owing to Dutch penetration of the area, and a bitter struggle developed between natives and Europeans as well as

between the Europeans themselves, did the Chinese try to gain a share of the spice trade for themselves. Then they conducted their operations from the Philippines, but the Dutch were to prevent them from achieving their objective.¹⁹⁵

In the second half of the 16th century the relationship between the Portuguese and the ruler of Ternate grew steadily worse. Finally the Portuguese had to give up their settlement there, a development in which the growing religious antithesis must certainly have been a major factor. Ternate's expansion, which had begun before the coming of the Portuguese, was linked with the propagation of Islam, and in the second half of the 16th century the intolerant Jesuit mission barred the way. Because religious considerations were allowed to predominate (which was certainly not in Portugal's economic interests) the conflict became more and more bitter and culminated in the murder of the sultan.¹⁹⁶ His successor, the famous Baab Ullah, drove the Portuguese out of Ternate.¹⁹⁷ Yet the motive was certainly not purely religious this time either. Through their monopoly policy, their claim that, as vassals, the natives must pay tribute in cloves,¹⁹⁸ and their frequently tactless and tyrannical behaviour, the Portuguese had made themselves unbearable to the natives. Baab's victory over the Portuguese made him highly respected among the natives (as was also the case with the sultan of Achin) and in the years that followed most of the Greater Indies (the territory also known as the Seventy-two Islands) came within his sphere of influence¹⁹⁹ and had to pay him tribute.²⁰⁰ Proof that the root of the trouble was political and economic is to be found in the treaty that the Portuguese concluded with Tidore (which was just as Moslem as Ternate) after they had been driven out of Ternate. The sultan of Tidore, who was traditionally antagonistic to the sultan of Ternate and undoubtedly fearful of that island's increasing strength, also hoped that the clove trade would be transferred to his island. In 1578 after Baab had made an assault upon the island, the sultan permitted the Portuguese to build a fort on Tidore.²⁰¹

But the Portuguese now began to concentrate their power and commercial activity in the Spice Islands on Amboina. Clove cultivation cannot have been introduced on that island before the beginning of the 16th century. This is borne out by the circumstance that Pires does not list the clove as one of the crops grown on Amboina²⁰² and also by the fact that in Cambello on Ceram the first clove trees could still be pointed out to the Dutch on their arrival.²⁰³ (Cloves had first been introduced from Makian to Ceram and then from Ceram to Amboina.)²⁰⁴

Hitu became the centre of the clove trade on Amboina.²⁰⁵ The origin of this settlement can be traced to Javanese emigration from Tuban,²⁰⁶ but the emigration cannot have been connected with the spice trade since the settlement dates from a time when no cloves grew on either Amboina or Ceram.

The residents of Hitu did not plant or harvest the cloves themselves, but received them in tribute from smaller places ²⁰⁷ which stood in some sort of dependent relationship towards the larger ones and were obliged to provide them with certain commodities. The tribute consisted primarily of cloves, but included wood ²⁰⁸ and other products as well.

The expanding clove cultivation led to brisk trade with the Javanese, who came to get the cloves in exchange for foodstuffs and cloth. The rapidity of expansion is proved by Couto's report of the arrival off Hitu in 1538 of a fleet of junks coming to load cloves in this port, which had become the central market for the product. This fleet was said to include 10 very large junks.²⁰⁹ The Javanese had warehouses in Hitu for storing the cloves. Couto estimates the entire clove crop of Amboina at some 2,000 *quintals*; another source (Barbosa Machado, 1565) quotes only half this quantity however.²¹⁰

The Javanese propagated Mohammedanism in Hitu, and the town became a Moslem centre, but part of the island remained "heathen." In fact the smaller places which were directly dependent upon Hitu stayed heathen until the beginning of the 17th century even though most of the chiefs professed Islam by then.²¹¹

Valentijn (whose authority is the native chronicle of Ridjali) ²¹² makes special mention of Japara's influence upon Hitu. Although the ruler of Ternate also laid claim to Ceram and Amboina ²¹³ apparently the inhabitants of Hitu did not recognize his authority.²¹⁴

At first the Hituese also entered into business relations with the Portuguese and allowed them to establish a settlement (1525).²¹⁵ But the Portuguese tried to stop the Javanese trading there because they feared that the Javanese demand would send spice prices up.²¹⁶ Neither the Javanese nor the Hituese could brook such interference and when the native inhabitants revolted they were able to count on the assistance of the Javanese. The religious factor became very important because the Portuguese tried to combat the Hituese resistance by winning over the heathen sector of the island population ²¹⁷ through the medium of the Christian mission. The antagonism became fierce and fanatical in character ²¹⁸ since the Christian mission now came up

against expansionist Islam. The Portuguese abandoned Hitu and settled in their converts' territory, where they built fortifications on the Leitimor Peninsula and tried to promote the cultivation of cloves there.

The Hituese received the most help against the Portuguese from the Queen of Japara, whose acquaintance we have already made.²¹⁹ But a little later on the influence of the Giri ruler, the Javanese spiritual leader from the vicinity of Grise, can be observed.²²⁰ As Japara's influence in Amboina decreased, the prestige of Giri grew, and undoubtedly the spice interests of Grise likewise.

The people of Amboina received help against the Portuguese from the inhabitants of the Banda Islands ²²¹ as well as from the Javanese. As we have already seen, even before the coming of the Portuguese these islands were a focal point of trade where not only the domestic spices – nutmeg and mace – but the cloves from the Moluccas and Amboina were collected for sale to the foreign merchants who came to the Banda Islands ²²² from places both inside and outside the archipelago.²²³ Since the Bandanese were the only people in the Spice Islands to engage in merchant shipping,²²⁴ it must have been they who brought the cloves from the Moluccas and Amboina to Banda.²²⁵ On Banda the cultivation of the nutmegs was primarily the task of the women ²²⁶ yet apparently the major rôle in the sale of the spices was played by the foreign merchants established on the coast. The other inhabitants depended on them for their requirements in the way of food and clothing and for the sale of their spices.²²⁷ The Bandanese resisted every attempt by the Portuguese to obtain a foothold on the islands,²²⁸ yet the merchandise brought by the Portuguese, particularly the cloth, was in great demand among them.²²⁹ Independent Portuguese private traders were able to do good business on Banda but this sent prices up, to the detriment of the official trade of the Portuguese. To combat inflation, the Portuguese captain De Brito concluded a treaty with the Bandanese in 1522 in the name of the Portuguese government.²³⁰ Although at first the Portuguese obtained the nuts in exchange not only for goods but also for *cruzados* or for the cash which were also in circulation in the Spice Islands,²³¹ in the long run they began to avoid putting money into circulation. By the time the Dutch arrived in the Spice Islands commercial intercourse between the Portuguese and the natives was conducted exclusively on the basis of an exchange of goods. To their own great cost, the Dutch were to depart from this system.²³²

Although the activities of the Portuguese were sometimes charac-

terized by violence,²³³ trade with them was profitable to the Bandanese, not least because of the competition operating among the Portuguese themselves.

The Bandanese also managed to evade the Portuguese clove monopoly. They ceased collecting their cloves from Ternate (where the Portuguese controlled most of the supply in the first half of the 16th century) and went to Tidore instead, which was under Spanish influence at first.²³⁴ The continued efforts of the Portuguese to examine the Bandanese junks led to a serious conflict with Tidore.²³⁵ Once the Portuguese had been driven out of Ternate the impediments to native trade disappeared and the Bandanese could once more obtain supplies of cloves from Ternate and the islands subordinate to it.

If the profits made by the independent Portuguese merchants were excessive, the Portuguese crown derived little benefit from the Banda trade, which was characterized by the same drawbacks as the Moluccan trade. The costs of equipping an expedition to the Banda Islands were very high. In comparison with other spices the nutmegs took up a great deal of room, and because of this the largest ships that the Portuguese had in the Indies had to be used. Every year one such ship (in which 1,200 *bahar* of nutmegs and mace could be loaded) set sail for the islands. In this case, too, the trading expedition took the form of a "voyage" granted to a deserving captain,²³⁶ with the government itself having a right to 2/7 of the cargo. But on top of this, private traders were given permission to sail in the royal ship to Banda to buy nutmegs and mace in exchange for merchandise which could be obtained from the king's stores. On the return to Malacca a considerable proportion of the nutmegs and mace destined for the crown fell into the wrong hands because of gifts made by the viceroy and governors to friends and relations. In 1561 the government tried to remedy this evil by introducing a sort of farming system. A proportion of the entire cargo of 1,200 *bahar* namely 300 *bahar* of nutmegs and 50 *bahar* of mace, was to be bought for the government at a fixed price from the captains who had been granted a voyage to Banda, and these captains were then to be allowed to take the government cargo free of duty to Malacca.²³⁷ But this regulation had very little effect either, and the Portuguese finally decided to leave this part of the trade to the natives, who were to supply Malacca with cloves, nutmegs, and mace in future.²³⁸ Couto specially mentions the Javanese in this connection, but Malays must also have been concerned in the traffic. Thus they could supply cargoes of spices for the ships of the independent Asian trade (sailing

via the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean) and also for the official Portuguese ships (via Goa and the Cape of Good Hope).

It is only in the second half of the 16th century that the Portuguese writers begin to mention regular business relations between Malacca and Macassar. According to Eredia, after 1558 brisk trade developed between Macassar and Malacca in spices, aromatic goods, and various kinds of foodstuffs.²³⁹ But once more it is the Dutch reports which give the clearest picture of the way the Portuguese traded with Macassar at the beginning of the 17th century. According to a Dutch memorandum on trade in the Indonesian Archipelago dated 1603, the Portuguese went to Macassar every year in junks²⁴⁰ and took on nutmegs, mace, and cloves, which they were only allowed to purchase in exchange for cloth.²⁴¹ These spices were brought from Banda to Macassar²⁴² by Javanese and Malays and perhaps in the beginning by Bandanese too.²⁴³ Somewhat later the Macassarese themselves also took an active part in this trade,²⁴⁴ which really began to flourish after the loss of Amboina and Tidore in 1605-1607. In Macassar the Portuguese could also obtain supplies of rice, which was the principal domestic product. Tortoise-shell, obtained from the turtles which occurred in great numbers off the coast of Celebes, was brought from Macassar to Malacca by the Javanese.²⁴⁵ Finally, Macassar was a market for male and female slaves, who were purchased there by the Portuguese.²⁴⁶ But commerce in the port was mainly in the hands of Malay merchants from Johore, Patani, and other places on the Malay Peninsula who had settled there²⁴⁷ and remained in contact with their compatriots through the regular arrival in Macassar of junks carrying merchandise from those parts. Junks even came from Siam with Chinese goods for Macassar.²⁴⁸ The Portuguese and the Malay merchants cooperated in this trade between Macassar and Malacca.

When the Dutch captured a Portuguese junk coming from Macassar with a cargo of 150 *bahar* of nutmegs, mace and cloves, as well as a number of male and female slaves, the captain was a Portuguese but the mate was a Moslem Malay living in Macassar, while there was also a Christian Malay on board from the same town.²⁴⁹ In British accounts, too, we come across this mixed Portuguese and native trade between Macassar and Malacca, carried on in ships with half Portuguese, half native, crews, or in native ships chartered by Portuguese.²⁵⁰ The ruler did much to stimulate trade. As their owner, he sent the junks to Malacca and, in his turn, he allowed the Portuguese to participate in the trade as well.²⁵¹ On one of the junks which the Dutch seized, they

found some Portuguese who owned part of the cargo space and had loaded spices in it. The Dutch were to try in vain to put a stop to this Portuguese-Macassarese traffic.²⁵²

In 1621, according to a report from the Dutch merchant of the United Company in Macassar, some twelve Portuguese vessels were arriving in the port annually. Furthermore ships coming from the Moluccas called at Macassar to dispose of spices and, conversely, other Portuguese ships bought spices there from the Javanese, Malay, and Macassarese junks coming from Banda and Amboina. When no spices were obtainable they loaded rice, on which there was less profit to be made in Malacca because of the high import duties of 10% which had to be paid to the crown.²⁵³ At that time some twenty to thirty Portuguese families were normally settled in Macassar. The Dutch estimated the joint capital of these families at about 40,000 *reals*, so that on the whole they must have been small tradesmen with an average trading capital of some 2,000 *reals*.²⁵⁴ But this was at the time when part of Malacca's trade had been transferred to Macassar because of the threat of the Dutch and so it is not an entirely accurate picture of the situation as it was before the Dutch came.

After the conquest of Malacca, communications with Borneo were broken off for some time. But because of the great importance to Malacca's trade of Borneo's products – particularly camphor and diamonds – the Portuguese soon invited the sultan of Brunei to permit his subjects to trade with Malacca again. Moreover, the inhabitants of places on the Borneo coast brought foodstuffs to Malacca. And so trade of the kind which had been carried on during the sultanate revived again between Borneo and Malacca. The places on Borneo provided a market for the cloth and other products of western Asia, and in the ports where Moslem merchants had settled and carried on trade with China and Further India the Portuguese could easily obtain the small Chinese coins called cash which were in demand in the Moluccas.²⁵⁵ The first Dutch reports say nothing about any actual Portuguese settlements, just that Portuguese went there every year in small junks to conduct trade.²⁵⁶ Spaniards from the Philippines also traded on Borneo and obtained there in exchange for cloth many small but valuable goods such as diamonds, pearls, gold, bezoar stones, camphor, and tortoise-shell.²⁵⁷

The Portuguese had a considerable effect upon the tin trade of the Malay Peninsula. The greater part of the output of the tin mines in Perak, estimated by Resende at some 5 or 6 *quintals* a year, originally

went to Malacca in the form of tribute.²⁵⁸ The captains of Malacca also engaged in lucrative trade in Perak, where they had their own trading-post which sometimes yielded bigger profits than any of the others. In the long run, however, the king was only prepared to pay tribute if he received Portuguese help against the Achinese who were devastating his country.²⁵⁹ But the support the Portuguese gave him was inadequate for there was a steady decrease in supplies reaching Malacca, and in Resende's time the Portuguese were getting less than a third of the former amount. A little later on the Dutch managed to lay hands on the greater part of the tin and transported it to Achin, whence it could be exported to India at considerable profit.

The Portuguese used to take cloth to Patani,²⁶⁰ but the bottom fell out of the market when shipments of cloth to Siam and Further India via Tenasserim increased. The route led right across the Malay Peninsula, following roads which had been in existence for a long time,²⁶¹ since they provided a means for the native traders to avoid the high duties levied by Malacca and to obtain the cloth direct from the western Asians at much lower prices. Use was also made of other routes across the Malay Peninsula and so, besides Tenasserim, at the beginning of the 17th century Trang,²⁶² situated to the north of Kedah, developed into an import port for western Asian textiles. Apparently dealers in this Asian cloth trade did not handle large quantities at a time. Peter Floris reports a number of proas manned by some 8 or 10 Indians, each of whom carried not more than one bundle of different kinds of woven material. These men roamed about the country disposing of their wares at very low prices.²⁶³ Compared with the total quantity of cloth that the Portuguese brought to the Indonesian Archipelago, the Asian trade carried on via the Malay Peninsula cannot have been of much significance. The Portuguese carried cloth to Pahang and also opium, which they bartered for gold dust, gold coins, and bezoar stones. In Pahang, moreover, they could obtain rice and dye-woods as well.²⁶⁴ Portuguese Malacca also shipped cloth to Further India despite the competition via the route across the Malay Peninsula. In Cambodia and Cochin-China, but particularly in the latter,²⁶⁵ the Portuguese could dispose of large quantities of cloth. But later on great harm was done to this trade by the tyrannical behaviour of the captains of Malacca.²⁶⁶

The Portuguese themselves transported the woven materials to places all over the Indonesian Archipelago – to Bantam, the Moluccas, and Jambi, for example – or else they tried to sell them in Malacca to the

Javanese and Malays, who then disposed of them to other customers. The problem of preventing the Portuguese from importing these cloths into the area was to become one of the main worries of the Dutch.²⁶⁷

The abuses perpetrated by the Portuguese commanders in Malacca, however, were to do a great deal of harm to the port in its capacity of focal point of trade in the Malay-Indonesian area. On the basis of data from Couto and Botelho, detailed descriptions have been given by Tiele, Winstedt, and Whiteway of the way the captains misused their power to impose duties in Malacca at the beginning of the 16th century.²⁶⁸ This caused native trade to shun the port, and in order to prevent further loss of trade the toll system was reorganized in 1544. Henceforth 6% had to be paid on all goods in Malacca, except those coming from Bengal on which 8% was charged. A duty of 10% had to be paid on Chinese goods imported by Portuguese, but only 6% if these goods were brought in by natives.²⁶⁹ In this way the Portuguese authorities hoped to restrict Portuguese private trade to some extent. The private traders tried in every way to dodge the taxes imposed by the captains and they were equally unwilling to pay the royal taxes. The government's main aim, however, was to attract native trade back to Malacca since the royal taxes could be expected to benefit more from them than from the Portuguese traders. When it ultimately proved impossible to maintain the spice monopoly the Portuguese government allowed native merchandise to enter the port²⁷⁰ in order to make sure of an adequate supply of spices. But no reduction of the customs duties took place. Towards the end of the period of Portuguese administration in Malacca 3% was levied for the town as well as 6% for the royal exchequer. Export taxes then amounted to 4½%, comprising 3% for the throne and 1½% for the town.²⁷¹ Goods destined for Goa and Cochin were exempt from export duty because the king had toll-houses in these places and taxes were levied on the goods upon arrival.²⁷² There was a separate tax for gold, namely an import duty of 4 *cruzados* on a quantity worth approximately 230 *cruzados*.

Moreover there was an extra tax on Malay shipping in the form of a capitation tax on ships entering and leaving the port. The rate was half a *real* per head for ships with crews of five men or less and 3 *cruzados* for ships with bigger crews. Javanese and other foreigners and the residents of the town were exempt, and they did not have to pay any *ruba-ruba* either.²⁷³ Yet the income from these taxes still provided the crown with some 2,000 *cruzados* per year. The anchorage dues (to which all ships with crews of five or more were subject at the rate of 1

cruzado per ship and smaller proas at only 1/8 *real*) were granted by the Portuguese crown to the descendents of Vasco da Gama.

The governor used to issue a pass bearing his own signature to all departing vessels. This stated that the ship had permission to leave and also gave the port of destination, the size of the crew and the armament carried. The sum of ¼ *real* had to be paid for such a pass.²⁷⁴

But if the reorganization of the customs in the middle of the 16th century did bring about a brief improvement in conditions and a revival of native trade, in the second half of the same century and the beginning of the 17th there was a further storm of protest about the corrupt methods of the Portuguese captains. Their victims were more especially the native traders who carried the monopoly products and foodstuffs. Joost Schouten has left us detailed information²⁷⁵ about the huge profits which these "vultures" derived from their varied activities. No one except the captain's factors was allowed to buy any cloves, nutmeg, mace, sandalwood, pepper, tin, or other remunerative merchandise, and these factors therefore made profits of 20% to 30% and more without any risk.²⁷⁶ Moreover we know from another source that the captains used to arrange to have the spices bought at sea so as to avoid paying the king's taxes.²⁷⁷ Sometimes they used to send ships to the Moluccas and Banda to buy cloves and nutmegs there for their own business transactions.²⁷⁸ For that matter, the captains were not the only ones to dodge the king's taxes; independent Portuguese traders and natives were equally active in this respect. The sources are full of complaints about this too.²⁷⁹ Rather than buy the hard-needed spices for their sovereign, the Portuguese captains exchanged the cloth with the Javanese for money for their own private use – money which the Javanese had obtained in Malacca by selling their foodstuffs and spices.²⁸⁰

When the Portuguese captains did buy spices, the prices they paid the natives were far too low, being half what the Javanese themselves could get for a *bahar* of spices in their own country (namely 50 instead of 100 *cruzados*), with the result that the Javanese brought small quantities. When the captains resold the goods the prices they demanded from the new purchasers were much too high. The danger of this Portuguese policy became especially apparent when the Dutch appeared in Indonesian waters and were quite prepared to pay the price of the country.²⁸¹ Moreover the Portuguese private traders (who came chiefly from the ranks of the *casados*), and the native merchants established in Malacca also tried to buy spices from the Javanese,

regardless of the prohibition which was in force. They went secretly by night in little boats to the Javanese and Malay junks and, by offering a somewhat higher price per *bahar* than the Javanese obtained from the captain's factor, they managed to obtain part of the spices which had been brought to the port. Then, of course, the toll-house did not receive any duties on the goods.²⁸² Obviously these spices, which remained outside the Portuguese monopoly, did not reach Europe via the Cape route, and so whoever benefited from the business which had been done in Malacca it was certainly not the Portuguese treasury. The big gains made by the captains of Malacca through all these forms of extortion and their own private trade are reported by Joost Schouten, who summarized the various advantages which the captains managed to procure.²⁸³ For, apart from those mentioned above, the captains insisted upon receiving a gift of 200 to 1,000 *cruzados* from any merchant wishing to make a voyage in a ship or sailing vessel. This was an extra burden upon native and independent Portuguese trade in Malacca, although the royal government had specifically forbidden such practices. The governors sent their cargoes to practically every part of the area and seldom paid any freight. Using their own or, if necessary, the king's vessels, armed with guns from the fort of Malacca,²⁸⁴ they customarily traded on Macao, Goa, Bengal, Negapatnam, Manilla, and other places. On these trading voyages, too, large profits were made. The Portuguese crown regarded the illegal trade which the captains carried on with the Spaniards in the Philippines as a particularly serious transgression,²⁸⁵ one, for that matter, which was not confined to the captains of Malacca alone. An equally important source of income were the gifts from the Indian rulers and all the other gifts which, in accordance with custom, foreigners presented to the captain upon their arrival in Malacca.

In its capacity of successor to the sultans of Malacca, the Portuguese crown reserved to itself the trade in tin from Perak, but the captain had a large share in it too,²⁸⁶ since the Portuguese king had conferred the trade for six months of the year upon the captain and for the other six months upon the town of Malacca, to the exclusion of all other traders. The captains, however, had succeeded in making themselves masters of the entire tin trade in Malacca and only paid the town a fixed quantity of 24 *bahar* per year. Thus as regards obtaining tin too, native traders found the way blocked not only by the Portuguese crown but by the captains of Malacca as well. Schouten estimates that this tin trade yielded the governors some 10,000

cruzados in three years. All in all the Malaccan captains are reputed to have "scraped together" between 50,000 and 80,000 *cruzados* (and sometimes more) during their 3-year periods of office. The Dutch thoroughly spoilt all this by obstructing Malacca's trade.²⁸⁷

In their commercial transactions the Portuguese captains made use of the services of Hindu merchants established in Malacca, borrowed money from them, and sometimes employed them as their factors.²⁸⁸ The attempts of the Portuguese administration to bring about an improvement in this state of affairs had no effect,²⁸⁹ and native shipping began to avoid the Portuguese centre more and more. Even residents of places under Portuguese influence such as Negapatnam and St. Thomé went direct to Perak to exchange their cloth for tin instead of calling at Malacca where they would have had to pay duties.²⁹⁰

At first the Portuguese also encouraged²⁹¹ the Chinese junk traffic which had figured so largely in Malaccan trade during the sultanate.²⁹² In their attempts to obtain a firm foothold in China so as to develop their own trade in that country the Portuguese made use of the knowledge and good offices of Chinese merchants established in Malacca who, because of the prohibitions in force in their own country, could no longer carry on trade in China and therefore allowed the Portuguese to do so for them.²⁹³ But the more the China trade conducted by the Portuguese themselves prospered, and particularly after they had established themselves in Macao, the less dependent they felt upon the supplies brought by the Chinese to Malacca; indeed they probably came to look upon the Chinese activities as competition. There was no longer any reason for the Chinese junk traders to be treated with special consideration and so they, just like the other Asian merchants, began to suffer from the exaction and extortion practised by the Portuguese authorities. They too therefore, turned their attention to other ports, and in the second half of the 16th century we do not hear any more about the presence of Chinese merchants in the Portuguese centre. They did visit ports on the Malay Peninsula – Patani, Pahang, Johore, for instance – all places where pepper could be obtained.²⁹⁴ Without touching Malacca at all, they also sailed via the west coast of Borneo and the east coast of Sumatra to Bantam and Timor for pepper and sandalwood. In this way they avoided the Malay Straits, which the continuous wars between Portuguese Malacca and the Malay states of Achin and Johore had rendered unsafe and where, moreover, a Portuguese *armada de rema* tried to force all ships to enter Malacca, there to be subjected to the ex-

tortionate practices of the Portuguese captains. An echo of the aversion felt by the Chinese for the Portuguese trading centre can be found in a Chinese source which contrasts the good commercial prospects existing in Malacca before the Portuguese conquest with the greatly inferior ones under Portuguese administration, added to which was the greater insecurity of the Malay Straits. For this reason Chinese ships mostly sailed right on and no longer called at Malacca.²⁹⁵ In the early period when the Portuguese still did not have a firm foothold in China, yet found Chinese goods indispensable as barter commodities for inter-Asian trade, they adopted a tolerant policy, but before long they went over to the opposite extreme. The commercial activities of the Chinese in the Indonesian Archipelago came to be regarded as competition and the Portuguese administration tried to obstruct this trade. Thus attempts were made to prevent the Chinese from buying pepper in Sunda, Patani, Pahang, Indragiri and other pepper growing places.²⁹⁶ The Portuguese also tried to stop the Chinese going to Solor for sandalwood.²⁹⁷

But notwithstanding all these abuses and the deterrents placed in the way of the Asian traders there are indications that there was a relative increase in native trade in Portuguese Malacca during the 16th century. It is worth noting, for example, that Couto estimates the proceeds of customs duties immediately after the customs reorganization in 1544 at 26,250 *pardaos* and in his own time at 80,000 *pardaos*; ²⁹⁸ a considerable difference. Of course due allowance should be made for depreciation. Couto's estimates do not apply to foodstuffs since these were free of duty.²⁹⁹ But if under the given circumstances there was actually an increase in native trade in Malacca then it is surely reasonable to assume that an increase also occurred in that trade in the Malay-Indonesian area, which had withdrawn from the Portuguese monopoly and was going its own way.

A more official source than Couto's data, a memorandum on trade in Malacca dated around 1610,³⁰⁰ does not, to be sure, give the amount realized by toll duties, but it estimates the quantity of merchandise brought annually to Malacca at some 4,000 *bahar* (approximately equal to 800 tons). Duties were paid on only half this quantity, the other half evading the regulations by various illegal means. This estimate did not include the untaxed foodstuffs either, so the 4,000 *bahar* must have consisted largely of the more valuable products. By 1610, however, the economic situation in Malacca had already deteriorated greatly; imports must have been much higher in Couto's time

since he estimated that toll duties brought in 80,000 *pardaos* a year. In 1584 Duarte Menezes estimated the income received by the Portuguese king from all sources in Malacca (thus not only from customs duties) at 60,000 *pardaos*.³⁰¹ Lacking more accurate material for comparison, few conclusions can be drawn from these estimates, which include, moreover, the duties imposed upon Portuguese private trade as well. We are struck by the comparatively small quantity of the goods sold by the Asians in Malacca and, in view of this circumstance, by the high sums realized by the toll duties.

Schouten gives a long list of import and export commodities in the latter period of Portuguese administration in Malacca,³⁰² a list borrowed by Winstedt for inclusion in his "History of Malaya." There are omissions in Winstedt's catalogue³⁰³ and unfortunately it does not include the information provided by Schouten as to whether the goods were conveyed by the Portuguese or by the natives themselves. Furthermore, Schouten mentions the prices of the various products,³⁰⁴ which Winstedt does not.

Goods from the Malay Peninsula and the east coast of Sumatra might be brought by the natives or fetched and carried by the Portuguese. The same was true of Borneo, Java, Bima, and Macassar. But the products of Siam and Cambodia were mostly collected by the Portuguese while the inhabitants of these countries only came occasionally to Malacca. Only the Portuguese had any contact with Manilla and, as we have already seen, this was illegal into the bargain. Apparently the Portuguese were also the only people to maintain contact with China. Schouten does not say so in so many words but mentions in this connection the imports and exports of Macao, which were conveyed in Portuguese ships. Communications with Goa and Cochin were also maintained by the Portuguese exclusively, but Klings had a share in shipping to and from Negapatnam and St. Thomé. Again, trade to and from Bengal was conducted almost exclusively by the Portuguese. From a Portuguese source, we know that natives of the Maldives also visited Portuguese Malacca and in 1615 the king of these islands requested that goods bought by his subjects in Malacca should be exempted from export duty.³⁰⁵ Schouten's account confirms the picture of Malaccan trade drawn in the preceding pages from predominantly Portuguese sources and literature. It is informative about the inter-Asian trade of the Portuguese, but Schouten is no better than the Portuguese sources as far as details of native trade is concerned.

Thanks to Eredia, we are rather better informed about the food

supplies brought by the Javanese.³⁰⁶ Every year more than 200 boats of varying sizes entered the port of Malacca loaded with rice, ginger, onions, garlic, butter, oil, honey; wax, cassia fistula, a little cinnamon, tamarind, coconuts, poultry, saffron and other herbs (some of them medicinal); large quantities of meat and preserved and dried fish; huge quantities of coarse earthenware; mats, baskets and trinkets, as well as weapons such as lances, arrows, crises, etc. The spices brought along with the other merchandise were subject to Malaccan taxation unless they were smuggled in.

Proof of how important food supplies were to Malacca can be found in the offer made in 1591 by the ruler of the seaport of Masulipatnam ("rei de Masulapatao" – ruler of Golconda or the governor of the town?) to send a cargo of rice to Malacca each year in exchange for passes for his ships: the Portuguese accepted his offer.³⁰⁷

In spite of the gloomy views about Malacca's declining importance as an emporium held by initiates like the author of "*Livro das cidades e fortalezas*" (1581), Malacca maintained its fame as an important commercial city until the end of the 16th century.³⁰⁸ An eyewitness like the Englishman, Ralph Fitch, who visited Malacca in 1588, was still very much impressed by its busy shipping traffic.³⁰⁹ Nor do the earliest Dutch reports paint a different picture. But in their panoramic descriptions neither Jan Huygen van Linschoten³¹⁰ nor the anonymous author of a manuscript also dating from the end of the 16th century,³¹¹ makes any distinction between official and independent Portuguese trade or between these and the trade of the Asian merchants. Yet both seem to attribute a certain importance to the latter. Linschoten at least compares the small number of Portuguese established in Malacca with the many merchants coming from elsewhere to do business in the port. The author of the manuscript, who reports the annual arrival in Malacca of some 300 ships also relates that the Portuguese themselves bought only small quantities of the various commodities imported into Malacca and that most of them fell into the hands of the Klings. This proves that even at that time the Klings were an important mercantile group in Malacca. This is not surprising as they were undoubtedly the chief importers and vendors of the much coveted cloth, at least in so far as the Portuguese administration did not deal in the Coromandel cloth itself. In the period now following, however, which ends when the town passes definitively into Dutch hands, the decline proceeded apace and by 1641 Malacca had lost all significance as a commercial emporium.

VIII. THE COMING OF THE NORTHERN EUROPEANS TO THE MALAY-INDONESIAN AREA

INTER-EUROPEAN CONFLICTS AND ASIAN TRADE

To the envious northern Europeans who, in their turn, wanted to make sure of a share in the spice supplies, it was no secret that at the end of the 16th century the power of Portugal in its Asian settlements was on the decline. An invaluable guide was provided for the Dutch by Jan Huygen van Linschoten's *Itinerario*. He pointed out the weak spots in the Portuguese system to his fellow-countrymen and showed them where they had the best chance of succeeding against the Spanish and Portuguese. This was in the Indonesian Archipelago, which was also the production area of the spices, the commodities most in demand. In 1597 the first expeditionary fleet sent by the Dutch to the East Indies cruised about in the Malay-Indonesian area for eight months without coming across any Portuguese ships.¹ But at that time the Dutch were still not out to conquer, and if they had happened to encounter the enemy would only have taken defensive action. The Portuguese strongholds in Malacca, the Moluccas and Solor were avoided, and efforts were made to obtain the coveted cargoes in the ports of Java. The sole reason for the various fleets which were fitted out by the trading companies within a short space of time was the conduct of profitable trade. But then frantic competition broke out and obstructed all initiative against the common enemy. At the same time it provided the Asian traders with a number of customers for their goods whose efforts to outbid one another drove prices up, so that these customers were actually promoting Asian interests instead of their own. This naturally gave considerable impetus to Asian trade and the data relating to the first Dutch voyages provide unmistakable indication of increased activity in the Javanese ports. The formation of the United Company meant the concentration of groupings hitherto opposed to one another. The separate enterprises of private merchants of limited means, whose aim was not conquest but simply commercial advantage, were now combined in one body under a charter from the State, and even though the leaders still remained merchants whose

primary concern was commercial gain, the State granted them letters patent, and wars were waged and treaties concluded in the name of the States General. But the latter body had no controlling or regulating voice in the Company's commercial activities. Consolidation was the only means by which the Dutch, whose resources of power were relatively small, could hold their own in Asia. The charter conferred monopoly rights upon the United Company to the exclusion of other persons or groups in the Republic. Henceforth every effort was made to secure a monopoly of both purchase and sale by concluding contracts with the native princes which enforced compulsory deliveries of goods at prices fixed by the Company.

Oldenbarnevelt regarded the monopoly granted to the United Company primarily as an economic weapon with which a blow could be struck against the Spanish and the Portuguese in East Indian waters as well as in other parts of the world. But economic motives were coupled with military ones, for when the first fleet to be fitted-out entirely by the United Company set sail for the Indies in 1603 under the command of Steven van der Hagen, at the insistence of the States General military objectives were to the fore for the first time.²

But the monopolistic aspirations of the Dutch were not directed solely against the Spanish and the Portuguese. For the Asian peoples in general and the inhabitants of the Spice Islands in particular, the success of the "praiseworthy" Company's efforts at establishing a monopoly meant that native trade and shipping were strangled and the price of resistance was national extermination. This aspect of the monopoly was personified in its most extreme form in Jan Pietersz. Coen, although he was, in fact, no more than the (extraordinarily rigorous) executor of the directives issued by the management of the Company. His efforts to extend the monopoly so as to benefit the Dutch colonists will be discussed later.

The most important European rivals of the Dutch were the English and the United Company's monopoly policy led to very serious conflicts with them and was one of the main reasons why relations between the two countries were disturbed for many years.

Before considering to what extent the United Company was able to enforce its monopoly, especially as far as the Asian traders in Indonesia were concerned, a brief account will be given of the relative strength of each of the rival European nations in Asia and the effect of this upon Asian trade.

Just as the rapid initial ascendancy of the Portuguese over the

Asians was mainly due to their technical, naval, and military superiority, so now a decisive factor in the Dutch successes against the Portuguese must have been the improved maritime techniques³ and naval and military strategy⁴ of the Dutch. At any rate, when they arrived in Asia they had lighter and better-constructed ships, easier to manoeuvre than the vessels – usually large and heavy – with which the Portuguese maintained communications between their widely separated settlements. The British ships, again, were also somewhat cumbersome in design.⁵ Although the Dutch ships were quite small they were nevertheless extremely well provided with heavy artillery.⁶ Dutch guns were superior both in number and calibre to those of the Portuguese *caracks*. Until the second half of the 17th century the Portuguese ships were almost always too lightly armed for their size. A big, 1,600 or 1,800 ton *carack* often had no more than 18 or 20 guns, and most of these were not heavy brass cannon but small iron pieces.⁷ Dutch naval tactics were directed towards long-range fighting in which artillery battles were decisive. Portuguese tactics, on the other hand, were based on conflicts at short range in which an issue could be forced by boarding the enemy.⁸ The Portuguese methods were frequently successful and the Dutch by no means underestimated the frigates and galleys of the Portuguese war fleets.⁹

In the Indonesian Archipelago, however, the Spanish and Portuguese also had a great variety of smaller ships – yachts, galliots and lateen-rigged lighters – built in the Philippines by large numbers of native workmen who had been taught shipbuilding by Greeks, Italian, Spanish, English, and even some Dutch, shipwrights. The Dutch, on the other hand, had practically nothing but their big ships to begin with, since their shipbuilding in Indonesia was carried out by Dutch shipwrights who had not then given instruction to a sufficient number of natives. And to employ unskilled natives would be as useless as “voyaging to Norway for figs and raisins,”¹⁰ which seems to prove that European shipbuilding requirements were quite different from the native ones. The Dutch soon made up for lost time, however, and in the long run they managed to obtain the ascendancy over the Spanish and Portuguese in this respect too.¹¹

As regards land warfare, the Dutch troops used in Asia displayed more cohesion and were under much stricter discipline¹² than other European forces. At this time, of course, (around 1600) Portugal still had some great naval leaders such as Ruy Freire de Andrade and Nuno Alvares Botelho, but Holland, with its great tradition of merchant

shipping, had far more ships,¹³ and crews which were much better trained. Moreover, the Netherlands could always draw on the reserves of manpower in neighbouring countries.¹⁴ Sheer necessity obliged Portugal to try to obtain labour from the same source,¹⁵ for at the beginning of the 17th century the recruitment of naval personnel in sparsely populated Portugal was becoming increasingly difficult. Numerous foreigners, including many Scots and Flemings, were serving in the Portuguese fleets.¹⁶ The guns were manned chiefly by Germans, although there were Dutch and English gunners as well.¹⁷ And, as we have already seen, the crews of many Portuguese ships were predominantly Asians.¹⁸ Nor was there any question of Portuguese naval personnel receiving any military training. For these reasons Professor Boxer considers that the human element was more important than maritime and technical factors.¹⁹ In his *Tragic history of the Sea* he clearly demonstrates the inferiority of the Portuguese seamen.²⁰ The many abuses and shortcomings are indicated: the failure to comply with the regulations concerning ships (overloading, for example); the shortage of naval personnel; the contempt felt by the Portuguese for the naval profession as such, which meant that the soldiers in the ships considered themselves much higher in rank than the seamen; the quarrels resulting from this attitude, and the disobedience shown by the soldiers towards the ships' officers. According to Professor Boxer, this last point was one of the chief causes of the frequent naval defeats inflicted upon the Portuguese by the Dutch.

Moreover, the way Portuguese overseas trade was organized had a very bad effect on the shipping industry. Since 1577 shipping and trade had been in separate hands, the latter being a state enterprise for the benefit of the crown, which had farmed out the transport of products as well as their purchase and sale.²¹ Gross neglect of the fleet was the result. Vigilance was relaxed as regarded the loading and seaworthiness of the ships. Too much attention was directed towards building big freighters of eight or nine hundred tons at the lowest possible price. These enormous ships were difficult to manoeuvre and their cargoes much too heavy and badly distributed, so that a series of shipping disasters ensued, involving the loss of very valuable wares as well as the death of 800 to 1,000 men per ship.²² In these heavily-laden ships, crammed with soldiers and sailors, the sanitary conditions must have been appalling. Dutch ships could remain at sea for a much longer period than the Portuguese vessels without calling at a port to take on provisions and fresh water. Portuguese captives expressed astonish-

ment that the Hollanders "could stand it for so long at sea, yea, thought it impossible to stay so long at sea without a pause." ²³

These huge Portuguese ships, which were not equipped for making war and were quite unsuitable for the purpose, fell an easy prey to the swift, armed, sailing vessels of the northern Europeans. The Portuguese learnt by bitter experience, and later on used smaller ships exclusively even on long-distance routes,²⁴ but this does not alter the fact that the Dutch gained considerable ascendancy at first because of the many Portuguese prizes they took.

But the superiority of the northern Europeans in general and of the Dutch in particular was not confined to naval and military fields. Whatever its defects, in the sphere of trade the Dutch East India Company represented a far more efficient and, above all, much more business-like system than the government undertaking of the Portuguese. For in spite of the frequent failures to which it, too, was subject Dutch control did achieve some results. For those days, the United Company was a well run business, as the neatly-arranged records left by its administrators prove. Unfortunately we are much less well-informed about the financial side of things because the bookkeeping then was still somewhat primitive. The system followed by the United Company in the Netherlands must have been similar in some respects to the systems followed by its member companies prior to amalgamation.²⁵ Traces of these former companies survived in the degree of independence in administration and bookkeeping enjoyed by the various Chambers of the United Company.²⁶ This resulted in a complicated system little suited to a gigantic business organization like the United Company, in which surveyability was a factor of primary importance. Furthermore the fact that there was practically no connection between the bookkeeping departments in Holland and in Asia made it extremely difficult to obtain a general view of the whole undertaking.²⁷ The accounts of the various trading posts were transposed into one central bookkeeping system in the main office in Batavia, but although the directors could acquaint themselves with the state of affairs by having copies sent over to Europe,²⁸ the lack of a central bookkeeping department in the Netherlands meant that no aggregation was made of the data so obtained; moreover, the method of calculating expenses remained completely inadequate.

As far as actual trading went, however, the United Company must certainly have been superior to the Portuguese enterprise, and in any case the Dutch enjoyed the great advantage of having in their

own hands the sales of the products they imported into Europe. Lane considers it typical of the lack of commercial insight displayed by the Portuguese that they never tried to meet the competition offered by the Mediterranean route by making it cheaper to transport their products around the Cape, but relied instead upon their army and navy for help.²⁹ It was primarily the decline in their military power which made it impossible for the Portuguese to maintain their monopoly. It must be pointed out here, however, that the steadily increasing tonnage of the Portuguese ships does indicate a tendency to economize on transport. In the areas where it enjoyed military and naval supremacy the United Company did not need to employ commercial tactics to maintain its monopoly either, but in the areas outside its sphere of influence it had to maintain a certain price level in order to keep foreign competition at bay.³⁰ Yet it is certainly desirable for comparative research to be carried out with the object of arriving at a truer appreciation of how the Portuguese and Dutch concerns functioned as economic organizations and what were the results they achieved.³¹

The overseas enterprises of the Dutch were the work of merchants with a centuries-old tradition of commerce and the carrying-trade in Europe behind them.³² In Portugal, overseas trade was a government concern, and was, in fact, largely the personal business of the king, conducted on medieval lines by officials who, as far as the higher posts were concerned, were recruited almost exclusively from the nobility,³³ even though the *fidalgos* were not a closed caste.³⁴ They had their own code of ethics, characterized by a deep contempt for all physical work and every branch of commerce.³⁵ The acute and realistically-minded Tomé Pires testified to the Portuguese failure to get used to the idea of trade when he wrote at the beginning of the 16th century "We do our trade like Portuguese, who are not accustomed to it." ³⁶ Then there is Albuquerque's famous verdict on his fellow-countrymen's failing in this respect: "a clerk trained in a counting-house of Bartholomew the Florentine would be more useful than all the factors the King has in India." ³⁷ Yet these views are contradicted by the flourishing private trade carried on by the Portuguese in Asia and also by Pires' own keen economic insight. Pires' writings are no exception, moreover. We have only to think of Duarte Barbosa's *Book* or of the works of Barros and Couto, which have been lost, unfortunately, but which must have borne a close resemblance to that of Pires.³⁸ Bocarro's *Livro do Estado da India* may also be regarded as a 17th century equivalent of Pires' *Suma Oriental*. The commercial element was

definitely gaining more and more ground among the Portuguese and in Asia practically all of them engaged in trade. For this reason Professor Boxer considers that the share held by the Portuguese in inter-Asian trade was even more important and yielded greater profits than the trade carried on with Lisbon by the route round the Cape of Good Hope, so much of which was in foreign hands. But even though some Portuguese private traders did have extensive business contacts and a lot of money was probably earned (money which remained in Asia and so did not benefit the mother-country at all), the inter-Asian trade of the Portuguese still lacked the capitalistic structure which was a distinguishing feature of the trade of the northern Europeans.

The Portuguese merchant shipping trade that was carried on privately by the "*casados*" (married Portuguese soldiers who had been discharged from the army) and by officials and clergy, was mainly business on a small scale – although, generally speaking, the last two categories had greater financial resources than the first. It was not different from the trade carried on by the Asians themselves and certainly not to be compared with the business concerns which were being founded in western Europe at that time. The latter, after all, were already being run on capitalistic lines, the great advantage of which was that a strong concentration of all business transactions was possible. One of the great differences between Portuguese and Dutch enterprise was precisely the circumstance that Portuguese inter-Asian trade was almost entirely in private hands, and was carried on in cooperation with the trade of the Asians, with which it was closely connected. The Spanish-Portuguese state was only interested in the small number of monopoly products destined for sale in Europe.³⁹ Moreover, the failure of the Portuguese system of supervision meant that there was plenty of scope left for private initiative,⁴⁰ even as far as the actual monopoly products were concerned.

Neither the Dutch nor the English had developed their systems of supervision or codes of official morality to the stage where they could have prevented private trade entirely; on the contrary, this evil was present in all ranks, from high to low. But the servants of the United Company did at least have fixed wages, and these, even if they were much too low, were paid at regular intervals. Vigorous action was taken against private trading when this was discovered, and it was punished accordingly. It was out of the question for United Company employees to set up as merchants and to fit out ships for purposes of trade. In fact it was only a few free burghers who were permitted to do

this and then only for short periods and in respect of a territory that was mainly confined to the Indonesian Archipelago and only by way of exception extended beyond it. Company servants were also strictly forbidden to participate openly in the trade of Asians by chartering ships or giving goods in *commenda*. As long as the Company's territory was confined mainly to Indonesia, control was possible, but when the distances between the Company's settlements became greater, abuses and infringements of the regulations became more common. They still occurred largely within the framework of the Company's trade however, examples of such transgressions being the sending of privately owned goods in Company ships for sale in Europe, smuggling in monopoly products, and corruption in connection with the payment of toll duties. Bengal, which was a long distance from Batavia was famous in the 18th century for the opportunities it offered for acquiring wealth. The United Company continued its efforts to keep inter-Asian trade entirely in its own hands, however, refusing to tolerate participation by others and doing everything possible to acquire a monopoly and enforce it. Dutch resources were much greater than those of the Portuguese private traders and therefore, helped by the coordination of trade at the various trading posts, Dutch inter-Asian commerce grew to unheard-of proportions, and was all concentrated in one port of loading – Batavia. The Dutch did even more than the Portuguese to bring the various parts of Asia into contact with one another, establishing direct lines of communication between areas which had hitherto been quite unfamiliar with one another's products or had only been able to obtain them by a roundabout process. This led to new requirements being felt in Asia too, and the demand in Europe and the new demand in Asia did much to stimulate Asian production and trade. This was another blessing in disguise.

Of course the United Company was by no means powerful enough to control all inter-Asian trade. Alongside the business done by the Dutch Company, the ancient trade of the Asians themselves still survived, as well as that of Holland's European competitors, whose trade actually benefited from the activities of the United Company. Nevertheless, the measures they adopted against the United Company resulted in the failure of the latter's efforts to achieve a monopoly, particularly in those places where the Company did not exercise any direct authority and its position was thus determined solely by commercial treaties.

The Spanish-Portuguese government was certainly not blind to the profits being made by the northern European trading enterprises,

whose activities were crowned with so much success. In farming-out the transport and sale of Asian products the Spanish government, like the Portuguese, had handed over this section of its work to private initiative.⁴¹ Its own lack of power caused it to go still further and promote the formation of trading companies on the Dutch and English pattern.⁴² In 1629 attempts were made to raise capital amounting to fl. 4,000,000. The Company concerned was to fit out various ships for the Indies and also to be responsible for the garrisons in Asia.⁴³ It seems that converted Portuguese Jews figured prominently in this undertaking.⁴⁴ The participants were rather slow in registering their capital, however,⁴⁵ and because of the Spanish government's high military requirements the whole plan came to nothing.⁴⁶ But the very nature of Portuguese expansion (so entirely different from that of the Dutch) meant that it was hardly possible to organize Portuguese trade on monopolistic lines. For the populous Portuguese settlements in Asia could not all suddenly be deprived of their means of existence by placing trade in Asia in the hands of a monopolistic concern.⁴⁷

The Portuguese and the Dutch held completely different attitudes towards religious affairs. For the Portuguese, the propagation of Christianity – their version of which, especially as a result of the Counter-Reformation, often took intolerant forms – was more important than the prosecution of lucrative trade. Now and again their zealotry and intolerance resulted in large-scale disasters, for example, the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan. With the Dutch, trade was the primary concern. They knew better than to endanger it through the preaching of their doctrine, and the Reformed Church in Indonesia was too dependent upon the United Company to display much fervency in its missionary work.

The activities of the Dutch and the English soon made their effect felt in Asia, and in 1607 Spanish and Portuguese losses were so great that "it was a wound almost incurable."⁴⁸ Their lines of communication were in constant danger because of the capture or destruction of their ships by the enemy whose gain, moreover, was not limited to the prizes they took. From captured maps, sailing directions, letters and reports, they learned the nautical and mercantile secrets of the Portuguese – secrets which had already been partially disclosed to them by Portuguese helmsmen who had entered their service.⁴⁹

No less dangerous as far as the Spanish government was concerned was the relationship of the Dutch with the Portuguese Jews, including the refugees who had settled in Amsterdam as well as those who had

turned Christian and still lived in Spain, Portugal or Asia (especially in Malacca).⁵⁰ The Spanish government suspected its converted Portuguese Jewish subjects who lived in Asia of participating in the business of the Dutch United Company.⁵¹

But other Portuguese, too, who might have been expected to display more loyalty than the *cristaos novos*, had no scruples about supplying the newcomers with information and doing lucrative trade with them.⁵² One such was the well-known Portuguese navigator Pedro d'Atayde, who helped the Dutch during their first sea voyage to Java.⁵³

By concentrating on the Indonesian Archipelago at first, the Dutch acquired a good strategic position from which they could operate at all times of the year⁵⁴ without having to take the monsoon winds into account, as the Portuguese had to do with their bases in India. This meant that the Dutch were always able to take the initiative. Moreover in this island region, where they did not have to fear attack from any of the powerful continental states of Asia, it was easier for the Dutch to influence the petty princes.

The centre of Portuguese power had long been on the Indian coast, and now that they were threatened in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago the Portuguese found the help which Spain could send from the Philippines very welcome.⁵⁵ For the rest, opinions are divided⁵⁶ about the extent to which Portugal's overseas possessions benefited by the union of Spain and Portugal. Undoubtedly it resulted in a big drain on the Portuguese navy, which had already suffered a heavy blow from the destruction of the armada in 1588,⁵⁷ and which now had to bear the full weight of the war in Asia. On the credit side there was, firstly, the Spanish help in the Moluccas,⁵⁸ and secondly, the fact that the Spanish government showed signs of wanting to correct the abuses to some extent.⁵⁹ Various measures were proclaimed, which were intended to improve army organization – the formation of companies, with fixed rates of pay, for example – and to ensure better ship construction.⁶⁰ The motive behind numerous decisions was the prosecution of vigorous war against the *corsarios holandeses* and the obstruction of their trade with the natives.⁶¹ Action had to be taken against rulers who were giving aid to the Dutch.⁶² In particular, Portugal was now in a position to draw on the much greater financial reserves of the Spanish Empire for its overseas enterprises, a circumstance which Coen – probably with an eye to its propaganda value – enlarged upon at length in his letters. In comparison with the 5 million florins, which was his estimate of the Spanish-Portuguese trading capital,⁶³ Coen considered

the fl. 290,000 of the United Company "no more than a drop in the ocean." ⁶⁴ In Manilla alone, the two-way traffic with New Spain put fl. 2,800,000 into circulation. ⁶⁵

The Dutch had many more ships than the Spanish and Portuguese but their maritime strength was not coupled with sufficient business capital to carry out all Coen's far-reaching projects. Above all the rich trade carried on by the enemy with the Chinese – which provided the latter with American silver – aroused Coen's envy. ⁶⁶

For neither the Dutch nor the English succeeded in obtaining permission to establish a permanent settlement on Chinese soil, and this circumstance had a profound effect upon the trade of the United Company in the Indonesian Archipelago. It meant that from their base in Macao ⁶⁷ the Portuguese, and particularly the private traders, could continue to offer a good deal of competition for quite a long time to the United Company's trade in the archipelago. But even more profitable for the Portuguese in Macao (although they were so deeply dependent upon the Chinese authorities) was the lucrative three-way trade with Japan and the Spanish settlement in the Philippines. This trade, in the course of which Chinese silk was bartered in the Philippines for Spanish silver, and the silver used to obtain more silk in China for sale on the Japanese market, yielded huge profits. ⁶⁸ In order to maintain the silver and silk monopoly in the Asia-America trade, the Spanish government had strictly prohibited any private trade between the settlements in eastern Asia and those in America, ⁶⁹ and it goes without saying that they did not allow the Portuguese to participate in such trade either. The plurality of the prohibitions, however, indicate that the regulations were repeatedly transgressed.

Competition from the Chinese led to a decline in Portuguese trade with Manilla but at first a substantial amount of trade was still done with Japan. ⁷⁰

As the position of the Portuguese in Japan deteriorated because of the Japanese government's anti-Portuguese measures, culminating in Portuguese banishment from Japan in 1639, and as more and more Portuguese ships were captured by the Dutch while *en route* to Malacca and India, the repercussions were felt in Macao as well, and as early as 1633 there are reports about the impoverishment of its citizens. ⁷¹

The help given by the Spanish to the Portuguese in the Spice Islands did not prevent the Dutch from gaining the ascendancy there. In 1605 the Portuguese fort on Amboina fell into Dutch hands. Two years later the Dutch built a fort in east Ternate to counterbalance the

Spanish one on the southwest coast erected after the western half of Ternate had been conquered together with Tidore in 1606. In 1609 the island of Banda Neira was occupied by the Dutch in the face of strong resistance from the population. A fort was built there too, although the Portuguese had never managed to establish one there permanently. This was the start of the efforts made to obtain complete mastery over the nutmeg and mace output of the Banda Islands. The Spanish still maintained their position on Tidore,⁷² and from their fort in Ternate they tried to exert an influence on the king of that island as well. This gave them control not only of the cloves supplied by Tidore and its subordinate islands, but also over the cloves sent by subject islands to Ternate, although the king of Ternate had concluded agreements with the Dutch in respect of these. Of all the Spice Islands, Makian was the richest in cloves.⁷³

Thanks to Spanish backing from the Philippines, the commercial centre of Malacca was still in Portuguese hands. But we have seen how precarious its position was at the end of the 16th century and Dutch activity aggravated the situation. When the Dutchman Paulus van Solt sailed past in 1606 there were no merchant vessels or warships lying off-shore, only a few fishing proas,⁷⁴ and the Portuguese did not make the least attempt to attack the Dutch fleet "which shows that their pride is somewhat subdued and that they have little power." The Dutch learned that there were few, if any, soldiers in Malacca because of the great losses suffered by the Portuguese in their campaigns against Johore. The business of the *casados* had come to a complete standstill because they no longer dared risk their goods and money on trading voyages.⁷⁵ In the years now following, the Dutch did their best to cut off Malacca's trade, while at the same time the town was continually exposed to attacks from neighbouring Achin. Dutch sources also contain repeated references to the bad conditions in Malacca.⁷⁶ The measures taken by the Spanish-Portuguese administration⁷⁷ might occasionally bring some relief to the town, but it was never of a permanent nature. The military and naval struggle between the Dutch and the Portuguese, however, is beyond the province of this study.

Portuguese interests in the Malay-Indonesian area were restricted for the most part to the import of textiles, which were exchanged for foodstuffs. Because of this trade, contact was maintained between the Portuguese and Javanese Mataram and the rice-exporting towns of Java. Moreover, Malacca continued to form a link in the chain along

which Portuguese shipping and supplies from Macao reached the central collecting point of Goa, even though this line of communication was badly harassed by the Dutch. As for the spices – nutmegs and mace in particular – the Dutch largely gained control over these. The monopoly in cloves had already proved much more difficult to enforce, and the Portuguese – particularly the private dealers – still managed to lay hands on a certain quantity. Together with the English and the Dutch, the Portuguese retained a hold on part of the pepper crop, especially that from Sumatran Jambi. Finally, thanks to their fortifications on Solor ⁷⁸ and their settlement on Timor, they managed to send regular shipments of sandalwood to Malacca. It was chiefly since the coming of the northern Europeans that private traders had begun to deal in all these products. To guarantee their textile imports to the Indonesian area it was of the utmost importance for the Portuguese to maintain their position on the Indian coast, especially in Surat and Coromandel, which formed the heart of their overseas empire. Their possession of both Muscat and Hormuz gave the Portuguese control over the entrance to the Persian Gulf ⁷⁹ and by keeping their own vessels cruising in the vicinity of the Red Sea they tried to close that channel to other shipping. There were also various Portuguese strong-points on the coast of India where tolls were levied and where some measure of control could be exercised over Indian shipping. Even though serious blows were inflicted upon the Portuguese military and naval forces in this area by the superior English and Dutch fleets, the commercial power of the Portuguese was still not inconsiderable. Goa was a centre for Asian shipping and by employing large fleets of small coasters ⁸⁰ (as many as two to three hundred lateen-rigged lighters when trade was flourishing) the Portuguese managed to provide the Indian ports, particularly Cambay, with the merchandise the Asians wanted. Besides supplying them with European goods, the Portuguese also imported spices and Far Eastern products which the Asian merchants had previously only been able to obtain by making long and tiring voyages via various intermediary ports. Portuguese imports and the Portuguese demand for Asian products strongly influenced market conditions in the trading towns on the Indian coast right up to Coromandel.⁸¹ When Portuguese shipments were heavy, prices dropped in Goa, which attracted Asian traders to this Portuguese centre and caused markets in the other Asian ports to deteriorate.

The ships of the northern Europeans could do little against the Portuguese coasters because as soon as they saw British or Dutch

ships approaching, the Portuguese beached their vessels and took refuge ashore.⁸²

Although Asian shipping was subjected to much extortion and violence by the Portuguese⁸³ and although the Asians were forced to pay high duties and to obtain Portuguese passes, the northern Europeans observed to their surprise that, by and large, the Asians put up with this ill treatment. To be sure, there were outbreaks of hostilities,⁸⁴ but the Asians continued to allow the Portuguese access to their ports and "showed themselves more kindly disposed towards her [Portugal] than towards other European nations."⁸⁵ This was certainly due to the fact that the Portuguese adopted a less superior attitude than the other countries. Where appropriate, they placed their nautical knowledge at the disposal of the Asians. Sometimes even stood at the helm of Asian ships themselves and held shares in the cargo.⁸⁶ It was in this way, for example, that the Portuguese were able to continue trading with Aden; by carrying on their activities entirely in Indian ships they gained entry to a port that was closed to the Portuguese.³⁷

In order to combat textile imports to the Indonesian area successfully while ensuring a supply of these media of exchange for themselves (needed for the purchase of the actual spices), the British and Dutch were also obliged to try to obtain cloth from Surat and Coromandel. The cloths from Surat were especially suitable for quantity sales in the Indonesian area while Coromandel supplied finer sorts of materials.⁸⁸ It was of the utmost importance, therefore, for the Portuguese to prevent the northern Europeans from doing any trade on the Indian coast.⁸⁹ The population was warned that its ships would be burned and its towns laid waste if it tolerated the rivals of the Portuguese.⁹⁰ In spite of this, Dutch and English merchants succeeded in starting trade with India, although this by no means signified that Portuguese influence there then came to an end. Goa long remained a centre of Portuguese trade and the Portuguese still had powerful connections in the Mogul kingdom. In Surat there was a strong pro-Portuguese group whose numbers included various high officials such as the governor of Amadabad and some of the governors of Surat itself.⁹¹ By means of gifts and the good offices of Roman Catholic missionaries, the Portuguese also managed to secure a certain following at court.⁹² For example, Prince Khurram, later to become Shah Jehan, the emperor, who held Surat as a sort of appanage,⁹³ was well disposed towards them. Moreover, they enjoyed the support of the most prominent brokers.⁹⁴ At first then, they succeeded in thwarting the

attempts of the Dutch and English to obtain concessions.⁹⁵ At sea, the Mogul Empire was practically powerless. It possessed no warships at all and it was only by favour of the Portuguese that the emperor was able to send his ships to Mecca each year.⁹⁶ Against the armed merchant ships of the Dutch and the English, however, the Indian ships were helpless,⁹⁷ as is clearly illustrated by a letter written in 1612 to the Great Mogul by Admiral Middleton after he had captured some dozen Indian ships off the entrance to the Red Sea: "Wondering much that your Highness being so great a monarch to live as it were in slavery to the Portugals ... that your subjects' ships cannot make any voyage anywhere, but they must first pay tribute to the Portugals, which is a great disgrace to the greatness of your monarchie, much marvelling that it can be suffered by your Highness such open injuries within your own land." ⁹⁸

When, however, the English and Dutch obtained permanent trading settlements in Surat, which belonged to the kingdom of the Great Mogul, it became advisable for them to observe caution in their dealings with Asian shipping in order to prevent reprisals being taken against these trading posts. Ashore, their position in respect of the continental Asian powers was no stronger than that of the Portuguese, and, moreover, for profitable trade a good relationship with the Asian rulers and merchants was desirable. Henceforth they confined themselves to removing Portuguese goods from native ships, paying for them at the market price and allowing the ships to continue on their way unmolested.⁹⁹ The Asian ships were obliged to sail under English and Dutch passes, however, and this meant extra taxation as far as they were concerned since they could not dispense with the Portuguese passes either if they wanted to be safe in that quarter as well. Yet apparently the profits made on the various products were so great that Asian shipping trade prospered even under the burden of double taxation.

The superiority of the Dutch and British naval forces meant that in the long run the Mogul Empire came to depend on these newcomers to protect its shipping. A provisional treaty between the Portuguese and the pro-Portuguese governor of Surat, which aimed at denying Dutchmen and Englishmen entry to Mogul territory, was not ratified by the emperor¹⁰⁰ and probably never became operative. Asians began to take advantage of the better accommodation and greater seaworthiness of northern European ships for transporting their freight. It was mostly the English who rendered these services

for the natives, and mostly they followed the trade route from India leading from Surat to the Persian Gulf and connecting up with the caravan route to Aleppo. The Dutch took umbrage and temporarily ceased their own activity in this respect since they decided it was unprofitable and, moreover, were afraid that it would stimulate Asian competition.¹⁰¹

When the Portuguese made peace with the English in 1635 the Great Mogul feared that the two countries would cooperate in trying to prevent his subjects from voyaging to Persia and Arabia, and he sought Dutch support in keeping the seas open to trade.¹⁰² The king of Persia showed himself equally suspicious about this pact.¹⁰³ Thanks to Portuguese imports and exports, the Asian rulers had enjoyed high incomes from toll duties and as valuable gifts.¹⁰⁴ Even as late as 1634 (although the political and military situation of the Portuguese on the Indian coast was already very bad by then) their adversaries still considered that the Portuguese did a substantial amount of trade in these parts, in spite of the fact that for supplies of textiles and other goods the Portuguese were completely dependent on the powerful Hindu merchants who conveyed these wares to them from the interior because of the lack of Portuguese trading posts further inland.¹⁰⁵ But as the northern Europeans increased their trade with the Mogul Empire, they became the ones who had to pay the tolls and propitiate the rulers with gifts.

The Dutch settlements in south Coromandel represented even more of a threat to Portuguese textile imports in the Indonesian area than Dutch influence in Surat. In south Coromandel the Dutch were in a stronger position than in the Mogul Empire, where the authorities were sometimes far from kindly disposed towards them and where, moreover, they suffered keen competition from the English. The rivalry between the northern Europeans, however, was to the advantage of the Portuguese. In their settlements in south Coromandel (Paleacatte, for example) the Dutch had only to deal with the rulers of various smaller kingdoms and not with a powerful country like that of the Great Mogul. The position was different in north Coromandel, where United Company posts such as that at Masulipatnam had to deal with the kingdom of Golconda.

The Portuguese were well aware of the harmful effect of the Dutch activity in Coromandel. Shortly after the Dutch arrived in Masulipatnam in 1605 the Portuguese government resolved (in vain) to prevent them from trading there.¹⁰⁶ When the Dutch had established

themselves in Paleacatte the Portuguese took steps to reinforce nearby Meliapur.¹⁰⁷ Serious interruption of shipments of cloth from Coromandel endangered Malacca's food supplies, since the Javanese and Malays would take no other goods in exchange for their foodstuffs but those particular cloths. In Coromandel it was easier for the Dutch "rebels" to obtain the cloths than in Surat, which was more directly under the influence of the Portuguese fleets.¹⁰⁸ The Portuguese hoped to make the Dutch position in the Moluccas untenable by preventing them from purchasing textiles in either Surat or Coromandel.¹⁰⁹ This view was put before the Council of the Indies in Spain by the former governor of the Baia de todos los Santos, whose imprisonment in Holland had apparently enabled him to become well-informed about these affairs.¹¹⁰

The tactics now employed by the Portuguese were directed towards living in peace with the Indian rulers as far as possible.¹¹¹ In point of fact they managed to retain a certain proportion of the textile trade until far into the thirties of the 17th century.

In Coromandel the Portuguese had the benefit of longer and wider experience and, added to this, the right products for exchange. Their adversaries were obliged to admit that the Portuguese "spare themselves no trouble or labour in order to achieve their purpose in business." ¹¹²

In 1633 Philip Lucasz. considered that Portuguese cloth sales in Malacca were still very damaging to the United Company because Malacca continued to supply these cloths to a great many Malayan countries, including Kedah, Trang, Tenasserim, and Pegu, as well as Siam, Cambodia, much of Java, Macassar, and the islands to the east of Java such as Bali, Solor, Timor and Bima. The people of these heavily-populated places were good customers and "prodigal in their habitude." Lucasz. considered the only effective solution to the problem to lie in the conquest of Malacca.¹¹³ But Portuguese trade could also be crippled by obstructing its shipping on the Indian coast. As far as Surat was concerned, this meant sending fleets every year after 1636 to blockade Goa.¹¹⁴ In order to intercept Portuguese *navetas* sailing from St. Thomé and Tegenapatnam on the Coromandel coast it was essential to have some armed yachts cruising in the vicinity of these places which were out of range of the Dutch blockading fleet.¹¹⁵ Reports from a Portuguese source, which reached Holland via the Portuguese-Jewish shareholders in the United Company, particularly mentioned the success of the blockade off Goa.¹¹⁶ The Portuguese

only managed to continue trading between Malabar and Goa by using small vessels which could keep out of range of the bigger Dutch ships.¹¹⁷ In 1634 Company letters are still cautious in their comments upon the probably exaggerated rumours about the seriousness of the Portuguese position,¹¹⁸ but in later years there are no such reservations and Dutch and British sources are unanimous in their accounts of the hopelessness of the Portuguese situation from a military and naval point of view.¹¹⁹

The Portuguese had once occupied a very strong position in the Persian Gulf, being "in a manner the lords and chief commanders of those seas" and controlling the various market towns situated on the shores of the Gulf.¹²⁰ Their occupation of Hormuz at the entrance to the Gulf had given them not only a strategically-situated base but also a commercial port of considerable significance, in fact the most important market in those parts for disposing of the goods, particularly spices, which they had brought from places further east. No ship could call at the ports of the Persian king without their permission, and duties levied in Hormuz provided the Spanish crown with incomes estimated at a hundred thousand pounds annually.¹²¹ But as early as 1617 an English report mentions a decline in trade,¹²² stating that the quantities of spices sold there were less than a sixth of those in previous years. This was because the Portuguese were no longer capable of preventing trade by foreign merchants owing to the reduction and weakening of their own shipping power. The fall of Hormuz, that "diamond of the Spanish king,"¹²³ which was conquered by the Persians in 1622¹²⁴ with the help of the British fleet, was an irreparable blow to Portuguese prestige in these parts, even though they retained Muscat, in Arabia, until 1650,¹²⁵ so that for a time neither the British nor the Dutch could obtain a permanent footing there. After the fall of Hormuz the Portuguese still had an important trading centre left in Sind, at the mouth of the Indus, which was part of the Mogul Empire.¹²⁶ They used to bring great quantities of spices to this port, too, and dispose of them via Hormuz to places in Persia, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and on the east coast of Africa. Moreover, cloths were purchased in Sind, and the Portuguese did considerable trade there in foodstuffs.¹²⁷ After the fall of Hormuz this trade was diverted to Muscat, on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, and for the convenience of Asian merchants the Portuguese maintained a busy cargo service on their ships to Muscat¹²⁸ until that port, too, was lost in 1650.

Primarily because they were afraid of Portuguese reprisals, the

Mogul authorities refused to grant the English and the Dutch any trading posts in Sind¹²⁹ until a great sea battle in 1625 and the subsequent naval supremacy of the British and the Dutch put an end to the profitable trade which the Portuguese had carried on there too.¹³⁰

The fact that the Portuguese position in the western part of Asia was still reasonably strong at first, coupled with the sales of spices and purchases of textiles consequent upon this, undoubtedly continued to exert an influence in the Malay-Indonesian area, and this goes a long way to explaining how it was that the Portuguese were able to maintain their position in Malacca for so long. Their expulsion by the Great Mogul's governor in 1632 from Hooghly, their main base in Bengal; their struggle with the Dutch in Ceylon; the blockade of Goa after 1636; the efforts of the Dutch to obtain a share in the Malabar pepper trade; and, in the Far East, the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan (after which their place in the profitable China-Japan trade was taken by the Dutch); all these are circumstances which, important though they are, can only be touched upon lightly here. The treaty concluded with England in 1635 relieved the Portuguese of one of their assailants, at least as far as the coast of India was concerned. They could then ship some of their freight under cover of the British flag and thus they as well as the Asian traders profited from the conflicts between the English and the Dutch. But the first real respite for the Portuguese did not come until after the dissolution of the union with Spain when a truce was made with Holland in 1641. This truce, however, did not come into operation until 1644 and the suspension of hostilities only lasted until 1652, after which war broke out again, resulting in the loss of a large part of Portugal's possessions in Asia.^{130a}

The English had appeared in the Malay-Indonesian area earlier than the Dutch,¹³¹ but it was only after the foundation of the English East India Company in 1600 and the consequent consolidation of forces that there was any question of them carrying on regular trade.¹³² In an extremely keen competitive struggle ("for the Dutch envy is so great towards us that to take out one of our eyes they will lose both their own"¹³³ – a remark that can easily be capped by an equally trenchant Dutch verdict on the English) the Dutch at first managed to retain the upper hand. This was primarily due to the fact that the United Company was organized on a stricter and much more rational basis than its English counterpart, which was a regulated company at first, reminis-

cent of a guild in structure, with its members all trading independently and at their own expense while submitting to the general regulations of the Company. They owned ships in common but traded with private capital.¹³⁴ There was no centralization of financial or administrative affairs such as there was in the United Company. In fact even the Dutch forerunners of the United Company displayed more characteristics of centralization than the English Company, since each one of them operated on common capital. And if traces of the individual companies of former days still survived in the freedom enjoyed by the various Chambers in financial and administrative matters, something new had yet been aimed at and achieved, namely a closer and more lasting unity. Forces were no longer joined for the duration of one voyage only, a charter was granted for 21 years and capital deposited for a period of 10 years, after which the first account was to be closed. Instead of being a shareholder in a single voyage, the supplier of capital thus became a partner in a commercial enterprise which was given continuity by the fact that, in practice, no capital was paid back even after the 10-year period had elapsed.¹³⁵

In contrast to this, up to 1612 the expeditions of the English Company were kept quite distinct from one another, since each voyage was financed separately. The shareholders in a voyage bore the entire cost themselves and took all the profits.¹³⁶ The consequence was that in Asia there was no cooperation between the factors handling the various voyages. Thus in Bantam there were three different English lodges with rival functionaries.¹³⁷ It was only after the 12th voyage that a joint-stock company was formed for successive expeditions,¹³⁸ and it was not until 1638 that a proposal was made to organize trade on the basis of an ordinary instead of a joint-stock company. This suggestion, however, was never carried into effect.¹³⁹

Nor did the English in Asia have a strictly-organized central administration such as that enjoyed by the United Company. The Dutch Governor General and Council possessed powers which enabled them to intervene much more quickly in local questions than the English authorities, in fact disputes between the English factors in Asia could only be regulated in England.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, although the United Company's system of control was far from perfect, it did guarantee some supervision of private trade. Apart from its more closely-knit organization, the United Company also had better means at its disposal and, moreover, could reckon to a far greater extent on government help. The injuries which the United Company inflicted upon the

Portuguese and Spanish in Asia were part of the struggle which the Dutch were conducting against these countries in Europe, and therefore the Company enjoyed full government support,¹⁴¹ including protection against competition in Holland. In England powerful groups such as the merchants trading with the Levant, who considered that the spices shipped via the Cape of Good Hope represented a threat to their trade, were able to oppose the English East India Company. Such opposition would not have been possible in Holland because the United Company could count on government support, as was demonstrated by the help it received in preventing Dutch subjects from holding shares in foreign companies.

The monopolistic character of the English Company was, moreover, much less stringently enforced than in the case of the United Company. In spite of the royal charter that had been granted to it, other ships were fitted-out and sent to Asia to carry on trade there and, if the occasion should arise, to engage in piracy. This seriously affected the Asian attitude towards the English Company. Apart from the competition to which the Company was subjected, the acts of piracy gave the English a bad name. The Company reaped the bitter fruits of this policy ¹⁴² and its trading posts were exposed to the worst reprisals of the Asians.¹⁴³ But the Company also suffered from the trade carried on privately by its own servants. To be sure, this evil was also present in the United Company, but the English Company seems to have had its underlings much less well in hand: "concerning the private trade of the English ... Your Honours must believe that if the Company of England were served according to the manner in which Your Honours are served it would long since have surpassed the Dutch Company."¹⁴⁴ Probably Philip Lucasz. was painting too rosy a picture of the integrity of the United Company servants, yet there is a germ of truth in his remark. Everyone on board the outward-bound English ships took goods or money along with them to barter for Asian wares. They even took money for other people with the object of doing business for them in Asia, and the English helped one another in this trade. Ships bound for England always had a quantity of privately-owned goods on board,¹⁴⁵ and when private interests conflicted with Company ones, the former usually won the day. All efforts to put an end to this situation were in vain. Ultimately the private trade of Company servants received legal recognition and employees were granted certain privileges in this connection, although at the same time the monopoly products were explicitly defined and trade in them prohibited.¹⁴⁶

Unlike the United Company, the English Company was seriously hampered by a chronic lack of money.¹⁴⁷ As a result of Holland's trade with Spain, at the end of the 16th century the Dutch held large stocks of precious metals,¹⁴⁸ and this was a factor of the greatest significance in the development of their East Indian trade. Moreover, the British government was much more strongly opposed than the Dutch government to the export of money, and money was the chief product if not the only one that Asia wanted to buy from Europe.¹⁴⁹ This put the English at a serious disadvantage, especially in the early days when their Asian intermediary trade had still not reached an advanced stage of development. In many cases, through lack of means, the English had to watch the Dutch walking off with the greater part of the goods, including the better quality wares, or, if they still felt inclined to stand up to the competition, they had to resort to borrowing money from native princes and notables. These men, who were all too well aware of the bad state of the English exchequer, supplied loans only at very high interest. They stood to gain in two ways, for when the Europeans had enough ready money they bid against one another and so sent prices up. The rival who had the most money and so could hold out longest gained possession of the merchandise. The Dutch were usually successful,¹⁵⁰ but the people who really benefited most were the native sellers of the goods, so that this was yet another blessing in disguise as far as Asia was concerned.

A comparison between Dutch and English naval power shows that in this respect, too, the Dutch had the advantage. In the years 1613-1617 (for which period data are available in published British sources)¹⁵¹ the total number of ships sailing from England to Asia was 29. During the same period 51 ships sailed there from Holland.¹⁵² Since we know the tonnage and condition of by no means all of them, a true comparison cannot be drawn. It is not easy to ascertain to what extent the figures given in the sources actually reflect the relative strengths of the naval power of the two countries, but statements made between 1618 and 1620 by Coen (who actually maintained that the English forces were superior)¹⁵³ are certainly tendentious, prompted by his wish to spur on the Gentlemen Seventeen to greater efforts: "It is a great mistake on the part of Your Honours to suppose that the finest trading opportunities in all the world can be seized and held in the face of all the world by keeping 30, 40, or perhaps 50 ships and yachts in the fairway." ¹⁵⁴

In the years following 1619, when the two companies worked to-

gether for a short period, the Dutch Company archives contain records of the numbers of English ships. As early as 1621 there appear to have been some 67 Dutch ships in Asia, as opposed to only 25 English ones.¹⁵⁵ The following year these figures were 83 and 28 respectively, and the disproportion continued in subsequent years.¹⁵⁶ The English regarded their competitor's many ships with envy,¹⁵⁷ but lack of means hindered them in the renewal and repair of their own vessels, which were, moreover, particularly subject to deterioration in the tropics.

In the sphere of practical salesmanship the Dutch once more revealed themselves ahead of the English. They were more careful to choose suitable barter products, and since they packed their goods better these reached the purchasers in better condition.¹⁵⁸

Of all the places where the Dutch and English carried on trade, the Spice Islands were the scene of the keenest rivalry. There was no strong native government there to prevent a struggle for the monopoly or to act as a check upon disputes between the competitors, so that the stronger of the two countries had a chance to cut the other out entirely.¹⁵⁹

The Dutch justified their actions to their English competitors by pointing to the necessity for large-scale expenditure in order to be able to wage war against the Portuguese and Spaniards in those parts.¹⁶⁰ But the military equipment, the forts that were built and the large army that was maintained were also used to make the natives hand over the spices.

The justification to the natives for the pressure exerted upon them to make them hand over their products was the "protection" that the Dutch provided by waging war against the Spanish and the Portuguese although the Dutch monopoly was much more of a burden on the population than its Spanish and Portuguese counterpart had been.

Dutch protection proved a costly business for the inhabitants of the Spice Islands. These people, who were completely dependent for rice and cloth upon imports by foreign merchants, and who exchanged their spices for these products, found their supplies cut off by the Dutch. The Dutch did bring them rice and cloth in exchange for the spices but in very inadequate quantities and at prices which were much too high. Small wonder then that the natives began to seek aid and protection from the English, although it is, of course, questionable whether they would have fared much better with the latter if they had come to be dependent upon them exclusively. What is quite

certain, however, is that a peaceful relationship between the English and the Dutch would certainly not have been to their advantage. In view of the weakness of their position in the Spice Islands the English were obliged to decide in favour of free trade on a peaceful basis. Nevertheless it is true that in their commercial expansion the English were less concerned than the United Company with achieving a monopoly, and for that reason English remarks about the undesirability of using force in trade are not necessarily hypocritical. In 1615 an English factor called Cockaine wrote: "trade that comes by compulsion is not profitable and only arouses the hate and opposition of the natives."¹⁶¹ The maxim adopted by the British ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, in his negotiations in the East is also well known: "If you will profit, seek it at sea and in quiet (peaceful) trade."¹⁶² This is realistic salesmanship and we come across the same attitude among Dutch advocates of freer trade for their fellow-Europeans as well as for the natives. Humanitarian considerations were not entirely lacking and could be found among both the English and the Dutch,¹⁶³ even though such considerations were by no means regarded as decisive arguments.

At the conferences which the Dutch and English held about their conflicts in the East in 1613, 1615, and between 1618 and 1619, the Dutch concentrated on defending the legal aspect of their claims, namely the validity of the contracts they had concluded with the natives.¹⁶⁴ They also put forward the argument that since they were carrying on the struggle against the enemy single-handed they had a right to all the profits made in the Indian trade. If these were lost to them because of English competition they would no longer be capable of carrying on the war.¹⁶⁵ According to the English, however, no single nation had the right to prevent any other from engaging in trade.¹⁶⁶ They disputed the validity of the contracts which the Dutch had concluded with the natives, on the grounds that most of them had been made under pressure.¹⁶⁷ Although negotiations were broken off and reopened many times, both sides had a reasonable argument, of course, and in the long run this led to the two countries making an alliance on eastern trade. The main object was to put an end to the expensive and exhausting rivalry between them, which was consuming all the profits and benefiting no one but their common enemies, Spain and Portugal. On the Dutch side, various capable men such as Gerard Reynst, Steven van der Hagen, Laurens Reael, Cornelis Dedel and, somewhat later on, Philip Lucasz. were in favour of such a reconciliation. Governor General Reynst was certainly no friend of the English – "a pernicious

haughty, and incompatible nation, for ever seeking its own advantage" ¹⁶⁸ – but he allowed his own feelings to be outweighed by considerations of the advantage which would be gained by waging war jointly and of the favourable results which might be expected to ensue.¹⁶⁹ Steven van der Hagen, who was an efficient admiral, leader of two of the early Dutch expeditions to the East Indies, and a man of great experience, level-headed, humane, and beloved of the native population,¹⁷⁰ also declared himself in favour of such an alliance, although as long as a treaty had not actually been concluded he tried to prevent the English from building fortified settlements on Ceram and Banda.¹⁷¹ For he, too, as his letters reveal, was very suspicious of English intentions. Nevertheless, in contrast to Coen, Van der Hagen hoped to bring about a tolerable situation by means of an adjustment in the relative strength of the two countries. He could see no advantage at all in rivalry between them, holding that it could only damage both parties but that the United Company would suffer most because it had the most to lose.¹⁷² On the basis of his own experience he judged it to be impossible to wage war on two fronts, that is to say against the English as well as against the Portuguese and the Spanish.¹⁷³ At that time the United Company had neither ships nor men enough for such an undertaking. Van der Hagen also advised reaching an agreement with the English with a view to the establishment of a rendezvous, in which connection the Straits of Singapore and the Sunda Straits had been mentioned.¹⁷⁴ But that was not all. The commercial significance of textile supplies to the Indonesian area was immense and joint action by the English and Dutch on the Indian coast against the Portuguese (whose position there at that time was still so strong) and the powerful Mogul Empire might have better results than separate efforts on the part of the two countries to obtain a permanent footing there, particularly when these efforts would be further impeded by mutual competition.¹⁷⁵ It is not surprising, therefore, that Van der Hagen wholeheartedly supported Laurens Reael's policy.

Reael, rather than Steven van der Hagen, is generally considered to have been the chief exponent of a peaceable policy. In Dutch historical literature opinions are divided about the course he followed. De Jonge strongly censures Reael's attitude towards the English,¹⁷⁶ but Tiele, on the other hand, stands up for it.¹⁷⁷ These diametrically opposite views also dominate the works of later authors whose ideas are based on those of De Jonge or of Tiele and on the documents of which they published only fragments. Up to now the last word on the

subject (based on authentic sources) has been uttered by L. Kiers in his tendentious book *Coen on Banda*. He makes short work of all the historians from De Jonge to Schaper (Presser) – “that placid herd of historical ruminants” – in order to prove that Coen, his hero, was right.¹⁷⁸ Kiers’ *bête noire* is Laurens Reael, whom he blames for the United Company’s failure to force the Bandanese to fulfil their contracts.¹⁷⁹ He leaves no stone unturned in order to show Reael up in a bad light, even making out that the care the latter took of his clothes was in itself a defect of character.¹⁸⁰ Although Kiers tries to give the impression that he had consulted all the literature on the subject as well as unpublished sources, he has certainly not conducted an exhaustive search into the records for the years when Reael and Van der Hagen were still in Indonesia. There are, for example, very important documents which he has not consulted at all (or at least he does not mention them), such as the original letters of Reael and Van der Hagen, the resolutions of Reael’s Council, the letters and resolutions of the Gentlemen Seventeen, etc. If Kiers had, in fact, studied these sources he would have perceived that these two Company servants certainly did not use “pseudo-exalted” arguments^{180a} – Kiers’ (or Gerretson’s?^{180b}) interpretation of the liberal views of Van der Chijs and Tiele – but that they held due reckoning with the economic possibilities of this Asian world and with the consequences of the use of force, including the way in which the United Company itself would be affected by such a policy. And after all, were they not right? It was years before the Company finally obtained control of all the spices, and did the monopoly really do the Company so much good? Dr Glamann’s latest and very thorough study clearly demonstrates the relative insignificance of the monopoly when compared with the whole volume of the Company’s trade. One thing for which Reael may well be blamed was his failure to stand up to Coen, and Van der Hagen’s attitude in this respect provides a pleasing contrast. Moreover, the extremely Eurocentric standpoint which Kiers adopts in his work betrays a complete unfamiliarity with the Asian background¹⁸¹ and with conditions as they were in the Spice Islands under the Portuguese.¹⁸²

After the publication of Kiers’ thesis, H. Terpstra and C. Wessels pointed out that his attitude was not impartial,¹⁸³ but they were referring especially to the period of the actual extermination of the Bandanese. No less biased, however, and incomplete into the bargain, is Kiers’ treatment of preceding events, and the false pathos with which he defends a nasty affair is positively antipathetic. It was definitely

advisable therefore, when considering this question, which has been discussed so often before, to turn once more to the original sources ("the fresh grass" – to keep to Kiers' idiom) in order to be able to formulate very briefly one's own opinion about the conduct and attitudes of those who deviated from the official standpoint of the United Company. The more so since the deviation was not limited to the attitude towards the English, which is the subject under discussion in this chapter, but was equally apparent in respect of the policy towards native shipping and trade, which will be discussed in the chapter following.

In the matter of the English, the Gentlemen Seventeen and especially Director General Coen blamed Reael particularly because he did not use force to prevent the English from trading with the Spanish and the natives on Tidore although forcible action would have been permissible according to the rules of war. The negotiations with England then proceeding in Europe and the consequent lack of clearly-defined orders from Holland, coupled with the inadequate military resources at his disposal in the Moluccas, had kept Reael from adopting such a course. Certainly no blame attaches to him in this respect. After all, on the 2nd of November, 1614, while the negotiations were still going on and caution was thus indicated, the Gentlemen Seventeen had sent instructions to their overseas employees which laid down that the English must be prevented from doing any trade at all, but "without as yet lifting a hand against them."¹⁸⁴ Would it not be difficult to put such instructions into effect? In a letter from Holland dated 30th April, 1615 (the contents of which only reached Reael a year later, however), which contained news of the failure of the conference, the Directors issued some further directives about the attitude to be adopted towards the English. But their standpoint was the rather strange one that if the English tried to compel the natives to trade against their will by force of arms, the Dutch were obliged by the terms of the contracts to defend the natives and could thus employ force¹⁸⁵ in their turn. In his defence Reael rightly pointed out that there was absolutely no need for the English to use force to make the natives trade with them since they were only too glad to supply the English with their spices.¹⁸⁶ The use of force was explicitly prescribed for the first time in a letter dated 30th November, 1615, which was not received until August 1616. By that time the Seventeen apparently had very little hope left of reaching an agreement with the English (the Dutch attributed the failure of the negotiations to the English desire

to obtain a share in the spice trade at Dutch expense),¹⁸⁷ but even then it is not clear whether the States General entirely approved of such action.¹⁸⁸ It must have been difficult indeed for the Gentlemen Seventeen to persuade the States General to make a clear statement of policy. In their petition they even threatened to abandon the Spice Islands¹⁸⁹ if the States General did not support vigorous action against the objections of their Governor General and his "scrupulous" Council,¹⁹⁰ for it was the Council, rather than Reael himself, which had prevented the attack upon the English.¹⁹¹ Steven van der Hagen held a seat on this Council,¹⁹² but so did Joris van Spilbergen, who was in command of the pursuit of the English during their voyage in the Moluccas. Reael did not have a really strong character, however, so that his policy as regards the enforcement of the monopoly among the natives lacked consistency and he was apparently too easily influenced by more energetic people in his environment. He seems to have been less concerned than Van der Hagen about avoiding an armed conflict with the English. In the instructions issued to Joris van Spilbergen on 9th May, 1616, the use of force was certainly not excluded, and, in fact, it was to be directed especially against the natives if they sold spices to the English. But weapons were also to be used to prevent the English from helping the natives, and even to compel the English to permit inspection of the boats in which they carried the spices to their ships. Armed attack was only considered to be too risky if the English were to take cover close under the walls of the Spanish fort on Tidore.¹⁹³ When this did indeed turn out to be the case, the Dutch limited themselves to a protest.¹⁹⁴ At the next sitting of the Council on the 16th of May 1616 special attention was devoted to the effect which an exchange of fire with the English might have upon the negotiations in Europe, and the idea of forcible action was accordingly abandoned.¹⁹⁵

Although Reael personally cannot have been so averse to violence – as can be seen from passages in letters written by him to the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber on 25th July, 1615 and 10th May, 1617,¹⁹⁶ as well as from certain clauses in the orders for Van Spilbergen – he bowed to the judgment of the members of his Council, and, besides that, the idea of being responsible for a possible conflict with the English, without the backing of definite instructions from the Directors and the States General also began to weigh heavily with him.¹⁹⁷ When he did finally receive definite instructions he took action against the English in the Banda Islands.¹⁹⁸

Of all the figures surrounding Reael, Van der Hagen was the most

outstanding. His character was undoubtedly stronger and his principles higher than Reael's, and the latter must have been deeply influenced by this man who was so much older and had had so much more experience in Asia than himself. Moreover, they must have held similar religious views and both had a humane attitude towards the natives.¹⁹⁹ In his attitude towards the English, Reael was primarily influenced by considerations of the shortage of military and naval weapons as well as by his awareness that his administration was not backed by definite instructions from the Company Directors and the States General.²⁰⁰ The letters written by Van der Hagen during his period of office (unfortunately few and far between) reveal his conviction that in the interests of the Company the positions of both sides had to be clearly defined so that a stand could be made against the Portuguese-Spanish enemy.²⁰¹ Moreover, he pointed out to the Gentlemen in Amsterdam that there was a close connection between the United Company's attitude towards the natives and the relations of the latter with the English. If events in the Banda Islands and on Ceram continued to shape towards a climax, the building of a United Company fort on the coast of Ceram, against the will of the people, would make the inhabitants of the clove villages of Luhu and Cambello seek English support and then in future they would supply the English with cloves.²⁰²

In 1617 the Bandanese on the island of Pulu Run, where famine was raging because food supplies had been cut off, concluded an agreement with the English, who were providing them with rice, about the establishment of a settlement upon their island. Reael's irritation, signs of which were already to be seen in the letters mentioned above, steadily increased as he found himself obliged to carry out the orders of the Gentlemen Seventeen, and it also found expression in his personal contacts with the English. When the attempts that he made to reach an agreement with them about the Banda Islands proved in vain,²⁰³ he grew so beside himself that "seeing he could not prevail and to have his desire, grew much discontented and threw his hat on the ground and pulled his beard for anger."²⁰⁴ It can be seen that he was an emotional man, and his letters to the Company Directors show that he was also annoyed about the lack of adequate support from Director General Coen,²⁰⁵ which had prevented him from taking more vigorous action against the English in the Banda Islands. Rather than send ships to the Spice Islands to reinforce naval power there, Coen had directed them to Malacca "on an empty hull and in the illusive hope of spoils, while he (Coen) knew quite well that

the English were on the way to Banda now a spark has been ignited here that, without doubt, will carry a great fire along with it." ²⁰⁶ This proved to be a true prophecy and yet in spite of it Reael held Coen in sincere esteem.²⁰⁷ His feelings, however, were not reciprocated by the Director General.²⁰⁸ Coen's sharp criticism of Reael's conduct must have been responsible for the decision of the Gentlemen Seventeen not to confirm the Council of the Indies' choice of Reael as Governor General and not to prolong his period of office.²⁰⁹ Since Van der Hagen was also discharged at his own request on the grounds of his long service in Asia and both left for Holland in 1619, no serious opponents of a rigorous monopoly policy were left in the Indies. Dedel, who had been a capable man but very young, was already dead and Artus Gysels' criticism was the expression of personal antipathy rather than of well-grounded opposition. Now that he no longer had any opposition to deal with in his own circle Coen was free to carry out his plans. From the outset he had been bitterly opposed to collaboration with the English,²¹⁰ whom he considered to be the greatest obstacles in the way of the Dutch empire which he wanted to found, in which only the Dutch would be permitted to carry on trade and shipping. He considered it "an absurd matter" ²¹¹ that the English had obtained more cloves from the Moluccas than the Dutch in 1616 and he was prepared to use any means to prevent this happening again in the future.

Anglo-Dutch rivalry was keenest in the Spice Islands but the interests of the two countries conflicted elsewhere in the Indonesian Archipelago as well, particularly in Bantam and on Sumatra, where pepper was a product coveted by both parties. But there Coen did not have to take the views of Reael and his supporters into account since these men remained in the Spice Islands and accordingly had less contact with the other settlements.

A treaty between the English and the Dutch East India Company was finally signed in 1619, much against the wishes of Coen. Even though he abided by the letter of the agreement, he definitely tried to sabotage its spirit. Characteristic in this respect are the steps he took to collect as many spices as possible for the United Company before the English factors on the Spice Islands could be officially informed of the existence of the treaty. He did this because the agreement stipulated that a third share of the spices had to be relinquished to the English.²¹² Even Kiers admits that the renewed action against the Banda Islands was primarily intended to make the Bandanese fulfil their contracts before the English should demand their share in the booty ²¹³ on the

grounds of their participation in the struggle. Coen feared that his ultimate objective, the realization of Dutch supremacy in the archipelago, would not be achieved if conquests were undertaken jointly with the English.²¹⁴

The worsening of relations which resulted from Coen's policy and which culminated in the events in Amboina (Coen was not directly concerned in these events but they were nevertheless a direct consequence of the mistrust which Coen encouraged his subordinates to feel) troubled Anglo-Dutch relations in Europe for generations. British trade switched from the Spice Islands to Macassar and Bantam, so that the Dutch were then faced with keen competition there. Large quantities of cloves reached Europe via the Macassar route and badly affected sales of cloves shipped by the United Company to Holland.²¹⁵ Unlike the Dutch, moreover, the British did not have to reckon with the heavy cost of military actions, punitive expeditions against the natives, and the upkeep of forts, ships and garrisons. They had to pay a much higher purchase price for the cloves in Macassar and Bantam, of course, yet they, too, were able to make high profits.

The resultant state of war between the United Company and Macassar lasted until 1669, after which Macassar was obliged to submit to the United Company and this side-channel for the disposal of cloves was accordingly cut off.

But it was not until 1682, after the United Company's conquest of Bantam, that the English were driven back to the west of the Indonesian Archipelago and any indirect contact that they might still have had in Bantam with the Spice Islands (unlikely though this was) definitely came to an end.²¹⁶ On Sumatra they still retained a base for expansion on the Malay Peninsula and for the increasingly bitter fight against the United Company monopoly which was carried on throughout the entire archipelago. Because of Dutch opposition in Indonesia, the central point of trade as far as the English were concerned in the first half of the 17th century came to lie in India.²¹⁷ At first it was concentrated in Surat and the Persian Gulf, but around 1640 English competition also became more noticeable on the Coromandel coast.²¹⁸ Since they were prevented from obtaining spices, the English were compelled to turn their attention to other types of merchandise, particularly textiles. These were to prove of much greater value than spices in the future, although the English lacked the advantage of the interplay of economic forces between the Spice Islands and India²¹⁹ which was such an important factor as far as the Dutch were concerned

because of their barter trade in textiles and spices. In their contacts with the Indian kingdoms, which at first were exclusively commercial, the English were also laying the foundations for their future empire overseas.

During the whole of the period with which we are concerned here, however, the Dutch continued to regard spices as their principle trading objective. But even Coen was obliged to admit as early as 1623 that the activities of the United Company in the Spice Islands were absorbing all the Company's resources and swallowing up all its profits, whereas the English, in the meantime, were extending their trade in Surat.²²⁰ The treaty between the two rivals was still in force at that time, but the English were shirking their obligation to contribute towards the costs of forts and military forces. These, after all, would only serve to increase Dutch trade in spices.²²¹ The English must rather have enjoyed seeing how burdened the Dutch were with "so many castles, much trouble and little profit." ²²² Later on too, when there was no longer any question of a formal alliance, disquiet was felt in Holland because valuable return freights were being shipped by the British to Europe. And although the English Company still remained inferior to the United Company because of its more slender capital resources,²²³ it, too, had some good years as far as the volume of its commercial turnover was concerned. In 1633 the English received a cargo of merchandise from Persia and Surat worth some fl. 4,500,000.²²⁴ In 1638 the Gentlemen informed the Governor General and Council that a return freight of approximately fl. 1,400,000 value had reached England,²²⁵ while in 1641 900,000 pounds of pepper arrived there. The Dutch considered it "an important matter for the friends (!) that protected by the weapons and great expenses of this Company [the United Company] they can sail peacefully and generally carry on their trade." ²²⁶

During these years the English were investing ever greater sums of capital in expeditions to the Indian coast, and they also made large profits by acting as freight carriers for Asian merchants ²²⁷ in the Indian Ocean. The prosperity of the English, which had become apparent in 1623 when a fleet arrived in England with cargoes worth fl. 3,600,000 ²²⁸ added fuel to the flames of Coen's hatred for the treaty.

In no small measure, the difficulties which the Dutch encountered in the Spice Islands were a consequence of Anglo-Dutch rivalry. The effort made to drive the English from the Banda Islands led to the events which followed, namely the conquest of the native inhabitants

and their more or less complete extermination. This same rivalry over spices lay at the root of all further conflict between the Dutch and the English in the Moluccas, on Amboina, in Ceram and Macassar. And even though the Dutch finally succeeded in eliminating all traces of English influence from the spice trade this only caused the rivalry to be transferred to other fields and was to have very far-reaching consequences in the future.

Compared with the Anglo-Dutch conflict, the activities of other European competitors in the Indonesian Archipelago were of very little consequence. To no small extent both the Danish and the French enterprises came into being through the cooperation and advice of Dutchmen who found the road to Asia barred to their own enterprises because of the United Company monopoly. Attempts by French merchants to open up trade in Bantam in 1617 met with scant success owing to friction between the partners on the voyage and unfamiliarity with commercial conditions in Bantam. Similar attempts in Achin had no better results. The French also tried their luck in Macassar. But French colonial history has been but little concerned with these French efforts at expansion in Indonesia.²²⁹

Dutchmen also held shares in the Danish chartered company which was founded in 1616. Trade with Indonesia was carried on from Tranquebar, the settlement established by this company on the Coromandel coast. Macassar, in particular, became a centre of the company's trade, this being the place where Coromandel cloth could most easily be exchanged for cloves. The trade was very profitable because of the high prices which could be obtained in India for these spices, and the United Company regarded the undertaking as an inadmissible encroachment on its monopoly. The Danes also entered into commercial relations with Borneo and the Lesser Sunda Islands, with Bantam and the ports of northern Java, and with Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. It was only in the early years that the United Company worried about Danish competition. It soon became obvious that the Danes possessed neither adequate financial resources nor a sufficient number of well-equipped ships. The Danish settlements were given too little support by Denmark and ultimately they led a very precarious existence.²³⁰

In the Spice Islands, where the United Company was not confronted by any powerful Asian kingdoms, it used this freedom to destroy Asian shipping and trade in a series of protracted, exhaustive, and money-consuming expeditions against any natives who offered resistance. It was only in the places where the English still held their own alongside

the Dutch – in Macassar at first and in Bantam and at some points on Sumatra and Borneo – that independent native trade managed to survive for a while. The jealousy between the Europeans enabled the Asians to hold on to some remnants of their old trade, and thus they were usually ready witnesses of conflicts which resulted in increased prices for their own products.

A spectacular event such as the naval battle between the Dutch and English in Patani roads, in which John Jourdain, one of the ablest English pioneers in Asia, was killed, inspired the population of Patani to “public verses composed after their own fashion.” ²³¹

In the foregoing pages it has certainly not been the author’s intention to give an exhaustive account of inter-European relations in the Indonesian Archipelago and the rest of Asia. The aim was to shed light on only a few facets of the situation and our attention has been principally devoted to the relative strength of the southern and northern Europeans, the competitive struggle between them, and the way in which these conflicts affected native trade.

This has been closely linked with a critical appreciation of the much-disputed line of conduct adopted towards the English, by Governor General Reael and his immediate colleagues, who are also reputed to have been in favour of a less rigid enforcement of the monopoly as far as the natives were concerned. There was more hope for the future in such a course of action than in the rigorous monopoly which, although it triumphed in the Spice Islands, could not be enforced elsewhere as far as either European competitors or Asian traders were concerned. This partial failure of the policy of the Gentlemen Seventeen and their anything but humble servant Coen serves to confirm the wisdom of the proverb: “Much would have more and lost all.”

IX. THE SPICE MONOPOLY OF THE UNITED COMPANY AND ASIAN TRADE IN THE MALAY-INDONESIAN AREA

Whenever we are tempted to condemn Coen as the annihilator of native shipping and trade in the Spice Islands we should remember that the policy he followed was precisely that laid down by his masters in Holland. Even though, later, they appear to have been somewhat disconcerted by the harsh way in which he had carried out their orders,¹ their criticism of his conduct still amounted to no more than a light dressing-down.² The memorandum embodying their views, which was drawn up by Hendrik Brouwer in 1612, and their letters to the Indies in the years following leave not the slightest doubt about the course of action which they advocated. Their letters of September and November 1614³ already contained a detailed programme for preventing both foreign and native merchants from carrying on trade. At this time the competitive struggle with the Portuguese was still very much in the foreground, and Portuguese imports of Indian cloth into Indonesia were a constant source of irritation to the Dutch.⁴ Every means was to be used to put a stop to the transport of Portuguese freight in native ships and the Portuguese *commenda* trade in native shipping. It was equally essential to prevent the export of spices, and the idea of destroying spice trees cropped up at this time.⁵ As early as this, mention occurs of rivalry with the English. As far as the activities of Asian traders from outside the Indonesian area were concerned, the recently revived Chinese trade in the Moluccas (especially Chinese imports of cloth which were bartered for spices and money) was regarded with much suspicion by the Dutch.⁶ This trade, too, had to be prevented for, to the "ruination" of the United Company, the Chinese used to sell the spices (which they also obtained in the Javanese ports and which were even supplied to them by United Company servants in Bantam) to Portuguese and English buyers.⁷ United Company officials were only permitted to sell spices to the Chinese if these spices were to be shipped direct to China, or to countries which offered no competition to United Company sales.⁸

Fear of opposition from the native rulers and their peoples caused Governor General Reynst and his Council to decide against excluding the foreign traders by force.⁹ The remarkable thing is that for the same reason Coen, who had been "the most ideal servant" of the United Company at first, did not favour the use of force at all in 1614. Soon, however, Coen, who since his appointment as Director General of trade in Bantam had done more to determine Company procedure than the distant Governor General in the Moluccas, adopted his masters' standpoint in its entirety and implemented their policy in the future with the utmost consistency. In this he presented a sharp contrast to Reael and Van der Hagen, who wanted to follow a completely different line of conduct.¹⁰ Although in the beginning Reael certainly showed himself to be in favour of enforcing the monopoly,¹¹ unlike Coen and the Gentlemen Seventeen, he made the important reservation that the natives should, at any rate, be provided with adequate supplies of foodstuffs and cloth, such as they had previously received from the Portuguese.¹² He held up the Portuguese as an example to the Dutch Directors because "every day now it can be seen how much the Dutch have to learn from the Portuguese in this Moluccan trade."¹³ But Reael seems to have been a man of many moods. A letter written by him in June 1614 almost smacks of Coen himself. In it he recommended that any means at all, and not always "flattering" ones, should be used against the foreign native merchants "to whom we should show our teeth with authority."¹⁴ On the other hand, a year later he once again condemned the use of force against the natives and called the attention of the Amsterdam Directors to the injustice, harshness and cruelty of their instructions for curbing Asian trade. According to him, no contract at all could give them the right to exclude foreign traders, in fact such a policy could only lead to reprisals against United Company settlements in the lands where those traders lived.¹⁵ Reael did not entirely rule out the use of force against the foreign merchants any more than against the English, but he lacked the wherewithal for it, namely adequate supplies of oar-propelled vessels, soldiers, and ammunition. He held that a much better way of dealing with the foreign traders would be to stop the import of money, for which the spices were exchanged and once more he pointed to the example of the Portuguese, who only permitted the exchange of goods.¹⁶

The import of specie resulted in the natives saving the money they obtained from the United Company until other foreign merchants came along from whom they could buy cloths and foodstuffs at much lower

prices than those the United Company charged. This meant that Company cloth sales dropped, and it was precisely on the cloths that the United Company made its greatest profit.¹⁷

Somewhat too optimistically, Reael anticipated that if the spices could not be bartered for anything but cloths and rice the foreign merchants, who came for money now that they could no longer get spices, would stay away of their own accord.¹⁸ This suggests an over-confidence in the natives' observance of their contracts, but Reael's proposal naturally had its good points as well. Increased sales of cloths from the Coromandel coast in the Moluccas would mean that it would no longer be necessary to send large capital sums there annually, and the money could accordingly be used elsewhere. At the same time, when supplies from other countries ceased and they became entirely dependent upon the Dutch for rice, the natives would once more apply themselves to gathering the spices.¹⁹

The Javanese, Malays, and Macassarese, who had originally been the principal suppliers of the Spice Islands, bought their textiles from Englishmen and Portuguese, who had obtained them, in their turn, from the Coromandel coast. Yet Reael considered that it would be inadvisable for the United Company to outdo the English and the Portuguese by buying too heavily on that coast.²⁰ The warehouses in the Moluccas were already filled to overflowing because of excessive purchasing. Considerable capital was thus lying idle, and it was to be feared that it would be years before these stocks were disposed of at the high prices laid down by the United Company. Added to this was the danger of deterioration, to which these goods were particularly subject in the tropics.

Reael saw objections to closing the Straits of Singapore, for while this would hamper Portuguese trade, English, Javanese, Gujarati and Achinese trade (all of which were much more injurious to the United Company) would continue, and would even suffer less inconvenience than usual from Portuguese competition. Freed of the Portuguese threat, thanks to the armed strength of the Dutch, these Asian and European merchants would be in a better position than ever to flood the Indonesian Archipelago with their cloths.²¹

Nor did Reael think that much good would come of competing with the foreign merchants in cloths, rice, sago, and other goods, since the United Company alone could not meet the whole demand and the foreign merchants carried a wide assortment of goods that were much prized by the natives but could not be supplied by the United Com-

pany. Compared with the trifling costs of this peddling trade, moreover, the profits of the foreign merchants were so large that however small their sales of cloths might be they could still continue to compete with the United Company. Reael estimated the profits of the Asian merchants at some 300% to 400%. He saw no good at all in a proposal to use gold from Siam to have coins minted in Patani or Johore of smaller value than the *reals* and to put them into circulation in the Moluccas in place of these. The losses which the foreign traders would suffer by bartering their merchandise for the newly-minted coins would be so slight that it would not affect their predilection for trading in the Moluccas. Although Reael did not specifically declare himself to be against the use of force when he made his important statement on 25th July 1615,²² he obviously considered then that the expedient he proposed of an exchange of goods was the best way of dealing with the competition offered by the foreign merchants, always provided that the goods were made available in sufficient quantity and at a reasonable price.²³

But when Reael lowered the price of rice in 1614 he encountered opposition from Coen,²⁴ and in 1618 he was severely censured by the Directors for reducing the price of cloths and foodstuffs.²⁵ Yet the alternative, an increased purchase price for the cloves (for the natives were complaining that they received far too little merchandise in exchange for their spices)²⁶ would have met with even stiffer opposition from the Directors. Since, up to then, the United Company had mainly tried to sell cloths of inferior quality to the natives of the clove islands,²⁷ Reael urged that better kinds should be sent. A certain concern on Reael's part for the natives is indicated by his intervention to prevent them from having to pay excessive taxes to their own rulers. By the terms of the United Company's contracts with the ruler of Ternate, the latter had reserved half of the proceeds of the duties for himself,²⁸ and such a provision could easily lead to over-taxation of the population.

The Gentlemen Seventeen, who were somewhat apprehensive at first about the consequences of a policy of violence, which might lead to a general revolt,²⁹ adopted at least one of their Governor General's proposals – the stoppage of money imports³⁰ – in spite of the objections that were being voiced about his policy.³¹ But for the rest they appear to have paid more attention to the complaints made by Coen about Reael's policy, namely, that he allowed foreign merchants to come to the Moluccas after they had just been excluded from Amboina

and Banda; that he issued them with safe-conducts, so that eleven of their junks had turned up in Makian;³² that he allowed the Chinese to trade freely in the Moluccas, with the result that they had been able to ship out a large quantity of coins.³³ But it was Reael's attitude towards the Bandanese that aroused Coen's strongest disapproval.³⁴ Reael was, in fact, unable to associate himself with the inhuman policy advocated by the Gentlemen Seventeen and Coen, which involved cutting off the Bandanese from all supplies of food and other essential commodities. Reael also drew attention to the rash way in which the Bandanese (and not only the Bandanese) had concluded contracts with the United Company, making promises that they would never be able to keep.³⁵ In their letters the Directors had put forward plans to exterminate the Bandanese and repopulate the country with other peoples, and Reael begged them to consider whether a country could, in fact, be worth anything without its inhabitants, since it would then be left without a labour force for cultivating and harvesting the nutmegs. Elsewhere, after all, there had been plenty of bad experience gained through populating a country with other than its original inhabitants.³⁶ Above all it must have been the recommendations of the members of the Council of the Indies that made Reael tend more and more to oppose the forcible exclusion of foreign merchants.³⁷ How easily Reael could be influenced and how little he could free himself from the dominating personality of Coen is shown by the fact that when he had a conference with Coen in Bantam in 1617 the latter was able to bring him round more or less to his own way of thinking. Coen could then write quite confidently to the Directors: "as far as the native traders are concerned, that will come all right in time."³⁸ And indeed Reael went back to Ambon, Banda and the Moluccas "to do our best to exclude the foreigners at once,"³⁹ although he only proposed to use violence in the last extremity.⁴⁰ This must also explain Reael's policy towards the Bandanese, for in 1617 he compelled them to sign a treaty that differed in no respect from the previous monopolistic agreements.⁴¹ There is a vast difference between the esteem in which Reael repeatedly showed he held Coen⁴² and the criticism that the latter constantly uttered about his Governor General in his letters to the Gentlemen Seventeen, not to mention the remarks (sometimes actually scornful) which he permitted himself about Reael: "apparently great wisdom can confuse a man just as much as stupidity can lead him astray."⁴³

We have no information about the deliberations of Reael's Council, whose decisions influenced him so deeply, but we do at least know the

views of Steven van der Hagen, a member of that Council, from the letters he wrote to the Directors. He, too, most strongly urged the Gentlemen Seventeen not to employ force, as this was the surest way of driving the natives into the arms of the British and augmenting, instead of destroying, Malay and Javanese trade.⁴⁴

Because of the forcible measures taken by the Dutch against foreign junks on the coast of Ceram the inhabitants of the clove-growing villages on that island had now called on the Macassarese for help, offering them trading opportunities in return, and Macassarese as well as Javanese proas thus began calling at places on the coast of Ceram.⁴⁵ Van der Hagen, too, was of the opinion that the United Company had no right at all to prevent the foreign junks from trading⁴⁶ and considered, moreover, that experience had shown that the use of force led to large-scale disturbances.⁴⁷ How could forcible measures be effective against the foreign junks when there were still numerous other places at which the *nakodas* could call. It was impossible for the United Company to keep a check on all of these places and the inhabitants of the clove districts in Ceram and Amboina could always take their cloves there instead.⁴⁸ As early as 1617 and 1618 foreign junks began carrying foodstuffs to the islands of Buru and Manipa and bringing back cloves in exchange. The inhabitants of the clove-growing villages in Ceram complained seriously to the king of Ternate (whose subjects they were) about the fact that the foreign junks were no longer visiting them because of Dutch activity.⁴⁹ For the same reason the inhabitants of the clove-growing district of Hitu on Amboina were dissatisfied with their headman, the so-called Captain Hitu, whom they blamed for the treaty which had been signed.⁵⁰

This Captain Hitu and Van der Hagen were on good terms with each other and their relationship was already one of long standing, dating back to the time when Van der Hagen had established Company rule on Amboina. Van der Hagen had always been able to count on the Captain's support and with his help he hoped to be able to pacify the clove districts in Ceram. He therefore strongly disapproved of the offensive way in which a Dutch minister, the Reverend Gasparus Wiltens, had behaved towards the headman of Hitu.⁵¹ The minister's attitude was a result of the Moslem propaganda which was being conducted from Hitu. But Van der Hagen blamed the population's susceptibility to Islam on the lack of religious fervour with which the Protestant doctrine was preached, and he uttered a warning that if the United Company lost the support of Captain Hitu they would be worse

off than the Portuguese, who could at least count on the Christian (Roman Catholic) section of the population to support them against the Moslems.⁵² Van der Hagen contrasted the Protestant mission with that of the Portuguese priests, whom the inhabitants loved because of their care for the sick and the poor, their teaching, and the church service. They were not to be found in eating-houses and tap-rooms, at dances and horse races, like "forest apes". Hardly a friendly description of the Dutch minister in the Spice Islands! ⁵³

Van der Hagen was opposed to excluding the foreign merchants and considered it much more advisable to allow the junks unrestricted access to their old ports of call as this would mean that a better check could be kept on the observance of contracts. A coastal patrol would have been much more effective than the small forts in the clove districts of Hitu and Cambello, whose hard-drinking garrisons were hated by the native inhabitants, but there would have to be enough oar-propelled boats to maintain such a patrol.⁵⁴

Van der Hagen did not hesitate to reproach the Directors with their short-sighted mercantile policy.⁵⁵ For if the natives were to be made to keep their contracts and cultivate and supply enough cloves they would also have to be provided with adequate supplies of rice, salt, and cloth, at prices lower than those asked by the foreign merchants.⁵⁶ Moreover, it was desirable for the Company to import these commodities early on in the season of the favourable monsoon so that the population could stock up before the foreign merchants appeared on the scene.⁵⁷ Care should also be taken that the goods sent were of good quality. The natives would rather eat sago than the black rice, infested with mites and rotten from lying so long in the ships, that the United Company normally provided.⁵⁸ Moreover, for these and other commodities, textiles in particular, the United Company demanded prices that were much too high.⁵⁹ The natives grumbled, too, about what they considered to be the strange way in which the Dutch did business. They were accustomed to haggling over prices when buying and selling merchandise, not to being forced to accept goods which they had not selected themselves at prices fixed by the Dutch.⁶⁰

As Van der Hagen had first arrived in the Indonesian Archipelago in 1600, he had become very familiar with the situation in regard to Portuguese-Asian trade. Small wonder then that when formulating his ideas and drawing his comparisons he repeatedly introduced the example of the Portuguese. According to him, the conditions imposed upon the natives by the Dutch were four times as severe as those laid

down by the Portuguese. The country had prospered in the Portuguese era and there had been many junks everywhere, carrying all the products that the native inhabitants required. Moreover, the Portuguese paid tolls and other duties. There was every chance, therefore, that the natives would ally themselves with the Spaniards on Tidore just to be rid of the Dutch: "that they would bring the devil and his dam into the country in order to badger us and drive us away."⁶¹ Unlike the Dutch, the Portuguese had always been accustomed to reach agreement with the natives about prices before goods were sold. Moreover, they only sold their wares to the top people who retailed them in their turn, to the rest of the population. Thus the Portuguese had dealings only with the nobility. Which meant that they were certain of making sales and obtaining payment, and should discontent arise among the natives it would be directed against their own nobles and not against the Portuguese.⁶² Having a financial interest in sales, moreover, the nobility would do their utmost to persuade their subjects to pick the cloves.⁶³

The excessive sales prices of the United Company were relatively higher still because the purchase prices which the Company gave for the spices were much too low. Even when the price was not specified in contracts, as in the case of Ceram, the Dutch were unwilling to give more than 50 to 60 *reals* per *bahar* for the cloves, whereas, according to Van der Hagen, before his time the cloves had fetched more than 70 to 80 *reals* per *bahar*.⁶⁴ It would therefore be much more sensible to let the foreign Asian traders continue coming with foodstuffs at least, for the United Company itself made very little profit on food imports and, moreover, could not meet nearly all the demand.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the assortments of cloths which the Dutch brought were not liked by the natives, and the quantities imported of those which did appeal to their taste were much too large, so that part remained unsold. Nor did the Dutch import products such as onions, garlic, pepper, various native spices, crises, containers for the ingredients required for preparing the betel wad, copper gongs, rattan, etc.,⁶⁶ all of which the inhabitants needed and which they had formerly obtained from the foreign Asian merchants. Every year some 100 junks carrying these articles had visited the Banda Islands alone.⁶⁷

Sago was brought to the Bandanese by the inhabitants of the Kai and Aru Islands, who exchanged it in Banda for cloth.⁶⁸

Van der Hagen calculated that yellow and black paddy bought by the United Company in Japara for 12 to 16 *reals* a *koyan* was resold at not less than 30 to 40 *reals*. If, therefore, the Asian traders brought

white rice at a much lower price,⁶⁹ there was no longer any demand for the Company product. Because of their relatively larger and more expensive ships the Dutch had much higher transportation costs than the Asian traders, and they had to make allowance for these expenses when fixing their rice prices. The natives did not buy the expensive United Company rice and were then forced by lack of other supplies to start growing rice themselves. According to Reael, the natives also began to produce their own sago (the Dutch actually asked five times as much as the Javanese for this commodity) or to fetch it from other islands, which often lay quite a distance away.⁷⁰

Van der Hagen sharply criticised the policy advocated by the Gentlemen Seventeen and Coen in respect of the Bandanese, the object of which was to obtain complete control of the nutmegs. At this time, the nefarious activities of the Company were still limited to chicanery during purchasing,⁷¹ but the inhabitants had definitely not forgotten the measures that had been taken against them earlier.

The Bandanese had never been accustomed to sort their nuts, and certainly no part of the crop was ever thrown away, but the Dutch laid down certain standards as to sort and quality. Natives were turned away daily because their nuts did not conform to Dutch specifications, although the Bandanese wanted to dispose of them at a lower price than had been agreed upon. If they got the chance, however, the natives would sell the rejected nuts to English, Portuguese or Gujarati merchants, and sales of United Company nuts in Europe and India suffered accordingly. It would have been very much better for the Company to sort the nuts themselves and then destroy those of poorer quality.⁷² The English, especially, profited from the consequent unrest on the island. Finally, Van der Hagen considered it extremely foolish to prejudice the United Company's position by laying too much emphasis on these and similar trifles, such as the prevention of the arrival of a couple of proas loaded with sago. His expositions help us to understand something of the background to the continual "bad faith" of the island inhabitants.

The letters of Van der Hagen reveal how deeply concerned he was about conditions in the Spice Islands. He had risked his own life to help establish the authority of the United Company, and, moreover, as a shareholder he felt himself personally involved in what he considered to be the mistaken policy of the United Company's management.⁷³

After lengthy deliberations, Reael and his council decided in 1617 not to use harsh measures against the Asian traders⁷⁴ for the same

reasons that we encounter in their letters, namely, the lack of any legal basis for denying trade to foreign merchants. The United Company had no sovereignty over the islands, except over Amboina and its subordinate territories, and none of the contracts stated that the United Company was entitled to prevent foreign traders from calling at those islands. If they insisted on doing this, the rulers would lose their incomes from customs duties and the population would be left without the primary necessities of life.⁷⁵ It is not only in the letters of Steven van der Hagen that we find this attitude reflected, but also in those of clever, young Cornelis Dedel,⁷⁶ whom Reael would have liked to see appointed his successor.⁷⁷ Even someone like Van Speult, who was later to serve Coen so faithfully as Governor of Amboina, and was one of the prominent figures in the events with the English there in 1623, had to admit that the Dutch had not the slightest right to prohibit the foreigners from carrying on trade.⁷⁸ The Governor of the Moluccas Jan Dircksz. Lam, also declared himself opposed to measures being taken against the foreign traders unless the Dutch themselves provided the population with what they needed.⁷⁹

Because they took actual conditions in the Spice Islands into account the reports of Reael and Van der Hagen provide a good insight into native economy in those parts. These two men had made a joint investigation of clove cultivation in the Moluccas. They were particularly interested in the reasons for the great drop in production which had taken place in a relatively short time. The reports of both men have been preserved. Reael's is long and detailed, while Van der Hagen's deals only with the main points, but the two have so much in common that they were probably drawn up in joint consultation.⁸⁰ Reael and Van der Hagen considered that the main reason for the reduction in the clove crops was the circumstance that the inhabitants of both Tidore and Ternate wanted to be rid of the Europeans – the Tidorese of the Spanish and the Ternatans of the Dutch – and that they felt their only chance of accomplishing this was by calling a temporary halt to clove production.

To the Dutch themselves the natives mentioned a lot of other reasons, such as the age of the trees, and the fact that new ones were not being planted because of the great decline in population, itself a consequence of heavy fatalities in the wars that were continually being waged in those parts. Moreover, the epidemics that raged through the islands every 7 or 8 years claimed many victims. The island of Batchan seemed to be particularly afflicted. Whereas formerly this island could

supply some 6,000 able-bodied men, they could now barely raise enough to man two *kora-koras*.⁸¹

The natives began to leave the areas most ravaged by the wars in order to avoid compulsory service in the ships of their rulers.⁸² Higher prices and the increased needs of the natives themselves (the result of European influence) even caused birth control, by means of abortion, to be practised.⁸³

The sharp decline in population resulted in the land and the clove trees falling into the hands of a small minority. Although it was a tradition among the natives that pickers who did not own their ground were entitled to half the crop, so little interest was now taken that the cloves remained unharvested and the trees ran wild.⁸⁴

For that matter, the population was now obliged to devote more energy to growing food crops and fishing in order to avoid having to buy the expensive rice imported by the United Company. This development received further encouragement when a new demand for food-stuffs arose among the soldiers of the United Company, whose wages were not paid in kind but in money.⁸⁵

But it was not only to the United Company that the population was obliged to surrender its spices. The documents also show clearly that the natives were preyed upon by their own rulers and notables,⁸⁶ and that they had to pay heavy taxes in the form of gifts of cloves to the ruler as well as to those of his officials who were concerned in collecting the fruit, namely, the tax-farmer, the weigher, the writer, and the inspector or overseer whose duty it was to watch that the king's cloves did not fall into the wrong hands. The ruler also compelled his subjects to buy a certain quantity of cloths or other wares at the highest prices. In the king's name, moreover, the notables of the country could force the natives to work for them on their *kora-koras*, so that they had no time left for themselves. This last fact was the main reason why they only managed to save a very small proportion of what they gained from the sale of their cloves.⁸⁷ It is not surprising, therefore, that they preferred to neglect the clove trees and busy themselves with fishing and cultivating food crops, the yield of which was not burdened with extra taxes. If the natives had seen any special advantage in trading with the Dutch, they might have felt more like cultivating the spices, but, as we have already seen, the contrary was the case.

In Amboina, too, a large part of the clove output fell into the hands of powerful people, who imposed duties on the crops of the growers and pickers.⁸⁸ But the fact that spice cultivation in Amboina and Ceram

increased considerably during this period indicates that in these places the natives themselves did achieve a certain degree of prosperity through the cultivation of this crop. Company data reveal the extent to which the spice crops increased. In 1622 the quantity of cloves grown in Amboina and Ceram was double the world consumption of this product.⁸⁹ Even in the Banda Islands, apparently, the United Company could not entirely control the nutmeg production of its own colonists and there, too, in the long run it was forced to recommend that food crops be grown instead of spices.⁹⁰

The Gentlemen Seventeen had not upheld the Council of the Indies' choice of Reael as Governor General. At any rate, they would not tolerate his presence in the Indies any longer.⁹¹ In Jan Pietersz. Coen they saw a better executor of their designs, and the latter's appointment as Governor General⁹² put an end to any further scruples about using force against the Asians.

Perhaps because his departure was drawing near, Reael's later letters have a more independent ring, and they show that he had been able to free himself from Coen's influence. He rejects the directors' reproof and shows himself determined, together with those who advise him (he must have been thinking here particularly of Steven van der Hagen) "to do what shall appear to us useful and necessary for the Company." His words: "the merchant's profit lies not so much in selling his wares at a high price as in the size of his sales and retailing"⁹³ are an appeal to the business instinct of the Gentlemen in Amsterdam.

Reael must have returned to Holland in 1619 a disappointed man, but Van der Hagen, who could also do no more good in Coen's eyes,⁹⁴ and who left for Holland in the same year,⁹⁵ must have been equally disillusioned. Coen had no other serious opponents in the Indies, for the criticism which Artus Gysels presumed to utter⁹⁶ was probably too deeply tinged by personal motives to be objective, and, moreover, it came from someone who was still a comparatively young man. And in any case, in 1621 Gysels also left the Indies, albeit temporarily, and went to Holland.

We may take it for granted that the opposition in Holland (the motives underlying which were mixed, and which was being directed more and more against Coen's administration in particular) was influenced by the views of Coen's opponents in the Indies. This circumstance found its clearest expression in the rain of marginal notes on the proposals made by Coen to the Gentlemen Seventeen⁹⁷ about the re-establishment of Company authority in the Indies, the so-called

"Points for Regulating and Redressing the State of the Company in the Indies."

Meanwhile events were running their course in Indonesia, for "it was a serious misapprehension that attempts were made to improve success by virtue or by doing good," in future the natives "must be made to feel the spur" ⁹⁸, a policy which was to have far-reaching consequences and one to which Reael's words of 1614 might be applicable: "we have begun to pull on a chain, and one link drags the other along with it." ⁹⁹ The population of the Banda Islands was almost entirely wiped out, and the land given to Dutch colonists, who were supposed to continue the cultivation of the nuts with slave labour brought from all over Asia. Completely isolated from the outside world (for the United Company was determined to retain the nutmeg monopoly at least) there came into being in these islands what was, from a sociological and ethnological point of view, a highly peculiar community.

It was only in the Banda Islands that the United Company had complete control of the spice crop. In the other islands a bitter struggle was to drag on for years before the Company finally gained control of most of the cloves. The struggle only came to an end when Malacca, Macassar and Bantam had all fallen into Company hands. The Gentlemen Seventeen justified their rigorous policy (the directives for which had been issued by them and implemented by Coen) by breach of contract on the part of the natives, who, in spite of their obligation to supply the United Company exclusively, sold thier spices to others as well. Did this, however, give the Company the right to exclude Asian traders bringing foodstuffs and cloth? The contracts – most of which had been signed under pressure – did not specify how the people were to continue getting food and clothing in future when they would be parting with all their spices, the only product they had to offer in exchange.

We may well – in fact, we should – ask ourselves whether we can apply European legal standards to this Asian society. It is noteworthy that the Gentlemen Seventeen held due reckoning with the extent to which "European custom" ¹⁰⁰ was valid as far as trade was concerned on the coast of India. There the monopoly could not be enforced by violence because of the risk of reprisals, and the United Company was accordingly dependent upon the goodwill of the Indian rulers.

With the disappearance of the Banda peoples, the only centre of

active trade in the Spice Islands had disintegrated. Amboinese commercial activity was of little significance ¹⁰¹ and had only developed comparatively recently with Javanese help. In *proas* of at least 16 to 24 tons' burden the Amboinese used to fetch slaves, iron knives and swords from the Banggai Islands, and from Buton, Salayar, and elsewhere,¹⁰² and brisk trade was also carried on with the neighbouring coast of Ceram.¹⁰³ But no more than two such ships were ever dispatched from any single place on Amboina, while the helmsmen, and sometimes the crew as well, were Javanese, and it was they who received the greater part of the proceeds from this trade.

Since Amboina yielded enough cloves to meet the combined demand of Europe ¹⁰⁴ and Asia, the United Company concentrated all its attention on the clove villages on this island and henceforth took steps to stop cultivation elsewhere, particularly on Ceram.¹⁰⁵ This was a more or less hopeless undertaking, since the native inhabitants were continually finding new places in which to grow cloves. The policy of destruction caused the United Company to be even more deeply hated by the natives, whose ability to defend themselves steadily increased as a result of the constant struggle against the Dutch.¹⁰⁶

In the thirties the Gentlemen Seventeen subordinated everything else to their efforts to acquire the spice monopoly. Whereas in 1633 their energies were divided among various projects, including attempts to gain a footing in the Chinese trade,¹⁰⁷ by 1640 Amboina was being given top priority.¹⁰⁸ The capture of Negombo in Ceylon led to Governor General Van Diemen being reprimanded for having "much too big ideas" and the Gentlemen Seventeen were astonished that "the Governor General and Council do not hold the redress of Moluccan and Amboinese affairs in greater esteem."¹⁰⁹

However, the policy of extirpating the clove trees, which was so highly advocated by the Company Directors,¹¹⁰ met with strenuous opposition from Governor General Van Diemen, who pointed out to the Gentlemen that there were vast numbers of these trees, growing in widely scattered and more often than not inaccessible villages deep in the interior.¹¹¹ The small initial success of the extirpation policy is demonstrated by the fact that in 1637 the English were still able to ship 200,000 pounds of cloves to Europe, while the Danes managed to get hold of another 100,000 pounds.¹¹² This was not surprising, for although the United Company tried to obtain mastery of all Amboina ¹¹³ it could not prevent considerable quantities of cloves being shipped from clove villages in Amboina to others in Ceram, where they

were bought by large numbers of foreign merchants. Macassar became the central market for these spices,¹¹⁴ and many foreign merchants, including Englishmen, participated in this trade (which was carried on in junks) by means of the *commenda* system.¹¹⁵ The cloves so obtained found their way to India, where they contributed towards the commercial prosperity of Englishmen and Danes.¹¹⁶

As far as the cultivation of cloves was concerned, the Moluccas were still of little value to the United Company. But in order to combat Spanish influence over the king of Ternate the Company had to maintain its armed forces at full strength.¹¹⁷ The extirpation policy was ultimately effective, but then it rebounded against the United Company itself. In 1656 cloves became scarce and there were no longer enough to satisfy the European and the Asian market.¹¹⁸

Although large profits were made on sales of spices in Europe, in the Indies, on the other hand, the United Company suffered serious losses for years because of the expense of its policy directed towards obtaining power by means of the spice monopoly. Coen himself was obliged to admit that before the coming of the Dutch the Portuguese had managed to obtain the necessary spices much more cheaply, and that for years they had derived far more profit from their overseas trade than the Dutch.¹¹⁹

In 1624 the deficit in the Moluccas (not counting Amboina, therefore) was fl. 100,000.¹²⁰ Two years later it had been reduced somewhat but still amounted to fl. 90,544¹²¹ and, according to the Gentlemen Seventeen, this sum was definitely more than the value of the cloves which had been shipped out of the Moluccas the previous year, even on the basis of the highest European prices.¹²² In 1623 Philip Lucasz. estimated the annual deficit in the Moluccas (these islands were then supplying practically no more cloves at all) at some fl. 80,000 – and this figure did not include the wages of the crews, wear and tear of the ships, and the cost of foodstuffs and ammunition. Yet the forts had to be maintained in order to prevent the Spaniards from making themselves masters of the cloves on Tidore, Ternate, and Makian, and in order to be able to continue to offer resistance to the intrigues of the Ternatans and Tidorese.¹²³ Things were not much better in Amboina, where the annual deficit varied in the thirties between fl. 80,000 and fl. 90,000.¹²⁴

Even Banda, the Company's "most principal conquest,"¹²⁵ which it dominated completely, still showed considerable losses.¹²⁶ Banda was always in danger of attack from the Macassarese, supported by various Bandanese who had fled to Celebes. It was therefore essential for this

island, too, to be kept well defended.¹²⁷ In order to save on the cost of transporting foodstuffs at least, attempts were made to revive the ancient trade carried on by the inhabitants of the Kai and Aru Islands with the Banda Islands, which had come to a standstill during the war of extermination. The Company encouraged the preaching of Christianity among these islanders in the hope that this would contribute towards the re-establishment of commercial relations.¹²⁸

Owing to the United Company's inadequate bookkeeping system it is unfortunately not possible to ascertain the relation which these enormous expenses in Asia bore to the profits made on the spices in Europe and elsewhere. Large profits were certainly made on the spices both in the Netherlands and in Asia, but it is essential to point out the very costly way in which these wares were obtained. In the 18th century (for which period we are better provided with data on Company business) the spice-producing factories belong on the debit side of the Company's ledger, in spite of the large profits that were still being made at that time in the Netherlands and in Asia.¹²⁹

The Gentlemen Seventeen pursued a definite price policy directed towards making it as unattractive as possible for their competitors to bring spices to Europe. Prices were therefore not fixed too high.¹³⁰ A similar policy was followed in India, but there prices could not be fixed too low lest the Asian merchants started shipping the cloves they had bought in India to the Mediterranean area.

Moreover, the United Company did not have such good control over its servants in Company factories on the coast of India that it could be sure these employees would not keep the price of cloves high in order to share in the profits of the foreign merchants.¹³¹

Because of the activities of the northern Europeans in the spice production areas, the intermediary trade in spices in the Indian Ocean, formerly so important, was now of practically no significance. The quantities of spices being shipped to the Mediterranean by Asian merchants at the beginning of the 17th century were extremely small. Significant in this connection are the data supplied by Pieter van den Broecke about trade in the entrepôt port of Mocha on the southern coast of Arabia in the country of Yemen. In the capacity of Company servant he had been sent to explore the possibilities for trade in Surat and Mocha. In 1616 he arrived in the last-mentioned port, which, since the conquest of Aden by the Turks in 1538 and its subsequent decline, had replaced that town as a centre of trade.¹³²

A substantial amount of Asian shipping used to visit Mocha in the

early years of the 17th century. Van den Broecke found some thirty Indian, Persian and Arab ships, both large and small, lying in the roads there,¹³³ and the big "king's ship" carrying pilgrims for Mecca that was despatched each year by the Great Mogul also used to tie up in Mocha. This ship carried large quantities of merchandise to the Red Sea and in return brought back part of the supply of coinage that Asia obtained from the Mediterranean area.¹³⁴ Only a small part of the cargo of the other ships, most of which came from the Indian trading towns of Dabhol, Chaul and Surat,¹³⁵ was made up of spices, and these consisted chiefly of pepper, with only a very few cloves, nutmegs, and mace. The most important part of the cargo consisted of large quantities of indigo, and cotton fabrics from the Indian coast.¹³⁶ According to brokers' estimates, in one commercial season in 1616, 2,400 *bahar* (that is to say, approximately 1,320,000 lbs) of pepper could still be sold in Mocha, and about 30 *bahar* of cloves.¹³⁷

Moreover, only a part of the scanty supplies of spices were shipped on to the Mediterranean; they were just as likely to find their way to the opposite coast of Africa or to places deeper in the interior of Arabia. Mocha was even connected by a caravan route with Aleppo.¹³⁸

If one compares the quantities of spices reaching the Mediterranean from Mocha in Van den Broecke's time with the figures quoted by Lane for the second half of the 16th century, it becomes obvious that quantities had fallen off considerably.¹³⁹ Lane gives some 1,310,454 lbs as the yearly average for pepper purchases in Venice alone during the years 1560 to 1564. Unfortunately, he does not give any figures for cloves and nutmegs. Total arrivals in Alexandria were estimated at between 3,336,000 and 4,480,000 lbs. Now arrivals in Mocha cannot be completely equated with arrivals in Alexandria, but, just the same, most of the spices reaching the latter town must have travelled via Mocha. Pepper supplies were declining, therefore, in spite of the relative independence at this time of the Sumatran pepper-exporting ports of Achin, the west coast ports, Jambi and Palembang, and also, to a lesser extent of Bantam on Java (whence pepper was mainly exported to China). Moreover, pepper was still reaching the Mocha market from Malabar.¹⁴⁰ The abatement in supply of the other spices, practically all of which were in the hands of the northern Europeans in the production areas, must therefore have been considerably more pronounced. In 1616 small quantities of cloves, nutmegs and mace, as well as pepper, seem to have found their way to western Asia.¹⁴¹ By 1621 the United Company had complete control over nutmegs and mace.¹⁴² As for

the cloves in the Indonesian area, some were still falling into English, Danish, and also Portuguese hands (chiefly via Asian merchants) but these, like the Dutch cloves, reached Europe via the Cape or were sold by the Europeans in the Indian coastal towns. They no longer reached the Levant. The Asian traders in the Indian Ocean had now been completely supplanted in what had once been the extremely important spice trade. The drop in supplies to the Levant corresponded with a fall in demand due to European markets being sated with spices arriving by the Cape route. The management of the Company estimated the annual sales in Europe in 1621 at some 7,000,000 lbs of pepper, 490,000 lbs of cloves, 450,000 lbs of nutmegs, and 180,000 lbs of mace.¹⁴³ In 1622 prices fell, yet the spices remained unsold. This was due partly to extra large shipments round the Cape and partly to the reduced demand in Europe. The latter circumstance may have been a consequence of the disturbances in Germany (the 30 years' war), as this country usually imported a good deal of the pepper.¹⁴⁴ The low prices made it impossible for spices shipped via the Levant to compete, especially as the prices of the latter were actually on the increase because of the war going on between the Arab states and the Turks, the extortion practised by the Turkish governors, and the high taxes levied in that country.¹⁴⁵ The lack of arrivals from the Levant now caused spices shipped to western Europe via the Cape to be sent to the Mediterranean area, a prospect already visualized by Coen in 1616: "for if the Gentlemen prevent others from carrying on this trade in Mocha and do nothing themselves, I hold it certain that the spices from the Netherlands will then be attracted thither [to the Levant] and that the merchants trading to the Levant will then carry Your Honours' wares instead of large sums of money."¹⁴⁶ In the accounts kept by B. ten Broecke, a Dutch merchant established in Leghorn, as early as 1620 various shipments of pepper, nutmegs and cloves from Holland are mentioned.¹⁴⁷

There was some hesitation at first about allowing spices to be imported into Mocha in case they would then be sent to the Mediterranean and so get in the way of supplies from Amsterdam. But the risk was finally taken in order to acquire supplies of coinage brought to Mocha, which would make it possible to send small consignments of money round the Cape.

Commercial relations between Mocha and the Dutch were interrupted from 1627 to 1640. The war in the Red Sea area which led to Mocha being destroyed in 1630 and avoided by merchants for a period

of four years after that also resulted in the stagnation of goods traffic.¹⁴⁸ But this was not a permanent state of affairs and trade must have revived quite rapidly. Since 1630 the port had not been under Turkish sovereignty but under the direct dominion of an Arab ruler, the Imam of Yemen. Fearing that trade might otherwise revert to Aden, he rebuilt the town and attracted foreign traders by offering them exemption from toll duties and better conditions than they had ever been used to with the Turks.¹⁴⁹ When the Dutch visited the port again in 1640 the great decline in the supplies of spices being shipped to this trading centre was very obvious. There was still a good deal of Indian shipping, namely some 30 to 40 ships carrying cargoes from Surat, Diu, Dabhol, Malabar, and Masulipatnam, as well as shipping from the Persian Gulf and the coast of Arabia. Achin is no longer mentioned; apparently there was no longer any direct shipping route between it and Mocha.¹⁵⁰ This is confirmed by the small number of specifically Sumatran wares imported into Mocha,¹⁵¹ and undoubtedly there was a connection between this fact and the growing influence of the United Company on Sumatra.

The principal commodity brought by the Indian merchants to Mocha was the cloth from Surat and Coromandel. Goods were still despatched from Mocha across country or along the coast of Arabia to the two great markets, held annually in Mecca and Medina,¹⁵² further, to Suez, and from there to Cairo and as far as Aleppo.¹⁵³ Shipments continued in the other direction too, overland by caravan or by ship along the Red Sea coast. The ready money that the Turkish merchants brought with them, however, was all in the form of "Moorish" ducats.¹⁵⁴ There seems to have been practically no demand any longer for spices. The Arabs did not use them themselves, apparently, and in any case the heavy duties levied by the Turks and the high costs along the route to Cairo would make the transport of those spices, which had escaped the northern Europeans' "attention", thus had not travelled round the Cape, too unprofitable.¹⁵⁵ Evidently the United Company was no longer afraid, as it had been twenty years previously, that the spices shipped via the Levant would compete with those brought to the Mediterranean area via Amsterdam. Sure of their monopoly, the Dutch were only surprised that the spices they wished to sell in Mocha did not have a readier sale, since they were certainly twice as expensive in Europe and, moreover, had to be shipped from Europe to Turkey at great expense.¹⁵⁶

Pepper, on the other hand, was very much in demand in Mocha, but

chiefly the varieties brought by the Indian merchants from Malabar and Bijapur. Seemingly some of this pepper still went to Europe, and in 1640 exports of this product from Mocha to Europe were even quite substantial. When the Dutch arrived in Mocha, three Armenian merchants had just left for Cairo with a load of 800 *bahar* of Malabar pepper. Since pepper was fetching a very high price in Europe, the Dutch were afraid that these merchants would do "a very good stroke of business."¹⁵⁷ The fact that no more European coins reached Mocha from Cairo leads to the assumption that these spices were only sold in Europe through indirect channels.

Their conquest of the Portuguese strongholds on the Malabar coast enabled the Dutch in the sixties to force the various Malabar rulers to grant them the monopoly in pepper. And yet, in 1706, when, after a long interim, the United Company again opened relations with Mocha, pepper was still being brought there from the Indian coast, even though only in very small quantities.¹⁵⁸ By that time Mocha's interests lay in the coffee beans, which the English and the Dutch competed with each other to obtain.¹⁵⁹

The details given above demonstrate the close connection between the expansion of the United Company's spice monopoly and trade in this Near Eastern port, and, moreover, the great change that had taken place in the direction and nature of commercial traffic in the Indian Ocean since the northern Europeans had first begun to be active in the region.

The result of the flooding of the European market with spices was that the Dutch began to seek new sales areas, and these they hoped to find in Asia itself. At the same time they wished, as far as possible, to prevent these commodities reaching the Mediterranean area via India, and therefore they ascertained exactly where in India spices were consumed. It appeared that the court of the Great Mogul in Lahore was an important customer. Apart from that, pepper was sold in the southern Indian states of Golconda and Bijapur, and also in Bengal, whence it was shipped to the Chinese frontier. Another stream of spices went to Persia and from there to Tartary. Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia also took their share of these spices. But now practically none of them reached the Christian West.¹⁶⁰ The most important product brought to Aleppo from India and Persia and then exported to Europe was Persian silk.¹⁶¹

The United Company's commercial policy in India was directed towards keeping spice prices in Asia high, so that it would not be

possible for any other nation to buy up the spices there and make a profit on taking them to Europe.¹⁶² But very soon excessive quantities were being sold in India and the markets there were flooded too. Prices fell steeply, and the Armenian and Hindu merchants who used to purchase the spices in Agra for further conveyance to Persia ceased to appear.¹⁶³

After that the United Company tried to reduce the quantities of spices shipped to the various Indian kingdoms, but this did not help to solve the problem of inadequate sales and over-production in both Europe and Asia. Destruction of the spices, a policy which had already been initiated on quite a large scale in De Carpentier's time (extirpation of the spices by the Nassau fleet) was henceforth practised with the utmost consistency, with, as we have seen, very doubtful results.¹⁶⁴

For a long time – too long, perhaps – the United Company continued to concentrate on the spice trade. Sales of spices formed the basis of Company expansion in other spheres of trade in Asia and were usually decisive when it was a question of continuing with a certain line of business or dropping it. It was only under the pressure of altered circumstances, namely the reduced demand for spices, that the trade ultimately lost some of its significance. But by that time the United Company had lost much of its influence and other nations (particularly the English, who had been forced to concentrate on other commodities because they had no spices of their own) were offering powerful competition.

It soon became obvious that if the United Company did not want the cultivation of spices to cease altogether it would have to find some way of providing the native population with sufficient food and cloth. At first Coen thought that he could delegate this task to the Dutch free burghers.¹⁶⁵

His discourse of 1614 was already concerned with this matter,¹⁶⁶ but it is doubtful whether he clearly visualized at that time what part these discharged servants of the United Company could be allowed to play. For how were their shipping and trade to be reconciled with the strict monopoly advocated by Coen? It was, moreover, not very realistic of him to suppose that by the "industry" of the handful of Dutch freemen in Asia trade could be won away from the Malays, Klings, Javanese and other Asian merchants, particularly when these Dutch free burghers were themselves such very poor material,¹⁶⁷ a circumstance of which Coen himself cannot have been unaware.

Unlike Coen, neither Reael nor Van der Hagen had any confidence

in trade run by Dutch civilians.¹⁶⁸ Van der Hagen had a terrible opinion of these men. He thought that they were nothing but a lot of drunkards with irregular habits to whom no native would gladly entrust his daughters in marriage. In this last point they formed quite a contrast with the Portuguese who seem to have been popular marriage partners,¹⁶⁹ at least among the Christian section of the native population in the Spice Islands. Yet mixed marriages were the only sure means by which permanent European-Asian colonization could be achieved.

At Coen's insistence, Reael finally granted a number of these free burghers permission to conduct some trade in the Spice Islands, but with scant result.¹⁷⁰ Coen had also devised a rôle for them to play in the struggle against the Spanish and the Portuguese.¹⁷¹ They were supplied with weapons and ammunition but this only provided them with the means of committing the most scandalous piracy against Asian traders, and that not only against subjects of states hostile to the United Company but also against nationals of friendly countries such as Surabaya, Palembang, India, Johore and Patani.¹⁷² Although these Asian traders carried safe-conducts from the United Company, free burghers burned their junks and murdered the crews in order to gain possession of the cargoes. Coen was then obliged to admit that his protégés "had dared to behave so villainously and scandalously that we should be ashamed to repeat the details here."¹⁷³ Although a few of the malefactors were condemned to death, certainly more than a hundred others deserved the same fate but apparently escaped the noose. But it can be imagined in what difficulties such activities could place the United Company and what reprisals might be taken against its settlements in the countries where those ships belonged.¹⁷⁴

At first the United Company allowed the free burghers to sell cloths too, but when they began to spoil the market this trade was hurriedly forbidden and cloths remained the province of the Company.¹⁷⁵ One might suppose that this experience would have made Coen somewhat hesitant about trying any fresh experiments. Yet in 1623 he unfolded a plan to turn over a great part of the Company's Asian trade to the free burghers.¹⁷⁶ They were to be given a big share in trade with the Coromandel coast as well as in Indonesia, and they were even to be allowed to make use of Company ships for conveying their goods, provided they paid proper freight and tolls.¹⁷⁷

Gentlemen Seventeen gave earnest consideration to Coen's proposals but apparently there was a strong core of opposition to them.¹⁷⁸

Coen had tried to forestall any possible criticism by his well-known "Representations to the States General" (21 September 1623), of which the Gentlemen Seventeen were also meant to take cognizance.¹⁷⁹ In this he certainly showed that he had high hopes of good results from private enterprise. He held that the private traders would trade better when it was a question of their own interests than if they were in Company service, while the United Company would then be relieved of both the risk and the expenses of trade and merchant shipping. And there was hope that when acting on their own behalf the private traders would compete as keenly as possible with "the public enemy and simulated friends."¹⁸⁰

Coen must have expected to obtain very considerable incomes from the toll duties to be levied on this private trade, for they were to be used to defray the costs of ships and forts as well as to purchase all the spices needed for Europe.¹⁸¹

That Coen did not wish to allow the free burghers unlimited trade is evident from his proposal to let the Council of the Indies decide in what goods they should be allowed to trade and in which places.¹⁸² But there was little justification for his optimism in believing that the terms of the concessions would be faithfully complied with. The most complete break with the Company's monopoly policy is signified by Coen's proposal to the Gentlemen Seventeen that private persons should be allowed to sail to Batavia in Company ships. There and in the Spice Islands they could act for themselves.¹⁸³ It is not quite clear whether or not he wanted the Asians to be allowed to do a certain amount of trade.¹⁸⁴

The "Points for Regulating and Redressing the State of the Company in the Indies"¹⁸⁵ drawn up by the lawyer Boreel on the basis of data supplied by Coen are less vague on this point than Coen's "Representations" to the States General in 1623. One might gather from the latter document that only the Asian inhabitants of the Company's own settlements were to be allowed to do a certain amount of trade, equivalent to that of the free burghers. But this passage is by no means clear.¹⁸⁶ When he spoke of the Company settlements in Indonesia, Coen was apparently thinking particularly of Batavia, although he mentioned Amboina and Banda as well. Adequate supplies of foodstuffs were vital to Batavia and their provision was certainly not a task that could be carried out solely by the free burghers on the spot, while it would have been much too expensive for the United Company to bring in supplies.

Coen's plans to attract various foreign Asian traders to Batavia, particularly from China and Further India, were, however, in flat contradiction to the policy of prohibiting or obstructing these merchants. Malays, from the coastal regions of Sumatra were also welcome if they brought pepper to Batavia.¹⁸⁷ But strong opposition to Coen's proposals was raised in the Netherlands, both inside and outside the management of the Company. And although the fact that people felt the monopoly to be threatened was the primary reason for this, other motives also played a part. The criticism found its sharpest expression in the marginal notes on the "Points for Regulating and Redressing" mentioned earlier.¹⁸⁸

In the "considerations (A)" of 1624 which originated with the Directors, the concept of monopoly was uppermost and they pruned down Coen's proposals so severely that trade was only possible to the free burghers under very far-reaching restrictions.¹⁸⁹ The author of another set of "considerations (B)" dating from the same year¹⁹⁰ had more in common with those who also saw the "Asian" side of trade. Dealing with the question of whether the free burghers in the Spice Islands should be permitted to trade like the natives ("Indians"), this writer rightly pointed out that trade was forbidden altogether to the latter group. Everywhere else in Asia where the Company had no contracts granting it the monopoly "it is not so much a matter of the Company tolerating the Indians as of the Indians tolerating the Company."¹⁹¹

The author of the "considerations (B)" believed that trading by free burghers could only lead to the deterioration and falling-off of trade and hatred of the Dutch by the natives. Nor was he any less critical of Coen's expectations that the tolls with which the Company was supposed to be satisfied when trading itself became the business of the free burghers would show a high yield. According to him they would only produce a tenth of what they would if the United Company did its own trading.¹⁹²

If the free burghers in Batavia were allowed to do a certain amount of trade and as many Asian traders as possible were also induced to visit the port, Batavia might perhaps develop into a flourishing centre of commerce.¹⁹³ This was a matter about which Coen, who had learnt by experience, was to express himself more clearly in his later letters, and he propagated the idea as much as possible when he became aware of the scant success of his projects concerning the free burghers.

Shortage of capital could be a serious handicap to the free burghers and for that reason the author of the marginal notes considered it

desirable that when they sailed for the Indies in United Company ships they should be allowed to take money with them belonging to others (on commission) as well as their own. In this connection it is worth noting that the author of the "considerations (B)" holds up the Portuguese as an example. These people were accustomed to trading with other people's money on a commission basis. With the risk for the supplier of the money, annual profits of 70% to 90% could be sent back to Portugal.¹⁹⁴ It was even recommended in these "considerations" that Asian merchants should also be provided with capital. The Chinese, in particular, should be enabled to borrow large sums of money so that they could bring the coveted Chinese products to Batavia. Part of these could then be acquired by the Company in exchange for deliveries of other wares, especially spices and sandalwood. But other Asian traders could only be given smaller sums in commission. Since the United Company held the monopoly of some of the main products in any case, loans of this sort by private persons to Asian merchants could certainly not do it any harm. Rather they would stimulate commercial activity in Batavia, for "trade goes where there is money." ¹⁹⁵

The prosperity of Manilla, in the Philippines, with its population of more than 20,000 native, Chinese and Japanese families, could serve as an example to Batavia. In Manilla the relatively small number of Spaniards profited from the trade, agriculture, and other forms of industry of the huge native population, while the Spanish government benefited from the not inconsiderable tribute which these people paid, as well as from the income from toll duties.¹⁹⁶

The inconsistencies and ambiguities in Coen's projects were most keenly exposed in the previously mentioned marginal notes to the "Points for Regulating and Redressing." ¹⁹⁷ For was it not counter to all the earlier principles of monopoly to turn trade in the Spice Islands over to others just when all the foreigners had been driven out at enormous trouble and expense, and all shipping and trade made impossible for the natives? ¹⁹⁸

The author of the marginal notes was also of the opinion that it was only in Batavia that trade by free burghers was feasible at all, and then only on a very limited scale. He did not share Coen's expectations that the United Company would be able to meet its expenses out of the duties levied on the trade conducted by these private citizens. The free burghers were not of high enough quality for this, and there were too few of them. And how could they compete with the Asian merchants

who lived so much more soberly than they, whose navigating and selling expenses were so much smaller than their own, and who were, as natives of the country, far better acquainted with local conditions and commercial custom. The only way to make tolls show a good yield was to allow the Asians to trade freely and at the same time to introduce a moderate scale of duties, lower than those of other Asian trading places situated near at hand. The example of the port of Bantam as it was at the time of the Dutch arrival in Indonesia should convince Coen how important free barter-trade was to the prosperity of a town.¹⁹⁹ The more humane tenor of these marginal notes is primarily directed against Coen's policy of power and violence. Supposing that the free burghers could compete successfully against the natives, how were the latter to live? "Are they to be struck dead, or to be allowed to starve of hunger? That would not help us either, for there is no profit at all in an empty sea, empty countries and dead people."²⁰⁰ Nevertheless, the chief concern of this writer, too, was the maintenance of the United Company monopoly in the most valuable and profitable commodities, and therefore it was only in some products which were not included in the monopoly that the free burghers were to be allowed to do a certain amount of trade. At the same time, however, the implication was that the author of the marginal notes did not wish the Asian merchants to be allowed to trade in the monopoly products either. His choice of Bantam as an example was therefore not wholly fortunate.

None of Coen's adversaries could have abandoned the principle of United Company monopoly even if they had wanted to, and for them, therefore, it was really a question of defining the limits of the monopoly and the way in which it should be enforced. The criticism of Coen's plans uttered by a group of shareholders in 1625 was based on an even more narrowly monopolistic point of view. These men could only see the damage which free burgher trade would do to the United Company, and the lowering of dividends which would be the result. They were entirely disinterested in the whole question of native Asian trade.²⁰¹

In the years to come the subject of the free burghers cropped up repeatedly. But now even Coen became convinced of the flimsy moral fibre of these people.²⁰² In 1628 they were forbidden to sell cloths in the Moluccas, Amboina, Banda and Solor, which they had been temporarily allowed to do as a result of Coen's proposals in 1623.²⁰³ Evidently this prohibition order was made in 1628 with Coen's approval.²⁰⁴

The handful of ships that the free burghers had at their disposal shows how meagre was the actual volume of their trade. In 1625 they

had about six quite small ships, the maximum tonnage of which was given as some 120 ton, and two or three small junks.²⁰⁵ When rice was scarce they had some share in shipments of that product from Patani and Siam.²⁰⁶ They also carried on a more or less lucrative trade in cloths in Coromandel.²⁰⁷ The Gentlemen in Holland, however, did not feel at all inclined to allow them to increase their trade, and they found the activity in Coromandel particularly irksome.²⁰⁸ Letters from Governor General and Council also reveal some apprehension about the competition the free burghers were offering the Company, especially on the Coromandel coast.²⁰⁹ This competition was causing prices to rise and, moreover, the native authorities were making claims on the United Company for toll duties owed by the free burghers.²¹⁰ Yet the High Government in Batavia was more convinced than the Gentlemen in Holland that it was advisable for the free burghers to be allowed to do a certain amount of trade if they were not to be deprived of all means of subsistence. But the Gentlemen Seventeen, being of the opinion that the civilians already had far too much commercial freedom, promulgated regulations in 1631 which restricted civilian trade so drastically that Colenbrander has justifiably called them a parody of Coen's projects.²¹¹ The Coromandel coast ("the richest pastures, where the Company should be grazing") was completely forbidden to them.²¹² They were only allowed to trade in places where they could not inconvenience the United Company, namely, in Bengal and Further India, and in the Indonesian Archipelago on Solor and Macassar, and also, later on, on the eastern tip of Java in and around Balambangan. The letters of the Gentlemen Seventeen do not trouble to disguise their point of view. If the civilians in Batavia could not subsist without trade with Coromandel, then they must go, "for if one of the two must suffer, either the Company or the civilians, then it is much better that the civilians should make shift and suffer . . . let us be sensible about it for once and not employ any tender-hearted charity."²¹³ Henceforth the free burghers were only allowed to deal in cloths which they had bought from the United Company and could only ship them to places for which they had received permission from the United Company.²¹⁴

Nevertheless, in 1633, Governor General and Council, who were better acquainted with local conditions than the Gentlemen in the mother-country, wished to try once more to increase the scope of the free burghers' trade. They therefore suggested to the Gentlemen Seventeen that civilians should be allowed to make "double" voyages

from Batavia to Coromandel, calling on the return journey at places such as Bengal, Patani, Tenasserim, Ligor, Siam, Pegu and Achin to barter goods, primarily with a view to obtaining food supplies for Batavia.²¹⁵ At the same time they considered allowing the free burghers to do some trade with Formosa, since this might help to provide Batavia with sugar, porcelain, and other Chinese goods.²¹⁶ For, after all, fellow-Dutchmen could hardly be denied concessions which had already been granted to the Chinese residents of Batavia.

The High Government continued to promote marriage between free burghers and native women in the hope that the former would then be more inclined to settle in Asia for good. But whether the free burghers could successfully compete with the Asian traders was a question which the High Government certainly did not dare to answer in the affirmative. Of all the Asian traders, it was the Chinese, satisfied as they were with scanty profits, who most completely out-classed the Dutch in the art of holding their own as small tradesmen.²¹⁷ It cost the free burghers far more than the Asians to equip and man their ships and, moreover, they were obliged to purchase the goods which were destined for barter at very high prices from the United Company. It was only during a very brief period that they were allowed to go and collect the cloths from Coromandel themselves. Soon they were obliged to obtain them from the United Company exclusively, which considerably reduced their profits. They were also forbidden to sell the cloths where the demand was highest, namely on the Javanese coast, in the Lesser Sunda Islands, Brunei, Sambas, Sukadana, and Banjarmasin.²¹⁸

In his important memorandum of 1633 Philip Lucasz. gave a good deal of consideration to the problem of increasing Batavia's prosperity. He proposed that all residents, including Asians and free burghers, should be granted permission to trade, within certain limitations, throughout the whole of Asia. He made the proviso, however, that the spices should still be reserved for the Company and, in his view, the supplying of cloths and the Chinese trade ought also to be absolute monopolies of the United Company. The Company could sell these products to various traders in Batavia who could then resell them elsewhere.²¹⁹ This plan meant, therefore, that the United Company would have to surrender part of its inter-Asian trade. Parallel to these proposals were Philip Lucasz.'s suggestions that Asian traders should be attracted to Batavia from other regions in the hope that a staple market would come into existence there, a means "of

reviving the weak state of the Company as well as of the private citizens to a flourishing constitution." ²²⁰ But this purpose was impossible of achievement because Lucasz. proposed to permit the free burghers too little trade. He excluded the Moluccas, Amboina, Banda, Solor, Timor, Coromandel, Surat, Persia, Taiwan (Formosa), Japan, Siam, Jambi, and the west coast of Sumatra, that is to say, all the regions that exported the valuable products.²²¹ Bantam, Cheribon, Tegal, Japara, Jortan (Jaratan), Balambangan, Bali, Bima, Macassar, Johore, Pahang, Patani, Ligor, Sangora, Cambodia, Champa, Cochinchina, and Borneo were left open to the citizens of Batavia. They could sail in these areas under safe-conducts from the United Company, provided they took the products back to Batavia. For the sake of Batavia's food supplies, trade with the eastern tip of Java would have to be left entirely to the town's residents. They could take cloths there and bring back rice, meat, and other foodstuffs.²²² Traffic of this nature could take place twice every season and would ensure the citizens of Batavia of a lucrative industry. But a strict watch would have to be kept to prevent United Company servants from carrying on trade themselves under cover of the free burghers ²²³ – a danger that was by no means hypothetical. Lucasz. also exerted himself to obtain permission for the residents of Batavia to trade freely with Formosa if the United Company succeeded in gaining a foothold in China.²²⁴ The Chinese goods bought in Formosa could be taken, via Batavia, to Achin, the west coast of Sumatra, Bantam, the entire Javanese coast, Brunei, the Moluccas, Amboina, and Banda. These Chinese wares would replace the all too scarce *reals* as media of exchange for the spices.²²⁵ But trade with China and Japan was to be reserved exclusively for the United Company.²²⁶ Since the spices also remained a United Company monopoly and the free burghers had to have bartergoods in any case, Lucasz. suggested that they should buy cloths from the United Company in Batavia ²²⁷ as they were to be prevented in future from trading on the Coromandel coast and in Surat. But the Company would have to fix much lower purchase prices than the current ones if any profit was to be left over for the free burghers after tolls and freight had been deducted. Lucasz. was thinking primarily of Company interests when he advised the free burghers to sell those varieties of cloth that were most likely to perish quickly.

Lucasz. hoped that if the free burghers were given a larger measure of commercial freedom the foreign Asian traders would also come to Batavia and the toll duties would begin to realize considerable amounts.

This money could then be used to defray the abnormally high costs of the Company's settlement in Batavia and there might even be so much left over that return cargoes for Holland could be purchased with it.²²⁸

Lucasz. estimated, however, that to get free burgher trade off to a good start at least 6 or 8 good flutes of 120-400 tons' burden would be necessary.²²⁹ Further, he considered it advisable for the Dutch to work with the Chinese at first and to participate in their trade so as to benefit by their experience. He warned the Gentlemen Seventeen that unless they allowed the Dutch free burghers greater freedom, trade in Batavia would fall completely into the hands of the Chinese and other Asian traders. According to Lucasz., therefore, it was a question of favouring either the Dutch or the Asians, and he would prefer it to be the former.

Lucasz.'s proposals have been reproduced above in some detail because they present such a remarkable contrast with Coen's plans. Lucasz. was chiefly conscious of the importance of Batavia because at that time it was virtually the only one of the United Company settlements in the Indies where there was a free burgher community at all. Lucasz.'s plans were much better adapted than Coen's to the opportunities presented by the Asia of those days and to the Dutch human material with which the experiment had to be made.

But Lucasz.'s plans, moderate though they were, also encountered stiff opposition from the High Government. Governor General Brouwer, an upholder of the Company monopoly *à tort et à travers* (unlike his predecessor, Governor General Specx, who had hesitated to carry out the Seventeen's edict of 1631)²³⁰ wanted nothing to do with the free burghers and in order to get rid of them²³¹ he allowed them to return to Holland whenever possible, especially if they were married to Dutch women. The latter, apparently, had more difficulty in resigning themselves to a sober existence than the native women and they made their husbands discontented too, and tempted them to evade the Company monopoly. For that reason no more women were to be sent out from the Netherlands, with the exception of a few who were reserved for the highest officials of the United Company.²³² All hopes were now centred on the mixed marriages made by the free burghers.

The High Government used some remarkable arguments to defend its policy against the free burghers. For example, "the innate free nature of the Dutch would not tolerate such rigid limitation of activity and restricted conditions."²³³ The Asian nature was apparently more adaptable, for Chinese who settled in Batavia received very preferential

treatment.²³⁴ The latter – industrious, satisfied with small profits, and of an extremely modest way of life – would have to fill the vacuum caused by the lack of Dutch colonists. It was practically out of the question for Dutchmen to compete with these Chinese. After all, it was not in keeping with the Dutch character “to forage around in every hole and corner like the Chinese, and to see what profit can be done there.”²³⁵

And so the small number of free burghers in Batavia tried their luck by giving money in *commenda* to the Chinese, who used it for trading with the west coast of Sumatra, the Lesser Sunda Islands, the ports of Java, and Further India. The Chinese promised the suppliers of money profits of 30% to 50%, and proportionately larger ones could be made as trade increased.²³⁶ As far as possible the free burghers were kept concentrated in Batavia, since it was more difficult to control their behaviour in the Moluccas and Amboina and Banda, and they might therefore do damage to the United Company monopoly. In the Moluccas they worked chiefly as sutlers, and in that capacity, but that capacity alone, they were to be allowed to remain there, if necessary.²³⁷

In 1639 the Gentlemen Seventeen re-opened the question of the free burghers, for no effective decision had been taken after Coen's proposals had been made. Fearing that the United Company would be unable to continue its activities unless Dutch colonists settled in Asia, and that the small number of Dutchmen there would run the risk of being “swept off our feet by our enemies,”²³⁸ they decided to try another experiment.

The Gentlemen Seventeen still had before them the example of the Portuguese, who, in spite of the shortage of fresh supplies of manpower from the mother-country,²³⁹ had managed to hold their own in Asia for so long. This was entirely due to their colonists of mixed blood. The Directors asked for recommendations from the High Government so that a conclusive resolution could finally be passed on this point. Although both Governor General and Council were convinced of the necessity for Dutch colonization, they yet considered the objections to it too great, and deeply feared any encroachment upon the United Company monopoly.²⁴⁰ Moreover, because of all the expensive equipment they required it was impossible for private Dutch colonists to compete with Asian traders. The only positive suggestion made by the High Government in Batavia was difficult of realization. It consisted in sending out families that were “honest” but ill-provided with capital, who would be permitted to take money or goods with them on a

commission basis for wealthy Dutchmen who would not think of going to the Indies themselves. Important goods such as cloth, lead, amber and elephant tusks, however, had to be reserved for the United Company.²⁴¹ In Asia the colonists would have to comply absolutely with the regulations governing private trade, but they were to be granted the same latitude as the Asian traders in Batavia who sailed under United Company passes to Achin, Jambi, Palembang, the west coast of Sumatra, Timor, the Moluccas, Amboina, and Banda. We have already seen how little scope this latitude allowed.²⁴² The Dutch colonists would be allowed to sail to Macassar, Borneo, Cambodia, Siam, Patani, Johore, Perak, Kedah, Tenasserim, Arakan, and Bengal for foodstuffs and slaves to supply the needs of Batavia. The High Government also considered it very important for the Dutch colonists to participate in Chinese shipping and trade, although they advised against the establishment of colonies on Formosa.

For participation in the trade of the "Batavian" Chinese, however, capital was necessary. On money and goods supplied in *commenda* for voyages lasting 3 to 6 months, 30% to 70% profit could be made.²⁴³ Goods could also be purchased from the junks coming from China. If these goods were held in store for about 3 months, 20% to 30% profit could be made on them. Moreover, if a man had enough capital he could settle in Banda and buy nutmeg groves, while slaves were imported by the United Company. Dutch wives were still regarded as the greatest impediment to Dutch colonization, but it now appeared that in spite of the example of the Portuguese the mixed marriages were not such a success either: "it is certain the Portuguese can govern this land and people better than we," ²⁴⁴ and this held good for marital as well as political relations.

The Gentlemen Seventeen considered the advice of their Governor General and Council of little use, and they rejected altogether the idea of letting private persons participate in Asian trade by supplying money or goods indirectly to the free burghers.²⁴⁵ Once more, therefore, no effective decision was taken, and the Directors apparently resigned themselves to what they considered as a fact that life was too easy for the Dutch in their own country for them to move to distant tropical regions under the onerous conditions laid down by the United Company.²⁴⁶

X. THE UNITED COMPANY MONOPOLY AND THE FOREIGN ASIAN MERCHANTS IN INDONESIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 17TH CENTURY

None of the ports in the Malay-Indonesian area had been able to take over Malacca's rôle as a centre of trade once this town had lost some of its former attraction for the Asian merchants after its fall into Portuguese hands. To be sure, when the Dutch appeared on the scene, several of these trading places were still very busy. Achin, for example, where interest was focused on trade with western Asia, Bantam, which was principally a port of call for Chinese shipping, and the towns of northern Java with their increasingly important food exports and intermediary traffic in spices. Moreover, in the next few years Macassar also entered on a period of prosperity. Part of the Portuguese and Malay trade shifted there as a result of Dutch activity in the Malay Straits and the Spice Islands. We have seen how the Dutch attempted to obtain the monopoly in spices and how Asian traders were excluded from this area. Whatever the repercussions may have been elsewhere in the archipelago, the effect was clearly to be seen in the commercial town of Bantam.

When the Dutch first set foot ashore there they found an international market and a large number of merchants of many different nationalities, in fact, the commercial environment depicted so vividly by Van Leur, who based his description on the early Dutch accounts.¹ He was primarily interested in the social structure of this society and less in the part played by the various nationalities and the historical progress of Bantamese trade.

The situation as the Dutch found it upon their arrival was of short duration only, for very soon afterwards the western Asian merchants who, according to the Dutch accounts of the first voyage, were active in the commercial traffic of the Bantam market,² disappeared from the scene. At the same time, their visits to the towns of northern Java and the Spice Islands became much less frequent or even ceased altogether. This development was particularly marked in Bantam.

Yet although the western Asians had held quite a large share in

Bantamese trade, the significance of their rôle should not be overestimated, even for the period prior to 1600 and in spite of the fact that some of them managed to attain high positions in the state. In 1604 there were a few Indians among the top government officials, in fact the Dutch sources describe both the *shahbandar* and the admiral as Klings,³ and these men probably owed their position in the first place to cloth imports. The *shahbandar* came from Meliapur⁴ and had risen from nothing. When he "first arrived in Bantam he had nothing to live on, so that he busied himself with vile things to earn his living and after that started to deal in things of little value." Yet because he was "haughty and bold" he managed to achieve great prosperity.⁵ He stood high in the graces of the *chepate* (dipati?), the young king's governor, and because of this he obtained a share in the proceeds from the tolls. Moreover, he was allowed to sit on the king's council and although his vote carried little weight officially, this intelligent and experienced man of affairs rapidly gained considerable personal ascendancy, principally because of the indifference of the other members of the council, the Javanese nobles.⁶ The governor of Bantam made use of this Indian's services and allowed him to benefit from the privileges which he himself enjoyed, one of which in particular – the right of priority in purchase and sale – yielded large profits.⁷ By this regulation, the producers were forced to sell to the rulers at very low prices and the foreign merchants then had to buy from the governor and *shahbandar* at high prices. The difference thus disappeared into the pockets of those in authority. Yet these practises were not invariable, for we also come across mention of unrestricted purchase and sale.

The *shahbandar* was very ill-disposed towards the Dutch⁸ and did everything possible to thwart them. The Dutch interpreted this as favouritism towards the Gujarati, who were worth a great deal to Bantam because of the cloth they brought with them. For that reason the *shahbandar* probably preferred to guarantee that they, rather than the Dutch, should have pepper in exchange for cloths, more especially as the greater part of the pepper was already being carried off by the Chinese. This was in spite of the high prices offered by the Dutch, prices which the Gujarati either could not or would not pay.⁹ So we are shown this Indian exploiting his office in his own commercial interests but, for the rest, we are left completely in the dark about the nature and scope of his activities, even though he was one of the merchants established in Bantam and thus not representative of mobile western Asian traders.¹⁰

Rather more light is shed upon a Bantam wholesale dealer who did not owe his prosperity to public office and about whom the sources, by way of exception, do supply a few scanty details. This Sancho Moluco was not an Indian (as Van Leur thought)¹¹ but a half-blood, the son of a Spanish or Italian renegade.¹² We know that he did business on a fairly large scale. At any rate, he was in a position to supply the Dutch with 200 tons of pepper at a time, a quarter of their entire cargo.¹³ He did business from Bantam with other Javanese ports, and his name (Sancho) Chesi Moluco (i.e. Moluccan merchant) points to connections in the Spice Islands. His wealth (he had his own court in Bantam¹⁴ and visited the Dutch ships dressed in costly velvet) did not prevent him from embarking with his merchandise himself. The Dutch came across him with his junk in Grise.¹⁵ His visit to the court of Surabaya is proof of his economic importance in those parts. Yet it is clear how precarious the position was even of such a prosperous personage. Although he wanted to accompany the Dutch to Europe, he did not dare to do so because he feared that the ruler would have his goods seized on his departure.¹⁶

Most of the western Asian traders in Bantam, who might be either permanently or temporarily established there and some of whom had houses in the town,¹⁷ participated in the vast network of freight-traffic in the archipelago. Yet in spite of the share held by foreign traders, it was primarily the natives themselves who engaged in the traffic. This trade, with which we became very well acquainted when we were considering the early part of the 16th century,¹⁸ was conducted by the western Asians from other ports in the Indonesian Archipelago as well as from Bantam. Apart from goods reaching the Bantam market from outside Indonesia brisk inter-Indonesian traffic was carried on from Bantam as it had been from Sunda Kalapa in the old days. But the extent of this trade escapes us. Provisions were very important to Bantam, for it, too, was largely dependent for its food supplies on imports from abroad.¹⁹ This was probably due to the intensive pepper cultivation, which used up all the available ground and manpower and which, particularly after the coming of the northern Europeans, had to meet a steadily increasing demand. Cultivation must have been expanded to a considerable extent (for example, the ruler of Jacatra had new pepper estates laid out to the west of his town)²⁰ even taking into account the fact that supplies also came from neighbouring districts on Sumatra – supplies which were to decrease, however, once the Dutch started to purchase pepper there too.²¹

When the Dutch blockade of Bantam interfered with exports of pepper and imports of foodstuffs, the pepper estates became rice plantations once more.²² In fact some of the inhabitants even began to plant sugar instead of pepper, since sugar was a product which they could sell to the English factors in Bantam. But when the Dutch arrived in Bantam the food supply trade was still flourishing.

Some of the western Asians owned junks; for instance there was an Indian from Delhi established in Bantam who offered to take the Dutch in his ship to the Moluccas.²³ He was accustomed to trade there and, like a second Ibn Madjid, wanted to show later competitors the way (at a price of 200 *reals*).

Rice and salt were especially important food products that were purchased in the ports of northern Java for sale in Bantam and elsewhere. What Bantam did not need itself could be shipped to Malacca as long as that town was not blockaded by the Dutch. The food trade with the Portuguese was highly remunerative because no import duties were levied there on these products.²⁴

But the Portuguese were already buying foodstuffs in the market of Bantam itself. We have seen that some 6 or 8 Portuguese of either secular or ecclesiastical authority were established in Bantam.²⁵ Every year they used to send 4 junks to Malacca, each of some 40 tons' burden.²⁶ These ships (which might be sailing for the owners or under charter)²⁷ carried cargo which, apart from the valuable fine spices²⁸ and sandalwood, consisted largely of foodstuffs. In exchange, the Portuguese imported cloth into the country, cloth which, in 1617, was still of much better quality and far cheaper than that brought by the Dutch.²⁹

Although even the earliest Dutch reports describe the Chinese as the principal traders of Bantam – the buyers and shippers of pepper, which was the country's most important product³⁰ – western Asians also had a certain share in the pepper trade. Although an account from the first Dutch voyage seems to indicate that Peguans also sailed with one ship annually to Bantam roads (as they used to go to Malacca in former times),³¹ this is rather improbable since the Chinese were the only people who imported Peguan lac into Bantam.³²

Just before the time that the Chinese junks were expected to arrive, the western Asians used to buy up the pepper and other wares in Bantam and elsewhere so as to be able to obtain the Chinese wares brought by these junks.³³

Apparently the only western Asians to carry on direct shipping with

Bantam were the Gujarati, who brought cloth and took away pepper.³⁴ Unfortunately there is no indication at all of the extent of this trade. The other western Asians must have reached Bantam by indirect shipping routes. In addition to pepper and Chinese goods, the Gujarati also bought the finer kinds of spices.

In 1606 an inhabitant of the Banda Islands appeared in Bantam on a Javanese junk loaded with nutmeg and mace which he sold to the Gujarati.³⁵ But these finer kinds of spices largely disappeared from the Bantam market once the Dutch succeeded in gaining control of most of the spices in the production area.

A report dating from 1616 supplies a remarkable illustration of the close connection between trade in Bantam and the effectuation of the Dutch monopoly. The Gentlemen Seventeen were disturbed about the fact that nutmegs and mace were cheaper in Bantam than in Banda, a sign that things were not going too well for the Dutch in Banda and that matters would have to be attended to as soon as possible by preventing other people from trading there.³⁶

By the end of the 16th century, that is to say by the time the Dutch arrived on the scene, western Asian exports from Bantam must have already been smaller than the Chinese. In 1598 18,000 bags of pepper were shipped in 5 Chinese junks, as against 3,000 bags in a Gujarati ship. Nor did the Dutch manage to ship more than 9,000 bags.³⁷

Nevertheless, in 1616 there was still a Gujarati skipper in Bantam who maintained communications with a Moorish merchant in Japara.³⁸ This skipper must have been engaged in the previously mentioned freight-traffic on behalf of the Gujarati established in Bantam or travelling with their own merchandise. Probably the latter were mostly small-time traders for, according to the Dutch accounts, the actual suppliers of money and goods were to be found among the Malays and the Klings. The Gujarati were too poor for this and as a rule they just served as seamen³⁹ – a report that confirms what we already knew from other sources.⁴⁰

Bantam and other ports in Indonesia also attracted merchants in luxury articles such as precious stones and medicines. This trade was carried on particularly by "Persians," a term which probably served to describe other western Asians such as Turks and Armenians as well.⁴¹ According to the Dutch accounts, these Persians sometimes acquired great influence at the courts of the rulers.⁴² Among those who did not possess ships of their own but whose valuable merchandise gave them easy access to the necessary means, there must surely have been

suppliers of *commenda* as well. The use of the term "peddling merchants" to describe this category of persons does not seem very suitable.⁴³ Not only Persians but also merchants from the west coast of India sometimes managed to rise to high positions, for example, the Bantam *shahbandar* mentioned earlier, who did not, however, owe his position to traffic in luxury goods.⁴⁴

Two of the more important seaboard regents in the kingdom of Mataram, the *tumenggung* of Tegal and the governor of Japara, were not of Javanese origin, for the former was a Turk and the latter a Gujarati or a Persian.⁴⁵ Compared with the position in 15th century Malacca, sales by western Asians in Bantam must have been small, because by far the greater part of the western Asian merchant shipping visiting Indonesia went to Achin. In Bantam there was certainly not the exchange of goods between East and West that had formerly been a feature of the metropolis on the Malay Straits. Bantam owed most of its prosperity to Chinese purchases of its pepper and not to imports of Indian cloth, although large quantities of textiles were occasionally imported by Asian traders such as Malays and Japanese (the latter of whom traded from Portuguese Malacca) and also by Portuguese and Dutchmen.⁴⁶ At first the vast supplies of Asian cloth far surpassed those of the Dutch in quality and led to "flooding" of the market in Bantam.

In this respect an English view expressed in 1613 is significant: "For that if the trade at the Molucas be not supplied, I do not see, what profit can be made here [in Bantam], having trade in Guzerat and Coromandel, for this place will not vent the one half thereof, besides nothing to be had there but pepper and a most unhealthful country."⁴⁷

In 1614 there was no demand in Bantam for goods from Gujarat⁴⁸ and the Dutch were even forced to sell the Coromandel cloth at prices lower than they had paid themselves.⁴⁹ When, however, Asian and Portuguese supplies ceased coming because of Dutch activity and neither the sort nor the price of the cloths brought by the northern Europeans appealed to the Javanese, the latter began to weave their own cloth.⁵⁰ It can be seen that the Bantam market could only absorb a limited quantity of cloth. It was also far less important than the towns of northern Java as far as trade in the finer spices was concerned. The bulk of these soon disappeared from the Bantam market because of Dutch action in the Spice Islands.⁵¹ This was particularly true of nutmeg and mace. The Dutch were unable to cut off supplies of cloves completely, but most of the cloves which managed to evade the United Company monopoly went not to Bantam but to Macassar.

The Chinese were better able to stand up to the Europeans than the western Asians, chiefly because they were so firmly entrenched in the intermediary trade, both that in pepper and that in cloth.

Every year, as in other ports of south-east Asia, the Chinese junks arrived in Bantam, bringing their merchandise to be bartered for pepper. The figures for the number of junks that appeared in Bantam annually vary somewhat. According to the Dutch reports from the first voyage, 8 to 10 quite small junks came to Bantam each year. They had a maximum of 50 tons' burden and their hulls tapered off sharply below decks so that they did not have much cargo-space.⁵² Another report from the first voyage, however, mentions the annual arrival of 5 to 8 junks of 80 to 100 tons' burden.⁵³ The Frenchman Pyrard speaks of some 9 or 10 large junks,⁵⁴ while the Englishman Jourdain announced the arrival of 4 junks in 1614. According to the latter, 3 to 6 ships were normally expected, but these might have a tonnage of approximately 300 tons.⁵⁵ Jourdain's fellow-countryman, Saris, who was very well informed as a rule, reported the arrival of 3 or 4 junks in 1613.⁵⁶ This seems to have been the most usual figure and is also the one quoted by Coen in his letters, with the exception of the year 1614 when no fewer than 6 Chinese junks arrived in Bantam with a cargo worth no less than 300,000 *reals*.⁵⁷

Evidently the arrival of the Dutch and the English in Bantam and the demand they created for Chinese products had a stimulating effect upon supply. Bigger ships showed up and their combined tonnage was more than that of the greater number of much smaller ships which had come in previous years. Moreover, larger quantities of the more valuable kinds of merchandise such as silk were landed.⁵⁸

The increased supplies and improved quality of the goods aroused high hopes among the Dutch,⁵⁹ although further expansion of the Bantam trade could well be impeded by the fact that their financial means were small in comparison with those of the Spanish in the Philippines.

In Bantam, too, the Chinese trade was accompanied by fairly heavy immigration.⁶⁰ There was a large Chinese colony there and Thomas Best reported that no fewer than 300 Chinese died while an English ship was being caulked in the port.⁶¹ These were obviously the victims of an epidemic, yet it goes to show how many Chinese there were in the town. They lived in a separate district surrounded by palisades, and the richer among them had fine houses built of stone⁶² (at the time, a recent concession).⁶³ They used to purchase the pepper from the growers and

then resell it to their compatriots from the mother-country when the Chinese junks arrived in Bantam. In February and March, when the rains made the rivers navigable, the producers used to come down to the coast themselves in their pepper proas,⁶⁴ and so that the inhabitants of the Chinese district might be nearer the routes along which pepper was brought from the interior and might thus exercise pre-emption without leaving their own locality, the whole quarter was actually moved to a more southerly part of Bantam.⁶⁵ How important it was to be the first to get hold of the pepper can be seen from a Dutch report which states that the price of this product had doubled by the time the Chinese junks arrived.⁶⁶ Nor did the producers remain unaware of this fact, so that in years when the harvest was smaller than usual they held up supplies in order to obtain a better price. But then, before the rains broke the Chinese would trek inland to purchase the pepper, even though the quantities they bought were small, usually no more than one man could carry at a time, in view of the bad condition or even total absence of roads.⁶⁷ But the vast profits, which amounted to as much as 400%, made it worthwhile. The fact that there were so many buyers meant that a large quantity could be gathered together in a short time.⁶⁸ Besides pepper, the Chinese also exported sandalwood, fine spices such as nutmeg and cloves, tortoise-shell and elephant tusks from Bantam. To Bantam they brought raw and woven silk, silk thread, fine and heavy quality porcelain, musk and other drugs, and vast quantities of cash (the small copper coins).⁶⁹ It is worth noting that they also imported small-arms made of copper.⁷⁰ Thanks to the Europeans, they were able to export *reals* of eight as well. In fact their desire for European money was probably the main reason why they increased their shipments after the coming of the northern Europeans. Their export of *reals* from Bantam caused a shortage of these coins in the town, which indicates that the Dutch and the English did not have enough barter commodities to obtain the Chinese goods, particularly the silk and porcelain.⁷¹ At the same time it shows that Chinese imports to Bantam were on a very big scale when, besides large cargoes of pepper, costly sandalwood, ivory, tortoise-shell, etc., the merchants were able to take stocks of *reals* back to China as well.

The intermediary trade in these import and export goods was largely in the hands of the Chinese established in Bantam.⁷² Dutch accounts report that they even employed slaves to collect their products (notably pepper, but also rice) and that they apparently sent slaves on trading voyages in the archipelago as well,⁷³ sometimes in their own junks and sometimes in vessels belonging to others.

In their attempts to gain control of the Bantam pepper the Dutch encountered stiff opposition from both the government of Bantam and most of the Chinese community. The Chinese wholesale merchants established in the town were very influential. The ruler chose some of his advisers from among them and their prestige increased as the economy of Bantam became more and more dependent upon them. In 1614 the ruler's council contained as many Chinese as Klings.⁷⁴ But soon it was with the help of Chinese alone that the powerful regent Aria Rana di Manggala, who had acted for the king since 1608, attempted to thwart the Dutch.⁷⁵ The Chinese occupied official positions as well and the administration of Bantam was largely in their hands. Four of the six writers who kept the king's accounts were Chinese,⁷⁶ and there were also Chinese brokers,⁷⁷ interpreters, and weighers.⁷⁸ Yet the fact that the Chinese were afraid that upon their death their goods would revert to the king shows how insecure their social position was in spite of all this. This was why they used to send their most valuable possessions to China whenever there was an opportunity for shipping them.⁷⁹

Pepper exports were extremely important to Bantam. The quantities exported varied from year to year⁸⁰ but this was due more to the size of the crop in the interior than to any difference in the quantities arriving from other pepper areas.⁸¹ The documents speak of a periodic alternation of large and small harvests, which is clearly a reference to domestic cultivation. When there was very little pepper obtainable in 1616 although it was the wrong year for a small harvest, the Dutch blamed this on the fact that the growers were holding back the pepper in the hills so that they could get the best price possible.⁸²

Although the Dutch and the English were soon buying up a large part of the pepper crop, the Bantam government were not keen to lose the custom of the Chinese, who were the oldest purchasers of their pepper. They therefore prevented the Dutch from buying too much, so that there would be enough left over for the Chinese.⁸³ The Dutch also paid higher export duties than the Chinese (8% as compared to 5%) although the latter did have to make a gift of porcelain on top of paying duties.

The rulers of Bantam derived large incomes from tolls which included not only import and export duties but anchorage dues and the like. Settlement was by payment of a lump sum per ship,⁸⁴ two thirds of which went to the king and the rest to the *shahbandar*.⁸⁵ Export duties were not only levied on pepper but on other products as well,

such as silk, sandalwood and elephant tusks. Products which did not actually grow in Bantam itself were taxed more heavily than pepper.⁸⁶ The Dutch had to pay import duties of 3% on cloths.⁸⁷ It was a toll system which had something in common with that of Malacca. In 1607 the Bantam government suddenly doubled the 8% toll duty. The reason they gave for this was the big fall in pepper prices (from 4 *reals* to 2) and they pointed out that there was an agreement with the Dutch by the terms of which the size of the toll of 8% had been fixed on the basis of a standard price of 4 *reals* per bag.⁸⁸ This, it was pointed out, pre-supposed a price stability which did not really exist.

Although the Bantam government sometimes took steps to control prices,⁸⁹ this was not – as the Dutch tried to make out – its regular policy. The pattern revealed by the documents is rather that of commercial traffic controlled by supply and demand, with other factors (such as depreciation of the coinage, for example) also having an effect upon the rise and fall of prices. After 1599, prices rose quite steeply in rather a short space of time. The Dutch, who became very agitated about this unexpected inflation (“this people showed itself so false and unashamed, as fickle as the winds which in those parts change direction two or three times a day.”)⁹⁰ blamed the increase upon a Gujarati who had been in Europe and knew the high price at which pepper was sold there.⁹¹ But while they were not unaware of what the consequences of their own competition with one another must be, they cannot have been entirely ignorant of yet another reason for the rise in prices, namely the vast quantity of *reals* which their own purchases had put into circulation in Bantam.⁹² For these *reals*, which stood at 12,000 cash when the Dutch arrived, soon dropped in value to less than 6,000 cash,⁹³ and an increase in the price of all products was the inevitable result.

If we trace the course of pepper prices over a period of years, for instance from 1599 to 1621 (as far as the sources mention them, at least),⁹⁴ we see that prices kept rising until 1603, after which a movement in the opposite direction set in and the level of prices dropped steadily. This may have been because competition between the various Dutch companies ceased with the foundation of the United Company, but higher production and increased supplies may also have had an effect. Moreover the stocks of *reals* may have become smaller because pepper was being increasingly bartered for cloth, which yielded much higher profits (the figure of 80% is mentioned in this connection).

As we have already seen, the Bantam government wanted to take

the fall in pepper prices into account when fixing toll duties in 1608. This provided grounds for conflict, and the position was to become even more strained in the next few years with the Dutch trying to obtain the pepper monopoly at a price fixed by themselves and the Bantam government, on the other hand, wanting to revert to the old prices for pepper, on the basis of which they had levied their tolls. Unlike the English, who considered the motives of the Bantam rulers in the matter of the duties very reasonable ⁹⁵ (although they, too, complained about them),⁹⁶ the Dutch could see nothing in them but extortion and corruption, and felt that they had been taken in.

When the price level for pepper had dropped very low in Bantam, the northern Europeans tried to impose the same level on other pepper ports as well. But this could only be achieved by unanimous action. In 1603 Spilbergen came to an agreement with the English to buy pepper in the Sumatran ports of Achin and Priaman ⁹⁷ (where the price was higher than in Bantam) only at the price they were paying in Bantam.⁹⁸ But cooperation of this sort between the Dutch and the English was exceptional. As a rule their rivalry caused prices to rise immoderately and each in turn complained bitterly when the arrival of ships belonging to the other country brought about a price increase.⁹⁹

As we mentioned in passing, the rulers of Bantam sometimes interfered with the free action of the sources of supply and demand. In order to be able to meet the foreigners' demand for large parcels of pepper at a time,¹⁰⁰ the governor exercised a right of pre-emption. He purchased the pepper at low prices from the producers and then built up large stocks of it, which he sold to the Dutch at high prices. The Dutch felt that they were being victimized. But their moral indignation was not unmixed with envy: "that these people earned much money without expecting any risk of loss, also without taking any trouble . . . that they not only cheat the Christians, but also those over whom they are appointed in authority, whom they should rescue from deceit with a fatherly love." ¹⁰¹

The early Dutch sources do not make it clear whether the ruler of Bantam and his officials owned pepper estates themselves and thus had their own stocks of pepper. A passage from one of the journals of the first voyage could be taken to mean that nobles living in the town did own estates which were worked by their "slaves" (?) and that the products of these – including pepper, apparently – were transported to the town.¹⁰² This might account for the opposition put up by the nobles when the regent prohibited deliveries of pepper to the Dutch.

The sources have practically nothing to say about any further commercial activity by the Bantam nobility,¹⁰³ and this fits in with the indifference they displayed in the royal council when commercial affairs were under discussion.¹⁰⁴ It hardly seems probable, therefore, that the nobility dominated the commercial traffic of Bantam, as Van Leur would have us believe.¹⁰⁵ This might more readily be said of the traders from abroad.

The regent of Bantam was well aware where the interests of his town lay, and although the large-scale purchases of pepper by the Dutch advanced prosperity, their attempts to obtain the monopoly certainly represented a threat to Bantam's independence. The regent, or *pangeran* as he is called in United Company sources, tried in every way to prevent the Dutch from dominating trade in Bantam.¹⁰⁶ In this he could count on the support of most of the Chinese intermediary traders established in the town, for it was in their interests, too, to obtain the highest possible prices for pepper. Their slender capital resources, however, made them dependent upon the Dutch and the English, who supplied them with money on credit whenever large parcels of pepper had to be purchased. In this way the Dutch and the English were able to get their hands on practically all the pepper at prices fixed by themselves. The attempts of the Chinese intermediary traders to back out of this arrangement and to sell the pepper to the highest bidder led to violation of delivery contracts.¹⁰⁷ Thus here, as well as in the Spice Islands, the Dutch were faced with the difficulty of securing the observance of delivery contracts by a community whose traditions were completely different from their own.

Yet the Chinese did not all take the same line, and one of the most prosperous of them, a man called Sim Suan, chose to cooperate with the Dutch.¹⁰⁸ Unlike his fellow-countryman Lim Lakko, who was one of the most prominent of the regent's advisers, this man possessed no political influence.¹⁰⁹ As early as 1614 he concluded profitable commercial transactions with the United Company, who sold him cloth and sandalwood while he supplied the Company with pepper and rented his junks and warehouses to the Dutch.¹¹⁰ He even advised the Dutch to establish a rendezvous on an island in the Sunda Straits,¹¹¹ in effect, to create a rival port of Bantam. Sim Suan's advice fitted in well with Coen's plans, for the latter soon transferred the main centre of the United Company's activities from Bantam to Jacatra. In his letters Coen forestalled any possible objections on the part of his superiors, employing Sim Suan's argument that the people of Bantam would not

call in Portuguese or Spanish help if the Dutch built a fort in the immediate vicinity, because they hated the Iberians too much to do that.¹¹²

Sim Suan's relations with the Dutch did not escape the attention of the Bantam government. When he sent his junk and crew to Jambi to get pepper for the Dutch (which meant that they would be less dependent upon the regent),¹¹³ he was taken prisoner by the authorities in Bantam and put in irons.¹¹⁴ His house, in which the United Company was storing a large parcel of goods, was seized, and his wife and children were also deprived of their liberty. To be sure, he was released again after a couple of months, but from that time on his position was very precarious. In the meantime, moreover, he had run into debt with the Dutch, who had supplied him with large sums of money for deliveries of pepper. When the pepper was not forthcoming the Dutch threatened to recover their losses from junks carrying merchandise from China.¹¹⁵ Yet the connection with Sim Suan remained, and in 1617 he once more lent his junk to the Dutch for use in obtaining Sumatran pepper.¹¹⁶

The other Chinese intermediary traders in Bantam had to deal with Sim Suan before they could take joint action against the Dutch. They therefore excluded him from their agreement not to buy cloth from the United Company except at prices which they had fixed themselves,¹¹⁷ and hoped that the large debt which Sim Suan still owed the United Company would prevent the latter from concluding a new contract with him. But their unanimity did not last long when the Dutch let Sim Suan have cloth after all, and they all rushed to get their hands on some of the cloths too.¹¹⁸ The Dutch were not the sole importers of cloth, however, and large shipments from Portuguese Malacca by Englishmen, Malays and Javanese caused textile prices to fall.¹¹⁹ The United Company did not only try to prevent its competitors from importing cloth into Bantam but into places like Achin as well,¹²⁰ where they could also barter cloths for pepper.

In Bantam, however, the greatest losses were suffered by Sim Suan, who could no longer dispose of his expensively purchased cloth at high prices. Yet this did not shake his loyalty to the United Company, though it must be admitted that, suspect as he was in the eyes of the Bantam government, there was little he could do but remain faithful to the Company.

More and more obstacles were placed in the way of United Company trade in Bantam. The toll duties were increased and duties were introduced on goods which had previously been duty free.¹²¹

In 1616, a year when the pepper harvest was a small one (about 50,000 bags) the Chinese intermediary traders began to force up prices¹²² although these had dropped to $1\frac{1}{2}$ *reals* a bag¹²³ in spite of the small harvest. To the indignation of the English and the Dutch, the Chinese used the money which they had received from them on delivery contracts to buy up all the pepper in the vicinity at increasingly high prices and then declared themselves unable to part with it again at the low price which had been agreed upon. While the Dutch protested, the English were prepared to buy the pepper at the higher price of $3\frac{1}{2}$ *reals* per bag,¹²⁴ even though they too complained about these Chinese practices¹²⁵ and about the impossibility of obtaining justice from the Bantam government.¹²⁶ The Dutch could get no one to listen¹²⁷ to their complaints about these price increases or to their other grievances about trickery in connection with the weighing and delivery of the parcels of pepper.¹²⁸ They suspected the Bantam government of complicity,¹²⁹ and they were probably right, especially as Lim Lakko, a member of the *pangeran's* council, was one of the driving forces behind the conspiracy.

If in 1616 they were still in some doubt as to whether the regent himself was involved in the game the Chinese were playing, a year later his policy became perfectly clear. The conflict which he had with the Dutch about the size of the toll duties made him readier than ever to try to raise the level of prices.¹³⁰ The *pangeran* prohibited sales of pepper or purchases of cloth before he himself had fixed the price.¹³¹ He knew how much the pepper was worth in Further India and China,¹³² and was determined not to be dependent upon the Dutch. Prohibitions against reweighing and against giving credit in respect of deliveries of pepper, and the granting of permission to only 2 or 3 persons to sell pepper to the Dutch, and then only in small parcels at a time,¹³³ were measures aimed at preventing the Dutch from making deliveries of pepper on too large a scale and thus acquiring the monopoly. The Dutch considered the measures to be sheer chicanery and they accused their opponents of trying to obtain a monopoly, forgetting that their own commercial policy was in no way different. Coen, in particular, had the worst possible opinion of the regent and his council. He would have preferred the *pangeran* to be "pushed out of his usurped authority" and the king, who had meanwhile attained his majority, to be restored to power.¹³⁴ The Bantam government not only feared the economic superiority of the Dutch, they had all sorts of other grievances as well. They could not endure the constant disputes between the Dutch

and the English which sometimes led to serious disturbances in the town and, above all, they could not tolerate the high-handed removal of goods by the Dutch from a French ship in the Bantam roads and later the actual seizure of a French ship, a proceeding which was an encroachment upon the sovereignty of the king of Bantam.

By making gifts to the *shahbandar* and the writer, the Dutch tried to obtain a right of pre-emption, but they were not granted this any more than the monopoly.¹³⁵ It seemed, therefore, as if they would have to comply with the wishes of the Bantam government.¹³⁶ But then Coen started seizing junks departing for China with cargoes of pepper. The *nakodas* were made to hand over their cargoes at the low price (2 *reals* a bag) fixed by the United Company,¹³⁷ whereas the Chinese themselves had been obliged to purchase the pepper at 5 *reals* a bag.¹³⁸ Coen justified this proceeding by the United Company's claims on the Chinese intermediary traders of Bantam who had delivered the pepper to their fellow-countrymen.¹³⁹ The Dutch had already put one Chinese intermediary trader in Bantam in prison for the same reason. In that particular case it was really not so much a question of the claim they had upon him (as the Dutch documents try to make out) as of injuring the English pepper trade, since Kewee, the Chinaman concerned, was the principal merchant of the English.¹⁴⁰ Apparently the big debts owed by the Chinese were also connected with Anglo-Dutch competition. In order to damage English cloth shipments the Dutch had dumped large stocks of cloths on the market at half the normal price, and the Chinese had snapped them up. But it was not possible to find buyers in Bantam for such huge quantities.¹⁴¹ The result was fatal. The Chinese could no longer buy up enough pepper and what they did buy they preferred to sell at high prices to the "Chinese" Chinese rather than to the Dutch, who hoped to make up for their losses on the dumped cloths by paying low prices for pepper.

That Coen was perfectly aware of the illegality of removing pepper from the Chinese junks is obvious from his order that the operation was to be carried out as quietly as possible and that no one was to know that it was taking place at his command.¹⁴² In the event, the people who executed his orders interpreted them pretty broadly, for a Siamese junk en route to Jambi also fell victim to them.¹⁴³ The ostensible motive of obtaining compensation for pepper which had not been delivered in return for money advanced receded into the background, for a similar order about seizing Chinese ships and relieving them of pepper was also sent to Jambi and to the Bay of Patani. To

this end, some United Company ships were to cruise off Bangka in order to intercept Chinese junks coming from Jambi.¹⁴⁴ According to Coen this was a justifiable measure because the Chinese who went to Jambi came from the same region as those who called at Bantam. They must recover their losses from their compatriots, the chartering agents in China who also chartered ships to Bantam.¹⁴⁵ The real goal is now only too obvious, namely the acquisition of sufficient stocks of pepper bought at low prices "so as not to be forced to dance to the tune that is piped in Bantam." ¹⁴⁶

In the Netherlands, people disagreed strongly with Coen's policy, and it was sharply censured by the Gentlemen Seventeen.¹⁴⁷ They considered his actions in respect of the Chinese "very harsh and beyond all the limits of justice, [actions] which not in that land alone but also even here might cause disturbances and scandal among the participants and any others to whose ears it might happen to come." Above all, they were afraid that because of his actions "disturbances might arise among the neighbouring kings." For that reason they insisted that in future Coen would have to "make do with decent, legal means which were not subject to scandal." ¹⁴⁸ This exhortation had so little effect, however, that in 1619 Coen removed not only pepper from the junks but also the Chinese themselves. He wanted these people to populate his new settlement in Jacatra.¹⁴⁹ Yet this time the Gentlemen had been right. The seizures and the embargo led to large-scale disturbances in Bantam because of the determination of the "Chinese" Chinese to recover their losses from the Chinese debtors of the United Company who were established in Bantam.¹⁵⁰ There were turbulent sessions of the *pangeran* and his council in which the faint-hearted (who were to be found among the Javanese nobility apparently) kept out of the conflicts between the Dutch and the Chinese lest they should lose the Dutch as customers for the pepper.¹⁵¹ The latter tried to win over the nobles by means of gifts, thus "displaying the justice of our cause." Yet at first, in spite of the opposition of a section of his council the *pangeran* managed to carry his policy through. In order to prevent any more disturbances, he forbade Europeans to advance money against future deliveries of pepper.¹⁵² Henceforth pepper could only be purchased via the Bantam government. This "occasional trade" of the Bantam rulers theretore had a very special background. When the Dutch refused to let the Chinese junks embark freely, the *pangeran* ruled that no deliveries of pepper were to be made to them at all.¹⁵³

Since 1611 the Dutch had also had a lodge in neighbouring Jacatra.

Coen, who spent a great deal of his time there although the main factory was still in Bantam, now wanted a complete transfer to be made. The Dutch hoped to be able to exert more influence upon the ruler of this place (who was dependent upon Bantam but no friend of its regent) than upon the ruler of Bantam. The events that took place there, the conflicts with the English, the conquest of the town at the king of Jacatra's expense, the open warfare with Bantam (which regarded Jacatra as a feudal benefice),¹⁵⁴ warfare which resulted in a blockade of Bantam that lasted for years, all these facts are too widely known to be repeated here.¹⁵⁵ "New Malacca" was the name which the old king of Cheribon gave to the new Dutch fort,¹⁵⁶ a name bearing witness to his great insight into the dangers which this settlement represented for its Asian environment.

Because of their naval superiority the Dutch were able to cut Bantam off from all contact with the outside world. Moreover, the treaty concluded between the Dutch and the English companies in 1619 called for joint action against Bantam, and this immediately manifested itself in a lowering of the price level of pepper. The *pangeran* had had little pleasure out of the English either, for in 1618 they had started to employ the same methods as the Dutch in respect of the Chinese junks.¹⁵⁷

In the years 1620 and 1621 pepper prices in Bantam fell catastrophically to $7\frac{1}{2}$ and 5 *reals* per 10 bags.¹⁵⁸ By 1623 the same quantity was worth only 3 *reals*, while in the hills not more than 12 *reals* were being paid per 100 bags.¹⁵⁹ The blockade proved fatal to Bantam and trade there came to an absolute standstill. In 1620 Coen could triumphantly report that Bantam had utterly lost the staple of Indonesian trade: "Bantam is ruined and Jacatra will flourish."¹⁶⁰ Because so much pepper was being grown elsewhere, Coen hoped to be able to do without Bantam pepper.¹⁶¹ The Dutch and the English did offer peace terms to the regent. But once again their main demand was that the Dutch and the English jointly should have the sole right to buy pepper – at a price fixed by themselves. It was then decided not to give more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 *reals* per bag and, moreover, to enforce the reduction or abolition of the high duties.¹⁶² The trade of the Chinese was also to be restricted, since they were only to be allowed to make purchases after the English and the Dutch had taken what they wanted, and they were not to be allowed to resell what they had bought to other European nations.¹⁶³

The *pangeran* did not concede these demands but, fortunately for

him, the unanimity of the Dutch and the English in Bantam left everything to be desired and the English refused to take part in the blockade. This meant that Bantam still had some prospects of trade and it made use of its opportunities as soon as the tension dropped a bit.

The *pangeran* had forbidden all exports of pepper, so that large stocks of this product were decaying.¹⁶⁴ As long as the *pangeran* remained in power this prohibition on the sale of pepper was strictly enforced. Hardly any Bantam pepper reached Batavia, even by smuggling, although pepper was worth 6 *reals* a bag there and still only $\frac{1}{2}$ a *real* in Bantam.¹⁶⁵ The blockade also interfered badly with Bantam's food supplies. For that reason land was distributed for the cultivation of rice.¹⁶⁶

The rapid deterioration of its trade ¹⁶⁷ meant that Bantam lost much of its attraction for Chinese traders, too, who were also afraid that their junks might be seized by the Dutch. The Chinese intermediary traders, who could no longer collect their debts in Bantam, had got into great difficulties. Since they could see no prospects of further trade in Bantam, many of them left the port and transferred their business to the new settlement of Batavia.¹⁶⁸ The *pangeran* tried to prevent their departure and even compelled them to build new houses.¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, many Chinese still managed to escape from Bantam to Batavia.

The United Company's faithful ally, Sim Suan, who had actually sought protection in 1618 in a Dutch ship (in which he was nominally imprisoned for debt) ¹⁷⁰ did not, as yet, leave Bantam for good. In the years 1626 to 1628, after the abdication of the regent, he mediated in peace negotiations between the Bantam government and the United Company.¹⁷¹ During these years he constantly pressed for an agreement and, what with its declining trade and the risk of attack from Mataram, Bantam was readier than ever to entertain the idea. But the United Company, whom the war had liberated from a troublesome competitor, was much less interested, even though the blockade meant an extra burden on its naval forces.¹⁷² On the other hand, it would benefit the United Company little to take Bantam by force. The Dutch could not even get the pepper down from the hills by itself, so that even if the town were in its hands it would still be dependent upon the Chinese intermediary traders.¹⁷³

Sim Suan must have died between 1628 and 1631. Lim Lakko, who, as one of the *pangeran*'s advisers had continually opposed the United Company, had come to Batavia as early as 1622, utterly down and

out.¹⁷⁴ But in that town he rapidly regained his prosperity and by 1628 had a junk trading in Formosa.¹⁷⁵ He, too, was employed (but in this case by the United Company) as an arbitrator in the peace negotiations with the government of Bantam.

Only when the regent's influence had diminished and the prohibitions against the sale of pepper to the Dutch were being less rigidly observed than before ¹⁷⁶ did it again become possible for the Chinese in Bantam to send pepper overland to Batavia. In order to arrest Chinese emigration to Batavia, the king, who had apparently obtained rather more personal authority by that time, had granted the Chinese permission to sail to Batavia as early as 1623.¹⁷⁷ To revive trade, an attempt was even made to send a few proas and other larger vessels loaded with pepper to Malacca and Siam. They were convoyed by some heavily-manned and well-armed war proas until they were out of danger from the Dutch occupation fleet.¹⁷⁸

The extent to which pepper cultivation had decreased in Bantam is revealed by the returns for 1629. In that year the entire crop was said to amount to only 7,000 to 8,000 bags.¹⁷⁹

The town was still not completely isolated from the outside world, however. The Dutch blockade could prevent large junks from entering the port but small ships frequently escaped their attention.¹⁸⁰ This must have been why cloves were actually still sold in Bantam. Once again the trade was in the hands of Chinese merchants ¹⁸¹ but, at the same time, the king had a large share in it too.¹⁸² The cloves were offered for sale to the United Company ¹⁸³ and in 1632 we also see the Company obtaining pepper again from the Bantam Chinese.¹⁸⁴ The war, which lasted until 1645, was interrupted by truces which, however, were only of short duration. But even in 1634, when war had again broken out between the United Company and Bantam the Batavian Chinese continued trading with Bantam. This they were permitted to do on payment of a certain sum of money to one of the Bantam officials.¹⁸⁵

Yet, in spite of this, in 1634 Bantam was only a shadow of its former powerful self.¹⁸⁶ It was only because the English and the Dutch were on bad terms with each other that there was still some freedom of movement in the port. Nothing had come of the Anglo-Dutch blockade because the English had withdrawn from it although they complained that Batavian Chinese were fetching pepper from Bantam.¹⁸⁷ Soon, negotiations were taking place between the Bantam government and the English, and in 1627 the latter were again permitted to establish a

lodge in Bantam.¹⁸⁸ The small quantity of pepper that was still being collected now fell largely into the hands of the English factors. The price of pepper rose to 3 *reals* a bag¹⁸⁹ and higher duties were once more imposed on the pepper which the Batavian Chinese exported from Bantam.¹⁹⁰ After the English settled in Bantam, exports of pepper to Batavia stopped altogether for a time, until, in the thirties, thanks to the efforts of Chinese merchants in Bantam and Batavia, some pepper once more began to arrive in Batavia.¹⁹¹ The population of Bantam, formerly so "opulent and prodigal in its daily clothing now made a very impoverished and desolate" impression.¹⁹² The people busied themselves largely with fishing and growing food crops. Supplies of cloth were greatly reduced, and the natives had begun to do their own weaving. Additional supplies came from Englishmen and Danes, and were paid for with money obtained by selling food products to Batavia, which particularly needed extra food supplies when, as periodically happened, Mataram prohibited food exports to this town. There was an especially large consumer market for fish in Batavia, which meant that a lot of money left the town and made its way to Bantam.¹⁹³ In the latter town, moreover, a start was made with sugar refining. This was a new process, the art of which had now been mastered in Bantam, too.¹⁹⁴ The sugar was brought from China and, after refining, was purchased by both the English and the United Company.¹⁹⁵ It may be assumed that in Bantam, as in Batavia, it was mostly the Chinese who engaged in sugar refining. This inspired the United Company to encourage the Chinese in Batavia to cultivate and refine sugar.¹⁹⁶ The temporary revival of the Bantam pepper trade with English help in the seventies of the 17th century, is outside the scope of this study.

Until the arrival of the Dutch, the most important pepper port for the Chinese was undoubtedly Bantam. But they could also get pepper in Jambi, Palembang, and other places on the east coast of Sumatra, where prices were even lower than in Bantam. It is possible that the growing Chinese demand in Jambi was connected with the increasing competition of the northern Europeans in Bantam. We have seen how Jambi developed into an important pepper port, visited not only by Chinese junks but also by ships from Siam, Patani, Java, and Malacca.¹⁹⁷ In 1616 three Chinese junks called there, and although it had not been an abundant harvest that year, they were able to load 11,000 bags of pepper.¹⁹⁸ The Dutch calculated that when there was a good harvest it would be possible to obtain some 1,200 tons (= 25,000 to

30,000 bags) of pepper.¹⁹⁹ A couple of years later, a Chinese junk loaded 160 tons (= 2,000 *pikol* = 4,000 bags). In 1623 the Minangkabau pepper harvest, which was exported via Jambi, amounted to 50,000 bags,²⁰⁰ while in 1634 Philip Lucasz. estimated the yield at 36,000 to 40,000 bags.²⁰¹ The Chinese promised that if the king did not impose any export duties on pepper they would bring 6 or 7 junks to Jambi, which would mean that they would purchase practically the entire pepper crop of the country. As an added attraction they offered to bring over some Chinese who knew how to found guns.²⁰² The Dutch who, like the English, had had a lodge in Jambi since 1615,²⁰³ watched this Chinese competition enviously "since for long enough we have been shearing the pigs and others [the Chinese in this case] the sheep."²⁰⁴

In Jambi, too, the intermediary trade in pepper was almost entirely in Chinese hands. The country was governed by a king but the structure of the state was that of a community of nobles owning appanages in the interior and with people dependent upon them. No one who did not fit into this pattern had any rights at all. When a tenant who was not under the protection of one of the nobles died, his goods were seized by the king – an arrangement which was not conducive to the formation of a merchant class. There were, in fact, practically no merchants of native origin.²⁰⁵ Both the king and the Chinese merchants complained about the thieving tendencies of the population, which is hardly indicative of general prosperity.²⁰⁶

The pepper growers, hill-folk from Minangkabau, who were not under the sovereignty of the king of Jambi, were accustomed to come down to the coast with their proas laden with pepper. Usually about a 100 to 150 of these small ships appeared annually, each carrying a load of some 150 *pikol*.²⁰⁷ Chinese intermediary traders went to meet them to purchase the pepper. The Minangkabauers bartered it for cloths which they resold in the interior.²⁰⁸ If the Dutch and the English wanted to obtain some of this pepper (and Javanese, Siamese and Macassarrese also came to Jambi for it) they were obliged, in view of the slender capital resources of the Chinese buyers, to let the latter have money and, more especially, cloth on credit against future deliveries of pepper. Rivalry now sprang up between the English and the Dutch as to who should invest the most money in order to get their hands on the biggest stocks of pepper.²⁰⁹

The Dutch could count on the support of one of the foremost of Jambi's intermediate traders in pepper, Ketjil Japon. He placed his junk at the disposal of the Dutch for carrying pepper from Jambi to

Jacatra.²¹⁰ This man, who seems to have been a "shaven" Chinaman (a convert to Islam) managed to obtain an influential position near the king, and served as the latter's ambassador to the Dutch.²¹¹ From the fact that Company documents refer to him under the title of Orang Kaya and also under a changed name, that of Oran Kaya Sirre Lela, it must be assumed that he had been accepted into the Jambi nobility.²¹²

Apart from this Ketjil Japon,²¹³ we know the names of various other Chinese intermediary traders in pepper, some of whom were associated with the Dutch and some with the English. If the English or the Dutch accidentally came into contact with each other's business relations the mutual indignation was great. In 1620 an agreement was reached not to let the pepper price rise beyond 4 *reals* a bag.²¹⁴ But the Dutch and the English could not work together for long in Jambi either and soon the former were again complaining of competition from the latter: "with which nation [the English] it is not possible to create anything stable in the way of business, however binding and well-intentioned agreements one may make with her, if money is short, for fear that others may out-distance her, they bring forward regulations and redress, but if as much as a blade of straw threatens to break, everything is again at variance." ²¹⁵

The Dutch and the English did not have to deal only with each other and with the intermediary traders of Jambi. Here, too, Dutch efforts to monopolise pepper exports brought them into conflict with the Chinese who came from China to get Jambi pepper. When the latter showed that they were not prepared to surrender the pepper that they had bought in Jambi to the Dutch, their junks were held up as soon as they left the river for the open sea and the *nakodas* were compelled to hand over the pepper cargoes. To be sure, this was done against payment of the price obtaining in Jambi for the pepper with all costs thrown in, yet with the qualification that no more was to be paid than 4 *reals* per *pikol*.²¹⁶ Conscience was quieted – "the molestation shall, perchance, to those who do not know the evil seem vehement. But what does that matter? Common sense will be protection enough for us." ²¹⁷ Fearing reprisals from the king of Jambi ²¹⁸ who would, they knew, be justifiably annoyed at their actions, the Dutch used to load their most important possessions on board Dutch ships lying in the roads before they proceeded to detain any Chinese junks.²¹⁹ Fearing that these practices might cost his port its Chinese shipping (and the Chinese were his most important pepper buyers) ²²⁰ and strengthened in this fear by

the warnings given by the interpreter for the Chinese junks,²²¹ the ruler made earnest complaints to the Dutch. This Chinese interpreter who was so ill-disposed towards the Dutch seems to have been a brother of a Chinese merchant in Japara, which gives an indication of the network of relationships linking the Chinese intermediary traders in the Indonesian Archipelago, and shows how important Javanese exports of food and salt were to Jambi. Undoubtedly the Chinese also played an important rôle in this branch of trade until the Dutch put a stop to that too. The interpreter advised the king to risk a surprise attack upon the Dutch lodge, but for the time being the king confined himself to a complaint. Here, as in Bantam, the Dutch justified their seizure of Chinese ships by the claims which they had upon the Chinese for debt, claims which remained unsettled because, owing to the increase in the price of pepper in China, the Chinese intermediary traders could obtain much higher prices from the "Chinese" Chinese than had been agreed upon with the Dutch.²²² This was just as true of Jambi as of Bantam. The king of Jambi, however, could not tolerate such high-handed action by the Dutch in Jambi roads since it might lead to the downfall of trade in his kingdom. Moreover, besides Chinese junks the Dutch attacked Siamese as well, and that could certainly not be excused under the heading of a claim for debt.²²³ The king, therefore, can hardly have been very susceptible to the arguments of the Dutch merchants in Jambi who asserted that the Dutch had forced the Javanese junks carrying food produce from Malacca to enter Jambi with the result that a great deal of cloth was sold there at a low price.²²⁴ That, after all, was offset by the fact that the king's pepper trade with Malacca and Japara was being interrupted.²²⁵ Within the next few years it was to become clear that the king's apprehension was more than justified. In 1620 not a single Chinese junk appeared in Jambi roads²²⁶ and henceforth United Company ships prevented Chinese and other vessels, as far as possible, from trading with this port. The Chinese junks were forced to alter course for Batavia.²²⁷ It was the story of Bantam all over again.

Apparently an occasional Chinese junk did still manage to escape the attention of the Dutch,²²⁸ but for the sale of its pepper Jambi became chiefly dependent upon the Dutch and the English. The Dutch were unsuccessful in cutting out their English competitors but they did impede Portuguese traffic to and from Malacca. Thus they had made sure of a pepper supply which could make them independent of arrivals from Bantam. During these years, moreover, there was also

an increase in supplies from Sumatra's west coast, from the ports of Priaman, Tikou, etc., although here the opposition of Achin had to be taken into account, for Achin considered these ports to be under its dominion.

In the long run, the Dutch found the costs of transporting pepper from Jambi to Batavia in Company ships too high and, since they also wanted to avoid the high export duties²²⁹ (on account of which a conflict broke out with the ruler of Jambi in 1628 similar to the one that had previously taken place in Bantam),²³⁰ they began to encourage Jambi junks with cargoes of pepper to call at Batavia.²³¹

Palembang's pepper trade was mainly centred on Malacca, which gave the Dutch a reason for forcibly preventing pepper exports from there too.²³²

There was a close connection between Palembang and the kingdom of Mataram.²³³ Ambassadors were sent from Palembang to Mataram and in 1626 it was rumoured that Palembang had offered to help the Sunan to conquer Bantam.²³⁴ Ketjil Japon, the Chinese trader whose acquaintance we made in Jambi, also had connections in Palembang and it was entirely thanks to him that the United Company was still able to do some trade there. Ketjil Japon sent a junk which had loaded pepper in Palembang to Batavia, where the Company was prepared to pay the high purchase price of 10½ *reals* per *pikol* ²³⁵ in the hope of stimulating pepper exports from Palembang to Batavia.²³⁶

The action taken by the United Company against the Chinese merchants in Grise had much in common with the procedure they followed in their efforts to gain the monopoly in the other ports of Indonesia, but it will be better to deal with this when we are discussing the commercial traffic of Grise.

Banjarmasin's export trade in pepper, however, remained outside the United Company monopoly, and Chinese junks used to go to this port for pepper.²³⁷

The United Company cannot have gained too good a name for itself among the Chinese merchantmen, yet as long as it had no settlement on or near the Chinese coast the Company depended on arrivals of Chinese junks for supplies of specifically Chinese goods and also for the sale of its pepper once its stocks were so large that the European market was saturated. The United Company's policy towards the Chinese traders, which was part of its general policy towards the Chinese, was therefore full of inconsistencies. In this study, however, we are only interested in the effect which this policy had upon the Chinese junk traffic.²³⁸

In the markets of both Europe and Asia there was a growing demand for silk.²³⁹ Supplies to meet this demand might come from Persia or from China, but the largest profits were made on Chinese silk (according to Dutch estimates, only 100% on Persian silk as opposed to 150% on Chinese).²⁴⁰ Henceforth a close connection can be observed between the United Company's silk trade and the success or failure of its trade as a whole in either of these countries.²⁴¹

When the United Company entered into commercial relations with Japan in 1609 Chinese products proved to be indispensable media of exchange. Since the Chinese government forbade the Japanese to go and get these goods from China themselves,²⁴² the Japanese merchants were entirely dependent on supplies arriving from abroad and the Dutch could count on profitable sales of Chinese silk and other specifically Chinese products. Persian silk could only be sold in Japan at a loss.²⁴³

In view of the opposition which was to be expected from the Portuguese settlers in China and from the Chinese authorities themselves, the Dutch first tried to establish relations with the countries situated near China whose harbours had long been ports of call for Chinese junks, places such as Siam, Cambodia, and Quinam in Cochin-China.²⁴⁴ On the Malay Peninsula, too, in the ports on the Bay of Patani, the Chinese used to take on various products, pepper in particular.²⁴⁵ The Dutch did not have much success in these regions, however. In both Quinam and Siam they encountered competition from the Japanese, who had established colonies there.²⁴⁶ They also found difficulty in obtaining good quality products from the Chinese in the other parts of Further India and the Malay Peninsula. Yet they had come to these parts precisely because it had quickly become obvious to them that the Chinese did not like risking their best cargoes on very long sea voyages.²⁴⁷ In Patani the regular arrival of the junks was hindered by arbitrary regulations on the part of the native government. Moreover, the Dutch also had to contend with a lack of money.²⁴⁸ A shortage of suitable barter goods in kind went hand in hand with inadequate supplies of money.

For the Chinese, their trade with Spanish Manilla in the Philippines was far more important than that with Further India and Indonesia.²⁴⁹ The Philippines trade dated back to the days before the arrival of the Spaniards when the Chinese used to go there for gold dust and forest products.²⁵⁰ But it was only since the Spanish occupation that an exchange of exceptionally high value had developed there²⁵¹ thanks to

the huge demand for Chinese products, silk in particular, which arose in the Spanish colonies in America, and to the Chinese desire for American silver.²⁵² It was trade conducted partly at Spanish but mostly at Chinese risk.²⁵³

Because the Dutch were interested in intercepting or diverting the Philippines trade of the Chinese,²⁵⁴ various data have been preserved in Dutch sources about the number of junks calling at Manilla. As a rule, the total number of these varied between 20 and 30 per season. In considering these figures it should be remembered that the tonnage of the junks sometimes varied a good deal.²⁵⁵ The Dutch estimated that some had a tonnage of about 350 ton (half that of the largest Dutch ship),²⁵⁶ but they also captured smaller ones with crews of 25 or less.²⁵⁷ As Dutch activity rendered the channel off Manilla more and more unsafe, the larger, unarmed junks which fell easy prey to the Dutch were replaced by smaller ones fitted with oars as well as sails. These were more difficult for the enemy with his big heavy ships to get to grips with: "their junks are much bolder than ours in sailing, putting about and turning."²⁵⁸ After all, the Portuguese were also replacing their big ships with smaller navetas for freight-traffic. In 1625 a number of Chinese junks with tonnages varying between 10 and 20 tons went to Manilla. Since the distance from the Chinese ports of departure to Manilla was relatively short (the voyage took about 10 days) it was possible to make the trip in these small ships a couple of times each season.²⁵⁹ (The season lasted from March to the beginning of June).²⁶⁰

Only a small proportion of the junks carried products for Manilla's export market; the majority carried foodstuffs since Manilla, too, was dependent on supplies from outside. Of the 10 Chinese junks which fell into the hands of Admiral Lam off Manilla in 1617 7 were "fruit junks"²⁶¹ and only 3 were loaded with silk.²⁶² Yet the total value of the cargoes of these junks amounted to no less than fl. 750,000.²⁶³ In spite of the defeat which the Dutch fleet suffered at the hands of the Spaniards near Manilla in 1617, Dutch action against the Chinese junks soon began to take effect. In 1621 the value of 5 captured ships, only one of which was carrying foodstuffs, amounted to no more than about fl. 64,000.²⁶⁴ That was no coincidence. Fear of the Dutch had caused the Chinese to keep the ships carrying their most valuable goods in port. This meant that Dutch policy was successful for, after all, one of its main purposes was to put a stop to this trade which was so lucrative for the Spanish government. Coen estimated that proceeds from the tolls levied upon silk exports alone in Spanish Manilla were some 500,000

reals, which enabled the Spanish to maintain a defence fleet.²⁶⁵ The Chinese governor of Fukien in China claimed to collect some 80,000 to 100,000 *reals* a year in tolls on trade with Spanish Manilla.²⁶⁶ Thus it would certainly be worth while cutting off the Manilla trade. But there were other interests at stake as well. Obviously, it was still very important to protect the Moluccas²⁶⁷ and to avert Iberian influence there. The results which the United Company obtained from its trade with the Chinese junks in the archipelago were small in comparison with the lucrative Spanish-Chinese trade in the Philippines. The Dutch blamed this upon the lack of capital among the Chinese merchants sailing to Indonesia and upon the quality of the goods, which was relatively poor in comparison with that of the goods in the Chinese Manilla trade.

The entire overseas trade of the Chinese was carried on almost exclusively in the form of *commenda* and only very few of the merchants on the Chinese junks were travelling to the Indonesian Archipelago with their own goods and capital. The money-lenders and suppliers of goods who remained behind in China derived huge profits from this *commenda* trade. The nearer the foreign ports were to China, the smaller were the risk and the expenses and the larger the profits. Thus in Patani, for example, profits were a third more again than in Bantam, in spite of the extortion practised by officials, which was worse in Patani than elsewhere.²⁶⁸ Because Bantam was so far away (and this also applied to Batavia later on) the better quality goods usually went to Manilla, which was so much nearer at hand.²⁶⁹ Chinese as well as Spaniards invested a very great deal of capital in the Manilla trade. The Dutch, therefore, would also need very large capital resources if they wanted to attract Chinese trade to Bantam and later to Jacatra on the same scale as in Manilla.²⁷⁰ It was obviously important to cut off the Manilla trade, and Chinese who were friendly to the Dutch, such as Sim Suan, for instance, did not fail to point this out to them.²⁷¹

The letters of Van der Hagen reveal the interest which he took in this matter as well. His broad vision, which extended beyond the narrow interests of the United Company, saw what it would mean to the European silk industry as a whole if no more Chinese silk could be imported into the Philippines. As he wrote to the Directors in Amsterdam, most Chinese silk reached Europe via America and in view of the fact that the Chinese could imitate European silks to perfection, still larger imports might be fatal to the silk industries of Holland and the other countries of Europe.²⁷²

Once the Dutch settlement at Jacatra had become a general rendezvous, it was hoped that the Chinese would call there. After all, this place had been chosen partly with a view to trading with the Chinese.²⁷³

But at first there was little reason for elation about junk traffic in Batavia. In 1620 the first Chinese junk arrived in Batavia from Chincheo with a cargo of rather poor quality goods.²⁷⁴ United Company safe-conducts were given to the *nakoda* in the hope that more junks would follow his example. Coen's letters certainly sound very optimistic; he could already see Chinese trade being transferred from Manila to Jacatra.²⁷⁵ He hoped that, without any supplies of money from Holland, the China trade would make it possible to send about 100 tons of gold annually in readily-saleable return freights to Holland.²⁷⁶ Yet the rich and powerful merchants in China did not seem to have much confidence in the newcomers. In 1616 Coen had written to his masters; "The excellent Chinese still do not believe that (we) are upright merchants and seek to do a great Chinese trade, but (think that we) are after booty,"²⁷⁷ and was this not equally true in 1620? The Chinese who, together with other Asian merchants, also carried on trade in Manila and other ports of southern Asia where the laws of supply and demand operated freely, found in Batavia a port where there was no competition but only the United Company monopoly, which meant that prices were dictated to them.²⁷⁸

The blockade of Manila and the Chinese coast, the seizure of many junks, the removal of merchandise and the imprisonment of passengers and crew, cannot have caused Chinese opinion of the Dutch to alter for the better.

Besides the blockade of Manila, which had been rigorously enforced since 1621,²⁷⁹ an attempt was now made to implement the plan which had long been cherished (actually since a settlement had been obtained in Japan)²⁸⁰ of establishing a trading post either on the coast of China itself or in its immediate vicinity.²⁸¹ But this was to lead to open warfare with China. All junks were to be seized with the exception of those that wished to travel to Batavia under United Company safe-conducts, and all trade with Manila, Macao, Cochinchina and the whole of Further India was to be prevented.²⁸² The arguments advanced in justification of this policy have a dubious ring: "in our opinion this trade has been sought with friendship for long enough. We believe that we have just as much right to prevent them from trading with other countries as they to refuse us trade in their country. By the

same right as they hold us out of China we shall keep them there until they resolve otherwise." ²⁸³

In spite of the objections of the Gentlemen Seventeen, who only wanted to stop the Chinese trading with the enemies of the United Company, Coen persevered with his policy and caused all Chinese merchant shipping to be forcibly detained: "for as long as the poor are not in risk of their lives the rich will always hazard their goods." ²⁸⁴ In 1622 the Dutch destroyed 80 Chinese junks on the coast of China. ²⁸⁵

The Chinese who were established in Batavia warned Coen against this policy of violence and advised him to send a large delegation to propitiate the Chinese authorities. ²⁸⁶ In future, they suggested, it would be sensible to allow the Chinese to trade in the neutral ports and only prevent them from trading with Manilla. One of these Batavian Chinese even approached the ruler of Hokkien with a request to let the Dutch engage in trade in his province. ²⁸⁷

Reyersz.'s expedition to the Chinese coast, the defeat at the hands of the Portuguese (which meant the failure of the plan to eliminate the Portuguese by conquering Macao), the occupation of Pehu in the Pescadores, the difficulties with the Chinese rulers and the establishment of Fort Zeelandia on Formosa, all fall outside the province of this study. The Dutch could read what the Chinese thought about these events in some "booklets" printed by the Chinese, which fell into Reyersz.'s hands. ²⁸⁸ They can hardly have made edifying reading for the Gentlemen Seventeen. But objections were also being made by some of Coen's own colleagues. Martinus Sonck, Reyersz.'s successor in the Pescadores and a member of the Council of the Indies, expressed himself very sharply as a witness of these "procedures which have embittered all China so greatly against us, that we have gained the reputation of being murderers, tyrants, and pirates." According to Sonck, trade would never be obtained in that way, and he criticised Coen for not making himself thoroughly acquainted with the situation in the Chinese Empire before deciding on Reyersz.'s expedition: "then neither the whole Chinese kingdom nor the king himself would have harboured feelings of antipathy and vengeance towards us." ²⁸⁹ It would be very difficult to put right all the "inconveniences and disasters" so that the United Company could again conduct trade with the Chinese. ²⁹⁰

The Chinese demanded the evacuation of Pehu and did not want to send junks to Batavia until the Dutch had left the Pescadores. ²⁹¹ Representatives of the Toya of Hokkien arrived in Batavia ²⁹² but the

negotiations were to be kept from the ears of the Chinese central government, who wanted to keep the whole coastline closed to the barbarians from northern Europe. The delegation that visited Batavia was under the leadership of Ooi Wang San, one of the biggest of the Chinese merchants in Chincheo who carried on trade with Manilla.²⁹³

Although it was feared in Batavia that the most important trade of the Chinese would remain concentrated on Manilla,²⁹⁴ the Dutch activities against the Spanish Philippines were successful insofar as Chinese shipping to Manilla began to show definite signs of regression, particularly after the Dutch established their settlement on Formosa.²⁹⁵ But the looting and plundering of junks by Chinese pirates may also have had an effect on this.

Moreover, the Dutch succeeded in forcing the Chinese to accept United Company safe-conducts for their ancient trade to Indonesia and to Batavia in particular. In 1625 a big junk of 600 ton²⁹⁶ again appeared in Batavia, though loaded, it is true, with "coarse" goods only. The *nakodas*, however, announced that three more junks would be coming, the result, apparently, of the visit of the delegation in the previous year. Apart from goods, these junks (five of which ultimately arrived)²⁹⁷ brought a large number of Chinese emigrants.²⁹⁸ Everything was done to make the Chinese merchants' residence in Batavia as attractive as possible. In order to stimulate trade the Chinese were granted remission of half of the toll duties²⁹⁹ and they were also provided with convoys against the English and Chinese pirates.³⁰⁰

The Dutch now confined their acts of violence to junks not possessing United Company safe-conducts. Apparently trade with Batavia was very profitable to the Chinese after all. Moreover they were assured of a new market here in exchange for the loss of Bantam. In the years that followed, Batavia could count on the Chinese junks coming, with the exception of 1628 and 1629 when none came at all because of attacks by Chinese pirates on the Chinese coast.³⁰¹ In 1636 six large and six small junks arrived.³⁰² Convinced of the great importance of regular arrivals of Chinese wares in Batavia and of the sale of the United Company's surplus pepper in China, the Gentlemen in Holland urged that the Chinese should be given the best possible treatment,³⁰³ since their coming attracted other traders, which meant an increase in the prosperity of the residents of Batavia and of the Company's yield in tolls.³⁰⁴ It remained difficult, however, to receive the Chinese as welcome foreigners in Batavia and at the same time to prevent them by force from trading with the pepper-exporting places in Indonesia, where the United Company laid claim to the monopoly.³⁰⁵

XI. THE UNITED COMPANY MONOPOLY AND THE SPICE TRADE OF THE TOWNS OF NORTHERN JAVA ¹

As far as the intermediary trade in spices was concerned, the most important port on the coast of northern Java at the end of the 16th century was still the dual town of Grise-Jaratan. Thanks to Pires, we are already familiar with the place at the beginning of the century. When first visited by the Dutch, the town was under the authority of the ruler-priest of Giri, but soon afterwards nearby Surabaya included Grise under its dominion. At the beginning of the 17th century the little kingdom of Surabaya included Sidayu and Pasuruan as well as Grise. Between 1599 and 1601 Panarukan and Balambangan were added to it, and it even subordinated territories overseas and laid claim to Sukadana,² Banjarmasin,³ Lave Kate ⁴ and Bawean.⁵

But all these conquests brought Surabaya into sharp conflict with Mataram, which was also in the process of expansion towards the sea coast.

The description Pires gave of Surabaya at the beginning of the 16th century was certainly not that of a country which owed its prosperity to trade. It was a small agrarian kingdom with a very warlike ruler who, apart from an army of warriors, had a great many war proas which, according to Pires, he occasionally used for piracy.⁶ It is remarkable that while Surabaya had become much more powerful since those days (and certainly not least because it was comparatively strong at sea) the capital itself, even at the beginning of the 17th century, had not become a maritime trading town, although it was well-populated. Commercial activity was concentrated in Grise. The Europeans whose maritime trade brought them to Grise had very little to say about Surabaya. The town is not marked, for example, on Bartholomeus Laço's well-known map of 1590,⁷ and when the oldest Dutch reports were written it was still possible to speak of the "hamlet" of Surabaya.⁸ A Dutch report based on personal observation definitely does not give the impression of a place with much shipping activity and commercial traffic. Within the town, which was enclosed by a high wall

and gates, was the *kraton* of the ruler, itself also surrounded by a wall; ⁹ and the swamps encircling the town made it still more difficult of access to an enemy.

In spite of its trade in spices and foodstuffs, Grise-Jaratan did not impress the Dutch as a large place (although they expatiated on its busy commercial traffic); ¹⁰ on the contrary, it struck them as quite a small one. When Van Noort visited it in 1601 he counted only about a thousand houses, all made of wood.¹¹ This would account for the rapidity with which the town was rebuilt after it had been burned and laid waste by the armies of Mataram in 1613. But if there were so few houses the population must have been much smaller than Urdaneta estimated in 1523. He judged the number of inhabitants to be about 30,000,¹² a figure that corresponds more closely to the 50 to 60 000 inhabitants Surabaya was reputed to have at the beginning of the 17th century.¹³ Are we to conclude from this that Grise went rapidly downhill in the 16th century? Incontestable refutation of such a theory is provided by the earliest Dutch accounts, in which we find the same bustling commercial activity described as at the beginning of the century. It is more reasonable to assume that Urdaneta's figure was much too high or, if correct, referred to the entire region and included neighbouring Surabaya. This makes it seem all the more likely that the foreigners, who used to do their business in Grise and probably had little contact with Surabaya, included the inhabitants of the latter town in their earlier estimate of the population of Grise.

At the beginning of the 17th century, Grise and Jaratan served as the port and market centre for Surabaya. In 1599, the king of Surabaya had appointed a chief *shahbandar* in Grise and a deputy-*shahbandar* in Jaratan.¹⁴ Because the port had an excellent, sheltered harbour with deep water right up to the edge of the town,¹⁵ ships from other places in the neighbourhood used to anchor there.¹⁶ Small vessels of 40 to 100 tons, suitable for trading with the Spice Islands, were built there, and there were also facilities for having ships repaired.¹⁷ Everything points to a population whose main industry was shipping, although there was also a fertile agricultural area in the immediate vicinity of the town. The earliest Dutch reports speak of the annual arrival in Grise of some 60 vessels of various sizes, some of which must have been loaded with spices.¹⁸ The Dutch call these ships junks, whereas the Englishman John Saris speaks of proas.¹⁹ Probably most of them were proas for we know that no more than 7 junks were used to ship the nutmegs and mace from the Banda Islands to Java, and that some of these went to

other places besides Grise.²⁰ The Dutch accounts provide us with a glimpse of the spice trade of Grise, a trade which was certainly not exclusively one-sided. To be sure, the Bandanese took their own nutmegs and mace there,²¹ but the Javanese themselves sailed to other ports in the Indonesian Archipelago to dispose of the spices in small quantities at a time. As an owner of junks, the king of Surabaya had a big share in this trade.²² Three of the six junks that went to Banda in 1610, loaded with rice and foodstuffs, belonged to the king.

From Grise, the fine spices were also transported to Bantam. Apparently the Chinese had a hand in this, too, for in Bantam the Dutch came across merchants from Grise, undoubtedly spice-carriers who were the guests of one of the Chinese intermediary traders of Bantam.²³ Besides being a market for spices, Grise was also a food-exporting port²⁴ and products such as rice, beans, sugar, fish, cattle and game were shipped out, while horses were also exported.²⁵ Its agrarian products made Grise an important revictualling port on the route to the Spice Islands.²⁶ Large quantities of salt (long a product of the region between Juana and Pati where the salt-pans were located) were taken to Bantam for further shipment to Sumatra,²⁷ and cotton and yarn from the interior were also brought to the market in Grise.²⁸

The Chinese imported considerable quantities of silk, porcelain and other wares into Grise and proved, in their turn, ready purchasers of sandalwood and dye-wood from the Sunda Islands, whence also came forest products such as wax and honey.²⁹ Indian fabrics arrived from the West, and silk and velvet materials, iron, copper, lead, and even gold, opium, and diamonds could all be obtained in Grise.³⁰ The Javanese wove raw silk brought by the Chinese into silk materials and then apparently re-exported them.³¹ It can be seen from all this that no great changes had taken place in the trade of Grise since the beginning of the 16th century when Pires wrote his account.³² It is a pity that Pires did not leave us a list of prices such as that drawn up by the Dutch and preserved in the Company records, since an interesting comparison could then have been made.³³

Supplies of essential products particularly suited to the requirements of the Spice Islands, could be bought more easily in Grise than in Bantam, but the demand for them was quite high and so prices rose above those elsewhere on the north Javanese coast. We have already seen how several junks loaded with rice embarked from Grise for the Banda Islands.³⁴

The Dutch, therefore, soon began to make their purchases of rice in

Japara, where prices were lower than in Grise.³⁵ Japara was quite near and had good communications with rice-growing districts.³⁶ Probably, too, the Dutch preferred to buy in Japara because of the war being waged by Mataram against the region round Surabaya. Furthermore, as far as products which had to be brought from the interior were concerned, in Grise the Dutch again found themselves confronted with the system they so much detested, namely, the supplying of money or goods on credit. This was particularly the case with cotton yarns and they even had to exert strong pressure on the sellers to get them to bring yarn down to the coast from a district in the interior the expansionist policy of the kingdom of Mataram had plunged into a state of war.³⁷ Whenever the Javanese observed that large parcels were being bought, prices shot up immediately.

Cattle were reared on the neighbouring island of Madura and, as we have seen, brought for sale in the market of Grise. Other export products were poultry and game³⁸ and before long the United Company began exporting deerskins from Grise to Japan. Horsebreeding was an important local industry and one which led to the establishment of saddlers in Grise, in fact, records show that when Batavia placed an order for some hundred stallions and mares, saddles and bridles had to be delivered at the same time.³⁹ Prices of livestock increased with demand, but the animals obtainable in Grise were of much better quality than those in Japara.⁴⁰ Like all the other places on the north Javanese coast, Grise also exported timber, in the form of tree-trunks as well as sawn into beams and planks.⁴¹

The author of the *Verhaal van enige oorlogen* estimated the number of ships from the three adjacent ports of Grise, Jaratan and Sidayu at about one thousand, with tonnages varying between 20 and 200 tons, a far larger number, thus, than the 60 which had already been mentioned as calling at Grise. The majority of these little ships must have been proas of barely 20 tons' burden. There were never more than half of them in port at the same time because they had to take advantage of the seasonal winds. When the easterly monsoon was blowing, the little ships sailed to the Straits of Malacca, Sumatra, Borneo, Patani, and even as far as Siam. With the westerly winds they went east to the Lesser Sunda Islands and the Spice Islands, to Buton, Buru, Mindanao and the Kai and Aru Islands.⁴² This trade must have been carried on in pretty small craft the bulk of whose cargo consisted of merchandise of little value. Shipping and trade were thus mostly conducted on a small scale in Grise, and had their basis in extensive agrarian activity

on the outskirts of the town. It was only the trade in spices and a few other valuable goods that bore a somewhat different character. As we have already seen, the king had a large share in this trade and the merchants from abroad also played an important part in it. It appears from the data we have at our disposal that the Javanese themselves acted chiefly as skippers, transporting goods and dealing in the merchandise which had been entrusted to them in *commenda*, thereby earning a right to a share in the profits. When the Dutch became acquainted with the towns of northern Java, most of the foreign merchants were Portuguese or Chinese. We hear practically nothing about western Asians. Only one Gujarati is mentioned in the Dutch accounts and he turns out to have come from Bantam.⁴³ In 1601 Van Noort came across a junk in Jaratan that had come from Johore.⁴⁴

The participation of the foreign merchants in the trade of Grise was thus mostly in the form of *commenda*, which they supplied to the *nakodas* of junks sailing to the Spice Islands. When they first arrived in Grise the Dutch actually found a compatriot settled there, a man from Zaltbommel with a large spice business.⁴⁵ *Commenda* was the established custom as it was everywhere else in Asia, and the Portuguese engaged in it too, in fact we are quite well-informed about this particular *commenda* trade. We have already observed that they were trading in Grise on the arrival of the Dutch.⁴⁶ Grise was a profitable place for them since, at first, no toll duties were imposed there. The situation changed in 1612, however, when a new ruler in Surabaya did begin to impose duties.⁴⁷ But up to 1612 the Portuguese imported cotton cloths and cash (the small coins which they gave in *commenda* for purchasing spices) duty free.⁴⁸ In this way they obtained the spices very much more cheaply than if they had had to buy them in Grise.⁴⁹ This very lucrative business was carried on primarily by the so-called "black" Portuguese, but it attracted many others, too, including white Portuguese, although the black still remained greatly in the majority. In a few years the number of merchants increased from a bare 7 or 8⁵⁰ to between 150 and 200,⁵¹ and they used to import large parcels of cloths. It was extremely difficult for the Dutch to obtain a good foothold here because, in the first place, they did not have the kinds of cloth that the Javanese wanted⁵² and, in the second place, they could not sell their cloths at the low prices charged by the Portuguese, these being at least some 30% below those of the Dutch. The Portuguese also supplied the Javanese *nakodas* with rice on delivery terms, rice which they must first have bought themselves in Grise. Finally,

cash were also sent with the *nakodas* of the Javanese junks.⁵³ The Javanese who took these goods to Amboina and Banda to barter for cloves, nutmegs and mace, could keep a third of the profits for themselves, while the rest went to the suppliers of the goods.⁵⁴ In 1612 the Portuguese sent cloths and rice to the value of 20,000 *reals* to Banda,⁵⁵ while two years later the value of their cargoes to Malacca was twice as much again.⁵⁶

Apart from the spices which the Portuguese obtained through their *commenda* transactions, they also bought nutmegs and mace on the Grise market from the Bandanese, whose junks, loaded with spices, were arriving regularly in Grise in 1615.⁵⁷ The return freights of the Bandanese consisted of rice, salt, and Chinese goods. When in Grise the Bandanese also used to provide themselves with European weapons, probably English in origin, which had come to Grise from Bantam and which they could use in their struggle against the Dutch.⁵⁸

Besides spices, the Portuguese also bought a lot of sandalwood and wax from the Lesser Sunda Islands in Grise.⁵⁹ The greater part of the shipping trade from Grise to Malacca was conducted by the Portuguese themselves on their own account in ships manned by their slaves. They also hired junks sometimes, from the king of Surabaya among others.⁶⁰

Despite the marked degree of Portuguese involvement in Grise's trade, a close connection appears to have existed between this trade and the coming of the Dutch to the archipelago. The big Dutch demand for spices in Bantam had led to all supplies being taken to that port with the result that, as we read in a report by Van Noort, in 1601 no spices at all were landed in Grise-Jaratan.⁶¹ Apparently this was only an exceptional chance circumstance, a consequence of the fresh demand, for supplies soon started coming to Grise again and the Dutch began to buy spices there too. They had been permanently established in Grise since 1603, after a couple of factors had done business there on a temporary basis in 1602. United Company activity in Amboina and the Banda Islands, however, represented a danger to Grise's trade. This became apparent as early as 1608 when only very few spices reached the Grise market and trade languished.⁶² The situation became even worse when supplies of spices decreased still more because of the war in Banda.

This brought the Dutch into serious conflict with the king of Surabaya, whom they wanted to prevent from exporting any food-stuffs and spices to Portuguese Malacca.⁶³ For this ruler was possibly the person who profited most from the lucrative Portuguese trade in

Grise, since the Portuguese used to embark with their goods on junks which he himself had fitted out. One such junk captured by the Dutch just outside Grise roads was coming from Malacca with a cargo consisting chiefly of cloth.⁶⁴ A couple of years later, much the same happened.⁶⁵ The king showed that he was greatly disturbed, for he had reason to fear that such actions might bring the profitable commercial activity of the Portuguese in his harbours to an end.⁶⁶ This would lead to the loss of the toll duties which he levied on the Portuguese as well as of the rent of the warehouses let by him to the Portuguese merchants.⁶⁷ When the Dutch tried to draw the king into their conflict with the Portuguese, he did his best not to get involved. But although he must surely have made more profit out of the Portuguese, he did not dare to rebuff the Dutch altogether and fell in with their wishes to the extent of forbidding his subjects to undertake voyages to Malacca for the period of one year.⁶⁸ What was possibly even more serious for Grise than the obstruction of the Portuguese shipping trade was the way the Dutch upset its Banda traffic. Their interference was particularly detrimental to the king's interests because of the large share that he himself held in the trade. In 1610, for example three of the six junks that sailed to Banda were his property.⁶⁹ When the Dutch tried to lay down the law to the king about the Banda trade as well, they encountered stiff opposition from him. This was in spite of the fact that ever since 1610 the ruler of Mataram had been conducting an annual campaign against Surabaya, in the course of which he did not attack the town itself but laid waste the surrounding countryside.⁷⁰ The ruler of Surabaya answered the Dutch that he was an independent sovereign who would send his junks whither he saw fit. The Dutch attributed the king's lack of compliance to the promptings of an Englishman, a renegade from Banda who was resident at the court.⁷¹ Neither the Dutch threats to abandon the lodge at Grise nor their gifts of a piece of artillery succeeded in making the ruler change his mind. Meanwhile trade in Grise came practically to a standstill,⁷² and no foodstuffs were exported either. As early as 1608 a sharp increase in the price of spices could be observed in Grise. The price of mace, which amounted to no more than 60 *reals a bahar* in 1603,⁷³ had already risen to 90 *reals* in 1608,⁷⁴ and in 1610 the same quantity cost 130 *reals* and was mixed with dust and stones at that.⁷⁵ The price of cloves rose just as steeply. These cost 200 *reals* per *bahar* in 1610⁷⁶ as against 63 *reals* in 1608.⁷⁷ But by 1613, apparently, the Bandanese had temporarily regained some degree of commercial

independence and supplies of mace were so abundant that in Grise the price dropped once more to the old level of 70 *reals* per *bahar*. In Bantam, too, mace was costing 60 *reals* per *bahar* in 1615.⁷⁸ The revival of unrestricted spice imports, however, was of short duration. When the Dutch subordinated the Bandanese and the Ambonese, cloves, nutmegs, and mace all disappeared from the Grise market, where they had previously been available at reasonable prices.⁷⁹ The Dutch now hoped to supply the Javanese towns with spices themselves and thought that they could make profits of as much as 400% on this trade, which, as the United Company official, Block Maertensz. wrote, "would be very good domestic profits".^{79a} Ever since 1610, Grise had held little real attraction for the Portuguese. They suffered heavy losses because they could not obtain spices in exchange for the textiles which they had sent in the junks in *commenda* and the war meant that their goods were frequently lost.

Apart from the crippling effect of the Dutch tactics, Grise's trade suffered at this period from attacks by pirates from Madura and Tuban. In 1614 the inhabitants of Arosbaya captured a junk laden with nutmegs and mace worth some 8,000 to 10,000 *reals*.⁸⁰ The complaints made by the Portuguese to the king of Surabaya and their demands that he should put an end to these acts of piracy had little result. Apparently the ruler lacked the power to take any action although both he personally and the port of Grise in general stood to lose everything if the Portuguese deserted them.

The profitable *commenda* trade carried on by the Portuguese proved attractive to others, too, and at first the servants of the United Company also tried to get their hands on some spices in this way. Great was the indignation of their superiors, however, who would not be convinced by any arguments, although the Company servants warned them that if the Dutch did not give goods and money in *commenda* the Portuguese would certainly do so in order to gain control of the spices. As they pointed out, this would be far more detrimental to the United Company than private trade by Company servants, "for not one cloth less will be brought to Amboina and Banda by the Javanese because of it."⁸¹ But the Directors in the Netherlands were greatly afraid that the supplying of *commenda* would stimulate foreign trade with Banda, for the foreigners were in a position to bring all sorts of cloths to Banda and thus spoil the market for the United Company textiles.⁸² Moreover, they carried off nutmegs which would otherwise have fallen into Company hands

and took them mostly to Malacca, where the Portuguese paid much higher prices than the United Company wanted to give. A Company servant in Grise, who had sent 7,000 *reals* with the junks and made a profit of 20% on that sum, was sharply reprimanded for engaging in this private trade.⁸³ It was an abuse that the Company wanted to stamp out as quickly as possible.

The trade which the United Company did in Grise was not very extensive. According to estimates, a ship could take on half its cargo there.⁸⁴ The United Company had a warehouse in the port, rather a primitive affair, far from fire-proof, and so shaky on its foundations that it was in danger of blowing over in a fairly strong wind.⁸⁵ The Company was obviously not very concerned about this factory; all its efforts were concentrated on gaining control of the spices in the production area.

In 1613, during an attack by the ruler of Mataram which had been impending since 1610,⁸⁶ the inhabitants fled with their possessions to the fortified town of Surabaya, and the United Company officials left with them.⁸⁷ The abandoned town was destroyed, after which the army of Mataram, ravaged by illness, withdrew again and the inhabitants returned. The United Company officials also settled in Grise again, although the Company was already playing with the idea of leaving the port, because if there were no factory in Grise the Dutch would be freer to take action against trade conducted by merchants from Grise and Surabaya with the Banda Islands.⁸⁸ The Dutch began to have fewer and fewer scruples and in 1614 they seized a junk. In spite of this fact, the king, who was being subjected to increasing pressure by Mataram, made one of his noblemen promise the Dutch that the skippers of the junks would be warned to stop sailing to Banda.⁸⁹ The foreign traders had to be prevented from importing into Banda the much better quality cloth which came from the Portuguese and the English, cloth, moreover, which the Asians sold at much lower prices than were asked by the Dutch. The United Company could no longer dispose of its cloths and so did not have the barter goods for obtaining nutmegs and mace.⁹⁰ As we have seen, the inhabitants of the Banda Islands needed the cloth for clothing and to exchange for foodstuffs, so that money was of little use to them as a medium of exchange. In the spice areas, bartering was conducted in kind and the Portuguese had not made any alteration in this system.

Yet Dutch trade in Grise was profitable inasmuch as spices could be obtained there for *reals*.⁹¹ Less advantageous was the fact that, as peace-

able traders with a lodge in the town, the Dutch could hardly prevent other traders from making exports. If a policy of violence, whereby the Bandanese would become entirely dependent on the Dutch for their imports and exports, were implemented, it would mean that Grise's trade with the Spice Islands would be cut off at the same time. In 1615 the Dutch left the port.

The excuse given to the king of Surabaya for this sudden departure was that two Dutchmen had been murdered at the instigation of the Giri ruler.⁹² The Bandanese enjoyed the special protection of the ruler-priest of Giri, the Moslem "pope," as the Dutch called the *panembahan* who lived on a hill to the southwest of Grise. Apart from spiritual support, the Giri ruler could not give his protégés much actual help beyond arranging this murder of the two Dutchmen from the United Company lodge in Grise.⁹³ Although the king of Surabaya cannot have been very pleased about the obstacles the Dutch placed in the way of his trade with the Banda Islands,⁹⁴ he needed their help against the threatening advance of Mataram too much not to put on a show of being distressed about the murder which had been committed. But in spite of the protests of the United Company nothing further was done, "for who can ban the pope?"⁹⁵

The Giri ruler maintained relations with Hitu on Amboina as well as with Banda. In 1622 the youngest son of Captain Hitu joined the ruler-priest. In 1629 there was such a violent commotion among the people of Hitu because the Dutch seized a small ship belonging to the ruler and took the crew prisoner that the Dutch had to capitulate and set the prisoners free.⁹⁶ When Captain Hitu wanted to make the usual gift of cloves to the Giri ruler, the Dutch refused to allow him to do this.⁹⁷ The Giri ruler had small ships of his own, one of which – voyaging from Patani to Bantam with a cargo of rice and pepper – was encountered off the coast of Sumatra by Van der Hagen in 1605.⁹⁸ In later days, too, mention is occasionally made in the Dutch accounts of small ships from the *Bukit*, or "hill." In 1626, some little junks even brought pepper from Banjarmasin to Grise and Japara.⁹⁹ But the United Company regarded them as hostile craft to be pursued and seized without formality.¹⁰⁰ It is doubtful whether the murder of the two United Company officials, who, according to Gijsels at least,¹⁰¹ had given offence by their drunkenness, contributed greatly towards the closing-down of the lodge in Grise. Nor can it have had anything to do with the threat of attack by the new ruler of Mataram (who later became sultan Agung).¹⁰² The second and final destruction of Grise

did not take place until several years after the lodge had been given up in 1615. Moreover, there was no reason to dread such an attack. If it came to the worst, the Dutch could always carry their goods to safety in the ships and, as we have seen, little would have been lost if the lodge itself had been destroyed. Few traces remained of Grise's earlier demolition in 1613, the place was too primitive for that. The razed houses were rebuilt and activity in the bazaar resumed. It is therefore more logical to assume a connection between the giving-up of the lodge and the adoption of more drastic action against the Banda Islands. The Dutch closed down their factories in Macassar and Buton as well as in Grise, so as to be in a position to put a stop to the shipping trade of those places too.¹⁰³ The United Company now tried to establish a fortified Dutch lodge in Japara to take the place of its lodge in Grise, chiefly with a view to obtaining food supplies for the United Company factories.¹⁰⁴

No less disastrous for Grise's trade than the United Company's spice monopoly were the impediments which the Dutch placed in the way of Chinese shipping to the Javanese ports. We have already seen what kind of products the Chinese imported into Grise. Besides fine spices from the Moluccas, Amboina, and the Banda Islands, sandalwood and sappanwood from the Lesser Sunda Islands (the last two products – like the deerskins – being intended for China's trade with Japan),¹⁰⁵ the Chinese were anxious to obtain the pepper which was brought from the east coast of Sumatra – from Jambi in particular – to be exchanged for salt from the Javanese coast.¹⁰⁶ Yet this pepper does not seem to have been imported in very large quantities at first. Although the Dutch were loud in their praises of the place when they first visited Jaratant they regretted the fact that no pepper could be obtained there, for it would then be "the best and most efficient place in the entire East Indies."¹⁰⁷ The Chinese demand brought about an increase in supply in 1607 three junks called at the port,¹⁰⁸ and by 1608 the Dutch could buy 4,000 *pikol* of pepper there,¹⁰⁹ notwithstanding exports by the Chinese. One wonders whether the decrease in supplies of fine spice, did not have a stimulating effect on the pepper supply. Imports, moreover, must have been furthered by the virtual absence of tolls.¹¹⁰ In spite of the costs of transport, in 1608 pepper only cost between 4 and 4½ *reals* per *pikol* in Grise.¹¹¹ The Malays themselves brought it from the coast of Sumatra. It was also possible to take *commenda* in their ships and the United Company official mentioned earlier (who had not received his reprimand at that time) did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity.¹¹²

The presence of the Dutch in Grise may have had a positive effect on the revival of trade since they created a fresh demand for silk, and they imported cloth themselves. Customers for their cloths were to be found among the people of Jambi,¹¹³ who were apparently less particular about quality than the inhabitants of the Spice Islands. Both the Chinese and the Dutch bought Jambi pepper and the latter were particularly interested in obtaining silk. Thus we see the Dutch assuming the rôle of the Gujarati of Pires' day as cloth importers in Grise, and also, as we have already seen, trying to oust their Portuguese rivals. Pepper imports must have vastly increased in a short space of time since in 1610 it was already possible for two United Company ships to load 400 tons of pepper.¹¹⁴

Here, too, the Dutch soon began to have trouble with the Chinese. The quality of the Chinese silk was not to their liking. To be sure, the Chinese promised that if they were given money on credit they would return the following year with real Nanking silk, but the Dutch did not trust them and kept their purse-strings drawn tight.¹¹⁵

While it was certainly not the main reason, the attitude of the United Company may yet have been a contributory factor in the decline of Chinese trade with the ports of Java. Of greater importance, of course, were the much higher tolls that were levied after the advent of the new king of Surabaya.¹¹⁶ But even more serious was the action taken by Tuban in forcibly preventing Chinese junks from landing in Grise.¹¹⁷ The junks in question were taken to Tuban where they were deprived of their cargoes, an event which is reported in Chinese sources.¹¹⁸ Probably it was an attempt by the people of Tuban to grab a share of the profitable Chinese trade for, as we have seen, pepper traders lived in the town, so obviously pepper used to be brought to the port, and then, of course, buyers had to be found for it. But this was an odd and unbusinesslike way of trying to attract them. Tuban survives in Chinese tradition as a nest of pirates, moreover the treatment meted out to the Chinese junks by the Tubanese did not permanently discourage them from calling at Grise and in 1615 two more of them arrived at the latter port with cargoes of raw silk and coarse porcelain.¹¹⁹

As early as 1616 Chinese shipping to Grise was also being menaced by the Dutch. The increasing difficulties of the latter went hand-in-hand with their efforts to gain control of stocks of pepper in other parts of Indonesia. In 1616 they still did not dare forcibly to prevent the Javanese from exporting pepper from Jambi, but they decided to purchase as much pepper as possible from them themselves and to do

their best to prevail upon the Javanese to take their pepper to Jacatra instead of to Grise or Jaratan.¹²⁰ Nevertheless large parcels of pepper were still reaching the latter ports in 1617¹²¹ for the king of Jambi was reputed to have agreed to supply the Chinese with pepper at 12 *reals* per *pikol*. Because it had closed down its factory in Grise in 1615, however, the United Company considered itself free to take action against junks sailing to and from Jaratan and Grise. It was also necessary to stop pepper being shipped from Grise to China.¹²² Coen advised his officials to adopt the following procedure: In Jaratan they were to try to buy up all the pepper and prevent any being carried off by the Chinese or by anybody else. If there were no Chinese junks in the port the pepper was to be bought from the Javanese at a fair price and without the use of force. If there were any Chinese there the latter were to be told that they must postpone their purchases or shipments of pepper and resell any they had already bought to the Dutch. The Chinese were to receive the market price, which, however, meant that they would only get 9 *reals* per *pikol*¹²³ instead of the 12 *reals* per *pikol* that it had actually cost them. If they refused these terms, the Dutch were to lie alongside the Chinese ships in the hope of forcing them to surrender the pepper. If the Chinese remained "obstinate" the Dutch ships were to leave port at the same time as the junks and, once outside, were to relieve them of the pepper at a lower price than had first been offered.¹²⁴ It was the same procedure that we have already seen being employed elsewhere.

Nevertheless, threatened as he was by the armies of Mataram, the king of Surabaya was glad to see the Dutch in his port again. On their hasty departure in 1615 the United Company officials had not been able to collect anything like all their outstanding debts.¹²⁵ In 1618 these debts were still outstanding but the king promised to use his influence to ensure that the United Company got its money back as soon as the Company's debtors, who had gone hither and thither "to seek their living,"¹²⁶ returned. He does not seem to have interfered with the Dutch practices against the Chinese. But on the other hand, the Dutch could not do without Grise's exports, a circumstance which had a modifying effect upon the measures they adopted against Grise's shipping trade. Pepper prices rose here too. In 1618 pepper cost 10 *reals* per *pikol* in Grise¹²⁷ and 12 *reals* in Japara. Two years later, these prices had risen to 12 and 14 *reals* respectively,¹²⁸ which was considerably higher than the prices in Bantam which had so aroused the indignation of the Dutch. Coen was of the opinion that the

Bantam "monopolists" were encouraged to raise their prices by the high pepper prices in the other Javanese ports.¹²⁹

In spite of the friendship of the king, the United Company still did not feel very secure in this neighbourhood "for all the places around such as Madura, Bukit, Tuban are our enemies." ^{129a} The Company was forced to admit that more than once these Javanese had been bold enough to attack Company ships and sailing vessels "with dexterity." ¹³⁰

In 1619 a Dutch mission visited the king of Surabaya, taking gifts.¹³¹ The Dutch were well received ¹³² and they made promises of help to Surabaya. In the event of a naval attack by Mataram the United Company was to send ships to Surabaya.¹³³ The Dutch support seems to have been so much appreciated that the king gave orders that all junks coming from outside were to be forced to anchor near the Dutch lodge in Grise and forbidden to sail on to Jaratan. This was so that the Dutch might exercise pre-emption. They were also given preferential treatment over the Chinese in that they were allowed to purchase pepper at 9 *reals* per *pikol* while the Chinese had to pay 13 *reals* for it.¹³⁴ To maintain friendly relations, two or three Company officials were temporarily posted to Grise in 1619, but no move was made at that time to establish a permanent factory or lodge there.¹³⁵ In 1621 the people of Grise again fled the town in fear of the armies of Mataram. The Dutch, who kept ships lying off-shore for the assistance of the ruler of Surabaya, prevented gangs of Mataramese from setting fire to the deserted town.¹³⁶ The post in abandoned Grise was now used by the Dutch mainly for purchasing foodstuffs, the need for these being greater than ever now that Mataram was obstructing rice exports to Batavia.¹³⁷

In order to stimulate the export of goods (particularly pepper) from the Indonesian ports to the newly-founded Jacatra-Batavia, Coen instructed his officials in Jambi to keep prices down as much as possible. They were to do this by purchasing pepper as cheaply as they could (preferably all the stocks available), while in Jacatra the highest possible price would be given so as to attract shipments of pepper to the port, Jacatra and everywhere else (including Grise, therefore). The Chinese were to be prevented from shipping out pepper from Grise or any other part except Jacatra, and they were to be directed to Jacatra for buying sandalwood and obtaining supplies of money.¹³⁸ Coen hoped that once Chinese competition had been eliminated and the

Dutch had become the sole purchasers of pepper they would be able to obtain it at "reasonable" prices.

The pepper sold on the Grise market came not only from Jambi but from Indragiri and Palembang as well as from places such as Priaman on the west coast of Sumatra.¹³⁹ One of the exporters of pepper from Jambi to Grise was Ketjil Japon, the Chinese intermediary trader whose acquaintance we made earlier,¹⁴⁰ and another was the young king of Jambi, who sent a junk laden with pepper to Grise in 1620. These large-scale exports to Grise indicate that Coen failed in his intention of preventing any exports of pepper from Jambi. In that port the Dutch had to reckon with the local authorities to a greater extent than in Grise, where they had a free hand and managed to get hold of the pepper at the low price of 9 *reals* per *pikol*. The Dutch were convinced that if the Chinese had been able to buy it, too, the price would certainly have risen to 13 or 14 *reals* per *pikol*.¹⁴¹ The king of Surabaya must have been very hard pressed by "the Mataram" to have allowed such restrictions to be placed on the commercial traffic of his port.

The armies of Mataram, which used to undertake an annual campaign against Surabaya and hemmed the town in more and more each year, conquered Grise in 1623 and utterly destroyed it. Only 126 prisoners were taken and these included the two officials of the United Company who had remained there at the request of the king of Surabaya.¹⁴² Like Surabaya, Mataram was also seeking the support of the United Company and in 1624 both parties were competing for Company aid. When Surabaya was heavily besieged on shore but could still be re-victualled by sea (by the Macassarese, among others) the ruler of Mataram asked the United Company to send a ship to close the roads of Surabaya entirely to ships coming from the open sea.¹⁴³ Although the Company did not think that the prospects were very bright for its Surabayan ally, it was equally unattracted by the idea of an all-powerful Mataram. It therefore made no promises at all and maintained a strict neutrality.¹⁴⁴ But when, in 1625, Surabaya was also compelled to submit to Mataram, this put a temporary stop to United Company settlement in those parts. Yet the food trade soon revived and in Grise in 1626 we actually find the same *shahbandar*, Quiai [Kiahi?] Putoa, who was there in 1605 and 1619,¹⁴⁵ while the deputy-*shahbandar* in Jaratan was Intje Moeda, also no stranger to the United Company. The latter, who was Chinese or half-Chinese by birth, had meanwhile become related to the Batavian Chinese through his

daughter's marriage to Beng Kong, the leader of the latter group. This is a good example of the permutations which were constantly occurring in the Chinese communities in Indonesia. The Chinese intermediary traders had obviously adapted themselves to the new situation, that is to say they realized that the United Company was gaining the ascendancy in these parts. To be sure, it meant that they had to abide by the monopoly prices of the United Company, but they did enjoy legal security within the Company settlements once they had established themselves there as merchants, a legal security which they had frequently lacked in the native states, for example (as we have already observed), in Bantam.¹⁴⁶

Besides Grise, Pires described Tuban on the north coast of Java as a port of call at the beginning of the 16th century.¹⁴⁷ His account indicated that the two places differed in atmosphere, Tuban having a more aristocratic character than Grise. This was still true of Tuban at the beginning of the 17th century. To be sure, the Dutch who visited the place in the course of the second voyage called it a commercial town,¹⁴⁸ but it was obvious that its commercial traffic had made less impression on them than its fortifications¹⁴⁹ and the power of its ruler. The latter was surrounded by many nobles, each with his own vast retinue of slaves.¹⁵⁰ Tuban, like Surabaya, gave more the impression of being a *kraton* town, even though some trade was carried on there. In Surabaya-Grise the separation of the functions of the rulers was more complete.¹⁵¹ The Dutch estimated that within a short space of time the king of Tuban could raise an army of at least 32,000 to 33,000 infantry and 500 cavalry,¹⁵² which points to the existence of a thickly populated area in the immediate vicinity of the coastal town. Like Grise this little kingdom was primarily agrarian in character. Rice¹⁵³ was available, although not in large quantities,¹⁵⁴ the main industry being the raising of horses and cattle.¹⁵⁵ The fact that the cattle-raising was actually carried on in the town itself would seem to be an indication of the rustic and primitive character of this community. The Dutch accounts relate how the cows were driven out of the town in the morning and brought back again at night.¹⁵⁶ Hunting also yielded suitable export products such as game and deerskins. In addition, a good deal of fishing was carried on, so that Tuban had a great many small ships and a large sea-faring population.¹⁵⁷ The Dutch were struck by the quaint shape of the fishing boats of Tuban.¹⁵⁸ For trading junks were used and their cargoes generally consisted of pepper¹⁵⁹ for at this time the finer kinds of spices had apparently

vanished from the Tuban market as well. It is true that the king's adviser, a Portuguese renegade, held out hopes to the Dutch of the arrival of 40 junks laden with spices, but it turned out that most of them were destined for Grise.¹⁶⁰ So people in Tuban, too, probably bought pepper with the idea of re-exporting it.¹⁶¹ The cargo of a ship coming from Tuban, which was captured in 1607 by Matelief's fleet in the neighbourhood of Malacca, consisted entirely of garlic, onions, salt and rice, that is to say of food only.¹⁶² Besides foodstuffs, textiles such as silk, linen, and cotton also appeared on the Tuban market and here, too, the inhabitants manufactured their own cloths.¹⁶³

The Dutch gained the impression that it was a prosperous town, but it was the ruler who displayed the greatest luxury. Probably this was a survival of earlier days when in spite of the fact that it had been an early convert to Islam, Tuban had maintained close connections with the Hindu kingdom in the interior and provided it with an outlet to the sea.¹⁶⁴

By the end of the 16th century the Tuban roadstead was no longer up to much. The comparatively big ships of the United Company could not penetrate as far as the town and were obliged to anchor some distance out to sea.¹⁶⁵ Presumably this was because of changes in the Javanese coastline, but the big Chinese junks must have avoided the harbour for the same reason. This led to the people of Tuban using violence to try to compel the Chinese to call at their port. It actually came to a sea battle in which the Chinese were worsted and their entire cargo confiscated.¹⁶⁶ As we have already seen, these events caused Tuban to be reported in the Chinese sources as a place where piracy was committed.¹⁶⁷ For that matter, when the Dutch first visited Tuban they encountered 3 junks which they later learned were manned by "freebooters" from Tuban.¹⁶⁸ Tuban's claims to foreign possessions must have been based largely on a former position of power, which in those earlier days probably had an economic foundation. This also explains the conflict with Banjarmasin in Borneo. In collaboration with the Madurese from Arosbaya, the Tubanese used 3 galleys to prevent junks from Banjarmasin coming to Grise. Undoubtedly these were all attempts to revive the trade of Tuban, which had started to flag. Antagonism arose in this way between Tuban and Grise, a circumstance which can hardly have been conducive to the formation and pursuance of a united defence policy against the ruler of Mataram. Yet the danger that threatened from the inland kingdom drove them to form an alliance with the other ports of northern

Java.¹⁶⁹ The "bad testimonies" about Tuban, which reached the ears of the Dutch via the Portuguese and Javanese in Grise, also mentioned this antagonism between the two towns.¹⁷⁰

Tuban had little resistance left and in 1619 it fell into the hands of the ruler of Mataram. Its own ruler fled to Giri.¹⁷¹ But Giri's days were numbered too.

De Graaf blames the downfall of the ports of eastern Java primarily on the discord between them,¹⁷² but surely this was an effect not a cause, and it would be better to seek the latter in the economic situation, in the undermining of their means of subsistence. In the case of Grise, the connection between its decline and the destruction of the intermediary trade in spices is plain to see. Whether this was also true of Tuban is less clear, since geographical factors may have been influential there, and even Pires did not describe the town as a flourishing centre of trade.

Since the end of the 16th century Japara had been under the dominion of Mataram (the formerly independent coastal state is said to have been defeated by Senapati, the ruler of Mataram, in 1599)¹⁷³ and as long as Mataram had not subordinated the ports of eastern Java, Japara remained its main outlet to the sea, the port which handled its exports of rice from the interior. The town had a good roadstead where big ships could anchor,¹⁷⁴ but it was not very sheltered and this could be very dangerous,¹⁷⁵ particularly in the months of January and February when winds blew hard and strong, head-on to the coast.

Most of Japara's rice went to Portuguese Malacca, their trade being carried on by the Javanese themselves in fairly large junks of upwards of 200 tons' burden.¹⁷⁶ One wonders who were the owners of these junks, for the sources give only very scanty indications on the subject. It seems probable that they were the people in authority. At the beginning of the 17th century the governor of Japara was a Gujarati and the *shahbandar* was of Chinese origin, either wholly or in part, and had connections in Jambi.¹⁷⁷ We know of the latter that he transported rice in his little ships.¹⁷⁸ We also hear of a certain Kodja Babo (probably an Arab or a Persian) who owned a junk.¹⁷⁹ The governor of Demak may also have been the owner of junks sailing from Japara.¹⁸⁰

Other foodstuffs besides rice were exported from Japara too. These were the sort of products already mentioned in connection with Grise, namely, salt, dried and salted fish, onions, garlic, and arak (great quantities of which could be obtained in Japara though not in Grise).¹⁸¹ Further exports were olive oil and coconut oil in pots, salted fish roe,

beans, cattle, poultry and horses.¹⁸² The cattle exported were not only fat stock – an ox cost only 4 or 5 *reals*¹⁸³ – but included milking cows. Japara also exported forest products such as honey and drugs such as cumin, anise, and rhubarb, as well as sugar, both in powder form and candied. The Dutch who took part in the first voyage reported that sugar was already being exported from Japara to Bantam and Jacatra. This was, however, the so-called brown or palm sugar, which was not of good quality.¹⁸⁴ Besides foodstuffs, Japara's exports included wood sawn into beams and planks, bamboo, stone, and chalk, for building houses, and articles such as cotton thread, knives, and Chinese pangs made of iron.

In 1615 the Dutch encountered some 60 to 80 Javanese junks off the coast of Sumatra, laden with foodstuffs and *en route* to Malacca. Most of the junks had come from Japara and places around there.¹⁸⁵ In Malacca the Javanese used to barter the foodstuffs for cloth. Because of their own great need for rice the Dutch did not dare to interfere too much with this shipping trade, however detrimental it might be to their own imports of textiles in the Indonesian Archipelago.¹⁸⁶

Because it was in abundant supply, rice was cheap in Japara, actually only half as dear as it was in Grise and Macassar.¹⁸⁷ In 1614 the price of rice in Japara was only 15 *reals* per *koyan* or two tons but in Bantam it was 40 or 50 *reals*. Gijsels and Van den Broecke quote even lower rice prices, Gijsels compares the Japara price of 6 to 9 *reals* with that in Patani, which was 30 to 40 *reals* per two tons of approximately 3,500 lbs,¹⁸⁸ while, according to Van den Broecke, the price of rice in Japara in 1615 was 9 or 10 *reals*.¹⁸⁹ The rice which could be bought so cheaply in Japara could be sold in the Moluccas (unencumbered by toll duties, moreover) for 50 and 60 *reals* per ton.¹⁹⁰ In 1614 the ruler of Mataram, who did not style himself a merchant like the rulers of Bantam and Surabaya,¹⁹¹ had granted the Dutch exemption from import and export duties – a generous gesture, but one presumably inspired by a desire to obtain Company help against Surabaya and Bantam. The Asian traders were accustomed to sell the rice in the Spice Islands at 40 to 50 *reals* per two tons “which was the ordinary market price, on which they managed to make very good profits.”¹⁹² United Company profits were somewhat higher but it must be pointed out that the Company's expenses were higher too, because of their costly ships.

The ports of Demak, Tegal and Cheribon also exported rice, but the greatest quantity came from Japara even though there was no rice-producing area in the immediate vicinity and most of it must have been

brought to the port from the district around Demak. In 1616, that is to say before Batavia was founded, the United Company estimated the amount of rice it would require annually at some 2,000 tons.¹⁹³ This quantity was primarily designed to supply the needs of the Company forts in the Spice Islands but it had also to be used to feed the inhabitants of the islands who had been cut off from the Asian traders – their usual source of supply. By 1620, however, the Company demand for rice had already risen to some 4,000 to 6,000 tons per year.¹⁹⁴ The Company's conflict in Japara (which is discussed later)¹⁹⁵ and the closing-down of its lodge there, which involved the temporary loss of that particular "pantry,"¹⁹⁶ meant that attempts had to be made to meet the demand in some other way. Coen found it hard to accept that the Dutch would have to be entirely dependent on Japara for supplies of rice and that the United Company, therefore, would be in the position of "a little mouse that has only one hole."¹⁹⁷ At first he hoped to find other rice-producing areas in Palembang and Bima, and when efforts in that direction proved more or less fruitless he tried to obtain rice in Patani and Cambodia.¹⁹⁸

Textiles were imported on a large scale in Japara; most of them came from Portuguese Malacca and were obtained in exchange for rice. Pepper was also imported there and, as in the case of the other towns of northern Java, this product came largely from Jambi.¹⁹⁹ Apparently junks used to call at Jambi on their way home from Malacca to load pepper in exchange for the cloth they had bought in Malacca. But there was also direct trade between Japara and Jambi, the Javanese taking rice and salt to Jambi and the Sumatrans, in their turn, bringing pepper to Japara.²⁰⁰ The pepper attracted the Chinese to Japara, and in exchange for pepper the latter imported silk materials and also less costly goods such as coarse china and iron pans. The Chinese enjoyed the same privilege in Japara as the Dutch, namely, exemption from tolls.²⁰¹

As in Bantam and Grise, a rapid rise in pepper prices can be observed in Japara as a result of the growing demand for this product. The Chinese could obtain increasingly high prices in China for their pepper and were therefore prepared to pay higher purchase prices for it too.²⁰² Because of the trouble they were having over pepper in Bantam, it was very important for the Dutch to get their hands on the Jambi pepper in Japara.²⁰³ By 1618 the Chinese in Japara were already paying 10 to 13 *reals* per *pikol*. The Dutch decided to submit to these high prices, too, and to buy the costly Japara pepper in the hope that the steadily rising

prices in China would make it possible for them to dispose of it in the future at a profit.²⁰⁴ Although the pepper was expensive, generally speaking Japara was such a profitable trading place that imported goods were bartered there for other merchandise, with the result that the imported goods sometimes cost less than in the actual production areas.²⁰⁵

The Dutch sources contain very few details about the trade carried on by other Asian peoples with Japara during this period. No doubt Gujarati used to trade there.²⁰⁶ As we have already seen, the governor of the ruler of Mataram in Japara was a Gujarati who could presumably speak Javanese but not Malay.²⁰⁷ When the town was rebuilt further upstream after it had been destroyed by the Dutch, only a few "Gujarati" houses and the residences of other foreign merchants were left standing on the beach.²⁰⁸ As late as 1634 a Gujarati resident of Japara arrived with his junk in Batavia.²⁰⁹

Further, we hear of Malay junks from Patani bringing pepper to Japara and loading salt there.²¹⁰ Junks also came to the Javanese port from the Sumatran pepper places of Jambi, Palembang and Indragiri.²¹¹ The closest ties were with Jambi. The *shahbandar* in Japara, the Chinaman Intje Moeda,²¹² had a brother in Jambi who promoted his interests with the king. The Dutch did not care much for these Chinese brothers. They suspected them of intrigues with both the king of Jambi and the governor of Japara,²¹³ while the *shahbandar* apparently maintained communications with Portuguese Malacca as well.²¹⁴ Nevertheless, the Dutch made use of his services for collecting rice.²¹⁵

Besides Chinese and Dutch merchants, Englishmen began to visit Japara as well. In 1618 they were granted permission to build a lodge "and great friendship was shown towards them."²¹⁶ In 1628 some Danes also appeared in Japara. They sold cloths at abnormally low prices and "injured the sales of Batavia as far as this was in their power."²¹⁷

The Dutch were in rather a good position in Japara, where they had had a lodge since 1613. In 1616 they thought about reinforcing this lodge and Coen would have preferred it if the stone warehouse which it was proposed to build had been a square tower with a gallery around the top from which it would be possible to keep an attacking enemy under control, a tower, that is to say, similar to those on the "coasts of Italy and Barbary."²¹⁸ The Dutch, however, did not get time to erect this edifice. One can imagine that the governor of Japara who, being a Gujarati, would not be too well disposed towards the Dutch anyway,

would not look with approval on the conduct of these foreigners. On top of that they were impeding Chinese trade in Japara, too, by their attempts to buy up all the pepper,²¹⁹ even though this was done more covertly than in Bantam and Jambi. Coen, at any rate, advised his subordinates to arrange for the threats which were to make the Chinese surrender their pepper to the Dutch²²⁰ to be conveyed by people who were not themselves Dutch. Moreover, gifts were to be made to the governor of Japara to persuade him to give the Dutch priority over the the Chinese in purchasing pepper and to make him close his eyes to the fact that the Chinese were being compelled by threats to resell their pepper to the Dutch.²²¹

The rôle played by the Chinese *shahbandar* in Japara is rather obscure. The Dutch suspected him of plotting against them. Coen might regard the Chinese as the future colonists of his colonial empire but he did not have a very flattering opinion of them: "the nature of all Chinese [is] infamous, unfaithful, false and treacherous, not only singly but doubly so" and he remarks that "If Intje Moeda is not of this nature he cannot be a Chinese. If he is half-and-half [of mixed blood] then he is bound to be even worse." Coen therefore regards him as being the prime originator of the "evil," the attack made upon the Dutch lodge in Japara in 1618.²²² On the other hand, Intje Moeda did help the Dutch to collect the rice and advised them about where it could be obtained outside Japara.²²³

Coen sent sailing vessels to Japara, too, to buy up all the pepper, including that which had already been purchased by the Chinese. Here too, if the Chinese refused to part with their pepper they were to be made to do so by the threat that it would be confiscated if they did not sell.²²⁴ When the Dutch finally demanded the monopoly in purchasing and transporting rice in Japara as well,²²⁵ very little more was needed to touch off an explosion. Even though Chinese and English intrigues and offensive behaviour by the United Company merchant in Japara²²⁶ may have been contributory factors, they certainly cannot have been the main cause of the event which now took place, namely, the destruction of the Dutch lodge and the imprisonment of the Dutch officials.²²⁷

The governor of Japara declared that he had acted under orders from his master, the ruler of Mataram. This may have been true, in view of the slow progress of the negotiations between the United Company and the ruler and the attempts that were being made simultaneously by the Company to obtain a firm foothold in Jaca-

tra.²²⁸ Mataram policy may have been determined by its fear of a second Dutch stronghold on Java. The revenge taken by the Dutch was not a very pretty one. They feigned friendship at first in order to lay in stocks of the hard-needed rice and to secure the return of the prisoners and the confiscated goods, and only afterwards struck back with what De Graaf, the historian of these events, called "an unpleasing combination of commerce and justice."²²⁹ A number of inhabitants was killed and the town was largely destroyed, while all the junks and many smaller vessels off Japara and Demak were burned. And as if this were not enough, when Coen returned from the Moluccas in the following year he put in at Japara and another assault was made on the town, an attack that was directed against the English in particular. Although the town was now fortified and better defended, it again fell prey to the Dutch. This in conjunction with the conquest of Jacatra made Coen feel that he was the "dominator," since "most of the enemy's teeth had been pulled."²³⁰

In Japara harbour the Dutch had burned 9 or 10 junks which apparently belonged, in part, to the governor of Demak since, according to the Dutch, it was this man who had suffered the heaviest losses in the whole affair. The governor, however, immediately knuckled under and made offers of peace and friendship to the Dutch. He even wanted to mediate between the United Company and the ruler of Mataram.²³¹ In respect of the Gujarati Coen displayed great vindictiveness, for he gave orders that not one Gujarati was to be spared in the punitive action against Japara.²³²

During the raid the Dutch had also attacked a Chinese junk. They forced the captain to hand over his pepper, under threat of seizure, at the price then current in Bantam, and they threatened to repeat this treatment if the junk returned to Japara the following year instead of going to Jacatra.²³³ Besides destroying the English lodge in Japara, when Coen made his second attack on the Javanese port he wanted to kidnap the Chinese and carry them off to his new settlement in Jacatra. According to Coen, the Chinese in Japara had already asked permission to settle under the jurisdiction of the United Company before the port had been destroyed.²³⁴ The English, however, asserted that Coen had tricked Intje Moeda and a number of other Chinese into boarding the Dutch ships before the Dutch set fire to the town. The Chinese were landed at Onrust and during the battle for Jacatra they fled from there to Bantam.²³⁵ Later Intje Moeda returned to Japara²³⁶ and we also come across him again in Jaratan.²³⁷

In the years that followed, Chinese shipping to Japara was obstructed as much as possible.²³⁸ After 1633 when trade between Batavia and Japara had revived to a certain extent and rice and other foodstuffs were again reaching the United Company centre, Chinese products such as coarse china and iron pans were shipped from Batavia to Japara, the port of Mataram. This shows that the Company had succeeded in its objective of getting the Chinese junks to sell their products in Batavia.²³⁹ Japara continued to export pepper however.²⁴⁰

As long as communications with Malacca could be maintained Mataram was assured of a market for surplus Javanese rice, and so the cutting-off of supplies of this product to Batavia could be used as a political manoeuvre to cripple the power of the United Company.²⁴¹ Yet right up to the fall of Malacca it was only for very short periods at a time that there was any question of traffic to Batavia being stopped altogether. Such stoppages as did occur, moreover, were mostly connected with Mataram's preparations for war against its Javanese enemies, the two sieges of Jacatra-Batavia,²⁴² or with droughts, crop failures, and mass death from epidemics and famine.²⁴³

Moreover, the lords of the coastal territories of Kendal and Tegal, to whom the ruler of Mataram had granted the monopoly of rice sales,²⁴⁴ were too closely interested in finding a market for their rice. When the United Company impeded their exports to Malacca,²⁴⁵ they promoted United Company interests at the court of Mataram. For there was a close connection between rice supplies to Batavia and to Malacca. The quantity of rice that Java had available for export was determined by the surplus of production over domestic consumption. In the first half of the 17th century this surplus did not exceed some 6,000 tons per annum. When traffic with Malacca was obstructed this rice had to be sold elsewhere or it would go bad.²⁴⁶ Apart from Java itself and the Moluccas, the kingdom of Mataram had no other possible export markets for its rice. The Dutch cut off exports to the Spice Islands and it was only via them that Javanese rice could reach the islands at all. But in this way and also by their own steadily increasing need for rice, brought about by the growth of the United Company centre in Batavia, the Dutch had become the principal buyers of rice. They were usually not clear about the motives which induced Mataram to block supplies, and in their letters and reports they put forward the most varied hypotheses on the subject.²⁴⁷

Because of the growing naval superiority of the Dutch in the Straits

of Malacca it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Javanese to transport foodstuffs to Malacca itself. The Portuguese and Javanese tried to get round this by following a new and unusual sailing route ²⁴⁸ via the island of Karimata, near Borneo, where Javanese and Malays had founded a settlement ²⁴⁹ under the protection of the Portuguese. In this way they could avoid taking the customary route past Bangka and Lingga.²⁵⁰

They also tried to elude the big Dutch ships by using small, swift-sailing vessels.²⁵¹ These little Javanese ships, moreover, were convoyed into the safety of Malacca harbour by Portuguese frigates. The Portuguese contented themselves with very small profits on textiles in order to provide a greater inducement for Javanese and Malays to bring their food products to Malacca.²⁵² That is why Javanese food exports to Malacca continued as best they could throughout this entire period right up to the fall of the town, and it was really only after 1638 that the situation became critical for the population of Malacca.

Javanese supplies to Batavia temporarily ceased altogether around the time of the two sieges of the town in 1628 and 1629. The United Company took action against the ships which sultan Agung had intended for the revictualling of his army,²⁵³ and the Mataramese, in their turn, harassed the coast in the neighbourhood of Batavia.²⁵⁴ Englishmen, Danes, and Portuguese seized their chance and during these years they imported vast quantities of cloth into Mataram via the port of Japara.²⁵⁵ Javanese trade with Portuguese Malacca also increased. The United Company had to go elsewhere for its rice and it obtained it from Coromandel, Siam, Cambodia, and even from Japan.²⁵⁶ But relations improved after 1633 and the improvement was closely connected with the growing Dutch offensive which aimed at blockading Malacca.²⁵⁷ With the connivance of the king of Cheribon and the governor of Japara, various Chinese and Malay proas carrying rice and other foodstuffs again visited Batavia,²⁵⁸ stocks of rice having become too large in Java. In 1634 some 2,200 tons of rice reached the United Company centre.²⁵⁹ For Batavia this not only meant food for its expanding population but a great deal of trade too, for its inhabitants bartered the rice for other products. According to the Governor General and Council the 2000 tons of rice which the Javanese brought to Batavia themselves promoted more trade and traffic in Batavia because of the cloths and other goods purchased by the Javanese skippers than 20,000 tons brought in by United Company ships from outside the archipelago could have done.²⁶⁰ Moreover, the United

Company's non-Indonesian rice was very expensive because purchase prices and costs of transport were so high. In order to stimulate supplies of rice to Batavia, import duties were reduced from 10% to 5% ²⁶¹ and between 1638 and 1641 these supplies did indeed steadily increase.²⁶²

Only a few brief notes on Javanese rice exports have been given here to round off the description of the maritime trade of northern Java during the period covered by this study. A more comprehensive picture of Mataram's export trade in rice would mean extending the research to take in a much longer period. The same applies to the question of the extent to which the deterioration of the Javanese ports affected the survival of trade on the opposite coast, particularly the trade carried on in and from the ports of Macassar and Banjarmasin.

SUMMARY

The preceding chapters contain an outline of Asian maritime trade in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago and the changes brought about by European penetration of the area.

The first chapter presents a brief survey of the economic situation in the Malay-Indonesian region before the rise of the commercial port of Malacca in the 15th century, and contrasts Çriwijaya's rôle as a trading area with that of its successor on the Malay Straits. The consequences of Çriwijaya's decline as far as trade in those parts was concerned, the development of the seaports of north-eastern Java (whose prosperity was due to food exporting and the intermediary trade in spices) and the coming-into-being of the small, pepper-exporting, commercial states of northern Sumatra, all give rise to various questions, particularly in connection with the views held by Schrieke and the conclusions drawn by Van Leur. Space is therefore devoted to discussing the changes in the trade route in the Indian Ocean, the agrarian basis of the state of Çriwijaya, the carriage of spices in Indonesia and beyond, and the shipping trade of the Javanese themselves. Finally, some consideration is given to the Chinese contribution to trade in the Indonesian Archipelago at the end of the 14th century.

The rise of 15th century Malacca and the way it developed into a central market town is described in Chapter II. Political expansion is discussed only when this also happens to be of economic significance. The aspect receives more attention here than in the well-known studies of Wilkinson and Winstedt, and data have been obtained from Pires' *Suma Oriental*, Groeneveldt and Rockhill's publications of Chinese sources and, in respect of certain points, the Malay annals. Pires' *Suma Oriental* also proved to be an invaluable source of information about the commercial town of Malacca immediately prior to the arrival of the Portuguese (chapters III-V). Supplemented by other contemporary Portuguese sources and a few – unfortunately all too few – native ones, this early 16th evidence is compared with evidence from the late 16th

and early 17th century, the period of earliest Dutch contact with Indonesia.

Unfortunately, owing to the inadequacy of the sources, our knowledge of the subject remains incomplete. Yet we know much more about Malacca than about other Asian trading centres, for many more facts have been preserved about the organization of its trade than about the trade of any other centre in southeast Asia at any given time. This is true even in respect of the period when the Dutch were predominant in the Malay-Indonesian area. Although the Dutch material is much more abundant and, on the whole, perhaps more exact than the Portuguese, the Dutch were only interested in Asian trade and shipping in relation to their own commerce.

As there are practically no Asian sources providing the sort of information about contracts, accounts, customs registers, and so on, in which western economic history is so rich, our knowledge of Asian economics is bound to be founded largely on indirect sources of European origin and, however closely the accounts appear to stick to the truth on many points, their authors were nevertheless observing Asian situations through European eyes, and so these accounts are coloured by European experience.

On the basis of these European accounts an outline has been given of the staple trade which grew up in Malacca and its institutions and organization: the way in which transactions were effected; partnership, chiefly in the form of *commenda*; the official attitude to trade; legal security; and the part played by the sultan and the higher officials in trading and levying tolls. The rôle of the nobility, the structure of the actual mercantile community and its standing in Malaccan society are also discussed.

In this way it has been possible to compile a fairly reliable account of an Asian trading community at a time when it had hardly been affected at all by European penetration. In many respects this historical account of early 16th century Malacca confirms the conclusions reached by Van Leur, although the latter had practically no access to data of the period and had to depend largely on Dutch Company sources of nearly a century later.

Using Portuguese and other sources dating from soon after 1500 it has been possible to draw up, country by country, a fairly detailed summary of the nature and amount of the shipping and commercial traffic which was concentrated on Malacca, the routes followed by this traffic, and the share held in it by east- and west-Asians. Special

attention has been devoted to the Indonesian Archipelago, and trade in this region with places other than Malacca has also been discussed.

The description in chapter VI of the effect which the Portuguese had upon trade and traffic in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago is preceded by a discussion of some general aspects of Portuguese expansion. Although this chapter is based to a large extent on printed literature, use has also been made of a few published Portuguese documents, both old and new, including the recent series of publications of abstracts of documents in the Goa archives. The object of this discussion was to arrive at an independent verdict not only on Van Leur's views about Portuguese expansion in Asia (his criticism was largely negative) but also on a modern tendency in Portuguese historical literature to deny that a decline in Portuguese power set in in the 16th century. In particular, those factors are discussed which led to the Asian economic counter-offensive in the second half of the 16th century.

The nature of the immediately apparent Portuguese ascendancy over the Asians was political, military, and technical, as well as economic, moreover Portuguese expansion was closely linked with the existing pattern of Asian trade in the Indian Ocean and the network of maritime trade routes.

The centralization of inter-Asian trade by political and military means was, however, something quite new in Asia. In this respect the Portuguese paved the way for the northern Europeans who came after them.

But the Portuguese did not attain their economic goal, which was the diversion of the stream of Asian merchandise to the Cape route at the expense of Asian and Mediterranean maritime trade; on the contrary, it was precisely that branch of Asian trade which underwent a revival in the second half of the 16th century. To complement the studies of Braudel and others who take the situation in the Mediterranean as their starting-point, the question has now been considered from the angle of the market centres of Indonesia. The ultimate failure of the Portuguese plan was a consequence both of the Asiatic response to the European challenge and of the defects in the Portuguese system which became more and more apparent as time went on. The most serious defect was the failure of the governing body, but the growing intolerance (one result of which was the banning of the Jews from Asia) also had a bad effect in that foreigners acquired increasing importance in Portuguese undertakings overseas. The

chapter concludes by pointing out the significance to the Portuguese empire of the private trade carried on by its own citizens.

Since native commercial traffic in Indonesia was only affected to a limited extent by the Portuguese and since, moreover, the only sources of information about it are themselves Portuguese, the account of this traffic given in chapter VII has had to be confined to notes of a general nature which primarily indicate the changes occasioned by the presence of the Portuguese in Malacca. Here, too, use has been made of the Portuguese literature and published sources mentioned earlier. The most striking characteristics of this period are the reduced significance of Malacca as a central market town, the very vulnerable position of the Portuguese there, and the shifting of native trade to other ports such as Achin, Johore, Jambi, and the commercial towns of Java. The salient features of trade in these ports are indicated, namely, the commercial activity of Johore in the second half of the 16th century, Achin's communications with western Asia, the flourishing pepper trade of Jambi and the share held by the Portuguese in this, Malacca's relations with Japara, Demak, and Grise, and the conflicting economic interests of these towns in their relations with the Portuguese settlement. The fierce rivalry between the two Malay states of Achin and Johore was an important factor in the continued existence of Portuguese Malacca. In western Java we see the rise of the port of Bantam, and Portuguese relations with this commercial town are described.

Portuguese influence on native economy was greatest in the Spice Islands but it certainly cannot be said that native trade and industry were destroyed altogether here either. The Banda Islands were remarkable in this respect since they were the only independent centre of active trade in those parts and the staple not only for the domestic nutmeg and mace but also for cloves from the Moluccas, Amboina and Ceram.

The question arises as to whether religious or economic motives preponderated during the period of Portuguese expansion. Linked with this is the extent to which the Portuguese monopoly was enforced in the Moluccas and the way in which, at the end of the 16th century, the carriage of spices was left to the natives. But, in order to evade the Portuguese monopoly, new trade routes also came into being, for the export of tin and the import of cloth, for example. Portuguese trade within the archipelago, trade which was predominantly in private hands, is given the attention it demands. Consideration is given to the part played by Chinese merchants in the various Indonesian trading

centres in the 16th century, just as it was in respect of their rôle in the previous period. Finally, this seventh chapter concludes with an evaluation of Portuguese Malacca as a centre for Asian trade. In this connection, mention is made of the position of Hindu merchants in Malacca, the decline in Chinese trade with this port, and the supplies of foodstuffs brought from Java.

As an introduction to the activities of the northern Europeans in Indonesia, chapter VIII discusses the military relationships of the European countries concerned and the conflicts between them, particularly in the economic field, and above all in connection with their relations with the Asian peoples. As far as possible, use has been made of appropriate historical literature supplemented by published Portuguese documents, English and Dutch source publications, and original documents, as yet unpublished, from the records of the United Company. The factors which determined the increasing ascendancy of the Dutch over the Portuguese are traced and we are struck by the length of time it took for this ascendancy to become definitive. This was partly due to the comparatively strong position of the Portuguese in the western part of Asia and their possession of a settlement in Macao on the Chinese coast. It is notable that the growth of private trade carried on by the Portuguese went hand-in-hand with the decline of Portuguese political power in Asia.

Competition between the Dutch and the English was a particularly important factor in the enforcement of the Dutch monopoly in the Spice Islands, and in dealing with this special mention has been made of the main points in the history of Dutch and English expansion which effectively determined success or failure in those islands. Particular attention is paid to the line of conduct – at variance with the official viewpoint – adopted towards the English competitors by a few prominent figures in the United Company, for example, by Governor General Laurens Reael and by Steven van der Hagen, who was a member of the Council of the Indies and Governor of Amboina. For a fresh appreciation of their policy – which was such a vital factor in the survival or non-survival of independent Asian trade – English sources as well as hitherto unpublished documents from the United Company records have been consulted.

The effect of the United Company's monopoly on the native economy of the Spice Islands is more especially the subject of chapter IX, which is based almost entirely on documents in the Company records previously published only in part or not at all. Here too, the views held by

Reael and Van der Hagen are subjected to a renewed scrutiny which reveals the very great extent to which Reael's decisions were influenced by Van der Hagen, both men being opposed to the use of force against the native traders and both, apparently, having an excellent knowledge of the native situation. Their attitude brought them into conflict with Coen, the representative of the United Company's official policy which involved enforcing the monopoly – by force, if necessary – putting an end to the trade of the Asian merchants, and extirpating spice trees. This was a very costly policy which led to big deficits in the United Company settlements in the Spice Islands and caused the trade in spices, where this could evade the Company's control, to be transferred to Macassar and other ports.

Some attention has also been devoted to the United Company's price policy in marketing the spices and to the close connection between the extension of the United Company's monopoly and its trade in the ports of western Asia. A parallel is drawn between the disappearance of spices from Asian trade in the Indian Ocean and the situation with regard to spice supplies in the time of the Portuguese monopoly, important data being obtained from accounts of trade in the entrepot port of Mocha.

After the foreign merchants had been prevented from trading in the Spice Islands, the provisioning of these islands became a necessity and Coen's plans for the Dutch free burghers were important in this connection, as was also the criticism offered by his adversaries to these plans. A fresh investigation has been made into the authorship of the so-called marginal notes on Coen's proposals. The suggestions put forward by Philip Lucasz. at a slightly later period in respect of these free burghers are noteworthy; they are better adapted than Coen's to the possibilities presented by Asia at that time and to the quality of the Dutch colonists themselves. The Chinese were more suited to the work of intermediary traders than the Dutch and it was, in fact, the Chinese who carried out this task under the Company regime in respect of the products not included in the monopoly.

Following on from this, chapter X attempts to establish the part played by foreign Asian merchants in Indonesia at the time of the arrival of the Dutch. Proceeding from Van Leur's description of the place, the port of Bantam is taken as an example of a trading centre in Indonesia where western Asians occupied an important position in the commercial traffic of the town. Particularly striking, therefore, is the rapid disappearance of the western Asian merchants

from the commercial traffic of Bantam after the coming of the Dutch.

In this connection it is notable that the Chinese, as the principal purchasers of pepper, were in a much stronger position than the western Asians. This matter is then investigated rather more thoroughly and consideration is given to the extent of the Chinese shipping trade with Bantam, the goods they brought there, the merchandise they shipped out apart from pepper, Chinese immigration in Bantam, their influence as intermediaries and in the carrying-trade in Indonesia, the influence they had upon the government of Bantam, and the conflict of interests which flared up with the Dutch when the latter tried to acquire the pepper monopoly. In order to arrive at a better understanding of the points at issue, discussion is also devoted to the scope of the Bantam pepper trade, the fluctuations in the price of pepper, and the tolls levied by the rulers of Bantam. By founding Batavia, blockading the port of Bantam, and obtaining supplies of pepper from other places, the United Company managed to become independent of the Bantam pepper market, which rapidly began to decline. The position of the Chinese in Bantam was similar to that in Jambi, Palembang and Grise. The United Company's aim was to persuade the Chinese to concentrate on sending supplies to Batavia alone. An ideal, difficult to attain to, because the damage done to Chinese interests in trying to attain it, made the Chinese hate the Dutch. A stimulating example of what might have been achieved if this policy would have been a complete success, was provided by the vast supplies of Chinese goods which were shipped to the Spanish Philippines. This is illustrated by a comparison between Chinese trade with Manilla and with Indonesia, a comparison which takes account of the nature of the trade as well as its volume.

The problem of the rapid decline of the seaports of northern Java is best demonstrated by the case of the ports of Grise and Tuban, although there are fewer sources of information about the latter port than about Grise. Documents in the United Company records, as yet unpublished, supplied data relating to trade in Grise when the Dutch arrived there and to the decline which rapidly set in when the fine spices went off the market, although arrivals of pepper from Jambi assured the port of a certain amount of activity for a short time. The closing-down of its factory in Grise left the United Company free to strangle the trade of the port. A brief interval of peace accompanied by the restoration of the lodge was simply due to the fact that the king of Surabaya needed the help of the United Company against Mataram.

The question arises, however, as to whether the decline of Grise (and perhaps of Tuban, too) is entirely attributable to the policy followed by the kingdom of Mataram, or whether the economy of the seaports had already been undermined by the activities of the Dutch.

The eleventh chapter concludes with some notes on imports and exports in Japara (which was the seaport of Mataram), on the United Company's obstruction of Chinese trade there, and on Mataram's rice policy, with particular reference to the way in which this policy affected Japara.

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NOTES

(For abbreviations, see page 407)

INTRODUCTION

1. B. Schrieke, *Indonesian sociological studies*. Selected writings, I and II. The Hague-Bandung, 1955, 1957; J. C. van Leur, *Indonesian trade and society*. Essays in Asian social and economic history. The Hague-Bandung, 1955.
2. W. F. Wertheim, "Inleiding tot J. C. van Leur, *De Wereld van Zuid-Oost Asia* hfd. III," *TG* LX (1947), p. 292 et seq. Herdruk *NS* III (1948), p. 577-595; W. F. Wertheim, *Herrijzend Azië*, "Een nieuwe visie op het oude oosten. Leven en werken van wijlen Dr van Leur." Arnhem, 1950; *Idem*, *Effects of Western civilization on Indonesian society*. (Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat Paper No. 11). New York, 1950; *Idem*, "Early Asian trade: An appreciation of J. C. van Leur," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* XIII (1953-1954), p. 167-173.
3. See the bibliography in: J. C. van Leur, *Indonesian trade and society*, p. XIII-XV.
4. J. Romein, *NS* XI (1956), p. 416-419.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 418; W. F. Wertheim, *NS* III (1948), p. 593, 594.
6. G. W. Locher, "Inleidende beschouwingen over de ontmoeting van Oost en West in Indonesië," *Indonesië* II (1948-1949), p. 411-428; C. R. Boxer, "J. C. van Leur, Indonesian trade and society," a review, *Indonesië* VIII (1955), p. 425-430; C. R. Boxer, "The Portuguese in the East," in *The Portuguese and Brazil*, p. 191, 194, 211; C. R. Boxer, "Some considerations on Portuguese colonial historiography," *Proceedings of the International colloquium on Luso-Braslian Studies*, Washington, Oct. 15/20 1950, Nashville, Tenn. 1953, p. 171-172; C. R. Boxer, *The Christian century in Japan 1549-1650*. Berkeley, 1951, p. VIII-IX; C. R. Boxer, review of Johan van der Woude's "Coen, koopman van Heren XVII," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* X (1950-1951), p. 216-217; W. P. Coolhaas, "Van koloniale geschiedenis en geschiedenis van Indonesië, van historici en taalamtbenaren," *BKI* CVIII (1951), p. 151-153.
In the survey of Dutch colonial and historical literature by Coolhaas which was subsequently published in the *Revue d'histoire des colonies* XLIV (1957), Nos. 156 and 157, Van Leur's works are not mentioned. For further literature on the subject see, in particular, the articles by G. J. Resink in *Oriëntatie* (Orientation), 1950, XXXVII, p. 22-30, and in *Indonesië* VI (1952-1953), p. 372-379; the bibliography in J. C. van Leur, *Indonesian trade and society*, p. XIII-XV. No mention is made there of a critical appreciation by H. Terpstra in *TG* LI (1936), 81, 84 written on publication of Van Leur's thesis.
7. Coolhaas, "Van koloniale geschiedenis," p. 152; J. C. van Leur, "Enige aantekeningen betreffende de mogelijkheid der 18^e eeuw als categorie in de Indische geschiedschrijving," *TBG* LXXX (1940), p. 544-568.
8. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 117-119; "World of South East Asia," p. 164-165, 169-170.
9. See p. 2, Note 6.
10. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 119, 122.
11. J. C. van Leur, "Afscheid van Europa," *NS* XI (1956), p. 424-427.
12. *TG* LXIX (1956), p. 282. ("concluding address at the conference of the School of Oriental and African studies," Stencil Univ. London, 1956).
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14. G. B. Sansom, *The Western world and Japan, A study in the interaction of European and Asiatic cultures*, 1950, p. VI.
15. De Jonge, *Ophkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag*, II, 1-70.
16. J. A. van der Chijs, *De vestiging van het Nederlandsch gezag over de Banda eilanden 1599-1621*. Batavia-The Hague, 1886.

17. Aanwinsten Alg. Rijksarchief 1872 A XVIII, 94.
18. F. W. Stapel, *Het Bongaais verdrag*, 1922; *Idem*, *Cornelis Jansz. Speelman*. The Hague 1936.
19. Wertheim, "Early Asian trade," p. 172.
20. W. H. Moreland, *India at the death of Akbar: An economic study*. London, 1920; *Idem*, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb: A study in Indian economic history*. London, 1923.
21. B. Schrieke, "Shifts in political and economic power," in *Indonesian sociological studies*, 1955. First published as "Prolegomena tot eene sociologische studie over de volken van Sumatra," *TBG*. LXV (1925), p. 90-207.
22. See for the bibliography of Max Weber's works: Van Leur, *Indonesian trade and society*, bibliography, 438, 439.
23. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," see, for instance, p. 132, 133, 350 note 43, 67, 329 note 113, 338 note 198, p. 375-376, note 84; *Idem*, "The world of South East Asia" p. 194-200.
24. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," see, for instance p. 67, 329 note 110, p. 90, 342 note 7; "South East Asia," p. 162, 191, 192.
In the list he gives of these "valuable high-quality products" Van Leur includes such typical bulk goods as rice, salt, cloth, earthenware, and pepper (Van Leur, p. 90, 342, 343 note 7). Van Leur does not count cloth as a mass product although it is certainly not a luxury article. It is permissible to regard pepper as a bulk product, but the finer sorts of spices such as nutmegs, cloves and mace, are indeed better included in the category of luxury articles. The United Company also made this distinction.
25. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 5, etc.
Van Leur objects to the use of the term "mass exports" for Asian trade (Van Leur, p. 379, note 97). It is employed, however, to express the relation in which the goods in question stood to the luxury articles of the period, not to goods traffic in modern times.
26. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 112, 363 note 122; "South East Asia," pp. 168, 169.
27. See p. 33-35 (Malacca); p. 105 et seq. (Javanese coastal towns).
28. V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 934vs. (report Ph. Lucasz.); also O.B. 1633, fol. 45, 1/12 1632.
29. See p. 113.
30. See p. 105.
31. See p. 109.
32. See, for example, the part played by Tun Mutahir in Malacca, p. 53, 54.
33. See for Bantam, p. 240; for Japara, p. 286; for Grise-Jaratan, p. 283.
34. See p. 54, 259, 260.
35. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 135, 136.
W. H. Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 149 also mentions the isolated sites of the markets, but he is referring exclusively to the markets in the interior which were not linked by waterways. He points out that the coastal markets, on the other hand, displayed tendencies towards unification (*Ibid.*, p. 151, 152).
36. See p. 60 et seq.
37. See Chapters X and XI.
38. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 66, 67, 78, 79, 92, 132, 133; "South East Asia," p. 204-208.
Van Leur attaches too much value to trade carried on by native nobility, for example, the Javanese nobility (Van Leur, p. 112, 136).
39. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," 132, 133, 350 note 43; "South East Asia," p. 201-204.
Van Leur very properly draws attention to the fact that Asian wholesalers might be retailers at the same time. (Van Leur, 131, 374 note 69, 135, 136).
In a passage quoted by Van Leur himself from Van Linschoten's *Itinerario*, however, merchants who sold mass goods in bulk are explicitly mentioned: "There are likewise other marchants that deale all by great, with corne, rice and other Indian wares and marchandises as wood and such like." Linschoten, *Voyage I*, p. 228-229. See Dutch edition. *WLV I*, p. 154.
40. The views expressed by H. Lapeyre in *Une famille de marchands les Ruiz* (1955), in which heavy emphasis is laid on the survival in the 16th century of the medieval structure of European commercial traffic, have been subjected to a certain amount of criticism. It has also been pointed out what an effect the accumulation of capital assets had upon the

expansion of capitalism and on the new forms which trade began to take in the more active commercial centres, Antwerp, for example (H. van der Wee, in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* LII (1957), p. 568-570).

41. Romein, J. "Aera van Europa," *NS XI* (1956) pp. 133-148.
42. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 66, 67, 133.
43. See p. 43, 44, 45.
44. As was the case in contemporary western Europe, this partnership may have taken various forms. The available sources on the history of south east Asia seldom specify the form or its nearest western European equivalent, since very little is said as a rule about the relationship between partners. The most valuable sources of information on the subject are the Malay Maritime Code and Pires *Suma Oriental* (see hereafter p. 340, 341). For this reason, the term *commenda* has a wider application in the present study than when used in connection with the commercial traffic of western Europe during the same period.
45. Bensaude, *L'astronomie nautique au Portugal*. Berne, 1912.
46. See p. 118.
Van Leur rates Asian technology too highly. (Van Leur, *Indonesian trade and society*, "The world of Southeast Asia," p. 159, 160; *Idem*, "Three reviews," p. 262.)
47. See p. 120, 121.
48. Van Leur, too, points out that the Portuguese left Asian trade more or less intact (Van Leur, p. 122, 368 note 16), but, according to him, no quantitative change took place in it either (Van Leur, p. 117, 121). He bases the latter assertion on Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 5-6, 9-10, 92. This may have been true of India. In south east Asia, however, there was a definite rise in production and increase in trade (e.g. the China-Manilla trade, increased production in the Spice Islands, the rise of new commercial centres such as Achin, Bantam and Jambi).
49. Van Leur, *Indonesian trade and Society*. "On early Asian trade," p. 122; *Idem*, "The world of Southeast Asia" p. 188, 189.
50. Van Leur attributes this to the greater mobility of the Dutch troops (Van Leur, p. 189). But see Boxer's criticism in *Indonesië* 1955, p. 427. The latter considers that the lightly-armed Asian warriors were definitely more mobile than the heavily-armed Dutch, who were also handicapped by unfamiliarity with the terrain and the climate. Boxer holds that the better discipline of the Dutch troops was a more telling factor than mobility in Dutch military superiority.
51. Van Leur, "World of South East Asia," p. 177, 178, 229-234.
Van Leur's underestimation of the United Company: Van Leur, p. 188-190, 212-214, 235.
52. Van Leur estimated that Indonesian shipping in Indonesia amounted to 50,000 tons (Van Leur, p. 235). This figure is definitely too high. Asian shipping, moreover, lacked the strengthening element of centralization which characterised United Company activities.
53. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 378, note 88.
54. Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 137.

CHAPTER I

1. G. Coedès, *Les Etats hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie*, p. 53, 54; Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade," p. 22, 41, 52, 56, 57.
- 1a. G. Coedès, "Le Royaume de Çrivijaya," *BEFEO* XVIII (1918); *Idem*, *Les Etats hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie*; *Idem*, "A propos de la chute du royaume de Çrivijaya," *BKI* LXXXIII (1927), p. 459-472; G. Ferrand, "L'empire sumatranais de Çrivijaya," *JA* 11e série, XX (1922), p. 1-104, 160-244; J. Ph. Vogel, "Het koninkrijk Çrivijaya," *BKI* LXXV, (1919), p. 626-637; K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," *BEFEO* XL (1940), p. 239-313; J. L. Moens, "Çrivijaya, Yava en Kataha," *TBG*, LXXVII (1937), p. 317-486. On the basis of geographical data in the Chinese sources, the last-mentioned author differs with Coedès about the duration of the kingdom of Çrivijaya and the sites of its principal settlements. Since Moen's views do nothing to change the general economic picture of the Indonesian Archipelago and since it is not possible to evaluate them properly here, it has been decided to keep to the currently

accepted picture as given in Coedès' *Les Etats hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie*, published in 1948.

2. R. J. Wilkinson, "Early Indian Influence in Malaysia," *JRASMB*, vol. XIII, part II (1935), p. 6.
3. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 247; Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 246, 268, 286, 287, 295.
4. Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 256; "Eredia's Description of Malacca, Meridional India and Cathay," translated from the Portuguese with notes by J. V. Mills, *JRASMB* vol. VIII (1930), part 1, notes p. 94.
5. Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 256; Wilkinson, "Indian Influence," p. 10. According to S. R. Fatimi, In Quest of Kalah, *Journal Southeast Asian History*, vol. 1 no. 2 (1960), p. 62-101, Kalah, must be identified with Klang, not with Kedah. At the time of going to press, however, only the first part of this article by Fatimi had been published.
6. F. Hirth and W. W. Rockhill, *Chau Ju-Kua. His work on the Chinese and Arab trade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries entitled "Chu-Fan-chi"* (1912), p. 62: "If a merchant ship passes by without entering, their boats go forth to make a combined attack and all are ready to die (in the attempt). This is the reason why this country is a great shipping centre."
7. Hirth and Rockhill, *Chau Ju-Kua*, p. 61; G. Ferrand, "L'empire sumatranais de Çrivijaya," *JA*, XIe série XX (1922), p. 12, 16.
8. cardamon: pleasant-smelling spice, vulgo paradijskorrels (paradise grains), also called grain at times.
9. For the pronounced Persian element in those trading voyages and Persian influence on Arab nautical science see: G. Ferrand, "L'élément persan dans les textes nautiques arabes des XVe et XVIe siècles," *JA CCIV* (1924).
For Arab and Persian trade with China see: G. Ferrand, "L'empire sumatranais de Çrivijaya," p. 56; G. Ferrand, "L'élément persan dans les textes nautiques arabes des XVe et XVIe siècles," *JA CCIV* (1924), p. 241-257; G. Ferrand, *Introduction à l'astronomie nautique arabe* (1928), p. 74; K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 250.
The following publications also contain numerous Arab, Persian and Chinese reports about this Persian and Arab traffic: G. Ferrand, *Relations des voyages et textes géographiques arabes, persans et turks relatifs à l'Extrême Orient au VIIIe-XVIIIe siècle*, 1913, 1914; W. W. Rockhill, "Notes on the Relations and Trade of China. TP. XV, XVI (1914, 1915); E. Chavannes, *Mémoire composé à l'époque de la grande dynastie T'ang sur les religieux éminents, qui allèrent chercher la Loi dans les pays d'occident* (1894); W. P. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Archipelago and Malacca Compiled from Chinese Sources*, 1877. Suppl. TP VII (1896) p. 113-134; R. Reinaud, *Relations des voyages faits par les Arabes dans l'Inde et la Chine* (1845).
10. Both G. Ferrand and L. de Saussure (in *Introduction à l'astronomie nautique arabe*, p. 745) assume that Arabs and Persians really did engage in shipping to the Far East. There is reputed to have been intensive shipping from Siraf in an easterly direction, even after the end of the 9th century. This view is criticised by J. Sauvaget in: "Sur d'anciennes instructions nautiques arabes pour les mers de l'Inde." *JA CCXXXVI* (1948), p. 17.
11. In this connection it is worth noting the observation made by S. D. Goitein on the basis of the Geniza documents to the effect that there were fixed shipping routes in the Indian Ocean linking two or, at the outside, three different ports. Thus a ship coming from Aden and crossing the Indian Ocean would not call at several ports on the west coast of India but at one or two at most. (S. D. Goitein, "The Beginning of the Karim Merchants," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* I (1958), p. 176, note 3).
G. F. Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*, Princeton, 1951, who assumes that as far as these long trips were concerned, the entire voyage was made in one ship (Hourani, pp. 70, 74, 75, 114-120), does not believe that Chinese ships ever came as far west as the Persian Gulf. This means that both the outward and homeward voyages were made in Persian or Arab ships (Hourani, pp. 46, 75), but Hourani does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the passages in the works of Arab writers which mention the presence of Chinese ships in the Persian Gulf. According to Chou K'ü-fei, traders from the land of the Ta-shi voyaged southwards to Quilon, where they transferred from small ships to big ones, then sailed to Palembang

- and so on to China by the same route as the ships of Palembang. (Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 292).
12. Sauvaget, *Anciennes instructions*, p. 19.
 13. A. T. Wilson, *The Persian Gulf*, p. 95 et seq.
 14. The proposed publication by S. D. Goitein of the Geniza documents promises to be of great importance in this connection. The documents concerned came from the Jewish synagogue in Cairo, and Goitein supplies provisional information about them in *Speculum* XXIX (1954) p. 181-197: "From the Mediterranean to India. Documents on the Trade to India, South Arabia and East Africa from the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries."
 15. J. J. L. Duyvendak, "Iets over de zeereizen der Chinezen," in: *Varia Historica aangeboden aan Prof. Dr. A. W. Byvanck*, 1954, p. 101. See also: Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade," p. 114.
 16. G. Ferrand, "L'élément persan," p. 251.
 17. R. S. Lopez in: "East and West in the Early Middle Ages. Economic relations" (*Relazioni III, X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche* 1955), p. 125 quotes figures for the proceeds of the 10% tax on the maritime trade of Siraf in the 10th century (between 253,000 and 316,000 dinars per year).
 18. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 223.
 19. Ferrand, *Textes géographiques*, p. 299, provided the Zabag mentioned in the Arab sources is identical with Çrivijaya. See also Winstedt, *Malaya and its History*, p. 25. Perhaps this Zabag has more the meaning of the whole archipelago (Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 269, 272).
 20. Ferrand, "L'empire sumatranais," p. 29 (extract from the History of the Ming dynasty 1368-1643).
In view of the very fragmentary nature of the source material about Çrivijaya (Coedès, *Etats hindouisés* p. 7, 8), which consists of inscriptions, and Chinese and Arab texts even as late as 1948 Coedès was still unwilling to commit himself about the economic and political structure of that kingdom (Coedès, p. 7). Van Leur, on the other hand, who must have gained most of his information on the subject from Coedès' earlier studies, draws much more far-reaching conclusions (Van Leur, "On early Asian trade," p. 104-107).
 21. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 53, 221, 240, 309, 341.
 22. Schrieke assumes that there must have been a connection between the decline of Çrivijaya and the fact that international commercial traffic began to use the route via Egypt instead of via the Persian Gulf. It is doubtful, however, whether the diversion of the maritime trade route could have had such an effect on Çrivijaya, since the demand for eastern products did not diminish because of the diversion. It was just that the Red Sea route increased in importance. The only question is which people became the freight carriers now that Arab shipping began to be confined to the western half of the Indian Ocean. The Chinese used to voyage via Çrivijaya to the west, but it is not certain whether ships from the west coast of India were already sailing to the Malay Straits at that time.
 23. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 220, 244; Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 264, 279, 280; Berg, "Geschiedenis van Pril Majapahit," *Indonesië* IV (1950-1951), p. 483, 511, attaches little value to the theory of earlier imperialistic activity by Java in respect of Çrivijaya.
 24. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 159.
 25. *Ibid.*, p. 220, 239, 244.
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 243, 246, 247.
 27. According to Nilakanta Sastri, the onslaughts made by the Colas in the 11th century led to cooperation between Çrivijaya and Java (Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 285-288).
 28. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 240, 251; J. Ph. Vogel puts forward the suggestion that Javanese expansion westwards may have been closely connected with the attacks made by the Colas on Çrivijaya at the beginning of the 11th century, since these attacks weakened the Sumatran kingdom ("Çrivijaya," *BKI* LXXV (1919), p. 637); see also Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 245.
 29. Hirth and Rockhill, *Chau Ju-Kua*, p. 23; Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 302.
 30. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 309, 317, 338, 343.

31. Wilkinson, "Influence," p. 12.
32. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 343.
33. For the extent and intensity of Siamese penetration southwards and the controversy on this subject see: Mills, "Eredia's Description of Malacca," notes, p. 90.
34. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 300, 301.
35. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 335, 336, 337.
36. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 332.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 341.
38. Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 229; Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 308, 332.
39. Berg, "De Sadeng-oorlog en de mythe van Groot-Majapahit," *Indonesië* V (1951-1952), p. 387, 394, 403; "De Geschiedenis van Pril Majapahit," *Indonesië* IV (1950-1951) p. 483-485, 498, 499, 193-198.
40. Berg, "Sadeng-oorlog," p. 387.
41. F. D. K. Bosch, "C. C. Berg and Ancient Javanese History," *BKI* CXII (1956), p. 1-24.
42. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 338, 415.
43. Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 295, 297, 299, 300-304.
44. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 300, 301, 308, 309.
Coedès, too, however, regards the simultaneous attacks by the Javanese and the Thais as a determining factor (Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 338).
45. Nilakanta Sastri, "Sri Vijaya," p. 302, 303; Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 330, 335, 336.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 392.
47. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 385, 391.
48. For the preservation of Çrivijaya's commercial monopoly see Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 53, 240.
49. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 365; G. P. Rouffaer, "Was Malaka emporium voor 1400 A.D. genaamd Malajoer?," *BKI* LXXVII (1921), p. 142.
50. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 338, 408; Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 147, 166.
51. W. W. Rockhill, "Tao i chih lio (Description of the Barbarians of the Islands 1349)," *TP* XVI (1915), p. 129-132; Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 156, 158.
52. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 365.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
54. Rouffaer, *Malaka*, p. 152; Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 383.
55. Winstedt, *Malaya*, p. 32.
56. See p. 14, note 7.
57. W. P. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 86 (Ma Huan, 1425-1432, Fei Hsin 1436).
This pepper, a variety with a large, hollow berry, was cultivated by the inhabitants in gardens, harvested when half ripe and then dried in the sun. Two Chinese sources even specify the price of this pepper, but they differ considerably on the subject. According to Ma Huan (1416 or 1425-1432) 100 *kati* of pepper could be obtained for 1 silver *tael* (1 *tael* = about 37½ grams, 1 *kati* = 1/100 *pikol* or about 6 hectograms - Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 153; Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 86). According to Fei Hsin (1436), 1 *bahar* = 320 *kati* of pepper could be obtained for 20 pieces of silver weighing 6 *tael* (Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 88; Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 156). The price stated by Fei Hsin was therefore almost half that quoted by Ma Huan, but such isolated pieces of information tell us little in default of other material for comparison. Sulphur and silkworms were exported as well as pepper, and hill rice was grown for domestic consumption.
58. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 407; Winstedt, *Malay and its history*, p. 32.
Samudra and Pasè, situated one on either side of a river of the same name, succeeded each other as the centre of the small kingdom.
59. Professor Berg considers that Gajah Mada's policy of extending Majapahit influence both inside and outside Java was a temporary departure from Kertanagara's policy ("Sadeng-oorlog," p. 387-389, 403, 415; "Pril Majapahit," 198-201, 222, 223). According to Berg, no large-scale war was waged against any of the Nusantara after 1343 ("Sadeng-oorlog" p. 409), and Majapahit territory embraced only the central areas on Java and Bali, not Sunda ("Sadeng-oorlog," p. 411). Berg attaches very little value to the list given in the Nagarakrtagama of kingdoms subordinate to Majapahit. He considers that this is a document based on myths, simply reflecting the geographical knowledge of its framer, Prapança ("Sadeng-oorlog," p. 413), and that it is a more or

- less mystical claim to sovereignty over all the Nusantara or "other islands" (Berg, "Pril Majapahit," p. 512).
60. H. Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, WHS, series II, vol. XLI (vol. IV) "Ibn Batuta's Travels in Bengal and China," p. 95.
 61. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 396.
 62. First in 1405, later regularly between 1407 and 1431. Rockhill XVI, p. 152-155; Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 85-99.
 63. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I p. 145.
 64. *Ibid.*, p. 139, 163.
 - 64a. As this book was going to press, Professor Wertheim drew my attention to a paper by A. H. Johns (Conference of Southeast Asian History, University of Malaya, Singapore, Jan. 1961, stencil), *Sufism as a Category in Indonesian Literature and history*, in which great significance is attached to the influence of Sufi preaching on the Islamization of Indonesia. This would also explain why Islamization did not take place there until after the 13th century when the Sufis began to play an important part in the Islamic world. Although the Sufi orders maintained close relations with the merchants and craftsmen, the actual work of conversion is reputed to have been done by wandering preachers hailing from various Asian countries.
 65. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 336.
 66. *The Book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian*, ed. Yule and Cordier, vol. II, p. 284.
 67. J. P. Moquette, *Rapporten Oudheidkundige Dienst in Ned. Indië*, 1913. "De eerste vorsten van Samudra-Pasè," p. 1-12; *Encyclopaedie Ned.-Indië*, "Mohammedaansche Oudheden," III, p. 201 et seq.
 68. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 143.
A tombstone from Cambay (Moquette, p. 9) which was placed some considerable time later upon the grave of Samudra's first Moslem ruler Malik-al Saleh (d. 1297), does not rule out the possibility that Pasè was converted to Islam under Bengali influence. According to the *Malay Annals*, the conversion took place from Perlak after the latter place had been destroyed. (Moquette, p. 6). Pires' chronology on the matter of the Islamization of Pasè is obviously at fault. He states that it had occurred 160 years previously, that is to say not before the middle of the 14th century, while the date on the tombstone of the earliest known Moslem sultan is 1297.
 69. For the Islamization of Bengal see *Enzyklopaedie des Islam* (1927), t. I, p. 725.
In 1197 Buddhist Bihar was conquered and in 1199 the Moslem conquerors penetrated into Bengal itself.
 70. G. E. Marrison, "The Coming of Islam to the East Indies," *JRASMB* XXIV (1951), part I, p. 28-37.
 71. Schrieke, *Het boek van Bonang*, p. 10, 11; "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 16, cf. Van Leur, who denies that this occurred (Van Leur, "On early Asian Trade," p. 112, 363 note 122).
 72. In northeastern Europe medieval merchants often took priests with them on their long journeys, partly to perform ministrations but also, since priests could read and write, in a secretarial capacity. The church founded by merchants in a trading centre could serve a double purpose: in a foreign country the priest was able to read mass in his own church and the merchant had a permanent meeting-place at his disposal (*Hansische Geschichtsblätter* LXXVII (1959), p. 129, review by H. Weczerka of Paul Johansens' "Die Kaufmannskirche in Ostseeggebiet"). Is it not possible that in Asia, where the Moslem preachers would usually be more cultured than the travelling merchants, an analogous development took place?
 73. Yule, *Marco Polo* II, p. 294.
 74. Schrieke, *Bonang*, p. 12.
 75. According to Chinese sources dating from the early centuries of the Christian era, Javanese missions had already visited the Chinese imperial court at that time. For centuries tribute for the Chinese emperor was transported over the same route, which led through the straits between Bangka and Sumatra and along the coasts of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and Indo-China (G. Ferrand, "Le K'ouen-Louen et les anciennes navigations," *JA* 111 série, XIII (1919), p. 450, 451, 546; *Ibid.*, XIV, p. 14).
The Javanese must also have undertaken long voyages westwards, in fact Madagascar is reputed to have been colonized by them, and they also traded in the ports of East Africa. The tradition of Javanese long-distance shipping is encountered not only in the

works of the Arab writers but even in those of the 16th century Portuguese writer, Diogo Couto (G. Ferrand, "Le K'ouen-Louen," *J.A.* 11e série XIV, p. 65; D. Couto, Dec. IV, Liv. III, chap. 1, p. 169). In this connection it is worth noting Pires' observation that Javanese ships formerly sailed as far as Aden (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 174). The voyages made to this western Asian trading centre, however, must have been more commercial in character than those made in earlier days for the purpose of transporting booty or tribute.

76. Pires states that a century before his time, that is to say, around 1415, Javanese sovereignty extended as far as the Moluccas in the east and over almost the whole island of Sumatra in the west (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 174). Perhaps the vassal relationship in which Malacca stood to the Javanese Hindu kingdom in the sultans' era (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 245) is a further indication of this sovereignty. Majapahit must have owed its supremacy over the Malay trading centres to sea power. As Majapahit withdrew further inland, these trading centres resumed their independent existence, and subsequently the Javanese seaports actually became economically dependent, to a certain extent, upon Malacca.
77. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 402, 408, 409.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 408.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 409, 410, but cf. Berg, "Sadeng-oorlog," p. 412.
80. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 409.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 410, 411.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 412.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 413.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 412; According to Chinese chronology the attack by Hayam Wuruk took place in 1376 or 1377, according to the Javanese about 1361.
85. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 405.
86. Apart from the summary in the Nagarakrtagama, Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 417, also Krom, p. 390, according to G. Ferrand's identification of the passage in *Chau Ju-Kua*, and provided Sou-ki-tan may be identified with Java.
87. H. J. de Graaf, "Tomé Pires 'Suma Oriental' en het tijdperk van godsdienstovergang op Java," *BKI* CVIII (1952) p. 145.
88. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 182. Notably in Demak, Japara and Cheribon, although Malays were concerned here rather than western Asians. According to Chinese sources in Grise there may even have been a question of Chinese descent (see p. 107).
89. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 191.
90. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 40.
91. See p. 83, 84, 108 et seq.
92. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 46.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
94. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 426, 427, 449, 450, 451, 461.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 433.
96. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 182.
Pires' version supplies complete confirmation of Schrieke's account (based on Javanese data) of the way northern Java was converted to Islam. (Schrieke, *Bonang*).
97. See p. 160, 161.
98. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 283; Ferrand, "Çrivijaya," p. 66.
99. In the 13th century there was brisk shipping from the ports of southern China to the islands further south. This had already been observed by Marco Polo during his stay in China and he attributed the activity to trade in pepper and other spices (Yule, *Marco Polo* II, p. 272-275).
100. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 405.
101. *Encyklopaedie des Islam* III, p. 1112.
At the beginning of the 16th century small gold coins were in circulation in Pasè as well as small tin ones, and gold dust and silver were other media of exchange (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 144). The gold mentioned by both Ibn Batuta and Pires may, of course, have come from the hinterland of Sumatra.
102. *Encyklopaedie Nederl. Indië* I, p. 73.
103. E. W. van Orsoy de Flines, "Onderzoek naar en van keramische scherven in de bodem van noordelijk midden Java 1940-1942," in *Verslag 1941-1947 van de Oudheidkundige Dienst* (Archaeological Service) in *Indonesië* (covers shards dating from the 9th century

- and later). Cf. also H. J. de Graaf, *De regering van Panembahan Senapati Ingalaga*, 1954, p. 18 (about finds in the soil of Padjang, in east Java, dating from the 13th century and later).
104. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 36; See also Wang Gungwu "The Nanhai Trade," p. 118, 119.
 105. Rockhill, *TP* XV, p. 442-446.
 106. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 47-53; Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 238, 245; Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche geschiedenis*, p. 398.
 107. Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 241; Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 47, 48 (Ma Huan 1425-1432).
The founding of Grise on a deserted strip of seacoast must have taken place some time later than the mid-14th century, since a Chinese source from 1349 mentions nothing about a trading place on this spot (Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 236), (Wang Ta Yuan 1349).
 108. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 117-119; Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 256-260.
 109. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 179.

CHAPTER II

1. *Sejarah Melayu*, published in English translation by J. Leyden (1821), *The Malay Annals*: this is the version corresponding to the publication by Shellabear (Romanised edition 1898 and by Winstedt in *JRASMB* XVI (1938), part 3, p. 1-226, also XXII, part 1 (1949), p. 170-180. It was originally compiled in Johore in 1612-1613; *Ibid.*, translation by C. C. Brown in *JRASMB* XXV, parts 2 and 3 (1952). The "Raffles" MS. No. 18, Library RAS, compiled about 1536.
For the origin of the Malay Annals see R. Winstedt in *JRASMB* XVI, part 3 (1938), p. 27-41; *Ibid.*, *The Malays*, p. 150-151; *Malay Literature*, p. 106, 107; W. Linehan, "The sources of the Shellabear text of the Malay Annals," *JRASMB* XX, part 2, (1947), p. 105 et seq. Also Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 148, 367, 450-453, 455, 464, 472, 474, 480.
2. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 24.
3. Schrieke considers that these refugees were Javanese Hindu traders (Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power" [in *Indonesian Sociological Studies*], p. 16).
4. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 229-238. In Note 1 on page 229 A. Cortesao summarizes the various versions of the founding of Malacca. Pires appears to have a great deal of new information at his disposal. Cf. also C. O. Blagden, "Notes on Malay History," *JRASB* LIII (1909), p. 139-162.
5. Selat = straits.
6. Winstedt, "A history of Malaya," *JRASMB* XIII, part 2 (1935), p. 39.
7. Pires mentions them in the same context as the Bugis, the seafarers and pirates who frequented the coasts of Celebes and Borneo and are mentioned so frequently in later sources (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 233). In another connection Pires contrasts Celates and Bugis (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 147), proof that he was not quite clear about the difference between these seafaring peoples.
8. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 235.
9. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 20, 165, 167, 414.
10. W. W. Rockhill, *TP*, 2nd series XVI (1915), p. 115-117.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 117-118.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 115, 118. Not a thieves' market, therefore. Cf. the Portuguese verdict, that of Braz d'Albuquerque, for example, *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque*, translated by W. de Gray Birch. *WHS* III (1880), p. 76.
14. Rockhill, *TP* 2nd series XVI (1915), p. 117; R. O. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 42.
15. Gibson-Hill, "Johore Lama and Other Ancient Sites on the Johore River, *JRASMB* XXVIII, part 2 (1955), p. 141, considers that the Malaccan sultans had little to do with Malacca's prosperity. Yet it was the sultans who created the conditions that made trade possible.
16. The eldest son of sultan Mansur Shah kills the son of the *bendahara* and therefore cannot succeed his father in Malacca. He becomes the sultan of Pahang (Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 97, 98).
17. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 263; R. O. Winstedt, *Malaya and its History*, p. 35.

18. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 556.
19. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 182.
20. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 243, 248; Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 556.
21. While Pires holds that Patani and Kedah were outside Malacca's direct sphere of influence (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 243, 244, 248, 260), and the same assumption is made by Rouffaer in his critical appreciation of the *Sejarah Melayu* (Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 556), Winstedt and Wilkinson abide by the *Annals* and record Patani and Kedah as vassal states of Malacca (Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 53; *Ibid.*, *Malaya and its History*, p. 34; R. J. Wilkinson, "The Malacca Sultanate," *JRASMB*, part 2, XIII (1935), p. 62).
22. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 244, 262, 264; Winstedt, *Malaya and its History*, p. 35.
23. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 264.
24. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 261; Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 549, 584.
25. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 147, 148.
A Chinese source dating from 1618 but based on earlier data reports a similar case of piracy organized by the ruler of a country, namely by the ruler of Brunei (Borneo). Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 102. In this case half the booty in prisoners and goods went to the king.
26. Leyden, *Malay Annals*, p. 224 et seq; Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 120-122; Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 251.
27. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 245.
28. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 550, 552, 553.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 554.
30. Smaller tribute-paying states on the east coast of Sumatra were: Rokan, which was originally subordinate to Aru and under whose authority it again came to stand (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 244); Tongkal, which was situated near Indragiri and was also a gold-exporting country (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 264); and, finally, Arkat and Purim. The principal activities of all these small countries were fishing and piracy.
31. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 550, 552, 553; Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 153; *Ibid.*, II, p. 263.
32. *Ibid.*, I, p. 156; *Ibid.*, II, p. 250, 264.
33. R. J. Wilkinson, "The fall of Malacca," *JRASMB* XIII, part 2 1935, p. 68.
34. Thus sultan Alaudin probably died from poison administered to him at the instigation of the kings of Pahang and Indragiri (Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 51).
35. G. Ferrand, "Le Malaya et Malayur," *JA* 11e série, XI (1918), p. 472.
36. For the Chinese trade, which until the mid-19th century took the form of tribute, see J. K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, p. 23-38.
37. The opinions variously held as to the cause and purpose of these expeditions are set forth by Wolfgang Franke, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Forschung zur Geschichte Chinas im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert," *Saeculum* VII (1956), p. 420, 421. According to Duyvendak the voyages were primarily occasioned by the need for obtaining luxury articles for the imperial court, a view adopted by Sansom as well. Moreover, both Fairbank and Chang Wei-hua point out that the official expeditions should probably be seen in connection with Chinese overseas trade, which was already very extensive at that time. Fairbank surmises that, even before the expeditions began, overseas trade was largely in the hands of Chinese business-men, and that trade no longer took the form (as it had done previously) of tribute missions from abroad. Overseas trade carried on by Chinese merchants in Chinese ships must have had a bad effect upon the tribute system. In this connection Fairbank considers that one aspect of the expeditions may possibly have been an attempt to channel overseas trade back into the confines of the formal structure of the system. This is, however, only a hypothesis advanced in the hope of finding a satisfactory solution (J. K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, p. 33-37) See also W. Eberhard, *Chinas Geschichte*, p. 287, 288; G. B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan, a Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures*, p. 43; Duyvendak, "Zeereizen Chinezen," p. 104.
38. Kings of Pahang, Kampar and Indragiri, for example, off-shoots of the Malaccan dynasty, traced their lineage to a marriage between one of the Malaccan rulers and a Chinese woman (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 242).
39. See p. 74 et seq.
40. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 238.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 236, 238.

42. When Albuquerque's fleet was approaching Malacca in 1511, a very richly laden junk was seized just as it left the harbour *en route* to Siam (*Commentaries* III, p. 65). Pires, too, includes Siamese among the merchants who visited Malacca. Since his list dates from just after the fall of the city (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 268) it is possible that this commercial relationship was of very recent date.
43. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 239, 240.
44. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 33.
45. Schrieke, *Bonang*, p. 12.
46. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 239.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
48. Van Leur's notion that the rise of Malacca was furthered by a political decline of the ports of north Sumatra (Van Leur, "On Early Asian Trade," in *Indonesian Trade and Society*, p. 112, 363), is not confirmed by Pires' account.
49. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 239.
50. *Ibid.*, II, p. 240; see also Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, part 2, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," p. 230 et seq.
51. Leyden, *Malay Annals*, p. 91-93; Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 52-54.
52. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 241.
53. Pires does not mention the Gujarati here (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 240), although in his time they were already trading in both Malacca and Pasè (Cf. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 144). Schrieke considers that about 1450 there was an exodus of Javanese Hindu traders from Palembang to Pasè and later to Malacca. It is probable, however, that the Javanese who appeared in Malacca were already Moslems when they arrived there. (Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 16, 17).
54. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 144.
55. Pires specifically mentions Arabs here (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 240) and distinguishes them very carefully from other western Asians. This indicates, therefore, that influences towards conversion sprang also from Mohammed's native country, not only from India (Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Arabië en Oost Indië*, p. 13-15).
56. The Malaccan ruler who was converted to Islam at an advanced age was sultan Muhammed Iskander Shah (d. 1424). There are many inconsistencies in the chronology of the Malaccan rulers and it is difficult to find a correspondence between the accounts in the Chinese chronicles and Pires' version of the Malay tradition which is repeated by Albuquerque in the *Commentaries*. For the penetration of Islam in Indonesia see also Schrieke II, "Ruler and Realm," p. 230 et seq.
57. When Ma Huan (1425-1432) visited Malacca he found that the inhabitants were Moslems (Rockhill, *TP XVI*, p. 115).
58. Ferrand, "Le Malāya et Malayūr," p. 441.
59. Rouffaer, "Malaka" p. 550, 551, 552, 553.
60. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 33; Schrieke, *Bonang*, p. 34.
61. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 245.
62. Van Leur ("On Early Asian Trade" p. 112) attributes Malacca's conversion to Islam partly to the support which it hoped to receive from the powerful allies in the West. Yet under the threat of Portuguese attack Malacca turned to China, not to western Asia, for help.

CHAPTER III

1. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 228; Barbosa *Book* II, p. 169-179.
2. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 286.
3. Godinho de Eredia, *Declaração de Malaca*. ed. L. Janssen. Cap. I, 4-6; Mills, "Eredia's Description of Malacca," *JRASMB* VIII, part 1 (1930), p. 19, 20; Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 167. Cf. also Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 259, where the names of the districts are mentioned but not the nationality of the people living in them.
4. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 90.
4. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 408, 409.

5. For the harbour of Malacca see *JRASSB* LII (1909), p. 111-115, extract from an article by D. F. A. Hervey in the *Singapore Free Press* of 1884.
When the Portuguese captured Malacca, the harbour had deep water and a fine, sandy bay, but in the course of time it deteriorated greatly owing to climatological influences.
6. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* I, p. 123.
7. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 269.
8. *Ibid.*, I, p. 123.
9. *Ibid.*, II, p. 284.
10. There is a big difference between Pires' description of the fertile surroundings of Malacca (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 236) and the Chinese reports of poor, arid, soil in which few products could be grown (Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 117). It is, of course, possible, that in the century that had elapsed since the Chinese accounts were written the countryside around Malacca had been subjected to better methods of cultivation.
11. The estimates of the size of the population of Malacca in the sultans' era cannot be checked. Albuquerque's figure of 100,000 inhabitants must have been very much on the high side (Wilkinson, "Fall of Malacca," p. 68-69), but the Malay Annals quote an even higher figure (190,000) (Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 408, 409). A more reliable impression is made by Ruy Araujo, the sultan's Portuguese prisoner, who reports that there were 10,000 homes (hearthstones) in the city in 1510. Assuming the average family to consist of 4 or 5 persons, we arrive at a population of 40,000 to 50,000, a figure which corresponds with Araujo's other estimate that in the events of war Malacca could raise 4,000 fighting men. (*Alguns Documentos*, p. 220).
The figure of 40,000 to 50,000 inhabitants also fits in better with the more exact data available for a later period when the Portuguese had become the masters of the city.
12. See p. 29, 30.
13. For the export of "troepoek" or fish roe see p. 81.
14. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 260.
15. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 408; Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 156.
16. For the export of Peguan junks see p. 69-71.
17. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 250; Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 142.
This means that the report that Malaccan merchants had junks built after the city fell to the Portuguese (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 283) is not necessarily contradictory. The junks in question may also have been ordered elsewhere.
18. Godinho de Eredia, cap. XIII, p. 26; Mills, "Eredia's Description," *JRASMB* VIII, 1 (1930), p. 36.
19. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 272 (Coromandel); Barbosa, *Book* II, p. 117 (Ceylon); *Ibid.*, p. 175 (Bengal); Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 98 (Pegu); *Ibid.*, p. 118, 122, 123 (China).
20. Sultan Muzaffar is reputed to have made improvements to the harbour (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 246).
21. Godinho de Eredia, cap. XI, p. 22; Mills, "Eredia's Description," *JRASMB* VIII, 1 (1930), p. 32, 33.
22. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 275.
23. Barros, *Da Asia*, Dec. II, Liv. VI, cap. VI, p. 89.
24. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 275.
25. *The Itinerario of Ludovico de Varthema of Bologna from 1502-1508*, ed. R. C. Temple, (1928), p. 86.
The credibility of Varthema has been in doubt since Garcia da Orta (1558-1561). According to R. C. Temple, Varthema's editor, the *Itinerario* is quite reliable, and, if so, it provides us with the first account by a European of the regions of the Malay Straits and the Indonesian Archipelago. Compared with the descriptions left by Pires and Barbosa, however, Varthema's account fails to give any impression of being based on first-hand knowledge.
26. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 276, 277.
How conscientious Pires was in his research is indicated by a passage in which he deplores the fact that the Portuguese government in Cochín did not take enough notice of his very accurate determination of a Malaccan unit of weight, a task which he had carried out in Malacca in his capacity as secretary (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 278).
27. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 277.
28. Dulaurier, Ed. *Institutions maritimes de l'archipel d'Asie, trad. en français Textes malay et bougui* (extrait Pardessus); B. F. Matthes, *Over de Wadjorezen met hun handels-en scheepswetboek*.

The rules of maritime law for South Celebes published by L. J. J. Caron were not codified until the second half of the 17th century. Caron has not gone into the connection with the maritime law of Malay (L. J. J. Caron, *Het handels- en zeerecht in de adatrechts-regelen van de rechtskring Zuid-Celebes*. Bussum, 1937).

Attention may well be drawn here to a Japanese maritime code, published by F. Joûon des Longrais, which is reputed to have had its origin in the Middle Ages ("Un coutumier maritime japonais médiéval," in *Etudes d'histoire du droit privé offertes à Pierre Petot*, Paris, 1959, p. 301-319).

29. Wilkinson, "Sultanate," p. 28; Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 54-59. In the Annals the organization of the governing body is attributed to Muhammed Shah, in Pires to Iskander Shah.
30. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 264, 265.
The accounts given by modern writers of the way in which the government of Malacca was organized are based on what Albuquerque has to say on the subject in the *Commentaries*. He, in turn, must have obtained his data from Pires, with whom he is largely in agreement. Pires, however, goes into much greater detail and provides more exact information. Yet Winstedt is the only modern writer who quotes Pires at all, and he does this very briefly in *Malaya and its History* (the popular version of his "History of Malaya") and then only in reference to the *shahbandars* (p. 36). Pires was not yet available to Winstedt when the latter wrote the "History of Malaya."
31. The *Paduca Raja* may have been the young son of the king.
32. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 87.
33. This was probably not a municipal post any more than the office of *shahbandar*, since there is nothing to indicate that Malacca enjoyed autonomous government. For that matter, autonomous towns were an institution unknown in Asia (M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* I, p. 87, 89, 291). Pires was misled here by his western way of looking at things.
34. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 87.
35. The *laksamana* only had command at sea.
36. Wilkinson, "Sultanate," p. 30, 31.
37. *Shahbandar*, a word of Persian origin (see Ferrand, "L'élément persan," p. 239) commonly used in the East to denote the person entrusted with the supervision of a harbour. In the earliest Dutch accounts of voyages the *shahbandars* were among the most important Asian personages with whom the Dutch came into contact.
38. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 273.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
40. Pardessus VI, p. 448.
41. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 273, 274.
42. Pardessus VI, p. 439.
43. Wilkinson, "Sultanate," p. 26.
44. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 265.
45. Pardessus VI, p. 439.
46. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 273.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
52. Although it is Pires' intention to describe the situation under the sultans, it is, of course, possible that he means an institution founded after the conquest of the town.
53. Report by Balthasar Bort, V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1679 I vervolg, fol. 584 et seq.
54. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 273, 274.
55. *Gedenkwaardigste Zee- en Landreysen na Oost- en West-Indiën*, uitg. Pieter van der Aa, dl. V ("Scheepstogt van Jorge d'Aguiar," p. 32).
56. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 273, 274.
57. See p. 40.
58. Pardessus VI, p. 381, 382.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 380, 381, 431.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 420.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 408.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 403, 404.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 407-409, 423-425.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 439.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 419.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 420.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 407, 408.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 408.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 407.
71. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 283.
72. Pardessus VI, p. 408.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 408.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 381, 421.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 404.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 407.
77. 1 *koyan* = 30 *pikol* = 3,750 pounds. The weight of a *gantang* varied in different parts of the country, but was between 8½ and 12 pounds. The 4½ pounds mentioned in the maritime code was therefore calculated on a very low basis. Practically no conclusions can be drawn from these unreliable figures.
78. Pardessus VI, p. 421.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 409.
80. Villiers, *The Indian Ocean*, p. 68-81.
81. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 283, 284.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 283, 284.
83. In the Japanese "respondencias" of the 16th and early 17th centuries the risk was also for the lender of the money. The texts of these Japanese *commenda* transactions have been preserved. See, among others, Seiichi Iwao, "Jan Joosten, the Forerunner of the Dutch Japanese Relation," reprint of the *Bulletin of the Japan-Netherlands Society* 1, Tokyo, 1958.
84. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 285.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 284.
86. Tanjung Pura, nowadays a village in the western part of Borneo in the state of Matan and formerly the capital of Matan. (*Aardrijkskundig Woordenboek Nederl.-Indië* III, Amsterdam 1869, 887).
87. Pardessus VI, p. 426.
88. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 284, 285.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
92. Cf. Hobson-Jobson, A Chetti is a member of the merchant caste in southern India (Banyans in northern India).
93. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 245 (letter from Affonso de Albuquerque to the king, 1st April 1512).
94. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 80. 140 *quintals* = 8,824 kg. Pires estimates Mansur Shah's fortune at 120 *quintals* of gold and large quantities of precious stones (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 250).
95. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 249, 265, 266; Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 47; Wilkinson, "Sultanate," p. 44.
96. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 285.
97. Wilkinson, "Sultanate," p. 27.
98. e.g. Admiral Hang Tuah and the coastal inhabitants of Bintang.
99. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 86.
100. For Tun Perak see Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 66-68, 86-89, 92-94, 98, 105-108, 111-119. Apparently Pires did not realize that the *bendaharas* were chosen from various families, and so he confuses Tun Perak with the Tamil "kingmaker" who played such an important rôle in the reign of Muzaffar. It is remarkable that, according to Pires, the Tamil mercantile family did not become influential under Muzaffar but only under Mansur. Moreover Pires states that this Kling was still heathen in Muzaffar's time, so that he cannot have been converted to Islam before Mansur's reign (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 249).

101. For Hang Tuah see Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 76-86, 92, 99, 100, 103, 104, 111-113, 116-118, 120-122, 140, 142; also the "Hikajat Hang Tuah." In *An Attempt of Interpretation of the Main Characters of the Malay "Hikayat Hang Tuah"* (paper presented by the USSR delegation to the XXV International Congress of Orientalists, Moscow, 1960) B. Parnickel calls attention to the different conception of the figure of Hang Tuah in the Malay Annals and in the Hikayat Hang Tuah, which was written 150 years later.
102. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 249.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
104. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 160.
105. Wilkinson, "Sultanate," p. 64.
106. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 134, cf. Wilkinson, "Sultanate," p. 64, who gives another translation and is probably keeping to the Leyden edition of the *Malay Annals*.
107. For Tun Mutahir see Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 95, 134, 135, 156-164.
108. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 176.
109. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 348 (letter from Ruy de Brito to the king, 6/1 1514).
110. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 214.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 41, 42; see also Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 125.
112. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 42.
113. Thomas Bowrey, *A Geographical Account of Countries round the Bay of Bengal, 1669-1679*. WHS, 1905, p. 24.
114. *Nair* = member of an aristocratic caste.
115. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 82.
116. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 177.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
118. Barros, *Da Asia*, Dec. II, Liv. IV, cap. IV, p. 405; *Ibid.*, Dec. II, Liv. VI, cap. III, p. 52, 53; Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 280-282.
119. Barros, *Da Asia*, Dec. II, Liv. VI, cap. VII, p. 93.
120. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 254.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
122. *Ibid.*, I, p. 93.
123. *Ibid.*, II, p. 249.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 266, 267.
125. Barros, *Da Asia*, Dec. II, Liv. VI, cap. VI, p. 86.
126. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 214.
127. Barros, *Da Asia*, Dec. III, part 1, p. 579.
Barros holds that Islam was spread in the Moluccas by Malays from Malacca as well as by Javanese: "assi os Jaos e Malayos já convertidos navegando as ilhas de Maluco e Banda, converteram as provoacoes maritimas com que tinham commercio."
128. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 55.
129. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 193.
130. Van Leur, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 85, 339 note 199.
131. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 176, 177.
132. Godinho de Eredia, cap. XIII, p. 26; Mills, "Eredia's Description of Malacca," p. 36-40.
133. See p. 163, 164.
134. Godinho de Eredia, cap. XIV, p. 31/32; Mills, "Eredia's Description of Malacca," p. 39.
135. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 220. (A Portuguese prisoner, probably Ruy de Araujo, to Affonso de Albuquerque 16/2 1510).
136. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," p. 57.

CHAPTER IV

1. At the beginning of the 16th century Aden and Jidda (the port of Mecca; were more important trading towns than Mocha, which did not become a flourishing port until the end of the 16th century (see Enrykl. Islam, I, p. 139; III, p. 631-632, also Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, 15-18).
2. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 269.

3. *Die Topographischen Capitel des Indischen Seespiegels*. Pub. M. Bittner (1897). About Sidi'Ali, *Mohlt*, p. 1.
 4. *Mohlt*, p. 3, 5, 6; Ferrand, *Astronomie Nautique*, p. 116; Ferrand, "Le pilote arabe de Vasco de Gama," *Ann. de Geogr.* 1922, p. 293.
 5. The Arab writings used by Sidi'Ali for his *Mohlt* are those of Shihab ed-din Ahmed ibn Madjid, whom Ferrand identifies with the Mu' allim or sea-captain in Melinde who furnished da Gama with valuable data for the crossing to the west coast of India (Ferrand, "Le pilote arabe," p. 289, 290, 292; Ferrand, *Astronomie nautique*, p. 184. Mu' allim means "master of the boat" or "master of astrological navigation," that is to say, the person from whom advice is sought before the commencement of a voyage). Ibn Madjid must have drawn up his documents between 1460 and 1494 or 1495, those of Sulayman-al Mahri, who carried on Ibn Madjid's work, date from 1511 (Ferrand, *Astronomie nautique*, p. 298-312. (Instructions nautiques de Sulayman), *Ibid.*, p. 237). Both Ibn Madjid and Sulayman al Mahri were Arabs (Ferrand, "Le pilote arabe," p. 293, 295; Ferrand, *Astronomie nautique*, p. 197). The former was probably a Shi-ite Moslem from Djulfar, an old seaport town in the province of Oman in southeast Arabia, and the latter probably came from Chihzm in the Djurz region, which is also in southern Arabia. Ferrand, the French arabic scholar, places a high value on these writings and calls them an admirable synthesis of the state of knowledge at the time. The Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris contains a copy of the original version which includes 19 sailing instructions and nautical tracts by Ibn Madjid. These have been published in arabic by G. Ferrand. They represent much more than the results of personal experience, although Ibn Madjid emphasizes that his own experience had rendered him capable of checking and verifying the whole work (Ferrand, "Le pilote arabe," p. 302). Moreover his document includes information gleaned from the writings on nautical subjects by his own father and grandfather who, like himself, were ships' captains, but whose knowledge was limited to the "Arabian and African coasts of the Red Sea" (Ferrand, "Le pilote arabe," p. 298). Finally, Ibn Madjid included in his work data from much earlier Arab and Persian authors, men who were not themselves professional seafarers but compilers of information. The latter had made use of the journals kept by voyagers, most of whom, presumably, were merchants rather than seamen (Ferrand, "Le pilote arabe," p. 304, 305; *Idem.*, *Astronomie nautique*, p. 223).
- In contrast to Ferrand, who holds that these papers go back to the 12th century, Sauvaget dates them as 10th century and points out that a considerable time elapsed between the production of these documents and those of Ibn Madjid (Sauvaget, p. 18). These papers must also have contained data from outside Ibn Madjid's own field of experience, for details are given about the lands between Cape Comorin and China, "the countries below the wind." The Malays, with whom this expression probably originated, drew the division between the countries above and below the wind near the northern tip of Sumatra (Ferrand "Le pilote arabe," p. 295). Apart from what they had learned by personal experience, Ibn Madjid and Sulayman al Mahri may have gained some of their knowledge about the eastern half of the Indian Ocean and of Indonesia from nautical documents originating in southern India, among the Colas on the Coromandel coast. Ferrand assumes this because the Colas' method of measuring latitude has been adopted in the Arabian instructions (Ferrand, *Astronomie nautique*, p. 243, 247).
- The assumption that these Arabs (who were seamen and not merchants) were not personally acquainted with Indonesia is based on the fact that they say, incorrectly, that Java lies north-south, a mistake which is repeated in the Turkish version of Sidi' Ali (Ferrand, "Le pilote arabe," p. 298). To be sure, Sulayman al Mahri appears to have a general knowledge of some of the Indonesian islands, but as soon as he goes into greater detail he stops short at Malacca and omits the actual Indonesian region. (Ferrand, *Astronomie nautique*, p. 242). His ideas about the region to the east of Malacca, and in particular about the China Sea, are too arbitrary and reveal great uncertainty (*Mohlt*, p. 12).

Attention must be drawn, however to a recent publication by T. A. Šumowsky (*Tri neizvestnye locii Achmada ibn Madkida Arabskogo locmana Wasko da Gamy w unikalnoj rukopisi Instituta vostokovedenija A. N. SSSR*. Predislovie D. A. Olderozge, Moskwa-Leningrad 1957) contains three hitherto unpublished documents by Ibn Madjid. They were previously in the possession of the former Asian Museum and are at present kept in

the Academy of Sciences in Leningrad. It was thanks to the well-known arabist I. J. Kračkowski that the volume with the so-called carmina could be attributed to Vasco da Gama's Arab pilot. Kračkowski drew Ferrand's attention to these unknown writings and through his intervention Ferrand received photo-copies of them. The latter considered that they were worth publishing, but his death in 1935 prevented the execution of this plan. At the instance of Kračkowski, Šumowsky undertook the task. The MS. was ready for the press in 1938 but the war delayed publication until 1957.

The Leningrad papers of Ibn Madjid are nautical guides, one of them covering a voyage from India to Malacca. Closer study of this publication certainly promises to be both interesting and rewarding. According to information provided by Professor W. F. Wertheim, the above-mentioned papers describe the sailing route from Calicut to Ceylon and on to the Nicobar Islands, the crossing from there to Penang and then the route along the coast of the Malay Peninsula to Malacca. It proved possible to identify the various points mentioned along the route. A superficial account is also given of Malacca itself. The guide must post-date 1500 and it is absolutely certain that Ibn Madjid must have made the voyage in person, the writings contain no information, however, about the territories to the east of Malacca.

In one of the papers there is a remarkable declaration by Ibn Madjid, which might perhaps be interpreted as an expression of regret at having shown the Portuguese the way. Unfortunately the passage in question is rather ambiguously worded so that its meaning is not entirely clear.

Setting aside the question of the authenticity of Ibn Madjid's observations in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, his writings represented the achievement of a peak of scholarship, and they had considerable influence upon the region in and around the Indian Ocean, primarily because of the empirical nature of the knowledge displayed about navigational techniques and, more especially, astronomical observations.

6. A. Villiers, *The Indian Ocean*, p. 52, 53.

The Arab ocean-going sailing-vessels or dhows survived until shortly before the second world war. Operating from the port of Kuwait they carried passengers and goods at cheap rates to and from the east coast of Africa and the west coast of India. These Arab dhows must have differed little from their 16th century predecessors, and the same applies to the trade carried on in these ships by the great numbers of small-time pedlars, each trading separately on a small scale (Villiers, p. 68, 71, 91, 92). A very detailed description of the Indian ships with a number of carefully-made drawings can be found in Thomas Bowrey's diary of his voyages. This writer traversed the Indian Ocean in many directions in private service and at his own expense. He compiled his work at the end of the 17th century but he must have come across many older types of ships. It is precisely because of this that his account is so valuable (Th. Bowrey, *Geographical account*, p. 42, 43, 99, 102, 103, 140, 228). Mookerji's well-known work on Indian shipping borrows Bowrey's description in its entirety, p. 231 et seq.

7. According to G. F. Hourani, *Arab seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*, p. 96, the Arab and Indian ships were built without rivets not in order to avoid rust but because they could be built more cheaply and possessed greater resilience if no iron was used in their construction. Hourani has to admit that these lashed ships were extremely frail (Hourani, p. 93), but in that case it is not very likely that they could weather the typhoons in the China Sea as he appears to assume.
8. Yule, *Marco Polo* I, p. 20, 108; see also *Cathay* III, p. 66, 69 (description of these ships by John of Montecorvino).
9. Coen, *Bescheiden* V, p. 535; VII, 1513, 1514, 1537.
10. Pieter van Dam, *Beschrijvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie*, pub. F. W. Stapel, II, 3, p. 14; *Dagregister Batavia* 1636, p. 110, 111.
11. At the beginning of the 17th century the transport of goods from Suez (Cairo's port on the Red Sea) to Mocha – which at that time had largely superseded Aden as a commercial centre – took place in a very large ship of 1,400 tons' burden. This ship was riveted – an exception in those parts – and it was to this fact that it owed its Arabic name of "the nailed ship" (Archives of the States General No. 7076, letters from Constantinople, Hadji Abraham report, 28th March 1617).
- 11a. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 269.
12. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 269.
13. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 16, 17; Yule, *Marco Polo* II, p. 438-441.

For the spice traders in Egypt in the time of the Mamluks, see W. J. Fischel, "The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt," in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, I (1958), p. 157-174.

From the 12th to the 15th century, trade in spices and pepper was in the hands of a group of Moslem merchants called the Kārimī who had their main supply centre in the Yemen (Aden) and shipped the goods from there to Egypt. Fischel assumes that these merchants formed a "closely organized corporation." He attributes its decline partly to interference on the part of the Egyptian government, which wanted to make a state monopoly of the spice trade and partly to the discovery of the Cape route. The latter is, in my opinion, a doubtful factor since this discovery did not drastically affect the spice trade via the Levant in the 16th century.

For the Kārimī merchants see also S. D. Goitein, "New Light on the Beginnings of the Kārim Merchants," in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, I (1958), p. 175-184.

14. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 43; *Ibid.*, II, p. 270.

15. Barbosa, *Book I*, p. LIX, 91.

16. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 42; Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 117.

17. Too much reliance, however, must not be placed on the passage in Mookerji's book (p. 194) which states that as early as the beginning of the 14th century Fra Odoric of Pordenone put to sea in a Gujarati ship with a crew of 700 men, and on the basis of this draws conclusions about the vast maritime experience and adroitness of the Indian seamen. Just as Mookerji wrongly applies Marco Polo's description of southern Chinese ships to Indian ships as well, so his habit of considering events from a nationalistic point of view plays him false here too. According to the text of Fra Odoric in *Cathay* II, p. 131, it was in a Chinese junk that the latter embarked on the Malabar coast.

It is, of course, an established fact that conversion to Islam and the closer contact with Arab and Persian seamen which resulted from it stimulated the Gujarati to expand their shipping and commercial activities. For the navigational skill of the Gujarati see also Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 58.

Pires describes the Gujarati ships as being bigger and better manned than other ships on the west coast of India (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 45).

18. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 46; *Ibid.*, II, p. 268.

19. Witness the career of Malik Ayaz, a Russian taken prisoner in his youth by the Turks, who later became vizier to the ruler of Gujarat and an able leader in the struggle against the Portuguese (Barbosa, *Book I*, p. LXIV, 119).

20. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 33.

21. Barros, *Da Asia*, Dec. II, Liv. VI, cap. I.

22. Leyden, *Malay Annals*, p. 133.

23. Barbosa, *Book I*, p. 109.

24. See p. 110.

25. Barbosa, *Book I*, p. 147, 148.

26. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 45; G. E. Marrison in *JRASMB* XXIV (1951), I, p. 28-37.

27. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 270.

The value of 1 *crusado* (an old Portuguese coin made of gold) was 390 *reis* in Pires' time, although according to his own calculations it seems to have been the equivalent of 375 *reis*. Cortesao puts the value of 1 *crusado* converted into modern currency at about 285 *escudos* or £ 2.17/- (note by Cortesao in Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 100).

28. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 347 (Ruy de Brito, governor of Malacca, to king Manuel, 6 Jan. 1514).

29. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 270.

30. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 224 (Ruy de Araujo to Affonso de Albuquerque 6 Feb. 1510).

31. See p. 66, 67, 69; Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 272.

32. Yule, *Cathay* IV, p. 3 (Ibn Batuta).

33. Barbosa, *Book I*, p. 56.

34. *Ibid.*, II, p. XXIII.

35. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 16, 17.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Yet there must have been shipping from Malacca to the Malabar coast and in particular to the port of Calicut. Cha Masser, the commercial agent of the Venetian Republic in

Lisbon, reports that in 1506 ships came to Calicut from Malacca carrying all sorts of spices and also some precious stones such as rubies and diamonds (Rouffaer, "Waar kwamen de raadselachtige Moetisalah's vandaan?" *BKI* L, p. 655, 656).

37. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 130.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 129-132; *Alguns Documentos*, p. 347, 348 (Ruy de Brito, 6 Jan. 1514).
39. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 74, 81.
40. The small shells used as change in parts of Asia.
41. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 82.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 83, 84.
43. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 125.
44. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 271, 272.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
46. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 347 (Ruy de Brito, 6 Jan. 1514).
47. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 272.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 272, cf. p. 270.
49. *Ibid.*, I, p. 45.
50. *Ibid.*, II, p. 272.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 272, 255.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
53. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 139; Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 88.
54. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 271.
55. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 142, 145.
56. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 92; cf. *Alguns Documentos* p. 223 (Ruy de Araujo 6/2 1510).
57. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 88, 92; Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 145, 146.
58. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 93 (cf. the import duty in Malacca equals 6%. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 92).
59. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 94, 95.
63. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 117.
64. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 87.
65. Part of present-day Burma.
66. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 98. Ruy de Araujo reports the arrival of only 4 junks in 1510 (*Alguns Documentos*, p. 223, 6/2 1510); Ruy de Brito, however, speaks of many junks (*Alguns Documentos*, p. 346, 6/1 1514).
67. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 195.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 98; Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 152.
69. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 158, 159.
70. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 98.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 100. At this point Pires gives the market value of cowries in the Peguan town of Martaban; a chicken can be bought for 400 or 500 cowries (1500 cowries = 1 *calaim* = 3/100 *cruzados*).
72. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
75. *Ibid.*, II, p. 284; see p. 50, 51.
76. *Ibid.*, I, p. 99.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 106, 107; cf. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 164, 165.
79. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 107.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
81. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 164.
82. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 284.
83. *Ibid.*, I, p. 107.
84. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 345 (Ruy de Brito, 6/1 1514).
85. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 107.
86. *Cassia fistula* = a cinnamon-like plant.
87. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 108.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

89. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 163.
90. Pires, *Suma Oriental I*, p. 104, 108.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 108, 109.
92. Higher taxes, namely 2 : 9 were levied on non-Chinese; on Chinese the tax was 2 : 12.
93. Pires, *Suma Oriental I*, p. 104.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 108, 226.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 105, 106.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 113, 115.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 112, 113, 114, 115.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
103. Duyvendak, "Zeereizen Chinezen," p. 104, 105; Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, p. 41, 141-143.
104. Duyvendak, "Zeereizen Chinezen," p. 104.
105. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, p. 43, 101, 108, 141-143.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 43, 143.
107. J. Poujade, *La route des Indes et ses navires*, holds that Chinese ships were better built, as regards both rigging (bamboo sails) and hull, than any other Asian ships (p. 159-168, 210, 212, 242, et seq.).
108. Yule, *Marco Polo II*, p. 249-251; Mookerji, in *Indian Shipping*, holds that this description by Marco Polo applies to Indian ships (p. 191-193), whereas Polo distinctly speaks of the ships of the land of Mansi (i.e. south China).
109. Yule, *Marco Polo II*, p. 251.
110. There is no reference to the use of a compass at sea until the 13th century, but its use may go back to the end of the 11th century (Duyvendak, "Zeereizen Chinezen," p. 102). The Chinese mariner's compass, however, was a primitive instrument, consisting of a needle, which had previously been rubbed with loadstone, floating on a straw in a bowl of water (Eredia, p. 27).
111. Pires, *Suma Oriental II*, p. 284.
112. Yule, *Marco Polo II*, p. 250.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
114. Pires, *Suma Oriental I*, p. 118.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 125; Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 213, 214; *Alguns Documentos*, p. 223 (Ruy de Araujo 6/2 1510, p. 347; Ruy de Brito 6/1 1514).
117. Pires, *Suma Oriental I*, p. 127; in China the excise duties on salt were farmed out.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
119. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 214.
120. Yule, *Marco Polo II*, p. 210. It is said that in Marco Polo's time for every shipload of pepper that went to Alexandria destined for European consumption 100 shiploads went to southern China.
121. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 223 (Ruy de Araujo 6/2 1510); *Alguns Documentos*, p. 349 (Ruy de Brito, 6/1 1514), possibly a consequence of the Portuguese occupation.
122. Pires, *Suma Oriental I*, p. 123.
123. See p. 44.
124. Pires, *Suma Oriental I*, p. 126.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 121, 123.
127. *Ibid.*, II, p. 284, see however also p. 51.
128. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, p. 43.
129. Duyvendak, "Zeereizen Chinezen," p. 101; T'ien Tse Chang, *Sino Portuguese Trade*, p. 28, 29.
130. Pires, *Suma Oriental I*, p. 124.
131. Rockhill, "Notes on the Relations and Trade of China," *TP*, XV, p. 421, 426.
132. Rockhill, *TP*, XV, p. 419.
133. Pires, *Suma Oriental I*, p. 124.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 124, 125.

135. Rockhill, *TP*, XV, p. 419.
 136. See p. 45.
 137. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 124.
 138. *Ibid.*, p. 124, 125.
 139. C. R. Boxer, "Some Aspects of Portuguese Influence in Japan, 1542-1640," p. 14.
 In his later work, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, Boxer sees the Gores as pirates who had swarmed out of Japan as a result of the constant civil wars in that country. According to him, they allowed piracy to alternate with peaceful trading activities and they used to visit the Malayan ports to carry on trade themselves or else accompanied by actual traders from the Liu-Kiu Islands (*Fidalgos*, p. 1).
 140. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 128-131.
 141. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
 142. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
 143. Perhaps Koreans.
 144. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 130.
 145. *Ibid.*, p. 131; *Alguns Documentos*, p. 223 (Ruy de Araujo 6/2 1510).
 146. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 130.
 147. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 89.
 148. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 130.
 149. Pigafetta, *The First Voyage Round the World by Magellan*. WHS, p. 108.
 150. Tiele, "Europeers" I, p. 331.
 151. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 281.
 152. See p. 30.
 153. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 153; *Ibid.*, II, p. 263.
 154. *Ibid.*, I, p. 150-152.
 155. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 346 (Ruy de Brito 6/1 1514).
 156. Cf. also Albuquerque's evidence in the *Commentaries*, quoted by Rouffaer ("Malaka," p. 578), but this probably came from Pires in the first place.
 157. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 136, 164.
 158. Pires' statement is confirmed by Urdaneta, who estimated that some 7 quintals of gold (= 700 lbs) came to Malacca from Sumatra. 2 bahar = approx. 750 lbs (Urdaneta, quoted by Tiele, "Europeers" II, p. 27).
 159. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 164.
 160. Schrieke, *Bonang*, p. 6.
 161. Pires gives the proportionate values of the various kinds of gold that were brought to Malacca, using the mate as a unit of value (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 275, 276). Gold of 8 mates is worth 16 calaims per mate, 100 calaims is 3 cruzados.
- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|
| gold from Brunei | 4½-6 mates |
| Lawe | 7-7½ mates |
| brought from Java | 8-8½ mates |
| Pahang | 8-8½ mates |
| Minangkabau | 9 mates |
| brought by Klings | 9½-9¾ mates |
| Cochin China | 9½-9¾ mates |
162. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 224 (Ruy de Araujo 6/2 1510).
 163. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 147, 148.
 164. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
 165. Eredia, "Description of Malaca," Notes, p. 99.
 166. Eredia, "Report on the Golden Chersonese," *JRASMB* VIII (1930), part 1, p. 241.
 167. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 148, 149.
 168. See p. 33, 34.
 169. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 155, 156.
 170. Here Pires contradicts his own precise enumeration of Sumatran countries which did or did not conduct trade with Malacca.
 171. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 165.
 172. *Ibid.*, p. 158; for Sunda see also H. Djajadiningrat, *Critische beschouwing van de Sadjarah-Banten*; H. ten Dam, "Verkenningen rondom Padjadjaran," *Indonesië*, X (1957) p. 290-310.
 173. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 272. For trade in Baros camphor see also Yule, *Marco Polo* II, p. 302-304.

174. See p. 103 et seq.
175. According to Schrieke, west Java only began to flourish after the rise of Malacca (Schrieke, *Bonang*, p. 17). As proof of this he points to the absence of reference to west Java in 15th century Chinese sources. But this silence on the part of the sources can more easily be explained by the fact that in the 15th century the Chinese did not voyage beyond Malacca (see p. 26).
176. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 169; *Alguns Documentos*, p. 347 (Ruy de Brito, 6/1 1514).
177. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 168.
178. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
179. *Ibid.*, p. 172-173.
180. For Padjadjaran see H. Ten Dam, "Verkenningen rondom Padjadjaran,".
181. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 169.
182. Areka is the nut of a variety of palm, the areca catechu, an ingredient used in making the wad for betel-chewing.
183. Pachak is probably putchock, trade name for a fragrant root, a product of the Himālaya in the vicinity of Kashmir, forming an article of export from both Bombay and Calcutta to China. See Hobson-Jobson, p. 744, 745.
184. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 169, 170.
185. See chapter VII, p. 148-150.
186. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 187.
187. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
188. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
These junks were probably some of the Peguan ships which were offered for sale in Malacca. At the beginning of the 17th century when Javanese trade with the Moluccas was carried on in small junks with a maximum tonnage of 40 tons some 40 to 60 junks were engaged in the trade (Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 24). But the explanation of this rather large number of ships lies in the fact that the Javanese and Malays used to carry rice and cloths to the Spice Islands, goods which took up more room than their equivalent value in spices.
189. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 193.
190. Cash were small copper coins. Since 1590, counterfeit cash made of lead had been in circulation (Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart*, I, p. 234). According to Jan Huygen van Linschoten, 1,000 cash = 1 *cruzado*.
191. The name of Bima is often used by the Portuguese and Dutch to indicate the entire island of Sumbawa.
192. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 206, 207.
193. *Tweede schipvaart onder Jacob Cornelisz. van Neck*, pub. J. Keuning, III, p. 201, 202.
194. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 214.
195. *Ibid.*, p. 213, 214.
- 195a. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies* II, Ruler and Realm in early Java, p. 230 et seq.
196. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 346 (Ruy de Brito, 6/1 1514).
197. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 132. Pires did not realize that the places he mentions called Lawe and Tanjung Pura were also situated on the south coast of Borneo; he held that they were located on separate islands (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 223-225).
198. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 100.
199. 1 catti of camphor was worth between 12 and 40 cruzados, depending on quality.
200. Barbosa, *Book* II, p. 206.
201. Pires puts the value of gold from Brunei at 4 to 6 mates (A Maas or mas is a unit of weight as well as of money. It was 1/10 of 1 tael. 1 tael was about 37½ gram). See also note 161.
202. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 134.
203. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 346 (Ruy de Brito, 6/1 1514).
204. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 133.
205. Lave = Lawe, a tributary of the River Mentohei in southeast Borneo (*Aardrijkskundig Woordenboek Nederl. Indië*, II, p. 332).
206. See p. 50, note 86.
207. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 268.
208. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
209. See p. 50.

210. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 227.
211. *Ibid.*, p. 227. Elsewhere, when speaking about conflicting elements in the Indonesian Archipelago, Pires is well aware of the difference between Celates and Bugis (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 147).
212. Pires, *Suma Oriental*, I, p. 227.
213. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
214. Arcat can no longer be found in modern maps.
215. Barbosa, *Book* II, p. 204, see also Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 216.
216. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 227.
217. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 66.
218. Pires calls the Sunda Islands the Southeastern Islands (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 200-205).
219. See p. 84.
220. Boxer, *Fidalgos*, p. 174.
Even in the Rev. François Valentijn's time, at the end of the 17th century, Chinese trinkets, beads and so on, were in great demand in these islands (Valentijn III 2, p. 124).
221. Tiele, "De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel" (The Europeans in the Malayan Archipelago), *BKI* XXVIII (1880), p. 413.
222. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 204.
223. Barbosa, *Book* II, p. 196; Pigafetta, *Magellan*, p. 153.
224. *Archivio Storico Italiano* III, Appendice (Empoli), p. 58.

CHAPTER V

1. See p. 32-34.
2. According to Pires, in its time Pasè had a population of 20,000 (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 143).
3. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 144.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 139. One consequence of the Portuguese capture of Malacca was that Pidië's pepper production decreased so drastically that it failed to exceed 2,000 to 3,000 *bahar* (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 140).
5. Jan Huygen van Linschoten, *Itinerario* I, p. 77. Linschoten estimates that Bantam could supply 4,000 to 5,000 quintals (1 quintal = 100 lbs).
6. J. E. Heeres, *Corpus Diplomaticum* I, p. 20.
7. *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië* III, p. 385.
8. The text of the relevant passage in Empoli's letter does not make it entirely clear whether the total export of pepper from Sumatra is meant or only the amount that was exported to China. It is true that the passage occurs in a section that refers exclusively to the trade of the Chinese, but at the same time Empoli records the size of pepper exports from the Malabar coast and there he is not referring to exports to China (letter from Giovanni da Empoli, 22 October 1516, in *Archivio Storico Italiano* III (1846), p. 87. I am indebted to Mr. W. H. Avelingh for the translation of this letter). Sumatra's pepper exports were therefore considerably higher at this period than those of the Malabar coast.
9. According to Giovanni da Empoli, the king of Pasè promised the Portuguese the total silk export of his country which, up till then, had been acquired by the Gujarati in exchange for cloth from Cambay and other merchandise to the value of 100,000 ducats (Giovanni da Empoli, *Archivio Storico Italiano* III (1846), p. 73).
10. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 144.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
12. See p. 20.
13. Lancharas = type of small ship.
14. Yule, *Marco Polo*, II, p. 300, 301; Yule, *Cathay* II, p. 146; Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 158.
15. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 138.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 138, 139.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 155. According to Pires, Palembang was conquered by the Javanese kings of the harbour principalities who had been converted to Islam. The only Javanese ruler of Palembang whom he mentions by name is the monarch of Demak.
20. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 33.
21. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 155.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
23. Pires makes a distinction between two islands supposedly lying off the coast opposite Palembang. He calls them Banka and Monomby, but Cortesao presumes that by the latter he meant a part of Bangka (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 155, note 1).
24. Mentioned by Pires in the wrong order (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 158).
25. Pires, *Suma Oriental*, I, p. 158.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 158, 159.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 159-165.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 137-139.
30. Coedès, *Etats hindouisés*, p. 207; K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, "A Tamil Merchant Guild in Sumatra," *TBG LXXII* (1932), p. 314 (concerns the Tamil inscription of 1088, originating in a merchant guild from southern India).
31. For Gujarati shipping via the Sunda Straits to the Javanese coast, see p. 22-23.
32. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 163. Cf. the pepper-growing places listed by the Dutch in the journal of the First Voyage (Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 70).
33. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 158.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
39. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 111; *Ibid.*, V², p. 73.
40. L. A. MacGregor, "Some Aspects of Portuguese Historical Writing of the 16th and 17th centuries on South East Asia," in: *Proceedings of the Conference of the South East Asia Seminar, School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London*, 1956, p. 2, 3.
41. Cf. for example, the figures given for the pepper output of Pasè and Pidiè by Pires and Giovanni da Empoli respectively (see p. 89). The nutmeg output was estimated by Araujo at 1,200 to 1,300 *bahar* (*Alguns Documentos*, p. 225, Ruy de Araujo 6 Feb. 1510). and by Pires at 600 *bahar*. The figures quoted by Pires for the export of gold from the interior of Sumatra more or less correspond with those given by Urdaneta. See p. 80, note 158.
42. G. P. Rouffaer en H. H. Juynboll, *De batikunst in Nederlandsch Indië en haar geschiedenis* "Memorie handel 1603," p. XXII.
43. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 207.
44. Cited in Rouffaer en Juynboll, "Memorie 1603," p. XXII.
45. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 207.
46. Rouffaer en Juynboll, "Memorie 1603," p. XXII.
47. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 208.
48. On the Banda Islands, therefore, there really was a market for goods needed to meet daily requirements (cf. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*; "On Early Asian Trade," p. 388, note 161). That the quantities involved were relatively small was of course due to the small number of inhabitants on the islands.
49. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 209.
50. Rouffaer en Juynboll, "Memorie 1603," p. XXII, note 4.
51. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 207.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
55. Barbosa, *Book* II, p. 196.
56. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 207.
57. *Ibid.*, II, p. 268.
58. See p. 42.
59. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 348 (Ruy de Brito, 6 Jan. 1514). For later Bandanese shipping to Malacca see *Alguns Documentos*, p. 475 (Antonio de Brito to King John III, 6 May

- 1523); "Beschrijvinge van de eylanden Banda," *BKI* III (1855) p. 77; F. Valentijn, *Oud- en Nieuw-Oost-Indiën* (Beschrijving van Banda) III^a, p. 34. Probably going back to data from Hendrik van Bergel, lost at the beginning of the 17th century; Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* IV, p. XLI, XLII.
60. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 212. Cf. also J. A. van der Chijs, *De vestiging van het Nederlandsche gezag over de Banda eilanden* 1599-1621, p. 11, who in this connection cites Heemskerck about the low standard of Bandanese navigation.
61. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 212.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
64. See p. 97, note 68.
66. Barbosa, *Book* II, p. 198.
67. *Ibid.*, II, p. 198.
68. According to Pires, as much as 50 years before his time (about 1465), according to Barros, 80 years before the Portuguese came to Ternate (about 1435). (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 213; Barros, *Da Asia*, Dec. III, Lib. V, cap. 5). Moslem merchants were established in the Banda Islands some 30 years before Pires' time (about 1485).
69. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 213.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
71. 1 : 10, as against 1 : 4 in Ternate.
72. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 214.
73. Pires does not state what foodstuffs the islands of Ternate and Tidore produced for themselves. On Motir, however, rice was cultivated (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 217).
74. According to Pires, the crop only amounted to 150 *bahar*, but in view of the total amount for all the islands (6,000 *bahar*), Ternate must have yielded 1,500 *bahar*.
75. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 215, 216.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
78. This does not tally with later data which indicate that provisions were, in fact, easy to obtain in Batchan (for example, V.O.C. archives 960 ⁶, resolution Van Caerden).
79. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 218, cf. the description in 1610 in *B & V* II ("Pieter Willem Verhoeff"), p. 100.
80. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 213, 221.
81. Estimates of clove crops in the Moluccas (16th century):
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| Urdaneta 3,000 <i>bahar</i> | } Tiele, "Europeërs" II, p. 22. | (Gabriel Rebello, "Informação das cousas de Maluco" in <i>Collecção de notícias para a historia</i> VI, p. 174. The figure quoted was for a good harvest. |
| Oviedo 2,300 " | | |
| Rebello 6,000 " | | |
- Carrion 4,500 *bahar* Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 412.
- De Brito 4,000 " *Alguns Documentos*, p. 474 (Antonio de Brito 6 May 1523).
- Pigafetta about 1,500 *bahar* Pigafetta, *Magellan*, p. 134.
- (300 to 400 *bahar* in each island)
- The figure of about 6,000 *bahar* is actually quoted again in 1599 by Reyer Cornelisz., who obtained his information from the inhabitants of Ternate. He divides the crop up over the various islands as follows:
- Ternate: 1,000 *bahar*
 Tidore: 1,000 "
 Makian: 2,000 "
 Motir: 600 to 700 *bahar*
- Batchan was no longer of any consequence at this time (late 16th century). (Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* V^a, p. 73; *Ibid.*, III^a).
- The solution to the riddle of the differing figures for the size of the crops is provided by Van den Broecke: *B & V* II ("Pieter van den Broecke") p. 27 (1615). Allowance should be made for the circumstance that the clove output varied a good deal. An extra large crop could be expected only once in 7 years. In the intervening years there was only a "small monsoon" (small harvest). The figures given by the Portuguese and by

Reyer Cornelisz. apparently applied to the big harvests. Pigafetta must have been nearer to the truth, for his figure agrees more or less with that given by Coen, in whose own interests it was to make an accurate estimate and who considered that in 1614 the average annual output of the Moluccas was some 1,000 to 1,500 *bakar* (Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 82).

82. See p. 208, 209.
83. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 216.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 214. Cf. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 142.
85. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart*, I, p. 56.
86. Rockhill, *TP XVI*, p. 260 (Wang Ta Yuan (1349)).
87. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 119 (Wang Ch'i Tsung).
88. See p. 158, 159.
89. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 123, 133; *Ibid.*, V, p. 133, 134; *B & V II* ("Cornelis Matelleff"), p. 69.
90. Translated by A Cortesao as "woolly-haired bestial people" (Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 442).
Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 212.
91. See p. 84, 85.
92. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 132.
93. Rockhill, *TP XVI*, p. 265 (Wang Ta Yuan (1349)).
94. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 102.
95. Rockhill, *TP XVI*, p. 265.
96. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 102 (Wang Ch'i-Tsung (1618)).
97. Pigafetta, *Magellan*, p. 114.
98. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 187.
99. Pigafetta, *Magellan*, p. 117-118.
100. Valentijn, *Oud- en Nieuw Oost-Indiën* III^a, p. 242.
101. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 172, 223-225.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 226, 227.
103. Pires also mentions Bima as distinct from Sumbawa, but he does actually mean the latter island (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 200-203). Bima is one of the ports on the north coast of Sumbawa. The Dutch also used the name Bima for the whole island (e.g. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart*, II, p. 220).
104. Eredia, "Report on the Golden Chersonese," p. 253.
105. Rockhill, *TP XVI*, p. 257 (Wang Ta Yuan).
106. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 116 (Wang Ta Yuan).
107. *Ibid.*, p. 117 (Wang Ch'i Tsung).
108. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 196.
109. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 348 (Ruy de Brito 6/1 1514).
110. Barbosa, *Book II*, p. 196.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 196; Pigafetta, *Magellan*, p. 153.
112. H. J. de Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental' en het tijdvak van godsdienstovergang op Java," *BKI* CVIII (1952), p. 132 et seq.
113. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 19, 22, 23.
114. The large type of Javanese cargo vessel, the junk, was somewhat similar to Chinese junks and ships from Further India as regards shape, rigging, and the division of the hold into separate compartments. Since it was very solidly constructed, with layer upon layer of heavy planks, this type of ship, like the Chinese junks, cannot have been very suitable for navigating the Indian Ocean.
115. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 195.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 226; *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 132.
117. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 168; Tiele "Europeërs" I, p. 343.
118. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 132.
119. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 195.
120. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 23 (description of a Javanese junk).
121. Albuquerque, *Cartas* I, p. 64, 65.
122. The original of this chart was unfortunately lost when Albuquerque was shipwrecked on the coast of Sumatra. The geographical names on it were written in Javanese

characters (Albuquerque, *Cartas* I, p. 65). But the most remarkable thing about the chart, which dates back to before 1512, is the fact that the coast of Brazil is depicted upon it. Probably the Javanese drew it up on the basis of a Portuguese chart and added details about their own sailing area which were then still quite unknown to the Portuguese, for example, the sailing route to the Moluccas (about which the Arabs, according to the Mohit, were also only partially informed) and the trade routes of the Chinese. We also encounter this method of cartography among the 18th century Buginese seafarers who adapted the charts of the East India Company to their own use by adding particulars of their own (C. C. F. M. Le Roux, "Boegineesche zeekaarten van den Indischen Archipel," *Tijdschr. Aardrijkskundig Genootschap*, 2e serie, LII (1935), p. 687-714. It is most remarkable, however, that the knowledge of western cartography had already spread so far in Asia.

For this Javanese chart see Cortesao's introduction to Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. LXXVIII, LXXIX; Cortesao, *Cartografia* II, p. 122-130; Ferrand, *Astronomie nautique*, p. 236; Ferrand, "A propos d'une carte javanaise du XVe siècle," *JA*, IIe série, XII (1918).

123. At any rate, the high Bantamese functionaries with whom the Dutch came into contact (both of whom, to be sure, came from India) were very well acquainted with nautical charts, and they immediately asked to be allowed to inspect those of the newcomers so that they might know from which country their strange visitors had come (Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 75).
124. Ferrand, *Astronomie nautique*, p. 97.
125. *De archieven van de Compagnieën op Oost Indië*, 1594-1603, No. 86, fol. 40. (Rekening wegens de negotie van de Zon 1600-1601).
127. Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 237 (Wang Ta Yuan, 1349); Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 180.
128. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 145; Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis*, p. 261.
129. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 45; Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 145.
130. De Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental'," p. 142.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 143; Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 191.
132. De Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental'," p. 145.
133. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 191.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
135. De Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental'," p. 145.
136. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 190.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
138. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 34, 36.
139. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 192.
140. *Ibid.*, p. 190, 191.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
142. *Ibid.*, p. 191; Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 34-40.
143. Ma Huan puts the number of families in Tuban between 1425 and 1432 at a thousand (Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 47).
144. According to De Graaf, Daha (Kadiri) must be meant here (De Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental'," p. 134).
145. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 191, 192.
146. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 47.
147. *Ibid.*, *Notes*, p. 47; Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 241.
148. Rockhill, *TP* XVI, p. 236.
149. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 41.
150. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 192.
151. J. A. B. Wiselius, "Historisch onderzoek naar de geestelijke en wereldlijke suprematie van Grissee op Midden- en Oost Java gedurende de 16e en 17e eeuw," *TBG* XXIII (1876), p. 464.
152. *Ibid.*, p. 483, 484.
153. This is an allusion to a well-known Dutch legend about a rich tradeswoman in what was once the celebrated Frisian tradingtown of Stavoren or Staveren.
154. J. A. B. Wiselius, "Historisch onderzoek naar de geestelijke en wereldlijke suprematie van Grissee," p. 468.
155. *Ibid.*, p. 468.
156. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 192-195. Apparently the authority of the ecclesiastical ruler

- at the beginning of the 16th century was still exclusively spiritual, thus he had nothing to do with the secular government of the port of Grise and therefore did not come to Pires' attention (The scant interest taken by the latter in religious matters has already been indicated elsewhere. See De Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental'," p. 163).
157. J. A. B. Wiselius, "Historisch onderzoek naar de geestelijke en wereldlijke suprematie van Grisee" p. 472.
 158. *Ibid.*, p. 474.
 159. De Graaf thinks that the origin of the dual town Grise-Jaratan should perhaps be sought in the rule of Pate Cuçuf and Pate Zeynall (De Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental'," p. 151).
 160. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 195.
 161. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
 162. *Ibid.*, p. 195. "There is nothing worth spending time on, because he has nothing on the sea," Pires, therefore, was only interested in the commercial activities of the Javanese notables.
 163. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 193.
 164. According to De Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental'," p. 151, Pate Adem was pure Malay, but this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Pate Adem's father apparently owned land in Java (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 193).
 165. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 193, 194.
 166. Brown, "Malay Annals", p. 136, 137; Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 193, note 1.
 167. See p. 83, 84.
 168. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 194.
 169. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
 170. Quotation: "Want is genoegsaem een besloten haven, men can op 12 vadem op een steenworp aen de muren van de stadt, met grote schepen leggen," Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 204; Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart*, I, p. 101.
 171. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 48.
 172. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 196.
 173. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
 174. *Ibid.*, p. 196-198.
 175. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
 176. *Ibid.*, p. 184-186.
A collection of charts published by Joannes and Gerard van Keulen at the end of the 17th century and at present in the Dutch General State Archives (Buitenlandse kaarten, kaartboek U) includes one of Java, showing the areas of rice production. These were located near Bantam, Cheribon (along the entire coast as far as Tegal), in the Rembang district not far from Demak, near Surabaya, and in the interior of Mataram, with communications with Surabaya and Grise.
 177. Pires, *Suma Oriental*, I, p. 189.
 178. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
 179. See p. 109.
 180. For 16th century Semarang, Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 184.
 181. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 183.
 182. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
 183. *Ibid.*, p. 183-185.
 184. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
 185. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
 186. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
 187. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
 188. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
 189. *Ibid.*, p. 166-173.
 190. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
 191. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
 192. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
 193. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
 194. *Ibid.*, p. 172, see p. 82-84.
 195. *Ibid.*, p. 168, 172-173.
 196. The Sundanese word "Dajeuh" means "capital town."
 197. In the treaty concluded by the king of Sunda with the Portuguese, the tribute to be

- paid in pepper is fixed at 160 bahar (*Alguns Documentos*, p. 460, 461; *Studia V*, p. 63).
198. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 168, 169.
 199. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
 200. *Ibid.*, p. 170-173.
 201. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
 202. See Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 168, 169.

CHAPTER VI

1. Albuquerque, *Cartas* I, p. 220 (4/12 1513); Cortesão, *Historia de Portugal* IV, p. 52.
2. Ibn Iyas, *Journal d'un bourgeois de Caïre*, ed. G. Wiet. (Review by Claude Cahen in *Revue Historique* CCXVII (1957), p. 348-350).
3. Ferrand, "Le pilote Arabe," *Ann. de geogr.* 1922, p. 289 et seq.
In one of the documents by Ibn Madjid which have been published by T. A. Sumowsky, the former expresses regret at having shown the Portuguese the way to the East Indies, see p. 343, 344.
4. Ballard, *Rulers of the Indian Ocean*, p. 51.
According to Cortesão, in order to transfer the spice monopoly from Moslem to Portuguese hands the Portuguese did no more than take advantage of the situation as they found it upon entering the Indian Ocean (Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* IV, p. 20).
5. Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* IV, p. 182; Prestage, *The Portuguese Pioneers*, p. 298; *Historia da expansão Portuguesa no mundo* I, p. 36, 123; Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, p. 64; Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, p. 13; Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, I, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 37; *Ibid.*, II, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," p. 233, 308, 309; Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 221.
Boxer considers that the battle of Lepanto and the rise of Persia did more to arrest Turkish progress than the activities of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean.
6. Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* IV, p. 37; De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale*, p. 60.
In Venice the arrival of the Portuguese in Asia was felt to be a national disaster, and although outwardly Christian solidarity had to be maintained this did not prevent agitation being carried on secretly through agents sent to the sultan (Cortesão IV, p. 33, Lannoy, p. 59). An excellent information service kept Venice well posted on Portuguese operations in Asia and a fast communications system enabled the spice market to be influenced in such a way that slumps occurred which were to the detriment of the Portuguese (Gentil da Silva, *Alguns elementos para a historia do comercio da India de Portugal*, p. 13, 14). In spite of protracted wars with the sultans the Venetians engaged in active and profitable trade with Turkey (Freddy Thiriet, "Les lettres commerciales des Bembo et le commerce Vénitien dans l'empire Ottoman à la fin du XV^e siècle," *Studi in Onore de Armando Saporì* II, p. 911-933).
7. Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 223; Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 217.
8. Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* IV, p. 46.
9. Boxer ("Portuguese in the East," p. 220) particularly mentions the sailing instructions, or roteiros, in which the results of practical experience were recorded.
For the scientific development of Portuguese navigation see J. Bensaude, *l'Astronomie nautique au Portugal*; in this connection cf. also C. Schoy, "The Geography of the Moslems of the Middle Ages," *The Geographical Review*, 1924, p. 257-269.
10. An exception was formed by the shipment of pepper direct from Sunda to Portugal. See p. 152.
11. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 4.
12. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, p. 117-119.
13. V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1617 III, fol. 50vs (Steven van der Hagen to the Amsterdam Chamber 18/7 1616. Dutch relations with the natives compared with those of the Portuguese); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 I, fol. 179vs, 180 (Van der Hagen to Amsterdam 6/5 1618, refers to the fact that the Dutch bought spices from the natives on less favourable conditions than the Portuguese, also to the busy commercial traffic which the natives formerly carried

on in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 III, fol. 357vs. (Van der Hagen to Amsterdam 14/8 1617. Van der Hagen contrasts the devout Portuguese priests, loved and respected for their self-sacrifice and industry among the converts to Christianity on Amboina, with the less than exemplary protestant ministers. ["the soundness of a doctrine is often less important than the character of its exponents" Sansom, p. 98]; Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. VII, refers to native commercial traffic and the Portuguese).

14. Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 191, 194, 211.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

16. A step in the right direction has been taken by Prof. A. da Silva Rego, founder of the Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa which has started filming all the sources connected with the history of Portuguese expansion and which, moreover, issues a bulletin at regular intervals containing abstracts of the documents filmed (instalments I-X of this *Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa* have appeared up to 1/1 1959). The historical research-worker is thus able to obtain some idea of the nature of the material. While it is inevitable that the choice of documents selected for inclusion in such a list of published digests is to some extent subjective, there is cause to be thankful that, at least, a start has been made.

17. Sansom, *Western World and Japan*, p. 50.

18. MacGregor, "Portuguese in Malaya," p. 8.

19. Cf. the general muster-rolls and ships' books. V.O.C. arch.

20. The system of safe-conducts was common in western Europe and the Portuguese applied the same principle over a much more extensive area in Asia.

21. Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, p. 10, 12; Barbosa, *Book I*, p. LXIII.

22. Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* IV, p. 18, 48, 49; Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power*, p. 152; Barbosa, *Book I*, p. LXII, 210.

The export of horses took place mainly from Hormuz. According to Barbosa, 20,000 horses were imported from Hormuz and Cambay; he does not say, however, over what length of time this large number of animals was transported to southern India. Van Leur calls this a trade in luxury products (*Indonesian Trade and Society*, p. 78), but a better description would be trade in strategic commodities.

23. Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 345, 347, 348.

24. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, p. 34.

25. When Pieter van den Broecke visited the port of Mocha with his ship in 1616 the Governor of that port held that it would be easy for the Dutch to overcome the 30 Indian merchant ships lying there at that time, even though some of the Indian ships were as large as European ones. This was because they carried no armament and so would not be able to put up any defence (Archives of the States General 7076, letter from Cornelis Pauw in Aleppo, 18th August 1617).

26. Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 195.

27. Cf. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, p. 159, 262.

28. The Chinese, however, set greater store by European guns than by those of their own manufacture, witness their use of them in their efforts to hold their own against the Manchu (Groeneveldt, *Nederlanders in China*, p. 60).

29. Eredia, *Declaração de Malaca*. The Portuguese make their opponents out to be as strong as possible in order not to detract from the glory of their own conquests. Wilkinson ("The Fall of Malacca," p. 68) also points to the remarkable fact that all those thousands of firearms did not lead to any serious losses among the Portuguese, who suffered mainly from poisoned arrows from Malayan blow-pipes.

30. Albuquerque, *Commentaries III*, p. 127.

31. Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power*, p. 94; Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* IV, p. 31.

32. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, p. 57.

As far as Indonesia is concerned, there is a remarkable statement by Mendes Pinto to the effect that the "emperor" of Demak had a renegade from Majorca in his service as an engineer (Pinto, *Voyages aventureux*, III, p. 109).

33. Botelho, "Tombo do Estado da India," p. 9. Botelho draws attention to the sale of ammunition and firearms by the Portuguese captains of the forts, an abuse which had a detrimental effect on the armament of these fortifications.

34. Boxer, "European Military Influence in Japan," p. 3-5.

35. According to Ferrand, the Arab sea-captain Ibn Madjid who was the author of some

important navigational instructions (see p. 60, note 5,) must actually have brought Vasco da Gama from Melinde to Calicut himself (Ferrand, "Pilote arabe," p. 289 et seq.); see also C. Verlinden, "Vasco da Gama in het licht van zijn Portugese en Arabische voorgangers," *Mededelingen Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Wetenschappen*. XIX (1957, No. 4, p. 16-20).

Cortêsão cites various instances of Moslem seafarers supplying the Portuguese with valuable information (Cortêsão, *Hist. de Portugal* IV, p. 13, 41, 42).

36. See p. 60, note 5.
37. Groeneveldt, *Nederlanders in China*, p. 82; Boxer, "European Military Influence in Japan," p. 6; Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 19, 101.
Prof. S. Iwao has published a work in Japanese dealing with the active role which the Japanese suddenly began to play in overseas trade at the end of the 16th century and continued to play until the prohibition of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1635 (the navigation of ships bearing a "red seal"). A summary of this work, written in English, can be found in *Shuinsen Boeki Shi no Kenkyu XXXII* (1958), p. 426-432, Tokyo, Kobundo. This shipping was concentrated mainly on Formosa and Further India, where Japanese colonies were formed. Some of the ships were built to European design, the smallest being 70 to 100 tons, the largest 600 to 800 tons, and the average 300 tons. At first European methods of navigation were employed. When the wind was favourable these ships required the same length of time for their voyages as the European ones, and, according to Prof. Iwao, this had a big effect on the prices of imported wares and the profits made on them. Iwao also gives details about the people engaged in this Japanese overseas trade and their relations with one another. According to Iwao, at its peak the volume of this trade equalled or even exceeded that done by Portuguese, Dutch and Chinese ships. The export of silver from Japan in these Japanese ships was very important. See also: S. Iwao, "Japanese Gold and Silver in World History," reprinted from *International Symposium on History of Eastern and Western Cultural Contacts. Collection of papers presented, compiled by the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO*, Nov. 1959.
38. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 18.
39. Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power*, p. 180.
Even today, vessels are in use in the neighbourhood of Bombay which bear a strong resemblance to the Portuguese galleys of the 17th and 18th centuries (Nooteboom, "Galeien in Azië," p. 376).
40. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale*, p. 123; Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power*, p. 257; Cortêsão, *Hist. de Portugal* IV, p. 23. Cortêsão attaches more value than Whiteway to the fighting qualities of the Asian peoples.
Stripling attributes the defeat suffered against the Portuguese by the Turks in 1538 to bad leadership of the Turkish fleet (Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, p. 92).
41. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho in a review of *South Africa under King Sebastian and the Cardinal 1557-1580* (1949) and *Portuguese Rule and Spanish Crown in South Africa 1581-1640* (1950) by S. R. Welch. *Revue Historique* CCIX (1953), p. 335-339; and of *Shipwreck and Empire - Portuguese Maritime Disasters in a Century of Decline* (1955) by James Duffy. *Revue Historique* CCXVII (1957), p. 136, 137.
Jaime Cortêsão (*Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 320, 321, 343) holds that a re-consolidation of Portuguese power took place at the end of the 16th century (after 1581). He points out however that the pattern of development varied a great deal in the various Portuguese settlements. For example, despite of Dutch activity in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean, Portuguese settlements and Portuguese influence in the religious sphere increased in the western Indian Ocean. Gentil da Silva calls Mario de Albuquerque the first Portuguese historian to break away from the classic conception about the decline of the Portuguese empire (in: "*O significado das navegações*" (1930)).
The only authoritative work on Portuguese economic history to date, J. Lucio de Azevedo's *De épocas de Portugal economico*, paints the traditional picture of exhaustion and decadence. Magalhães Godinho, who is also writing an economic history of Portugal but who holds the opposite view, has not yet treated the late 16th century. In his summary, Boxer also attaches value to the more recent conceptions ("Portuguese," p. 225).
42. *Documentos remetidos da Índia ou Livros das moncoes in Collecção de monumentos inéditos* 1880/1890.
43. *Boletim de Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa*. Nos. I - X.

44. Diogo do Couto, *O soldado pratico*. ed. Manuel Rodrigues Lapa, 2nd ed. (1954).
45. Various historians such as Whiteway (p. 13) and De Lannoy (p. 70) hold that the vitality of the Portuguese declined because of intermarriage and the tropical climate. This is a debatable proposition, at least as far as intermarriage is concerned. The private traders, in particular, were frequently of mixed blood, yet energy and enterprise were pre-requisites for this sort of trade. The devil-may-care lives led by many of these Portuguese merchant adventurers (a name also used to disguise some notorious pirates) are hardly indicative of a lack of vitality.
Whiteway holds that the decline of the aristocracy meant the disappearance of a class of people with strong qualities of leadership. But if this is true surely it also meant that feudal relationships, which, as we have already seen, had had such a bad effect upon colonial development, were weakened and more scope created for capable persons irrespective of birth or social position. This, after all, was the power behind Dutch "middle-class expansion." It is remarkable that in 1616 the viceroy's verdict on the captains of the forts was quite favourable whereas in a somewhat earlier period the number of complaints about them had been almost overwhelming. That he held a less flattering opinion about the other high officials does not detract from his appreciation of the captains (*Boletim* IV, p. 812. Carta vice-rei para el-rei, Jan. 1616).
46. Very different from the Dutch. Both Van Diemen and Maetsuyker praise the Portuguese method of colonization through intermarriage with people of Asian race (Boxer, "Rivalry," p. 41, Maetsuyker's views in De Jonge, *Opkomst* VI, p. XIX). For the influence of the Portuguese language in Asia, see David Lopes, *A expansão da língua Portuguesa no Oriente durante os seculos XVI, XVII e XVIII*.
47. *Boletim* II, p. 260 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 11/3 1585); *Ibid.*, p. 156 (Provisão régia, d.i.); *Ibid.*, p. 212 (Cópia de uns capitulos de duas cartas régias n.d.); *Ibid.*, IV, p. 241 (Carta sobre os cadernos das naos, 23/12 1613).
48. *Boletim* II, p. 299 (Carta régia para o vice-rei 26/3 1589); *Ibid.*, IV, p. 823 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, Março de 1617 No. 2).
Moreover the regulations were not formulated sufficiently clearly, a circumstance which facilitated their infringement.
49. Among other things, a synopsis had to be sent to Portugal every year of the naval power represented by posts already in existence or yet to be created and by the fleets currently in Asia (*Boletim* II, p. 305. Carta régia para o vice-rei, 12/1 1591).
50. For shortcomings in respect of the payment of salaries and wages, see Mac Gregor, "Portuguese in Malaya," p. 8, 9.
51. Affairs had to put in order again in Malacca in 1616 because the financial administration of the fortifications had become completely disorganized (*Boletim* IV, p. 803, 804 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei, No. 110 n.d. (c. 1616))).
52. MacGregor draws attention to the existence of strong family groups in the East, similar to those in Portugal itself.
53. *Boletim* II, p. 274 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 14/3 1588: corruption in general; *Ibid.*, p. 304 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 12/1 1591: abuses in spending the proceeds from the Fazenda Real; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 740 (Carta sobre as eleições dos oficiais da camara das cidades deste Estado, 23/12 1613: corruption among the employees of the Chambers); *Ibid.*, p. 784 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, 29/12 1615: corruption, to be punished by removal from office; *Documentos remetidos* III, XLII, 15/3 1616, p. 492: prohibition on private trade by officials).
54. *Boletim* IV, p. 646 (films 151), 652 (films 268, 270, 276).
55. Tiele, "Europeers" V, p. 157.
56. *Boletim* II, p. 292 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 6/2 1589); *Ibid.*, p. 305 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 12/1 1591).
57. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 836 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, march 1617) No. 70: complaints about the desembargadores); *Ibid.*, p. 847 (*Ibid.*, No. 122: desembargadores); *Ibid.*, p. 836, 843 (*Ibid.*, No. 70, 106: complaints about the ouvidores); *Ibid.*, p. 731 (O vice-rei para el-rei, 27/2 1612: attempt to gain control over the desembargadores).
58. MacGregor, "Portuguese in Malaya," p. 22.
59. *Boletim* IV, p. 731 (O vice-rei para el-rei, 27/2 1612).
60. *Ibid.*, III, p. 509 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 24/3 1605); *Ibid.*, p. 586 (Alvará régio, 18 (?) March 1604); *Ibid.*, II, p. 286 (Carta régia para o vice-rei 28/1 1588); *Ibid.*, p. 299 (Carta régia para o vice-rei 26/3 1589); *Ibid.*, p. 325 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 18/2

- 1595); *Ibid.*, IV, p. 801 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, No. 104, 5/1 1616); *Ibid.*, p. 729 (O vice-rei para el-rei, reposta da carta 9/1 1612); *Ibid.*, p. 775 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, No. 4, 28/1 1615).
61. *Ibid.*, II, p. 199 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 15/2 1594); *Ibid.*, p. 272 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 10/1 1587); *Ibid.*, p. 275 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 1/3 1588); *Ibid.*, p. 310 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, Jan. 1591).
 62. *Ibid.*, p. 286 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 28/1 1588); *Ibid.*, p. 178, (Traslado dum Alvará, n.d.); *Ibid.*, IV, p. 820, (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, Jan. 1616 No. 21(?)).
 63. *Documentos remetidos* III, p. 167, 29/11 1612 (?).
 64. *Ibid.*, IV, p. XXXIV, p. 290 (23/1 1618); *Ibid.*, II, p. VIII, p. 41 (21/2 1611).
 65. *Boletim* IV, p. 836 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei No. 69).
 66. *Documentos remetidos* III, p. XXXII, 419 (26/2 1616).
 67. *Boletim* IV, p. 710/711 (Reposta pelo vice-rei para el-rei n.d.); *Ibid.*, p. 771 (Carta do vice-rei para el-rei, April 1613).
 68. *Documentos remetidos* III, p. XLI, 479 (14/3 1616); *Ibid.*, p. XLII, 494 (16/3 1616); *Ibid.*, II, p. VIII, p. 43 (21/2 1611).
 69. *Boletim* IV, p. 812 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, Jan. 1616, No. 4).
 70. *Ibid.*, p. 832 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, March 1617 No. 48: complaint about an incompetent chancellor); *Ibid.*, p. 836, 843, 847 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, March 1617 Nos. 70, 106, 120, 122: complaints about the desembargadores and ouvidores (private trade, among other things); complaints already occurring in 1591 (*Ibid.*, II, p. 306, Carta régia para o vice-rei, 12/1 1591).
 71. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 768 (Carta do vice-rei para el-rei, 31 Dec. 1614); *Ibid.*, II, p. 287, (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 28/1 1588).
 72. *Ibid.*, II, p. 256 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 22/1 1601).
 73. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 722 (O vice-rei para el-rei, 1614 No. 31).
 74. e.g. *Ibid.*, II, 323 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 26/2 1595: complaints about poor loading of ships).
 75. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 853 (Carta do vice-rei para el-rei, 28/12 1616).
 76. *Ibid.*, p. 736 (Carta 24/12 1613).
 77. *Documentos remetidos* III, p. XXIV, 303, 5/3 1615.
 78. *Boletim* IV, p. 731 (Carta do vice-rei para el-rei, 27/2 1612).
 79. *Ibid.*, II, p. 260 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 11/3 1585); *Ibid.*, p. 179 (Apontamentos n.d.).
 80. *Ibid.*, p. 280 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 21/1 1588); *Ibid.*, p. 332 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 28/1 1595); see also MacGregor, "Portuguese in Malaya", p. 7, 9.
 81. *Ibid.*, p. 281 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 21/1 1588).
 82. *Ibid.*, p. 281, 21/1 1588.
 83. *Ibid.*, p. 281, 21/1 1588; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 825 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, March 1617 No. 14).
 84. *Ibid.*, p. 803 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, No. 108, 4/1 1616).
 85. *Ibid.*, II, p. 240 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 21/11 1598).
 86. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 827 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, March 1617 No. 24); *Ibid.*, p. 776 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, 31/12 1615 No. 13); *Ibid.*, III, p. 489 (Carta de D. Filipe II 3/10 1605); *Itinerario* I, p. 28. Van Linschoten puts the usual death-rate at 30 out of a ship's company of 400 to 500; Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*; p. 184.
 87. *Boletim* III, p. 531 No. 14 n.d.; Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 340, 351; Boxer, *Fidalgos*, p. 13.
 88. *Boletim* IV, p. 825, March 1617 No. 14; *Ibid.*, II, p. 311 (Carta régia para o vice-rei Jan. 1591); *Ibid.*, p. 329 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, n.d. (1595)); *Ibid.*, p. 251 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 19/12 1598); *Ibid.*, p. 286, 287 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 28/1 1588).
 89. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 827 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, March 1617 No. 23: shortage of gunners); *Ibid.*, II, p. 247 (Carta régia para o vice-rei 5/3 1598: a navigating officer to be recruited in Venice); *Documentos remetidos* III, p. XVIII, 14/2 1615: a German engineer, shortage of gunners; *Ibid.*, p. XIX, 248, 20/2 1615 (French engineer).
 90. Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 355.
 91. *Itinerario* I, p. 175.
 92. B & V II, "Matelieff," p. 165.
 93. Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 322.

94. Correa, *Lendas* III, p. 348.
95. *Boletim* II, p. 267 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 6/2 1587); *Ibid.*, p. 206 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 3/3 1594); *Ibid.*, p. 237 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 26/1 1598); Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 336.
96. *Historia da expansão Portuguesa* II, p. 92; Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 233.
97. *Historia da expansão Portuguesa* II, p. 89.
98. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 179-181.
99. *Boletim* IV, p. 736 (Carta que tratta das religiones, 24/12 1613); *Ibid.*, p. 721 (1609); *Ibid.*, p. 723 (n.d.); *Ibid.*, p. 781 No. 35, 18/12 1615.
100. Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 208.
101. *Boletim* II, p. 298 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 22/2 1589: the Jesuits forbidden to export copper to China); *Ibid.*, p. 196 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 8/2 1591); *Documentos remetidos* I, p. XXVIII, 308, 4/2 1610.
102. *Itinerario* I, p. 111.
103. *Boletim* II, p. 213 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 3/2 1594: prohibition public worship by non-Christians); *Ibid.*, IV, p. 835 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, March 1617, No. 64: abuses of the Inquisition).
104. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 740, 23/12 1613 No. 66.
105. *Ibid.*, II, p. 270 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 10/1 1587); *Ibid.*, p. 311 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, Jan. 1591); *Ibid.*, p. 234 (Carta do secretario de Estado para o vice-rei, 30/3 1598); *Ibid.*, p. 164 (Alvará régio, 20/11 1598).
106. For the Jews established in Malacca see *Studia* V, p. 66.
107. *Boletim* II, p. 270 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 10/1 1587).
108. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale*, p. 217.
109. *Boletim* IV, p. 780 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei, No. 29, 18/12 1615).
110. *Ibid.*, II, p. 252 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 19/2 1598); *Ibid.*, p. 104 (Alvará régio, 20/11 1598).
111. *Ibid.*, p. 286 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 28/1 1588); *Ibid.*, p. 213 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 3/2 1594); *Ibid.*, p. 186 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 26/2 1585).
112. *Ibid.*, p. 318 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 27/2 1595).
113. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 4.
114. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale*, p. 140.
115. Kellenbenz, "Der Pfeffermarkt um 1600 und die Hansestädte," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* LXXIV (1956), p. 29.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 32, 40.
117. Cf. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale*, p. 186, 190.
118. Goris, *Etude sur les colonies marchandes méridionales*, p. 236-238, 253 et seq., 272, 274, 275, 307, 319.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 49, 53, 102, 199, 562, 563, 568, 576.
For Rodriguez d'Evora's rôle in the pepper trade, see Gentil da Silva, *Stratégie des affaires à Lisbonne entre 1595 et 1607*, based on letters in the Ruiz archives.
120. Kellenbenz, "Der Pfeffermarkt um 1600 und die Hansestädte," p. 28-49; H. Kellenbenz, "Le commerce du poivre des Fugger et le marché international du poivre," *AESC* XI (1956), 1-28.
121. Kellenbenz, "Der Pfeffermarkt um 1600 und die Hansestädte," p. 29, 32, 42.
122. *Documentos remetidos* III, p. XII, 163, 4/4 1614; *Boletim* IV, p. 851 (Carta do vice-rei para el-rei, 29/12 1616); *Ibid.*, p. 798-799 (Registo de cartas do vice-rei para el-rei No. 93, 4/1 1616); *Ibid.*, II, p. 199 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 15/2 1594); *Ibid.*, p. 331 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 24/2 1595).
123. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, p. 29.
124. Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, p. 171.
125. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 10; Barbosa, *Book* I, p. 43; Lybyer, "The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade," p. 584. According to Lybyer, although shipments of spice from Aleppo and Alexandria to Italy were suspended, spices still reached Arabia, Persia, North Africa and Turkey by means of the old trade routes.
126. Boxer, "The Portuguese in the East," p. 191.
127. Barbosa, *Book* I, p. XL, letter from Duarte Barbosa to the king, dated 12 Jan. 1513: "This year the Portuguese ships bound for Cochim missed 4 or 5 Mecca ships which had come to Calicut, and a year previously 12 or 13 ships laden with spices went to Mecca and Aden and this year the same number are being prepared."

128. W. Brulez, "Lettres commerciales de Daniel et Antoine van Bombergen à Antonio Grimani (1532-1543)" in *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome* XXXI (1958), p. 168-205.
This work shows that in the first half of the 16th century, in spite of the discovery of the route from the East Indies to Europe via the Cape, spices imported via the Levant continued to occupy an important position on the Antwerp market (p. 182). Thus spices shipped via both routes were sold on this market. Earlier, F. Edler had also drawn attention to the fact that supplies of spices continued to arrive from the Levant via Marseilles (F. Edler, "The Market of Spices in Antwerp 1538-1544" *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* XVII (1938), p. 212-221).
129. In the second half of the 16th century Aleppo was a centre for trade between Asia and Europe (Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, p. 67). According to Stripling, the coming of the Turks to Irak (1546: conquest of Basra) led to the partial revival of the trade route through Mesopotamia. Before the Turkish conquest there had been too many small states in Mesopotamia capable of obstructing trade. The route from Baghdad to Syria was of little significance at that time and the route from Basra to Tana was not used at all. After the establishment of Turkish rule, however, overland trade from the Persian Gulf to Baghdad and, via Syria, to Aleppo in particular really began to flourish. In 1548 the Venetian consulate was transferred to Aleppo, Alexandretta (the port of Aleppo) and Tripoli became more important than Beirut, the port of Damascus (Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, p. 78, 81, 82). Unfortunately the documents concerning Dutch relations with Aleppo go back no further than 1612, and direct correspondence between the Dutch consul and the directors of the Levantine trade only began in 1627. It is, however, possible that Dutch citizens sailed to these parts before 1612 under a foreign flag.
In the early years of the 17th century, data relating to which are available in the Dutch sources, Aleppo's trade was based chiefly on silk, and spices no longer played an important rôle (K. Heeringa, *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel* I, p. 449, 454-457, 460; see also Archives Staten van Holland, archives Oldenbarneveldt No. 2609 g). Regulations concerning the toll duties, however, show that this must have been a development of quite recent date (Heeringa, *Bronnen Geschiedenis Levantschen Handel* I, p. 234, 251).
130. Gentil da Silva, *Alguns elementos para a historia do comercio da India de Portugal*, p. 25, 26.
131. *Enzyclopaëdie des Islam* III (1936), 631, 632.
132. Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*.
133. Lybyer, however, set out to prove that the Turks had not been responsible for the decline in the trade of the Levant (Lybyer, "The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade," p. 581, 588).
134. Frederic C. Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade."
135. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, p. 421 et seq.; Gentil da Silva, *Alguns elementos*, p. 8, 9; Lybyer, "The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade," p. 586; Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade," p. 581.
On the basis of letters from the Venetian merchant Andrea Berengo who was resident in Aleppo from 1553 to 1556, the publisher of these letters U. Tucci (*Lettres d'un marchand vénitien Andrea Berengo* (1553-1556), Paris 1957, Affaires et gens d'affaires X) holds that a decline can be shown to have taken place in the trade of Aleppo and that Cairo benefited from this decline. According to Tucci, this circumstance should be taken into account when considering Lane's figures about the volume of spice exports from Alexandria (Tucci, p. 15). The period covered by the above-mentioned publication, however, namely from Oct. 8th 1555 to June 29th 1556, is much too short for conclusions of a general nature to be drawn, especially as the spice trade in Aleppo at that time was operating under exceptional conditions because of a Venetian boycott on spices (Tucci, p. 19).
By the early years of the 17th century the supplies of spices reaching Aleppo had, indeed, greatly diminished. In his letters to Holland in 1617 (Archives of the States General 7076) Cornelis Pauw, the Dutch consul in Aleppo, reports that trade in products other than spices was also falling off. This was particularly true of indigo which, together with Persian silk, had become the most important sales commodity after supplies of spices had begun to decline. The drop in trade was attributed to purchases

of indigo in India by English and Dutch merchants, who had begun shipping vast quantities of this product to Europe. The merchants in Aleppo were very much afraid that the Europeans might also start shipping silk direct to Europe from the ports on the Persian Gulf, which would spell ruin for the trade of Aleppo.

For the connection between the decline of Venice and the diminished spice supply see also L. Beutin, "Der Wirtschaftliche Niedergang Venedigs im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* LXXVI (1958), p. 42-72.

136. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, p. 427, 445.
137. Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade," p. 583; Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, p. 443, 444, 447 (in 1600 there were still 17 Venetian business-houses in Aleppo); Lybyer, "The Ottoman Turks," p. 585.
138. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, p. 444; Gentil da Silva, *Alguns elementos*, p. 32, 61, 62. In this connection, there is a remarkable account by Frei Augustinho de Azevedo (c. 1590), published by Gentil da Silva, p. 61, 62 (the goods are conveyed to the ports of loading by caravans of 6,000 camels).
139. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, p. 447.
140. Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade," p. 586; Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, p. 428 et seq.

In particular, details are known about the volume of the Venetian spice trade in the middle of the 16th century. In 1554 the Venetians obtained about 6,000 *quintals* (1 quintal = 112 lbs) in Alexandria, that is to say about half of all the supplies that arrived there. Between 1560 and 1564 the amount taken by the Venetians had increased to 12,000 *quintals*. Other estimates quote the figure of 30,000 to 40,000 *quintals* as the total quantity of supplies reaching Alexandria (Braudel, p. 428; Lane, p. 585, 586). Portuguese spice exports from Asia via the Cape at the beginning of the 16th century are estimated at 25,000 to 35,000 *quintals* and the figures for the end of the 16th century vary between 20,000 and 40,000 *quintals* for pepper and 10,000 *quintals* for other spices. According to Lane, this figure is too high and probably represents the target aimed at (Lane, p. 586). Spices destined for oriental consumption are not included, nor supplies going to Aleppo (figures for which are lacking), but these quantities must also have been quite considerable (Lane, p. 587; Braudel, p. 428).

Pepper was the most important of the spices at this time, a proportion of which came from India (Malabar) but some also from Sumatra. Ships left Sumatra every year for Mecca (Hakluyt II, p. 250-265, John Eldred, quoted by Braudel, p. 443). A communication from the Venetian consul in Cairo, quoted by Lane (p. 586) reports the arrival in 1565 in Jidda (the rendez-vous for ships with cargoes for Cairo) of 3 ships from Assi, a kingdom on the island of Sumatra. The name seems to be a corruption of Achin. The arrival of two other ships from the same kingdom was anticipated. As opposed to the 5 Sumatran ships, 20 ships arrived from various trading places in India. In 1566 5 ships had arrived from Assi, together with 3 from Baticalao, bringing about 24,000 *cantara* of pepper (1 *cantara* was probably 1 Portuguese *quintal* of 112 English lbs). These must have been exceptionally large shipments. Lane draws no further conclusions from these data, and yet they are most remarkable because, provided Assi can be identified with Achin, they contain the earliest known reports about the volume of Achinese pepper exports to the West. This trade remained right outside the Portuguese sphere of influence, a fact accounting for the expansionist policy of the kingdom of Achin, the economic basis of which was the pepper trade and Achin's wealth in gold. The Portuguese must have obtained their Sumatran pepper from the east coast of the island, where Pidië was subordinate to them, while Achin on the other hand stimulated the cultivation and export of pepper on the west coast and extended its influence on that part of Sumatra.

141. When the Portuguese tried to make peace with the Turks in 1541 they offered to permit unlimited imports of pepper to Turkey, provided the Turks allowed the Portuguese to send as many ships as they wished to the Red Sea (G. W. F. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, p. 93).
142. Pires, *Suma Oriental II*, p. 287.
143. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, p. 423, 424; Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade," p. 589.

CHAPTER VII

1. According to MacGregor ("Portuguese in Malaya," p. 2, 6) there were seldom more than 600 Portuguese in Malacca at a time. In 1626 there were 114 married Portuguese there, of whom 62 lived outside the town.
2. In Pasè the Portuguese relied on the Hindu *shahbandar*, who helped them to obtain power (Barros III, 1, p. 272, 524).
3. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 69; Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 280. At the insistence of the Gujarati, the Javanese, and the Moslem religious teachers, the sultan of Malacca decided to oppose the Portuguese.
4. *Alguns Documentos*, p. 297 (30/11 1513).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 349 (6/1 1514).
6. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 283.
7. Pires' optimism about the future was based partly on his expectation that the Portuguese would bring luxury articles for which there was a demand among the Asians. The veracity and sense of justice which Pires imputed in greater measure to his compatriots than to the Malays might be regarded as an early sign of nascent feelings of western superiority. But in expressing these views he rather contradicts what he has said earlier about the well-run and fairly-organized commercial traffic during the sultanate.
8. Pires, *Suma Oriental* II, p. 283.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 286.
10. See p. 137.
11. For the expedition of Pate Unus see H. J. de Graaf, "Tomé Pires' 'Suma Oriental' en het tijdperk van godsdienstovergang op Java"; R. A. Kern, "Pati Unus en Sunda," p. 124, 125.
12. Albuquerque, *Commentaries* III, p. 125.
13. Couto, *Da Asia*, X, part 2, p. 274; *Boletim* II, p. 199 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 15/2 1594); *Ibid.*, p. 280 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 21/1 1588); *Ibid.*, p. 293 (Carta régia para a vice-rei 6/2 1589); *Ibid.*, p. 305 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 12/1 1591); *Ibid.*, p. 326 (Carta régia para a vice-rei, 18/2 1595); *Ibid.*, p. 214 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 6/8 1593: oppose English settlement in Pegu). Cf. also Schouten, "Rapport", p. 315. Schouten states that, apart from foodstuffs, the Peguans imported gold, rubies, musk, tin, and Martaban jars into Malacca, and that they exchanged these articles for cloth, sandalwood, pepper, cloves, silks, porcelain and iron pans.
14. *Studia* V, p. 100 (carta régia, 26/2 1595).
15. For the struggle between Portuguese Malacca and the dislodged sultan see: Tiele "Europeërs" I, p. 387; Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power*, p. 328; Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 72, 73, 74; Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 592, 593.
16. Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power*, p. 330; Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 79.
17. Barretto de Resende, "Account of Malacca," p. 4.
18. *Begin ende Voortgang* II, "Verhoeven," p. 39.
19. Eredia, "Description of Malacca," Notes, p. 118.
20. Barros, *Da Asia*, III, 2, p. 497.
21. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 346.
22. *Ibid.*, I, p. 344.
23. Couto, *Da Asia* X, part 2, p. 37, 38.
24. Couto, *Da Asia* X, part 2, p. 273; *Ibid.*, IV, 2, p. 275; *Ibid.*, X, 1, p. 421. The Peace of 1583 stipulated that Johore should not allow any Chinese to enter its port. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca*, p. 135.
25. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 142; Eredia, "Chersonesus," p. 229. For the various capitals see also Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 418, 424, 425, 438, 592, 593; MacGregor, "Johore Lama in the 16th Century," p. 48-126, (114-115); C. A. Gibson-Hill, "Johore Lama and Other Ancient Sites," p. 127-197 (193-194).
26. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 2, p. 467.

27. Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 2, p. 275.
28. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 136; *B & V* II, "Matelieff," p. 30.
The description by Matelieff, dating from 1606, of what was then the capital town, namely Batu Sawar on the left bank of the R. Johore, a little to the south of Kota Tinggi, reveals what was certainly a very primitive settlement of little houses all huddled together and built of wood and rushes. When danger threatened, the inhabitants used to set fire to their own houses.
A more favourable verdict is expressed on Johore Lama, the 16th century seat of government, situated closer to the mouth of the river. It had a good anchorage but was very exposed to attack (Gibson-Hill, "Johore Lama," p. 140, 141, 167; MacGregor, "Johore Lama in the 16th Century," p. 81, 106).
29. See also MacGregor, "Johore Lama in the 16th Century," p. 48-126.
30. Tiele, "Europëers" II, p. 36.
31. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 76.
32. Couto, *Da Asia* IV 1, p. 388.
33. Couto, *Da Asia* X 2, p. 37, 38.
34. Eredia, "Description of Malacca," *Notes*, p. 101.
35. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 42, 49, 63; Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, "The World of South East Asia," p. 174.
36. MacGregor, "Johore Lama in the 16th Century," p. 96-114.
37. *Boletim* II, p. 288 (Carte régia para o vice-rei, 6/2 1589).
38. *Boletim* II, p. 299 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 22/2 1589); *Ibid.*, p. 200 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 15/2 1594).
39. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 82.
40. Eredia, "Description of Malacca," *Notes*, p. 183.
41. *B & V* I, "Warwijck," p. 40.
42. Rouffaer, "Memorie handel 1603," p. XV.
43. Rouffaer, "Malaka," p. 134.
44. *B & V* I, "Warwijck," p. 80.
45. Dampier, *Reystogten*, II, p. 4.
46. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 684.
47. View held by Marsden (Veltman, "Pidië," p. 64, see also p. 26). The guns and ammunition captured by the Achinese in 1521 from the Portuguese were used against Pidië (Pedir) and Pasë.
48. For the expansion of Achin see Barros III, 2, p. 239-280.
49. Mention of Achin's wealth in gold can be found in Barros III, 1, p. 538. He describes the mosque in Achin "no qual havia muito ouro" (in which there was a lot of gold).
50. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 139.
51. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 300, 537. Ma Huan (1416) reports that fish could be obtained cheaply in Lambri (Lamori?) in the northern tip of Sumatra (Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca*, p. 98).
52. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 300.
53. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago*, p. 98. Ma Huan describes this country as inhabited by Moslems. Food was scarce, only fish and shrimps being cheap. Sandalwood came from the mountains and copper coins were in circulation as money.
Apparently Chinese ships went there (p. 99).
According to Schrieke ("Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 43), Achin's main motive in carrying on the struggle with Malacca was to obtain the Chinese trade. With a view to this, it secured the pepper ports on the west coast of Sumatra. Schrieke does not state, however, whether Achin actually succeeded in attracting the Chinese trade. In his *Selected Writings* II (p. 385, note 29) he mentions that the shipping Achin sent to China consisted of an annual trading fleet of 20 ships, (a piece of information borrowed from Tiele [Tiele "Europëers" V, p. 199]). The passage in question is based on a report by de Argensola, who states, however, that the Achinese ships sailed from the port of Bintang. But Bintang lies in Johore, so these must have been Chinese ships, not Achinese. Chinese merchant ships did, in fact, visit Johore each year.
54. Unger, *De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen naar Oost-Indië*, 1598-1604 (Journaal John Davis) p. 50,
55. Foster, *The voyage of Thomas Best*, p. 173.

56. Couto, *Da Asia* VIII, p. 60, 69.
57. See p. 132-135.
58. See p. 134, note 140.
59. Couto, *Da Asia* VII, 2, p. 452, 453; Pinto, *Voyages aventureux* III, p. 339, 345.
60. *Boletim* II, p. 241 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 21/11 1598).
61. Couto, *Da Asia* VIII, p. 131.
62. For the connection between the Samudri and the Moslem merchants engaged in the spice trade see Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, p. 39. The merchants of Calicut owned warehouses in Cairo and Alexandria and even in Fez.
63. Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 431.
64. See p. 148.
65. Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 1, p. 172; Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 400.
66. Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 2, p. 269.
On this occasion several ships coming from Cambaya as well as from Achin were seized. The cargoes were sold in Hormuz and fetched nearly 800,000 pardaos. (At the beginning of the 16th century one silver pardao was worth 300 reis. There were also gold pardaos worth 360 reis each. - Hobson-Jobson, p. 672-677). Cf. also Tiele, "Europeërs" V, p. 167 (seizure of Achinese ships by Portuguese in 1581).
67. Tiele, "Europeërs" III, p. 302; Pinto, *Voyages aventureux*, III, p. 336.
68. Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 1, p. 388.
69. *Boletim* III, p. 445 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 5/2 1597); *Ibid.*, II, p. 236 (Carta régia para a vice-rei, 26/1 1598); *Ibid.*, p. 248 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 5/3 1598); *Ibid.*, III, p. 538 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 7/2 1602).
70. Couto, *Da Asia* XII, p. 242; Foster, *Voyages of Sir James Lancaster*, p. 101.
71. *Boletim* III, p. 568 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, n.d.).
72. Gray and Bell, *The voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies* (1601-1611), IIa, p. 157, 158.
73. Schouten, "Rapport Malaka," p. 310.
Eredia, "Chersonesus," p. 239 mentions Indragiri and Kampar, as well as Jambi, as being important ports from which the pepper demanded by the captains of Malacca was exported.
74. *Dagregister Batavia* 1626, p. 284.
75. Linschoten, *Itinerario* I, p. 74, 75.
76. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 204 (10/10 1616).
77. Keuning, *Tweede Schipvaart* III, p. 148; Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste Schipvaart* II, p. 16.
78. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 177 (31/3 1616).
79. *Ibid.*, p. 178 (31/3 1616); *Ibid.*, II, p. 143 (11/9 1616).
80. *Ibid.*, I, p. 177 (31/3 1616).
81. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 110 (15/6 1616).
82. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
83. *Ibid.*, I, p. 204 (10/10 1616); *Ibid.*, II, p. 143 (11/9 1616); *Ibid.*, VII, p. 83-85 (27/5 1616); *Ibid.*, p. 77 (21/2 1616).
84. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 306 (5/12 1617); *Ibid.*, II, p. 596 (19/11 1619); *Ibid.*, p. 780 (21/11 1620); *Ibid.*, I, p. 595 (26/10 1620).
85. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 306 (5/12 1617).
86. See p. 138.
87. Apparently Pate Unus had planned to attack Malacca even before it fell into Portuguese hands (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 188). This would indicate growing commercial rivalry. Probably in the final period of the sultanate too little consideration had been given to the Javanese and too heavy duties levied on imports and exports. When the town fell into Portuguese hands this was an even more pressing reason for the Javanese ruler to put the plan into action.
Japara's conquest of Lawe and Tanjung Pura on Borneo and of Bangka and other islands (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 188) are further indication that Pate Unus sought to extend his authority. The grounds for the quarrel with Malacca must have been mainly economic.
88. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 187. See also p. 83.
89. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 188.
90. See p. 138, 104.
91. See p. 137.

92. See p. 103 et seq..
93. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 606.
According to Schrieke, the Portuguese Antonio de Brito assumed that the ruler of Grise also exercised authority over Madura (Schrieke II, *Selected Writings*, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," p. 68). This is not, however, apparent from the passage in Barros upon which Schrieke bases his assertion; Barros, *Da Asia* III, 2, p. 296; *Ibid.*, 2, p. 302.
94. *Ibid.*, III, 2, p. 296; *Ibid.*, p. 302.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 302; *Ibid.*, p. 308.
96. See p. 105-107.
97. Barros, *Da Asia* III, p. 606.
It is possible that Tuban also conducted trade via the R. Solor. According to Nicolaas Hartingh's memorandum of 1761, De Jonge, *Opkomst* X, p. 340, the land of Tuban extended as far as the R. Solor, at least that was so in the mid-18th century. Then a proportion of the imports and exports might have been made via Grise. Passages in the journals of the Second Voyage indicate that Grise acted as an intermediary for the maritime trade of Tuban, a consequence of the fact that the roads of Tuban were not very favourably situated (Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 42, 203, IV, p. 54). Yet at this time Tuban must have had quite a considerable spice trade (Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 167-169).
98. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, 188; Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën* II, "Ambonsche zaken," p. 6; See p. 161.
99. See p. 160, 161.
100. De Graaf, *Regering van Panembahan Senapati*, p. 29, 32-35.
101. Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 432.
102. De Graaf, *Senapati*, p. 35.
103. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 188.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
105. See p. 160, 161.
106. J. W. IJzerman, *Cornelis Buysero in Bantam* (1616-1618), p. 110.
107. See p. 111.
108. See p. 111.
109. *Encyclopedie Nederlandsch Indië* III, p. 244, 245 (G. P. Rouffaer).
110. Couto, *Da Asia* VIII, p. 132.
111. De Graaf, *Senapati*, p. 68.
De Graaf takes the passage in Couto to mean that Japara and Demak followed different policies, not Japara and Pajang. But whether or not Couto said Demak but meant Pajang, his passage refers to a ruler whose support the ruler of Achin was anxious to have in his struggle against the Portuguese, that is to say, to a ruler with ships and auxiliary troops at his disposal.
112. Couto, *Da Asia* IX, p. 234.
113. De Graaf, *Senapati*, p. 27.
114. De Graaf offers no explanation for the conflicting policies although they are clearly indicated in the Portuguese sources (De Graaf, *Senapati*, p. 32-37). It is also difficult to reconcile this circumstance with the view that Japara was the export port for Demak. According to Pires at least, (Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 186), Demak still had a good roadstead in the first half of the 16th century and also possessed a relatively large number of merchant ships.
115. Was commercial jealousy perhaps the reason for an expedition undertaken against Bantam by Japara in 1580? De Graaf does no more than record the fact (*Senapati*, p. 35). The Javanese sources, which throw light only upon differences in the political (dynastic) and religious sphere, probably present too one-sided a picture. It is, of course, advisable not to lay too much emphasis on economic motives in a society so essentially different from those in western Europe, yet it is certainly remarkable that it is precisely in the cases where the Portuguese sources supplement Javanese data, that a glimpse of the economic background to events usually becomes visible.
116. Keuning, *Tweede Schipvaart* III, p. 204.
117. Wiselius, "Historisch onderzoek naar de geestelijke en wereldlijke suprematie van Grisee."
118. See p. 270 et seq.
119. De Graaf, *Senapati* p. 60, 61, from which it appears that Grise had connections with the interior.

120. IJzerman, *Reis door Olivier van Noort*, 1598-1601, p. 138.
121. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 42.
122. V.O.C. arch. 965, 8/8 1612; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 74, 22/10 1615.
123. *Documentos remetidos* I, p. 339, 19/2 1610.
124. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 461, 10/9 1619.
125. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 168.
126. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 198.
127. This situation also occurs in Indian harbour-principalities.
128. Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 418.
129. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 397.
130. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 185, note 1, cf. *Eerste schipvaart* II, p. LXXXI. On the basis of data from Caspar de Cruz, Boxer maintains that this was a Dominican mission (*South China*, p. 55).
131. B & V I, "Joris van Spilbergen," p. 59.
132. "Twee vermaarde scheepstogten van Thomas Candish" (Cavendish) *Zee- en Landreysen*, p. 31; Tiele, "Europeërs" V, p. 187.
133. "Thomas Cavendish," p. 32.
134. A padrao has been found in what later became Batavia.
135. H. Djajadiningrat, *Sadjarah Banten*.
136. Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 2, p. 268.
137. *Ibid.*, VIII, p. 243; *Ibid.*, IX, p. 101.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
139. *Ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 167.
140. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* II, p. 398.
141. *Studia* V (1960), p. 100, (Carta régia, 28/2 1595).
142. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 157vs, 1 Aug. 1614.
143. B & V II, "Verhoeven," p. 121.
For the Portuguese sandalwood trade see Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 174 et seq.
144. Quotation: "alle jaer hier joncken van Malaka komen," Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* III, p. 99.
145. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 584.
146. See p. 93 et seq.
147. *Historia da expansao Portuguesa no mundo* II, p. 155.
148. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 217.
149. Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 2, p. 168.
150. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
151. Schrieke (*Indonesian Sociological Studies* II, p. 233/236) holds that the conflicts in the Spice Islands were primarily religious in origin.
152. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 601; Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. XXVIII.
At the request of the king of Ternate, the Portuguese built a fortified wooden house on Ternate, but Tidore wanted to see the Portuguese established on the clove island of Makian, the ownership of which was equally divided between the two rulers.
153. Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, p. 331.
154. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 361.
155. De Graaf, *Geschiedenis van Indonesië*, p. 131.
156. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 342.
157. See p. 97, note 68.
Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 580.
Pires' 50 years seems more probable than Barros' 80 years, especially as Barros speaks of the sultan who introduced Islam as being the father of the sultan reigning about 1520.
158. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 576.
159. *Ibid.*, p. 580.
160. *Ibid.*, p. 610.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 612.
162. *Ibid.*, III, 2, p. 327.
163. *Ibid.*, III, 1, p. 615; Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 1, p. 192.
164. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
165. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 389; Barros, *Da Asia* III, 2, p. 319.
166. *Ibid.*, III, 1, p. 615.
167. Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 1, p. 302.
168. Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, p. 334.

169. Cortesão, *Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 343.
170. Tiele, "Europeërs" II, p. 14.
171. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 409; *Ibid.*, II, p. 46, 47.
The Portuguese writers quote various prices for cloves. As we have already seen, Pires mentions a sales price of 9 to 10 *crusados* per *bahar* when supplies were abundant, and of 12 *crusados* when there was a shortage (1 *crusado* = 420 *reis* at the beginning of the 16th century). In the first treaty concluded between the Ternatans and the Portuguese in 1522, the purchase price for cloves was fixed at 800 *reis* per *bahar*. According to Castanheda, the price was 3 *pardao* per *bahar* (Castanheda VIII, p. 381) (1 *pardao* = 300 or 360 *reis*). Urdaneta mentions that the purchase price of cloves increased fivefold between 1526 and 1535 (Tiele, "Europeërs" II, p. 22). That the value of sales prices must have risen steeply is apparent from a passage in Couto (*Da Asia* VIII, p. 206) where it is stated that in 1565 110 *quintals* (4 *quintals* = 1 *bahar* of cloves) were landed in Goa and that these represented a value of 50,000 *pardaos*. When it was decided that only clean cloves would be bought in future, the factors paid the natives 5 *pardaos* per *bahar* in 1552 to compensate for the losses involved in sorting (Tiele, "Europeërs" III, p. 335).
172. Tiele, "Europeërs" III, p. 335.
173. *Ibid.*, I, p. 409; *Ibid.*, II, p. 14.
174. *Boletim* II, p. 260 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 11/3 1585).
175. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 410.
176. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 411.
177. *Boletim* II, p. 264 (Carta régia para o vice-rei, 6/3 1587).
178. Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 412.
179. *Ibid.*, II, p. 46; Castanheda VIII, p. 379.
180. De Lannoy apparently excludes the possibility of their existence (*Histoire de l'expansion coloniale*, p. 195).
181. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
182. Couto, *Da Asia*, X, 2, p. 352.
183. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale*, p. 194.
184. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 588.
185. Cf. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 143, 389 note 170.
186. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 380.
187. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 576.
188. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 119; Tiele, "Europeërs" II, p. 23.
189. Rockhill, "Notes on the Relations and Trade of China," *TP* XVI, p. 259, 260.
190. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 117.
191. Rockhill, "Notes on the Relations and Trade of China," *TP* XVI, p. 260.
192. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," p. 25.
193. See p. 107.
194. See p. 99, 100.
195. See p. 207.
196. Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 442.
197. *Ibid.*, p. 454.
198. Couto, *Da Asia* X, 2, p. 42.
199. Tiele, "Europeërs" V, p. 161.
200. At the height of its power, Ternate's sphere of influence extended over part of southern Mindanao, the Sangir and Talaoer Islands, Minahassa, Gorontalo, and other districts on the Gulf of Tomini, the Banggai and Sula Islands, a large part of the east coast of Celebes, Butung, Solor, Buru, part of Ceram and the Amboina Islands (*Encycl. Ned. Indië* IV, p. 321). Tidore's territory consisted of the islands of Tidore, Maitara and Maré, a large part of the island of Halmahera, the island of Gêbé, and the islands belonging to it, and the western part of New Guinea (*Encycl. Ned. Indië* IV, p. 335).
201. Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 455, 456.
202. See p. 100.
203. Valentijn, *Oud- en Nieuw Oost Indiën* II, "Beschrijvinge van Amboina," p. 37;
204. *Ibid.*, p. 37. "Ambonsche Zaaken," p. 15.
205. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
206. *Ibid.*, p. 2, 6.

207. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
208. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 161rs (Discours Amboina).
209. Couto, *Da Asia* V, 2, p. 53, 54.
Tiele, who goes by Castanheda, gives another version. In Tiele it is a fleet of junks from Java, Banda, Macassar, and Amboina (Tiele II, p. 54). Couto must be the more reliable of the two, for at this time neither Amboina itself, nor Macassar, possessed large junks, and probably Banda did not have any either.
210. Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 435.
211. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 162 (Discours Amboina).
212. From Valentijn's rendering of the Ridjali chronicle, the only version which has been preserved, it might be gathered that the inhabitants of Hitu were already in contact with Japara at the beginning of the 16th century. They are reputed to have concluded a contract with a ruler of Japara. After the latter's death relations ceased "because the next pangerang was not so upright" ("also de volgende pangerang zo oprecht niet was" - Valentijn II, "Ambonsche Zaaken," p. 6). Contact was only resumed when the Hituese called in Japara's help against the Portuguese, thus not until the Hituese began to find the Portuguese too troublesome.
213. Couto, *Da Asia* V, 2, p. 314.
214. Valentijn II, "Ambonsche Zaaken," p. 6.
But in 1626 the king of Ternate still calls the Hituese his subjects (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 III, fol. 128), see also Coen, *Bescheiden* V, p. 125 (3/II 1628).
215. Valentijn II, "Ambonsche Zaaken," p. 15.
216. Couto, *Da Asia* V, 2, p. 53.
217. Valentijn II, "Ambonsche Zaaken," p. 15, 17.
218. *Ibid.*, p. 9, 10, 15.
219. Couto, *Da Asia* VIII, p. 199.
220. Valentijn II, "Ambonsche Zaaken," p. 19.
221. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
222. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 589.
223. *Ibid.*, III, 2, p. 485.
224. See p. 96.
225. To be sure, Barros (III, 1, p. 585) and Couto (IV, 2, p. 290) hold that the inhabitants of the Moluccas took their spices to the Banda Islands, but this is contrary to what they must have learned about the navigation and trade of these natives from Pires' *Suma Oriental* and, more especially, from the later Dutch sources. For that matter, Barros also speaks of Bandanese going to Tidore to collect cloves (Barros III, 2, p. 314).
226. Barros III, 1, p. 585.
227. *Ibid.*, p. 588.
228. Tiele, "Europeërs" I, p. 360, 388; Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 600, 608.
229. See p. 95.
230. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 1, p. 608.
231. Couto, *Da Asia* IV, 2, 288.
232. See p. 208.
233. Barros, *Da Asia* III, 2, p. 485.
234. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
235. *Ibid.*, p. 315.
236. Tiele, "Europeërs" IV, p. 411.
237. *Ibid.*, p. 411.
238. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 93.
239. Eredia, "Notes," p. 181.
240. Rouffaer, "Memorie handel 1603," p. XVII.
241. Resende, "Account of Malacca," p. 10. *Jourdain* (Journal, p. 294) also gives particulars of extensive Portuguese importation of cloth into Macassar.
V.O.C. arch. 965, O.B. 1607-1613 (letter Samuel Denis, 9 July 1612).
242. V.O.C. arch. 965, O.B. 1607-1613 (letter Samuel Denis, 15 July 1612).
243. If the "Mollaceans" of the English reports may be held to include inhabitants of Banda (*Letters received by the East India Company* II, p. 78, 26/7 1614).
244. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 754. Report made to Coen after 7 Aug. 1621 by Jan Joosten.
245. Eredia, "Chersonesus," p. 246.
246. B&V I, "Warwijck," p. 34 (1603).

247. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 32 (24/7 1615); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 50vs (3/3 1625); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1627 III, fol. 126vs (13/12 1626).
248. *Letters received by the East India Company* II, p. 31, 24/4 1614.
249. B&V I, "Warwijck," p. 34 (1603).
250. *Letters received* II, p. 31 (24/4 1614).
251. B&V I, "Warwijck," p. 34 (1603).
252. See p. 207 et seq.
253. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 754. Report made to Coen after 7 Aug. 1621 by Jan Joosten.
254. *Ibid.*, p. 754.
255. Tiele, "Europeërs" II, p. 12, 13.
256. Rouffaer, "Memorie Handel 1603," p. XIX.
257. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I vervolg fol. 921 (Report Philips Lucasz.). Eredia, "Chersonesus," p. 245.
258. Resende, "Account of Malacca," p. 11.
259. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
260. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
261. Barros reports the arrival of 4 Gujarati ships in Tenasserim as early as 1522 (Barros, *Da Asia* III, 2, p. 255).
262. Moreland, *Peter Floris*, p. 42 note 1, 2.
263. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
264. Resende, "Account of Malacca," p. 8.
265. The Cochinchina of the Portuguese was not the Mekong Delta region which is given the name today, but Tonkin and northern Annam (C. R. Boxer, *South China in the 16th Century*, p. 29 note 2).
266. Resende, "Account of Malacca," p. 8.
267. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 79 (22/10 1615), 86 (10/11 1614), 101 (27/12 1614), 189 (31/3 1616); *Ibid.*, II, p. 336 (2/1 1618), 444 (19/9 1618); *Ibid.*, III, p. 755 (19/8 1621).
268. Tiele, "Europeërs" III, p. 298-300; *Ibid.* V, p. 171; Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 91, 93; Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, p. 290; Couto, *Da Asia* V, 2, p. 316-318.
269. Couto, *Da Asia* V, 2, p. 318. Couto does not state the size of the export duties.
270. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 93. See also *Documentos remetidos* I, p. 339, 19/2 1610 (Javanese spice trade in Malacca).
271. Schouten, Rapport Malaka, V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1642 III, fol. 436. Publ. *Berigten Hist. Genootschap*. 1859, (VII, 1), p. 258-375.
272. See also *Documentos remetidos* I, p. 321, Apontamentos sobre a alfandega de Malaca (c. 1610).
273. Ruba-ruba = anchorage dues.
274. Schouten, Rapport Malaka, fol. 437.
275. *Ibid.*, fol. 433-433 vs. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 93.
276. Schouten, Rapport Malaka, fol. 433vs.
277. *Documentos remetidos* II, p. 180 (27/2 1612); *Ibid.*, III, XVI, p. 206 (14/2 1615); *Boletim* III, p. 457. Alvará regio, 25/3 1589.
278. *Ibid.*, p. 457. Alvará regio, 25/3 1589.
279. e.g. *Documentos remetidos* III, XVI, p. 205 (14/2 1615); *Ibid.*, II, XVI, p. 178 (27/2 1612).
280. *Ibid.*, *Documentos remetidos* II, XVI, p. 178 (27/2 1612); *Boletim* III, p. 547. Provisao regia 19/2 1603; *Documentos remetidos* I, p. 321; Apontamentos sobre a alfandega de Malaca; *Ibid.*, I, XII, p. 73 (16/1 1607); *Ibid.*, I, XXVII, p. 291 (23/1 1610); *Ibid.*, XXVII, p. 294 (23/1 1610); *Ibid.*, II, XVII, p. 188, 189 (28/2 1612); *Boletim* III, p. 495 Alvará regio, 5/12 1606; *Ibid.*, p. 509, Carta regia, 24/3 1605; *Ibid.*, p. 486 Alvará do vice-rei, 9/11 1605.
281. *Documentos remetidos* I, p. 320, Apontamentos sobre a alfandega de Malaca.
282. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
283. Schouten, Rapport Malaka, fol. 433, 433vs.
284. *Documentos remetidos* I, XIX, p. 168, 2/1 1608; *Boletim* III, p. 606. Alvará regio, 15/2 1610.
285. *Ibid.*, II, p. 230. Carta regia, 10/2 1598; *Ibid.*, p. 231. Carta regia, 10/3 1598; *Ibid.*, p. 245. Alvará regio, 12/3 1598; *Documentos remetidos* II, p. XIV (31/1 1612).
286. Schouten, Rapport Malaka, fol. 433vs; *Documentos remetidos* II, p. 181 (27/2 1612); *Ibid.*, IV, XXIV, p. 173 (22/3 1617).

287. Schouten, Rapport Malaka, fol. 433vs.
Schouten states that the figure fell from 50,000 to 10,000 cruzados.
288. *Boletim III*, p. 527. Carta regia, 2/1 1601; *Ibid.*, p. 529. Carta regia, 25/1 1601.
289. *Boletim II*, p. 268. Carta regia, 13/3 1587; *Ibid.*, III, p. 457, 458. Alvará regio, 25/3 1589; *Documentos remetidos I*, XIX, p. 168, (2/1 1608); *Ibid.*, I, p. 318-319. Apontamentos sobre a alfandega de Malaca (c. 1610).
290. *Documentos remetidos II*, XVII, p. 181, (28/2 1612); *Ibid.*, III, XVI, p. 205, (14/2 1615).
291. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 63.
292. See p. 74 et seq.
293. Boxer, *South China* (Gaspar da Cruz), p. 191.
294. See p. 139, 140.
295. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 134, cf. also Couto, *Da Asia*, VII, 2, p. 450.
296. *Boletim II*, p. 311. Carta regia, Jan. 1591.
297. *Ibid.*, p. 333, Carta regia, 28/2 1595.
298. Couto, *Da Asia V*, 2, p. 318.
299. See p. 171, 172.
300. *Documentos remetidos I*, p. 319. Apontamentos sobre a alfandega de Malaca, (c. 1610).
301. *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes IX*, p. 164.
302. Schouten, Rapport Malaka, fol. 439-441.
303. Winstedt, "History of Malaya," p. 95-96.
304. Schouten, Rapport Malaka, fol. 439-441.
305. *Boletim IV*, p. 759. Carta do vice-rei, 23/1 1615.
306. Eredia, "Chersonesus," p. 243.
307. *Boletim II*, p. 305. Carta regia, 12/1 1591.
308. Cortesão, *História de Portugal V*, p. 340.
309. *Hakluytus Posthumus X*, p. 197.
310. Linschoten, *Itinerario I*, p. 73.
311. A microfilm of this manuscript, in possession of the Berg family which has never been published, is to be found in the Algemeen Rijksarchief (General State Archives) in The Hague. For the origin of the manuscript see J. C. M. Warnsinck: *De Wetenschappelijke voorbereiding van onze eerste scheepvaart naar Oost-Indië*, p. 5. According to Warnsinck, the data contained in it must have been collected before De Houtman's fleet departed, and must have comprised all the data (still unprinted in Holland in 1594, with the exception of Van Linschoten's *Itinerario*) referring to trade and shipping in the East Indies which had been collected by the directors of the *Maatschappij van Verre*. This is also indicated by the fact that the manuscript formed part of the estate of the burgomaster of Amsterdam Johannes Hudde, whose grandfather Hendrick Hudde Arentsz. had been one of the principal shipowners concerned in the First Voyage.

CHAPTER VIII

1. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart I*, p. XXIV.
2. See also J. G. van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie*, p. 11-20.
3. For the conflicts of the Portuguese and the Dutch in the overseas territories see: C. R. Boxer, "Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry 1641-1661" in *Studia II* (1958), p. 7-42. Later on the Portuguese tried to avail themselves of the superior shipbuilding skill of the northern Europeans by having ships built in English ports (*Documentos remetidos I*, p. XXIII, p. 237, 26/3 1608).
4. Outside Europe, the Dutch offensive was directed mainly against the Portuguese. In "Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry," p. 8, Boxer points out that the Dutch were usually defeated when they fought against the Spanish (for example, in the Philippines).
5. Barbour, "Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the 17th century," p. 227.
6. Tiele, "Europeërs" V, p. 202.
7. Boxer, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Review X (1950), p. 219.
8. *História da expansão II*, p. 94.

For the superiority of Dutch ships and naval tactics see Botelho de Sousa, *Subsidios para a Historia militar maritima da India* I, p. 433, 434, 437. In the 17th century boarding parties and man-to-man fighting gave way to gun battles between ships, which meant that the ships had to carry much heavier armament. While Barbour ("Dutch and English Merchant Shipping," p. 227) also attaches significance to these changes in the tactics of naval warfare, Professor Boxer does not consider that the contrast between Dutch and Portuguese tactics was so great. According to him, the Dutch still tried to board as soon as they could but the Portuguese, who were aware of Dutch superiority, tried to avoid battles, although of course, exceptions did occur (statement by Prof. Boxer).

9. Coen, *Bescheiden* VI, p. 456 (Discours 1614).
10. Quotation: "was so veel gezeeyt als dat men in Noorwegen om vijgen en rozynen zou varen," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 II, fol. 300, 10/3 1616; also *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 112vs, 10/3 1616; Coen, *Bescheiden* VI, p. 456 (Discours 1614).
11. Boxer considers that the Portuguese made a serious mistake in basing their defence upon lightly-armed but very easily manoeuvrable ships such as lateen-rigged lighters and frigates which fell easy prey to the heavily-armed vessels of the Dutch and English (Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 232).
12. "em tempo em que a guerra se faz aos holandezes que e gente bem disciplinade" (*Documentos remettidos* IV, p. 168, 22/3 1617).
13. Lopes, *Expansão da lingua portuguesa*, p. 12, gives some figures showing the ratio between the numbers of Dutch and Portuguese ships that were sent to the East Indies. According to Lopes, between 1595 and 1601 the Netherlands dispatched 65 ships (This figure is incorrect. According to the data provided by the Bijlsma inventory on the precursors of the United Company, the number was 48). During the same period 33 ships reputedly embarked from Lisbon. The cubic capacity of the Portuguese ships must have been considerably more than that of the Dutch vessels, however.
14. Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 23; Ballard, *Rulers of the Indian Ocean*, p. 211. Boxer ("Rivalry," p. 27, 28) considers that the quality of the human material was a factor of very considerable importance in the conflicts between the nations.
15. Dunlop, *Bronnen Perzië*, p. LVII; Pieter van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 16; Boxer, "Military influence," p. 7.
16. See, for instance, Van Dam II, 3, p. LVII, p. 16.
17. *Calendar of State Papers, East Indies*, 1617-1621, p. 21 (7/3 1617).
18. See p. 129.
19. Boxer attaches less importance to these technical factors and points out that the larger northern European ships destined for the East Indies trade were usually the same size as the smaller caracks and galleons of the Portuguese (Boxer, "Admiral João Pereira Corte Real and the construction of Portuguese East Indianmen in the Early 17th Century," *Mariner's Mirror* XXVI (1940), p. 388-390, 396-398, 404-406).
20. Boxer, *Tragic History of the Sea*, 1589-1622, p. 1-30.
21. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion* I, p. 143.
22. *Historia de Portugal V*, p. 340, 351; Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 13; *Ibid.*, "Rivalry," p. 13.
23. Quotation: "het soo lange op zee conden herden, ja hielden het voor onmogelijck, so lange sonder rust op zee te wesen," *B&V* II, "Matelieff," p. 51.
24. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 635; Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 27, 68.
25. W. M. F. Mansvelt, *Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer*, p. 70 et seq.
26. C. de Heer, in *Bijdrage tot de financieele geschiedenis der Oost-Indische Compagnie*, p. 1-17, contests the view that the United Company was a cartel, and he demonstrates that in spite of the autonomy of the various Chambers the Company was actually an entity in itself (p. 17).
27. Mansvelt, *Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer*, p. 93, 94.
28. In his *Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740*, K. Glamann takes a more favourable view of the Company's bookkeeping than Mansvelt. He uses a trade journal and ledger which have been preserved from the Company's office in Persia to demonstrate that the directors knew more about whether the factories were proving remunerative than Mansvelt supposed (Glamann, p. 250-252). Nevertheless, he does not dispose satisfactorily of one of Mansvelt's greatest objections, namely the United Company's totally inadequate system of calculating expenses. The directors were well aware of the imperfections of

their bookkeeping system, witness their repeated attempts to appoint an Accountant-General, whose task it would be to combine Dutch and Asian data into one general bookkeeping system (Van Dam I, 1, p. 372-376).

29. Lane, "Oceanic expansion," p. 22, 23.
30. For the inadequate costing system, see Mansvelt, *Rechtsvorm*, p. 107.
31. As far as the United Company is concerned, at least, the publication of Glamann's *Dutch Asiatic Trade* means that a solid foundation has already been laid. It is questionable, however, whether research of this nature, which depends primarily on statistical material, is possible in respect of the Portuguese enterprises.
32. For the significance to Dutch economy of the carrying trade, see J. E. Elias, *Het voorspel van den eersten Engelschen oorlog* (The Prelude to the First English War), I, chapter 1.
33. *Historia de Portugal* V, p. 336.
34. MacGregor, "Portuguese in Malaya," p. 23.
35. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion* I, p. 22.
36. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 220.
37. Quoted in Whiteway, *Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, p. 174. Bartholomew the Florentine was a certain Bartolomeo Marchione, an Italian merchant from Florence, who played an important role in Portuguese trade, owned a business-house in Portugal, and participated in Portuguese enterprises overseas (thus Giovanni da Empoli went to the Indies in Marchione's service in 1503). For Bartolomeo Marchione see Charles Verlinden, "La colonie italienne de Lisbonne et le développement de l'économie métropolitaine et coloniale portugaise" in: *Studi in Onore di Armando Saporì*, p. 621.
38. In mentioning Pires we must not forget Duarte Barbosa who was equally interested in economic affairs.
39. Unlike the Dutch United Company, the Portuguese government permitted private merchants in Portugal to send money in *commenda* with ships leaving for Asia. More than 40% profit was sometimes made on the reals-of-eight which were used for trading in Asia (*Itinerario* I, p. 9).
40. See p. 126, 128.
41. In 1609 rumours were current in Lisbon that the Spanish king would allow absolutely unrestricted trade with the East Indies against payment of an import and export duty of 50% (*Letters received by the East India Company from its servants in the East* I, p. XXXVIII).
42. Fitzler, "Überblick Portugiesischen Uebersee Handelsgesellschaften," p. 289, 290; *Boletim* IV, p. 689.
43. V.O.C. arch. 453, Gentlemen Seventeen to Gov. Gen. & Council, 2/1 1629; *Ibid.*, 14/3 1630; *Coen, Bescheiden*, VII b, p. 1813, 11/9 1629; *Ibid.*, V, p. 830, 2/1 1629.
44. V.O.C. arch. 453, Gentlemen Seventeen to Gov. Gen. & Council, 28/8 1629.
45. V.O.C. arch. 453, Gentlemen Seventeen to Gov. Gen. & Council, 14/3 1630.
46. See Pissurlencar, *Assentos* I, p. 572 (dissolution, by the king, of the Company for Trade with the East Indies, 12/4 1633).
47. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1630 I, fol. 245.
48. *Letters received by the East India Company from its servants in the East* I, p. XXXVIII.
49. *Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 351, 377; Pyrard, *Voyage* I, p. XII. The capture of the Portuguese carack "Madre de Deus" was very important in this respect.
50. *Documentos remetidos* I, p. XIV, p. 106; *Ibid.*, III, p. XXVI, p. 328, 18/3 1615; J. Lucio d'Azevedo, *Historia dos Christãos novos Portugueses*, makes no mention of converted Jews in Malacca.
51. *Documentos remetidos* IV, p. XXIII, p. 166, 21/3 1617.
52. *Boletim* II, p. 236 n.d. Carta do secretario de Estado para o vice-rei; *Ibid.*, III, p. 543. Carta regia, 19/2 1603; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 620 (codex Brit. Mus. No. 1131 fol. 209).
53. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 99.
54. Ballard, *Rulers of the Indian Ocean*, p. 154, 179; Villiers, *Indian Ocean*, p. 148; "a fleet lying in the zone of the perpetual south east trade winds is to windward of the whole Indian ocean throughout the year, on any part of which it can make a descent."
55. In 1606 a strong Spanish fleet under the command of Don Pedro de Cunha came to the Moluccas; in 1615 the Portuguese and Spanish made a combined attack aimed at conquering the Moluccas. Stapel, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië*, III, p. 54, 98.
56. Cf. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale* I, p. 72, 117, 219, with *Hist. de Portugal* V, p. 320, 342, 343, 386.

According to Cortesão the decline of the Portuguese empire began before 1580 and the Spanish kings had tried more than once to counteract it. Cortesão cites Oliveira Martins (*Portugal nos Mares I*) as a Portuguese historian who in a spirit of resistance to chauvinism denies that Spain had any influence on the Portuguese decline. Boxer, "Portuguese in the East," p. 236, draws attention to the fact that the decline continued even after Portugal had regained its independence from Spain.

57. *Hist. de Portugal V*, p. 350.
58. *Letters East India Company III*, p. XXIX (1615); *Ibid.*, IV, p. XIV (1616). V.O.C. arch. 452, 17/10 1624; *Boletim IV*, p. 819 (1616).
Noteworthy in this connection is the plan of Francisco de Saude the Spanish governor of the Philippines, to conquer Achin (MacGregor, "Johore Lama," p. 94 note 190).
59. *Hist. de Portugal V*, p. 320, 386.
60. De Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion I*, p. 128.
61. *Boletim III*, p. 573 (1601-1602), Carta régia n.d.; *Ibid.*, p. 544, Carta régia, 19/2 1603 *Ibid.*, p. 603, Carta régia, 25/2 1609; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 762, Carta do vice-rei, 19/1 1615; *Ibid.*, p. 779 n.d. (Dec. 1615); *Ibid.*, p. 819, 1616; *Documentos remetidos IV*, p. XXXIX, p. 346, 20/2 1618.
62. *Documentos remetidos I*, p. XXII, p. 210, 4/3 1608.
63. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 690, 700. Up till now, unfortunately, there has been no publication of Portuguese or Spanish records with which Coen's estimate could be compared. Quite possibly, in view of the poor state of Portuguese-Spanish financial administration, no such records exist. (De Lannoy I, p. 209).
64. Quotation: "niet meer dan een boon in een brouketel," *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 690.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 689.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 220, 677. See also Philip Lucasz.' memorandum, V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I, vervolg, fol. 912 vs.
67. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 144.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 134, 135.
69. *Boletim II*, p. 158. Alvará régio, 9/3 1594; *Ibid.*, p. 207. Carta régia, 1/3 1594; *Ibid.*, p. 326. Carta régia, 18/2 1595; *Ibid.*, p. 241. Carta régia, 21/11 1598; *Ibid.*, III, p. 597. Carta régia, 19/3 1609; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 713 n.d. *Ibid.*, 4, p. 840, March 1617.
70. According to the *Dagregister Batavia* of 1637 (13/1, p. 21), a short time previously the Portuguese had brought silver to the value of 60 or 70 tons of gold from Japan to Macao in 4 navettes.
Profits of 100% were made on this Macao-Japan trade, while 40 to 50% could be gained by giving money or goods in *commenda* (*Dagregister* 1637, p. 20).
71. *Dagregister Batavia*, 1633, p. 163. By 1637 communications between Macao and the coast of India had become very difficult because so many ships were being seized (*Dagregister Batavia* 1637, 3/3, p. 64).
72. In 1605 the Dutch captured Tidore from the Portuguese (Cornelis Bastiaensz.) but in 1606 it was recaptured by a combined Spanish-Portuguese fleet. Part of Ternate also fell into Spanish hands (De Jonge, *Ophomst III*, p. 53).
73. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1632 I, fol. 5vs (6/1 1632); fol. 135 (26/11 1631); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1633 I, fol. 190 (7/3 1632); fol. 396vs (1/11 1632).
74. *B & V II*, "Paulus van Solt," p. 55 (March 1606).
75. *B & V II*, "Van der Hagen," p. 50, 51. Cf. also *B & V II*, "Matelieff," p. 148.
76. *Coen, Bescheiden VIIb*, p. 988; *Dagregister Batavia* 1625, p. 205 (29/9 1625); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 II, fol. 261 (7/11 1632); *Dagregister Batavia* 1636, p. 166, 167 (15/7 1636); *Ibid.*, p. 3, (8/1 1636); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1637 I, fol. 109 (28/12 1636).
77. e.g. *Boletim IV*, p. 826, March 1617.
78. In 1613 the Dutch captured the Portuguese fort on Solor, but did not settle there permanently so that the Portuguese were able to continue trading.
79. A Portuguese squadron near Aden could control the Red Sea (Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, p. 33, 93).
80. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 212vs (22/10 1615).
81. Moreland, *Peter Floris*, p. 120, 121.
82. V.O.C. arch., 1617 III, fol. 216vs (22/10 1615).
83. For the Portuguese seizure of a Moslem ship coming from Mecca, see Pissurlencar, *Assentos I*, p. 291 et seq. (4/10 1630).
84. Threatened by its northern European enemies on the coast of India, the Portuguese

- government tried to remain on friendly terms with the Mogul empire (*Documentos remettidos* III, p. XXXI, p. 389 (11/2 1616); *Ibid.*, p. XLIII, 499 (18/3 1616); *Ibid.*, IV, p. XX (21/3 1617), p. 130; *Letters East India Company* II, p. 150 (2/12 1615); *Ibid.*, IV, p. 342 (2/11 1616).
85. Quotation: "haer nogh meerder genegentheyt toonden als voor andere Europische natien," Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 12.
 86. Moreland, *Peter Floris*, p. 68.
 87. "Verhaal van eenige oorlogen in Indië." *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871. p. 576.
 88. Terpstra, *Westerkwartieren*, p. 3.
 89. *Documentos remettidos* I, p. XIX, p. 165 (2/1 1608); *Ibid.*, III, p. 71 (4/2 1613); *Letters East India Company* III, p. 44 (8/3 1614/1615).
 90. *Ibid.*, I, p. 176 (2/4 1612); *Ibid.*, II, p. 229 (16/12 1614); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 211 (22/10 1615).
 91. Terpstra, *Westerkwartieren*, p. 37.
 92. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 216vs. (22/10 1616).
 93. *Letters East India Company* IV, p. XXX, p. 101 (1/5 1616).
 94. *Ibid.*, III, p. 38 (3/3 1614 [1615]); *Ibid.*, VI, p. XXV.
 95. *Ibid.*, I, p. XXXVIII.
 96. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 214 (22/10 1615).
 97. Yet some of these Indian ships do seem to have carried a certain amount of armament. In 1613 the English made a report about a large ship of 300 tons belonging to the Gujarati and coming from Mocha, which was armed with 12 pieces of artillery (Best, *Voyage to the East Indies*, p. 234, 14/1 1613). In his description of the Indian merchantmen, Van den Broecke states that they carried guns but that these guns were of little use because they were mounted in the wrong place and so were completely without shelter. Moreover, according to Van den Broecke, the Indians did not know how to handle them (*B & V* II, "Van den Broecke," p. 66).
 98. Jourdain, *Journal*, p. 223.
 99. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 II, fol. 125 (5/8 1626).
 100. Terpstra, *Westerkwartieren*, p. 41.
 101. Coen, *Bescheiden* VIII, p. 1209, 1213, 1501; *Ibid.* V, p. 297, 589, 590, 598; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 315; *Ibid.*, III, p. 23; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1628 II, fol. 154.
 102. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1636 I, fol. 24, 25 (4/1 1636); V.O.C. arch. 454, Brieven XVII (Gentlemen Seventeen), fol. 124vs, 127 (24/9 1636).
 103. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 128 (24/9 1636); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1636 I, fol. 4 (4/1 1636).
 104. *Letters East India Company* IV, p. 314 (26/5 1616).
 105. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 63 (15/8 1634).
 106. *Documentos remettidos* I, p. XVIII, p. 145, 146 (10/12 1607).
 107. *Ibid.*, III, p. XIV, p. 177 (16/1 1615); *Ibid.*, IV, p. XX, 125 (21/3 1617); *Boletim* IV, p. 803 (4/1 1616).
 108. *Documentos remettidos* III, p. 189, 190 (6/2 1615).
 109. *Ibid.*, p. 373 (6/2 1616).
 110. V.O.C. arch. 453 (Brieven XVII) 3/4 1628.
 111. *Documentos remettidos* IV, p. XX, 125 (21/3 1617); *Ibid.*, p. XXXIX, 346 (20/2 1618).
 112. Quotation: "zich geen moeyten, noch arbeyt laten verdrieten omme tot haar voornemen in negotie te comen," V.O.C. arch. 454 (XVII), p. 165 (6/12 1637).
 113. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 924 vs. (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
 114. *Ibid.*, fol. 935 (Philip Lucasz.).
 115. *Ibid.*, fol. 930, 935 (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
 116. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 188 (12/4 1638).
 117. *Ibid.*, fol. 188vs. (12/4 1638).
 118. *Ibid.*, fol. 39vs. (2/9 1634).
 119. From 1638-1641 the number of references to the hopelessness of the Portuguese situation is almost overwhelming.
 120. *Letters East India Company* IV, p. 236.
 121. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 277.
 122. *Letters East India Company* V, p. XIV (1617).
 123. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 277.
 124. Dunlop, *Bronnen Perzië*, p. LIV, LV, LVI.

125. *Ibid.*, p. LVII.
126. In 1616 the Portuguese had some 40 or 50 men living here for the purpose of conducting trade (*Letters East India Company*, IV, p. 315, 26/5 1616). An agent was authorized to take half of the import and export duties paid by Portuguese traders as well as those of other nationality in the name of the viceroy in Goa, for the Spanish crown (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 935vs., memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
127. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 11.
128. *Dagregister Batavia* 1636, p. 111 (2/6 1636).
129. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 935vs., 936, memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
130. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 11.
- 130a. C. van de Haar, *De diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen de Republiek en Portugal, 1640-1661* (The diplomatic relations between the [Dutch] Republic and Portugal.
131. Tiele, "Europeërs" V, p. 163-166.
132. Clark and Van Eysinga, *The Colonial Conferences between England and the Netherlands in 1613 and 1615*, II, p. 27.
133. *Letters East India Company* III, p. XXVI.
134. Van Rees, *Geschiedenis Koloniale politiek* II, p. 19; Van der Chijs, *Stichting Oost Indische Compagnie*, p. 149.
135. Mansvelt, *Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer*, p. 53.
136. *Letters East India Company* I, p. XXIII.
137. Moreland, *Peter Floris*, p. 84 note 2.
138. *Letters East India Company*, p. XXIII.
139. *Court Minutes* I, p. XXV.
140. Terpstra, *Nederlanders in Voor-Indië*, p. 37.
141. In a comparative study of the ways in which the two companies were organized ("Oceanic Expansion, Government Influence on Company Organization in Holland and England, 1550-1650") Riemersma makes some valuable suggestions which certainly merit elaboration. He sees the English company as an association of individuals retaining the character of a guild, and the Dutch United Company more as an organization for the joint use of capital in which the personal element was of much less importance.
The difference in the size of the shares in the United Company meant that there was quite a contrast between the big shareholders, who were chosen to fulfil the leading functions and the majority of the shareholders, who shared in the dividends but could exert no influence in the Company itself. According to Riemersma, there was far less difference in the size of the shares in the English company and so there was more equality among its members. But was the difference between the two companies in respect of the relationships among the shareholders themselves as great as Riemersma posits (p. 37)? After all, in the English company, just as in the Dutch United Company, there was friction between the big and smaller shareholders. (*Court Minutes* I, p. VIII).
142. *Letters East India Company* VI, p. XXIX; *Court Minutes* I, p. VI, XIV, XVIII, XXI.
143. *Court Minutes* I, p. XIV, XXI.
144. Quotation: "de particuliere handel van de Engelsen hebbe U Ed. te gelooven soo de Compagnie van Engelandt in voegen als UE. gedient wert, lange voor desen de Nederlandsche Compagnie te boven soude geraect wesen," V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 922vs. (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
145. *Letters East India Company* V, p. XXXVI.
146. *Ibid.*, p. XXXVIII; *Court Minutes* I, p. V.
Private trade to the value of fl. 31,000 was reputed to have been done in one year.
147. The United Company's initial capital (fl. 6,500,000) was eight times as much as that of the English company (£ 68,000). (Hall, *South East Asia*, p. 233).
148. Van Dillen, "Amsterdam als wereldmarkt der edele metalen in de 17e en 18e eeuw," p. 544, 583, 584.
149. It was laid down in 1609 that the quantity of coins which might be exported was not to exceed £ 30,000. It turned out however that there was no market for English goods in Asia and so the maximum for money exports was raised to £ 60,000. In 1616 £ 52,087 was exported in money as opposed to £ 16,506 in goods (*Letters East India Company* VI, p. XXXIX). The money the English exported usually had to be procured beforehand from the Netherlands (*Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 668, 16/12 1621).

For the years 1603-1617 Dutch money exports were as follows:

1603: fl. 650.000	1611: 500.000 reals
1604: no returns	1612: no shipment
1605: 345.600 reals	1613: 216.000 reals
1606: 340.000 reals	1614: 128.000 reals
1607: 500.000 reals	1615: 400.000 reals
1608: no returns	1616: 528.000 reals
1609: 300.000 reals	1617: 400.000 reals
1610: 600.000 reals	(Van Dam I, 1, p. 632).

The value of goods exported is only known for certain years. For example, in 1603 the value of the cargo amounted to fl. 131.000. In 1615, the value of goods exported only amounted to fl. 70.000, as against 432.000 reals = fl. 1.080.000 in money (V.O.C. arch. 248, fol. 314, 1/10 1615, resolution Gentlemen Seventeen). It may be assumed that the ratio in other years did not differ greatly from the figures quoted above. In 1607 it was expressly stated that no merchandise was exported except for some iron and lead, the value of which was not considered worth mentioning (V.O.C. arch. 248, 3/10 1607, resolution Gentlemen Seventeen).

For this reason the United Company tried from the beginning to stimulate goods exchange between the Asian countries themselves, so as to be able to reduce the shipments of money. The idea behind this was that trade in Asia would nourish itself and enough profit be made to cover the expenses of return freights to the Netherlands, which could then be used in the mother-country not only to provide for a distribution of profits but also as a basis for the formation of new capital.

Apart from the fact that the English company used to return their deposited capital to its shareholders, the mercantilistic financial policy of the English government must have been one of the reasons why the Dutch United Company had the upper hand of the English at first.

Moreover, at a somewhat later period the United Company in Asia also tried to obtain precious metals in exchange for goods. In the Indonesian Archipelago, for example, this was the case on Sumatra and Borneo, and outside Indonesia in Mocha, and particularly in China and Japan. According to Moreland the fact that the United Company controlled the Spice Islands and also had a monopoly of trade to Japan was one of the most important factors in the Company's success (Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 64). For the connection between eastern trade and the influx of American silver and the consequent rise of modern capitalism see E. J. Hamilton, "Prices as a Factor in Business Growth," *The Journal of Economic History* XII (1952), p. 333.

150. Much information to the shortage of money experienced by the English in Asia is to be found in English sources as well as in the records of the Dutch United Company. Only a few suggestions are given here: *Letters East India Company* I, p. XXXIX; *Ibid.*, V, p. XXV; *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 668; *Ibid.*, III, p. 113, 246; *Ibid.*, V p. 534, 596; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1628 I, fol. 40vs.

151. *Letters East India Company* VI, p. XLI.

152. V.O.C. arch. 4389 (departures register for Company ships).

153. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 493 (30/12 1618); *Ibid.*, p. 439 (19/9 1618); *Ibid.*, I, p. 554 (11/5 1620).

In his letter of 30/12 1618 Coen contrasts the 28 ships then in Asia with the ideal figure of 58. In 1620 he actually considered that English ships were in the majority, but his figures for the Dutch ships did not include small ships nor those which had just left for Holland. As opposed to the 42 ships on the official list in January 1619 we have Coen's figure of 19 (plus 11 worn-out ships). In 1617 there were 11 English ships as against 39 Dutch ones (I Jzerman, *Cornelis Buysero in Bantam*, p. 11).

154. Quotation: "Dat U.E. menen de treffelijcxte handel van de ganse werelt tegen alle werelt met 30, 40 ofte 50 schepen ende jachten, die in 't vaarwater houden, voor haer te besetten ende waer te nemen, is een groot abuys," *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 486 (5/8 1619).

155. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1622 I, fol. 119-121.

156. For example, in 1626 there were 62 Dutch ships and 21 English ones. 37 of the 62 Dutch ships had a capacity of more than 300 tons. No tonnage is mentioned in respect of the English craft, only the various categories, that is to say 12 or 13 ships, 6 yachts and 3 frigates (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 248). The figures for 1627 were 58 Dutch ships and 18 English ones (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 I, fol. 106).

157. *Letters East India Company* V, p. 154; *Ibid.*, I, p. XXXIX; *Jourdain, Journal*, p. 326.
158. *Letters East India Company* IV, p. XXVII.
159. *Ibid.*, p. XXVII.
160. For the English and Dutch standpoints in their colonial negotiations, see Clark and Van Eysinga, *Colonial Conferences* II, p. 28, 30, 65, 77, 101-113, 144-146.
161. *Letters East India Company* III, p. 146.
162. Villiers, *Indian Ocean*, p. 158.
163. For the more ethical stand taken by the English in the colonial conference see Clark, p. 146. Crawford's remark that the English would have been just as monopolistic as the Dutch if they had had the chance is a mere assumption and refers, moreover, to the English attitude towards the Dutch not towards the natives. Kiers (p. 83) treats Crawford's assumption as an established fact. He neglects, however, to produce contemporary evidence in support of the assumption.
164. Clark, *Colonial Conferences* II, p. 144, 145.
165. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
166. In criticising English claims to priority in the Spice Islands on the grounds that they were the first, Kiers fails to distinguish between territorial authority and the right to trade freely (p. 87).
167. Clark, *Colonial Conferences*, II, p. 28, 68-70, 145, 146.
168. Quotation: "een pernicieuse, hooveerdiche en incompatible natie, die overal hun voordeel soecken," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 10vs (11/11 1614).
169. *Ibid.*, fol. 8vs (11/11 1614).
170. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 III, fol. 356vs (14/8 1617); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 I, fol. 178 (6/5 1618).
171. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 II, fol. 297 (10/3 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 110vs (10/3 1616).
172. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 I, fol. 70vs (23/10 1615).
173. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 111 (10/3 1616).
174. *Ibid.*, fol. 112 (10/3 1616).
175. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253vs (20/8 1618).
176. De Jonge, *Opkomst* IV, p. XXX, XXXI, LXII, LXIII.
177. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. XXVI, XXVII.
178. Quotation: "de goede kudde der historische herkauwers," Kiers, *Coen op Banda*, p. 2-3.
179. *Ibid.*, p. 76, 77.
180. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
- 180a. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- 180b. In writing his thesis *Coen op Banda* for the University of Utrecht Kiers was strongly influenced by Professor C. Gerretson, who held the Chair of Colonial History at this University.
181. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
182. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
183. *TG.*, LVIII, (1943), p. 150-152 (H. Terpstra); *Tijdschr. Kon. Ned. Aardrijkskundig Genootschap*. LX (1943), p. 503 (C. Wessels).
184. Quotation: "sonder nochtans eenige handtdadigheyt tegens haer te plegen," *Coen, Bescheiden* VI, p. 71.
185. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 152-153.
186. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 10 (11/7 1616).
187. The Dutch actually accredited the English with the evil plan of getting the Bandanese to hand over their islands to the king of England in the presence of the king of Bantam (Petition from Reynst to the States General 26/10 1615, arch. St. Gen. 5746A *Letters East Indies* 1599-1622).
188. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 257 (30/11 1615), fol. 289 (10/12 1615, to Reael). The Seventeen's criticism of Reael fails to hold water, since they upbraid him (in their letter of April 1617) for taking forcible action on Banda and Ceram while displaying so many scruples in respect of the English and the Spanish (V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 573, 12/4 1617). After all, the military situation was not the same in both cases.
189. V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 179, 180 (Memorandum from the delegates sent by the Seventeen to the States General 31/5 1617); V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 196, see also resolutions States General 31/5 1617 (arch. St.-Gen. 564); *Letters East Indies* 1599-1622 (arch. St.-Gen. 5746A).
190. V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 179 (31/5 1617).

191. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 40vs (16/5 1616); *Ibid.*, fol. 45, 45vs (25/6 1616); *Ibid.*, fol. 48, 48vs (7/7 1616).
192. The resolution of 16th May 1616 is not signed by Van der Hagen, who was absent at the time. The resolution of 15th June 1616, however, which is an expression of approval of the action taken against Castleton, does carry Van der Hagen's signature.
193. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 35 (5/5 1616); *Ibid.*, fol. 37 (9/5 1616).
194. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 39vs. Protest by Reael about the English admiral's vessels lying off Tidore.
195. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 40vs (16/5 1616).
196. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 3vs (10/5 1617); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3 (25/7 1615). In the last-mentioned letter there are two conflicting remarks. On the one hand Reael displays vexation at the English "who carry supplies to the other's enemy [the Bandanese]. For this reason they must be more rigorously prevented from trading and these people must be dealt with more hardly" ("die eens anders viant [de Bandanezen] toevoer doen. Daarom moet hun de handel wat rigoureuzer worden belet" [en moet men] "met dit volck wat harder toegaen"). But on the other hand Reael praises the Seventeen's intention to make a pact with the English, "which is considered by all the world to be the only means of destroying the Spanish and the Portuguese in Asia."
197. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 10 (11/7 1616).
198. Kiers devotes several pages (p. 93–99) to discussing whether Reael had already received the Seventeen's order of 30th April 1615 when he left the English undisturbed. But the question is irrelevant since the order was not sufficiently explicit about the course that was to be followed, a fact admitted by Coen himself. It was not until the order of 30th November 1615 that all doubt about the Seventeen's intentions was dispelled. Kiers holds that Reael should have abided by an order issued by Governor General Reynst on 11th October 1615 when the existence of the order dated 21st November 1614 (no force to be used) was still unknown in the East Indies. This order by Governor General Reynst did prescribe the use of force. Was Reael, who had himself been appointed Governor General, obliged to carry out an order issued by his predecessor when he was perhaps already aware of the existence of the order issued by the higher authority, that is to say, the Gentlemen Seventeen, on 21st November 1614? At any rate he and his council did know about the negotiations being conducted in Europe.
199. Their attitude towards the natives, in a certain sense more humane than that of their colleagues, must be carefully adjudged in the light of contemporary feeling on the subject. Otherwise Van der Hagen's attitude towards slavery, for example, is totally inexplicable. As an argument in favour of keeping slaves he puts forward the idea that those owned by the United Company could become Christians (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 201vs, 26/5 1617). In the same way, Reael has no hesitation about forcibly displacing the entire population of the island of Siau in order to use these people as labourers in the Banda Islands (Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. XVIII, XIX). When United Company ships brought the Siau islanders to Amboina for transportation to the Banda Islands, a revolt broke out among the Amboinese, who were afraid that they would suffer the same fate, and only the confidence which they placed in Van der Hagen was able to avert worse trouble (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 50, 18/7 1616).
200. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 45 (25/6 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 10, 10vs. (11/7 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3 (25/7 1615).
201. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 111, 112 (10/3 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253vs (20/8 1618); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 I, fol. 70vs (23/10 1615).
202. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 255 (20/8 1618).
203. Kiers criticizes these negotiations by Reael (p. 110) but disapproves even more of Reael's negotiations with the Bandanese, although the latter were no more than a confirmation of the pact concluded the previous year with the Bandanese by Admiral Lam.
204. *Letters East India Company* V, p. XXXIV (1617).
205. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. XXX.
206. "Op een lege romp en hope van een ydele buit, [terwijl hij (Coen) heel goed wist, dat de Engels en op weg naar Banda waren], "nu alhyer een vyer ontsteken is, dat sonder twijffel een grooten brant met sich sal trecken." V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 4 (10/6 1617).
207. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 5 (25/7 1615); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 6vs (11/7 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 8vs (10/5 1617); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 II, fol. 5 (10/11 1617).

In making recommendations about his successor, Reael also put Coen's name forward although he knew that Coen, whom he held to be "a person of great discernment, diligent and bold" (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 28, 22/9 1616), advocated a policy diametrically opposed to his own. His personal preference, however, must have been for Cornelis Dedel.

208. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 145 (21/9 1616); *Ibid.*, p. 163 (10/10 1616); *Ibid.*, p. 173-175, 180, 191, 193 (7/11 1616); *Ibid.*, I, p. 199 (10/10 1616).
209. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 163 (10/10 1616); *Ibid.*, p. 174 (7/11 1616).
210. *Coen*, VI, p. 460 (Discours 1614); *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 88 (10/11 1614); *Ibid.*, p. 141 (22/10 1615).
211. Quotation: "absurde saecke," *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 183 (7/11 1616).
212. *Ibid.*, p. 721 (4/6 1620); *Ibid.*, p. 746 (26/6 1620); *Ibid.*, p. 764 (9/7 1620).
213. Kiers, *Coen op Banda*, p. 142.
214. Clark, *Colonial Conferences* II, p. 136. Clark considers this a realistic policy and a "prudent and practical plan."
215. In 1629 Gentlemen Seventeen complained that two English ships had brought 115,000 pounds of cloves, which would be damaging to United Company sales (V.O.C. arch. 453, 3/12 1629). In 1630 the directors estimated that the entire quantity of cloves brought to England in 1629 amounted to 300 *quartels* (1 quartel varied between 360 a 400 pounds) (V.O.C. arch. 453, 14/3 1630). These complaints continued in subsequent years (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 46 [2/9 1634], arrival of 255 *bahar* of cloves for the English in Bantam). In 1636 about 300,000 pounds of cloves were brought to England (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 139vs, 26/11 1636). In 1638; 118,000 pounds (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 216vs, 16/9 1638). In 1640 47,000 pounds (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 296vs, 11/9 1640) in spite of the destructive expeditions undertaken by the Dutch in the Spice Islands. In 1641, 46,000 pounds (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 357vs, 5/9 1641). In 1641 the English cargo actually included 3470 pounds of mace and 3340 pounds of nutmegs, although the Banda Islands were closed entirely to foreign traders (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 351vs, 5/9 1641). These nutmegs and mace must have reached the English through smuggling and private trading on the part of United Company officials and nutmeg-planters.
216. De Jonge, *Ophomst* VI, p. LXXVIII.
217. In 1624 four large ships went to Surat, while only one left for Bantam (V.O.C. arch. 452, Dec. 1624, see also *Letters East India Company* IV, p. XI [1616]).
218. V.O.C. arch. 454 fol. 303 (11/9 1640).
219. Terpstra, *Nederlanders in Voor-Indië*, p. 27.
220. *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 584, 585 (21/9 1623).
221. Because they feared that the one third share of the spices to which the English were entitled by the terms of the treaty might at some time in the future amount to so much that the English would be able to supply all Europe with spices, and that then the United Company would no longer be able to dispose of its cloves, the directors of the United Company wanted to specify once and for all the maximum quantity of cloves that might be shipped to Europe (*Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 491, 4/3 1621).
222. *Letters East India Company* III, p. 146 (16/7 1615).
223. If the shareholders of the English company wished, their deposited capital could be paid back to them. This was not the case in the United Company, in spite of the protests of its shareholders. In this way the United Company succeeded in establishing a capital reserve. Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade*, p. 8. See also p. 194, note 149.
224. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 23 (25/11 1633).
225. *Ibid.*, fol. 227 (16/9 1638).
226. Quotation: "een grote sake voor de vrienden [!], dat zij onder de wapenen en groote onkosten van dese Compagnie (the United Company) paisibel varen en haren handel doorgaans mogen drijven," V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 326vs (15/3 1641).
227. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 14; *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 573 (28/12 1619); V.O.C. arch. 453 (28/8 1629); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1631 I, fol. 21vs, 33vs, (7/3 1631); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1634, I, fol. 37 (15/8 1632); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1633 I, 34 (1/12 1632); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1634 I verv. fol. 956vs (memorandum Philip Lucasz.); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1634 I, fol. 43 (15/12 1633); *Dagregister Batavia* 1636, p. 110 (2/6 1636); V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 146vs, 148 (3/10 1637); *Ibid.*, fol. 256 (12/9 1639); *Ibid.*, fol. 299vs (11/9 1640).
228. Van Dam *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 14.
229. Heeres, *Encyclopaedie Ned. Indië* I, p. 723-725.

230. *Ibid.*, I, p. 583-584.
 231. Quotation: "publycke liedekens op haer wijze gemaect," *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 511 22/1 1620).

CHAPTER IX

1. *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 539, 548.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 539, 550. The criticism in 1622 (letter of 14th April, 1622 V.O.C. arch. 452) was primarily related to the war resulting from Coen's action. The harsh punishment inflicted upon the Bandanese – even though this should have been "carried out with milder means" ("met gematichder middelen moeten geschieden") – would serve as an example to others. Yet since "it will engender awe but no goodwill" ("t wel ontsagh, maar geen gunst sal baren"), care would have to be taken "not to fall into any new peril" ("in geen nieuw peryckel te vallen"). Considered retrospectively in 1630, the whole affair was still accorded only very mild censure (V.O.C. arch. 453, 27/8 1630). "The late General Coen was rather too energetic in those matters" ("d'Hr. Generael Coene salr was in die saecke al wat te animeus").
 In their letters of 30th April and 6th May, 1615, in which they prescribed the policy to be adopted against the Bandanese, the directors advised exterminating the population in the event of resistance and destroying their large vessels. The inhabitants of the remote islands of Ai and Run, who could not be prevented from trading with foreigners, were to be moved to other islands and all the nut trees destroyed.
3. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 45 (Sept. 1614); *Ibid.*, fol. 63, 67, 73, 100 (Nov. 1614).
4. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 45 (Sept. 1614).
5. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 67 (21/11 1614); *Ibid.*, fol. 171 (6/5 1615); *Ibid.*, fol. 286 (10/12 1615).
6. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 160 (30/4 1615); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 21 (11/9 1615); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 III, fol. 59 (6/8 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 4vs (10/5 1617).
 In the Moluccas the Chinese sold their silks to the natives as well as to the United Company (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 167, 7/5 1615).
7. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 286 (10/12 1615).
8. *Ibid.*, fol. 263, 264 (30/11 1615).
9. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 126 (resolution Reynst and council 10/7 1615).
10. For the exclusion of the foreign Asian traders from the Moluccas see: Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. XVII, XXXII-XXXV; De Jonge, *Opkomst* IV, p. LXI; Colenbrander, *Coen* VI, p. 104, 109.
 Even De Jonge, who has quite a bit to say about Reael's policy, has to admit that the latter's views on the exclusion of foreign traders from the Moluccas bear witness to his keen insight.
11. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 123 (1/8 1613); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1615, fol. 87vs (20/6 1614).
12. The arguments put forward by Kiers in defence of the starvation policy of Coen and the Gentlemen Seventeen are extremely weak (Kiers, p. 43, 82, 117, 119, 120, 121), and he still has to admit that the Dutch were incapable of providing the island inhabitants with food and shelter (p. 117, 121). In the contract which the Bandanese signed with the United Company in 1605, which was less repressive as far as the Bandanese were concerned than the subsequent agreements, it was expressly stipulated that the Dutch had to provide them with food (*Corpus Diplomaticum* I, p. 38 (13/7 1605)).
13. Quotation: "nu dagelijks te zien [is], hoe veel de Nederlanders in dese Molukse handel van de Portugezen moeten leren," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 123 (1/8 1613).
14. Quotation: "die men met autoriteit de tanden moest tonen," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 87vs (20/6 1614); cf. O.B. 1614, fol. 120vs (1/8 1613).
15. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 III, fol. 4 (25/7 1615).
16. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 87vs (20/6 1614); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 226vs (20/8 1618).
17. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1615, fol. 87vs (20/6 1614).
18. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 III, fol. 4vs (25/7 1615).
19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3 (25/7 1615).
The proposals about not putting reals into circulation met with a response among the directors. It became established policy that cloves, nutmegs and mace could only be bartered for clothing and rice.
21. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3vs (25/7 1615).
22. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3-4 (25/7 1615).
23. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 7vs-8vs (11/7 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1615 fol. 86vs (20/6 1614).
The United Company could certainly not afford to sell the cloths at prices higher than it demanded from its own soldiers. The latter received part of their wages in kind in the form of cloths. If the soldiers sold some of these cloths to the natives at prices lower than those of the United Company it meant that they were actually competing with the United Company (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618, I, fol. 19, 19/8 1616). Moreover, the soldiers' demands for foodstuffs in exchange for the cloths did not encourage the natives to cultivate cloves (V.O.C. Arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 52vs, (18/7 1616).
24. *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 83 (10/11 1614).
25. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 227 vs (20/8 1618).
26. *Ibid.*, fol. 228 (20/8 1618).
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 492 (26/11 1616).
30. *Ibid.*, fol. 453, 462 (26/11 1616).
31. *Ibid.*, fol. 463, 492, 499, 509, 512 (26/11 1616), 522-528 (12/12 1616); 571 (18/4 1617); 577-579, 581, 582, 584 (12/4 1617); *Ibid.*, 451, fol. 148 (31/10 1617); *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 363 (26/11 1616).
Besides disapproving of his policy towards the English and the natives, Reael's critics blamed him for not taking steps against Lemaire's fleet, for the unsuccessful voyage to the Philippines, for his uneconomical administration, for building more forts and creating more functions than were needed, and for entertaining too lavishly. Moreover, Reael had previously aroused the irritation of United Company servants in the commercial grades, who thought that he gave preference to the officers because he seemed to get on better with the latter. (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 63, 68vs (12/8 1614).
32. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 174-175 (7/11 1616).
33. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 33vs (7/4 1616); *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 127 (22/10 1615).
34. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 193 (7/11 1616).
35. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 3 (10/5 1617).
36. *Ibid.*, fol. 5 (10/5 1617).
37. *Ibid.*, fol. 8 (10/5 1617).
38. Quotation: "wat aengaet d'inlantsche negotianten, mettertijd sal 't oock wel sijn," Colenbrander, *Coen* VI, p. 118.
39. Quotation: "om onse beste te doen, soo de vreemden te weeren," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 III, fol. 3vs. (6/1 1618).
40. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 II, fol. 3 (10/11 1617).
41. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 215 vs (11/7 1618).
42. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 6vs (11/7 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 8vs (10/5 1617).
43. Quotation: "'t schijnt de grote wijsheyt een mensch soo wel abusere, als onverstant doet dolen," *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 191 (7/11 1616).
44. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253 (20/8 1618).
45. *Ibid.*, fol. 253 (20/8 1618); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 179 (6/5 1618).
46. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 197 (26/5 1617).
47. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 179 (6/5 1618); *Ibid.*, fol. 197vs (26/5 1617).
48. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253vs (20/8 1618).
49. *Ibid.*, fol. 253 (20/8 1618); *Ibid.*, fol. 222 (20/8 1618).
50. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 197vs, 198 (26/5 1617).
51. *Ibid.*, fol. 195, 195vs (26/5 1617).
52. *Ibid.*, fol. 195vs (26/5 1617).
53. Quotation: "woudapen," *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 III, fol. 357vs (14/8 1617).
The Rev. S. Danckaerts, who took the pulpit in Amboina in 1618 was a much better type of man. See C. A. L. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, *Biographisch woordenboek van Oost-Indische predikanten*.
54. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 II, fol. 296vs (10/3 1616); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 I, fol. 110vs (10/3 1616)

55. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253 (20/8 1618).
56. *Ibid.*, fol. 253vs (20/8 1618).
57. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 I, fol. 180 (6/5 1618).
58. *Ibid.*, fol. 180 (6/5 1618).
59. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 224vs (20/8 1618).
60. *Ibid.*, fol. 225 (20/8 1618).
61. Quotation: "dat se de duivel met zijn moeder wel zouden int land halen om ons te plagen en te verdrijven," *Ibid.*, 1619 I, fol. 179vs, 180 (6/5 1618).
62. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 224vs (20/8 1618).
63. *Ibid.*, fol. 227vs (20/8 1618).
64. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 197vs (26/5 1617).
65. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253 (20/8 1618).
66. *Ibid.*, fol. 225 (20/8 1618).
67. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. XXXIII.
68. V.O.C. arch. 4288, fragment letter l'Hermite c. 1600.
69. For the relative value of husked and unhusked rice, see a letter from Jan Jacobsz in Macassar, dated 13th February 1608. In connection with the purchase of rice from the king of Macassar it is stated that 2 *gantang* of unhusked rice are equivalent to 1 *gantang* of husked rice.
70. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 224vs (20/8 1618).
71. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 I, fol. 182vs (10/6 1618).
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.*, fol. 180 (6/5 1618).
74. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 I, fol. 25vs (17/3 1617).
75. *Ibid.*, I, fol. 8 (10/5 1617).
76. *Ibid.*, fol. 223 vs (10/5 1617); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1617 III, fol. 59 (6/8 1616).
Dedel considers that if trading is eliminated it will be impossible for the Company to supply the natives with everything that the foreign traders used to bring. For Reael's views on Cornelis Dedel, see V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 10vs (2/7 1617).
77. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 28 (22/9 1616).
78. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. XXXIV; *ibid.* II, p. IX.
It is odd, therefore, to see Kiers postulate the thesis that free trade was not possible in those regions because of the absence of legal authority. According to him, trade was only made possible by the weapons and fortresses of the Dutch, which stabilized the elements of conflict among the native peoples (Kiers p. 12, 13, 67, 114); a most noxious stabilization as far as the natives themselves were concerned.
79. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. L.
80. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 252-253vs (20/8 1618).
81. *Ibid.*, fol. 223vs (20/8 1618), cf. also "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 499. Here the depopulation is chiefly attributed to the fact that the inhabitants went to live on other islands. For the population of Batchan, see also p. 98.
82. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 222vs-223 (20/8 1618).
83. *Ibid.*, fol. 223vs (20/8 1618).
84. *Ibid.*, fol. 224 (20/8 1618).
85. *Ibid.*, fol. 252vs-253 (20/8 1618).
86. *Ibid.*, fol. 225-225vs, 226 (20/8 1618).
87. *Ibid.*, fol. 226 (20/8 1618).
88. "Grondig Verhaal Amboyna," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 352, 436.
89. Coen, *Bescheiden* IV, p. 564 (17/9 1622).
90. V.O.C. arch. 453 (28/8 1629).
91. Coen, *Bescheiden* IV, p. 377 (25/10 1617); *Ibid.*, p. 387 (3/11 1617); V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 128, 129 (25/10 1617); *Ibid.*, fol. 145 (31/10 1617).
92. V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 128 (25/10 1617).
93. Quotations: "te doene, hetgeen ons schijnen sal de Compagnie oorbaer te vereyssen," and "des coopmans profite niet soo seer in het hoogh venten van synne waren als in de grooten afftreck ende slete gelegen is," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 227vs (20/8 1618).
94. Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 283, 284 (20/11 1617); *Ibid.* p. 296 (30/11 1617); *Ibid.*, I, p. 262 (22/8 1617); *Ibid.* p. 364 (26/7 1618); *Ibid.*, II, p. 461, 462 (24/10 1618).

95. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 53vs (18/7 1616); *Ibid.*, 451, fol. 151, 164 (31/10 1617). Shortly before his departure for Holland, Van der Hagen, as the oldest member of the Council, was appointed by the Gentlemen Seventeen as Coen's successor in the event of the latter's decease (V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 165, 166, 168, 2/11 1617).
96. "Rapport Oost-Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 326 et seq.; Colenbrander, *Coen* VI, p. 4.
97. *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 610-623.
Colenbrander ascribes these marginal notes to Reael, but the authorship of the latter has already been called into question by H. Winkel-Rauws *Nederlandsch-Engelsche samenwerking in de Spaansche wateren 1625-1627*, p. 58, note 37 - although she does more to refute Gerretson's reasoning than to produce positive arguments in support of the opposite view. It may be pointed out here, particularly in the light of the criticism which Van der Hagen had already levelled at Coen in the Indies, that after the former's return to the Netherlands he had a great deal of contact with the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber, even though this was primarily for discussion of a personal matter (Langeraad, "Eenige mededeelingen van Arent van Buchel," *Navorscher* XXX [1897], p. 629). In these personal affairs Van der Hagen could count on the support of Arent van Buchel, the well-known director of the Amsterdam Chamber. In the notes made by Van Buchel on the meetings of the Chamber he speaks of Van der Hagen as the principal figure among those who were opposed to Coen's reappointment. Coen's opponents considered the reappointment "t selve ondienstich te wesen, overmits hij (Coen) is in de haet, soo van de Engelschen als Javanen, mette welcke onder sijn gouvernement weynich vrientschappe stont te verwachten" ["actually useless, since he is hated by both the English and the Javanese, from whom, under his government, little friendship could be expected"] (M.S. Buchelius, Aanw. 1882, A VI, 8. A.R.A. p. 66, minutes of the meeting of the Amsterdam Chamber 11/3 1621). Coen could still count on the majority of the directors being in agreement with his policy, however, even though there was increasing opposition to his "hoge concepten en exorbitante eisen" ["highflown ideas and exorbitant demands"] (*Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 536 [14/1 1622]; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 552, 8/9 1622). Van Buchel and Van der Hagen must have been in very close touch with each other (Langeraad, *Navorscher* 1897, p. 628, 629, 630). Van Buchel's papers contain comments on East Indian affairs which are also expressed in the letters of Van der Hagen, for example, their views on the contrast between the care taken of the natives by the Jesuit fathers and by the Dutch protestant ministers (Langeraad, p. 634). Unlike Van der Hagen, when Reael returned to the Netherlands he kept right in the background. At first he made no statement at all, either orally or in writing (Langeraad, p. 624). The report, based upon an interview with Reael which was finally delivered to the assembly in 1620 by Willem Boreel, the Company lawyer, is a purely factual account of events which had taken place, and does not contain a single word of criticism (Langeraad, p. 643). Reael was not offered a directorship and an attempt to have himself appointed ambassador to Venice was unsuccessful. After that, Reael must have concentrated entirely on his literary work. He left Amsterdam and settled elsewhere (Winkel-Rauws, p. 57, 58). All this is clear evidence that he did not wish to create a sensation. Is it likely that this man would utter pointed criticism of the sort to be found in the marginal notes? There is more to indicate that Van der Hagen was the author, but perhaps the marginal notes reveal a better knowledge of the whole working of the Company than Van der Hagen, who was not a director, could have had. But contact with this militant figure must have influenced his supporters among the directors to no small extent.
98. Quotation: "'t was een groot misverstant dat getracht was succes met deucht of goetdoen te beteren;" voortaan zouden de inheemschen "met harde sporen bereden moeten worden," *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 461 (24/10 1618).
99. Quotation: "men heeft een keten begonnen te trekken, daervan d'ene schaeckel den ander mede sleipt," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 90 (20/6 1614).
100. Quotation: "Europese gebruyck," V.O.C. arch. 452 (Project van de handel 1626).
101. "Grondig Verhaal Amboyna," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 414.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 442.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
104. In 1636 Gentlemen Seventeen demanded 300,000 to 500,000 lbs of cloves from the East Indies (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 134 (24/9 1636)).

- In 1656 Gentlemen Seventeen estimated European consumption at some 400,000 lbs of cloves per year (V.O.C. arch. 4462¹, extract from a letter from the Seventeen to Gov. Gen. and Council (13/10 1656)).
105. Although there had been earlier expeditions to destroy plantings, systematic extirpation at regular intervals may be said to date from the time when the crews of the ships of the Nassau fleet hacked down the trees in 1625 (Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* I, 2, p. 507).
106. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 83 (13/9 1635); *Ibid.*, fol. 156 (3/10 1637).
107. *Ibid.*, fol. 5 (19/7 1633).
108. *Ibid.*, fol. 306 (11/9 1640).
109. Quotation: "het redres van de Molukse en Amboinse zaken niet meer bij de Gouverneur General en Raden in achtig is," V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 307 (11/9 1640).
110. *Ibid.*, fol. 297-298 vs (11/9 1640).
111. *Ibid.*, fol. 250vs (12/9 1639).
112. *Ibid.*, fol. 151vs (3/10 1637).
113. *Ibid.*, fol. 137vs (26/11 1636); *Ibid.*, fol. 144 (26/3 1637); *Ibid.*, fol. 151vs (3/10 1637).
114. *Ibid.*, fol. 345vs, 346 (5/9 1641).
115. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 II, fol. 41. Report on Ceram.
In 1631 a good half of the cloves harvested in Ceram went to the Macassarese (V.O.C. arch. 453, 23/11 1631).
116. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 928 (Memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
117. The policy of the Seventeen in the Moluccas is most sharply defined in V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 298 (11/9 1640); *Ibid.*, fol. 129vs (24/9 1636), fol. 150 vs (3/10 1637); *Ibid.*, fol. 251vs (12/9 1639).
118. V.O.C. arch. 4462 (extract from a letter from the Seventeen to Gov. Gen. and Council, 9/10 1657).
119. *Coen, Bescheiden*, IV, p. 594 (21/9 1623, Vertooch).
120. V.O.C. arch., O.B., 1626 II, fol. 22 (27/10 1625).
121. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1627 III, fol. 125 (13/12 1626).
122. V.O.C. arch. 453 (10/8 1627).
123. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 902 vs. (Memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
124. In 1632 the deficit in Amboina amounted to: fl. 86.292 (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 I, fol. 65, 1/12 1632).
In 1635: fl. 94.697 (*Ibid.*, O.B. 1637 I, fol. 96, 28/12 1636).
125. Quotation: "principaelste conqueste," V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 252 (12/9 1639).
126. For 1632 the deficit in Banda was fl. 50.714.
For 1633 fl. 25.591.
for 1634 fl. 35.539.
If we select a year at random during the period 1630-1640, 1632 for example, the deficits in the Spice Islands are:
for Amboina: fl. 86.292
for Banda: fl. 50.714
for the Moluccas: fl. 59.777
(V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 I, fol. 65 (1/12 1632)).
127. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 84 (13/9 1635), *Ibid.*, fol. 67 (21/4 1635).
128. *Ibid.*, fol. 68 (21/4 1635).
129. Collectie Hope, No. 8396 (General State Archives) Overzichten van de tekorten in de specerijeilanden gedurende 1683-1750. (Review of deficits in the Spice Islands between 1683 and 1750).
130. V.O.C. arch. 4462¹ (13/10 1656); *Ibid.*, 453 (19/2 1632); *Ibid.*, 454, fol. 209 vs (16/9 1638); *Ibid.*, fol. 308vs (11/9 1640).
131. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 19. (Nov. 1633).
132. According to Johann Sigismund Wurffbain, who visited Mocha in 1640, the decline of Aden was due to the fact that the Straits of Bab el Mandeb were difficult to navigate. For this reason the tradingship of the Turkish sultan began calling at Mocha instead of at Aden (Posthumus Meyjes, *Wurffbain* II, p. 39). For a description of Aden in decline see *Wurffbain* II, p. 34. The arrival of the Dutch ship certainly represented a threat to the trade of the Indians since the Dutch could ship goods more easily, safely, and quickly than they. The letters written by consul Cornelis Pauw in Aleppo about Dutch trade in Mocha contain no hint of the anxiety which Dutch merchants interested in the Levant trade were later to entertain about the competition which the goods shipped by the

United Company via the Levant might offer to the goods brought to Europe via the Cape route. (Archives States General 7076, letter from Cornelis Pauw in Aleppo, 29th March, 1617).

133. The arrival of these ships was a very profitable affair for the authorities in Mocha since as much as 25,000 to 40,000 reals per ship might be paid in toll duties (Archives States General 7076, letter from Cornelis Pauw, 18th August, 1617).
134. In 1616 the stocks of money brought back by the king's ship amounted to some 200,000 to 300,000 reals and 16,000 to 20,000 Venetian ducats (*Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 238; *B & V* II, "Van den Broecke", p. 33). Van den Broecke quotes still higher figures, namely, 350,000 reals of eight and 50,000 golden Venetian and Moorish ducats. Mention of these Moorish ducats indicates that the stream of money did not come exclusively from the European part of the Mediterranean area.
Moreover, the caravans from Aleppo brought specie to the amount of 200,000 reals of eight and 100,000 Hungarian, Venetian and Moorish ducats, while some must also have been smuggled in (*B & V* II, "Van den Broecke," p. 29).
Braudel, who holds that Dutch and English supremacy was the main reason for the decline of the spice trade, considers the fact that about 1620 specie in the form of coins began to get scarce in the Mediterranean area a contributory cause, money being practically the only product which Europe exported to Asia (Braudel, p. 181), but in 1616 quite considerable supplies of coinage were still being shipped. A king's ship that arrived in Diu from Mocha in 1622 (*B & V* II, "Van den Broecke," p. 101) brought a supply of 250,000 rupees (worth 24 stuivers [pence] apiece) destined for the merchants of Amadabat, Cambay, Surat, and other places. The fact that rupees are mentioned instead of European coins probably means that the figure quoted was the estimated value of the European specie after it had been re-minted into Indian coins. Re-minting generally took place in Amadabat (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 215vs, 22/10 1616 - "de ryalen vervoeren de Engelsens van Suratte naar Amadabath en laten er daar ropias van slaan, naardat er veel zilver uit de Rode zee komt, schijnt op de ropias nog eenige winst te hebben" (the English transport the reals from Suratte to Amadabat and have them struck into rupees, whereas much silver comes from the Red Sea there appears to be some profit on the rupees). In 1640, however, the Turkish merchants brought only "Moorish ducats" to Mocha (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1640 I, fol. 1309, 26/5 1639).
135. *B & V* II, "Van den Broecke," p. 28, 33). In 1616 Van den Broecke recorded various ships of Indian origin in Mocha: 1 from Surat, 1 from Goga, 5 from Diu, 2 from Thouwel (Chaul?), 2 from Dabul, 1 from Goa, 2 from Calicut, 3 from Cananor, and 1 from Masulipatnam. Making due allowance for the fact that the tonnages are not known, these isolated data may be compared with a similar list from a Venetian source by Lane (p. 586) of ships arriving in Jidda (the port of Mecca) in 1565, namely: 1 ship from Dabul, 6 from Gujarat, 8 from Batticaloa (Batalao), 3 from Calicut, 2 from Mordassi. Five ships from Achin arrived in Jidda in 1565 as against one from Achin in Mocha in 1616. As far as the Indian towns were concerned, Dabul, especially, still had commercial dealings with Achin. The Dabul merchants bartered Gujarati cloths in Achin for Sumatran pepper and Chinese goods, which they took to Mocha and exchanged there for reals. Coen estimates that as much as 200,000 reals was shipped out of Mocha to the above-mentioned Indian towns alone (*Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 238).
As for the twenties, arrivals in Mocha in 1621 comprised 3 ships from Diu, 4 from Chaul, 2 from Dabul, and one from Cochin (*Coen, Bescheiden* VIIa, p. 770), while in 1628 there was one big ship in Mocha roads from Masulipatnam, another one from Diu, one from Cambay, one from Dabul, and 10 good frigates, probably from Malabar. There were also another 3 good "Moorish" ships, namely, one from Surat, one from Diu, and one from Chaul (*Coen, Bescheiden* VIIb, p. 1493). No more ships at all, however, came from the Malay-Indonesian area (Achin).
136. *B & V* II, "Van den Broecke," p. 53. Foster, *Journal of John Jourdain* p. 205-208 (the cargoes of the Asian ships seized by Middleton).
Van den Broecke gives a comprehensive list of the goods dealt in in Mocha. (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 205-210).
137. A list of prices of commodities in Mocha, which has been preserved in Company records, supplies more exact figures. 1,500 to 2,000 *bahar* of pepper from the Malabar coast and 600 to 1,000 *bahar* of pepper from Achin or Bantam could be sold there, further some 25 to 30 *bahar* of cloves, 5 or 6 *bahar* of mace and 30 to 40 *bahar* of nutmegs.

138. *B & V II*, "Van den Broecke," p. 29.
Some of the spices and other wares were conveyed further overland by the caravan from Aleppo, which was made up of as many as 1,000 camels.
Merchants and pilgrims used to gather together once a year in Aleppo and their numbers included not only people from the town itself and the surrounding districts but Persians, Tartars, and men of other nationalities as well. They all left for Mecca together and their caravans had fixed times of departure and arrival. First they went to Damascus, where they were joined by a similar group of merchants and pilgrims, and then, all together, they set off across the desert to Mecca. The governors of the provinces through which they passed provided the caravans with armed convoys to protect them from attack by Arab tribesmen. Food and water were also supplied through government channels. Another group of pilgrims and merchants used to congregate in Constantinople before crossing the sea to Cairo and then continuing overland to Mecca (Archives of the States General 7076, letter from Cornelis Pauw in Aleppo, 29th March, 1617).
139. See p. 134, note 140.
140. At first the United Company had no effect upon pepper exports from Malabar and Achin. It was only after 1638 when Company fleets began to blockade the coast of India that this circumstance combined with the Company's growing influence on the west coast of Sumatra resulted in a reduction in the supplies brought by Asian traders to Mocha. A contributory cause of the fall in supplies of spices reaching the Mediterranean in the first half of the 17th century must also have been the relentless war waged against the Portuguese at sea by the Dutch and the English. Every Portuguese ship and every native craft suspected of carrying spices belonging to the Portuguese was seized. Thus the spices which had been illegally diverted from the Cape route by the Portuguese did not fall into native hands either but came instead into the possession of the Dutch or the English and thus were shipped around the Cape after all.
141. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 238.
142. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 770.
143. *Ibid.*, III, p. 269; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 482.
144. *Ibid.*, III, p. 316, 320 (14/5 1623); p. 940 (21/1 1623); *Ibid.*, IV, p. 542 (14/4 1622); 563 (17/9 1622), 606 (21/10 1623); *Ibid.*, V, p. 843, 844 (28/8 1629); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 II, fol. 56.
The price of pepper actually fell so much that Coen wanted to send rice to Holland instead of pepper.
145. Heeringa, *Bronnen Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel I*, p. 497 (Cornelis Haga to the States General 25/11 1623).
146. Quotation: "want bijaldien de heren desen handel op Mokha andre verletten ende selfs niet en doen, houde ick voor seecker, dat de specerijen alsdan uit de Nederlanden te meer derwärts (naar de Levant) sullen trecken ende dat de Levantvaerders in plaetse van t grote gelt, U.E. waeren sullen voeren," *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 238 (10/12 1616).
147. Heeringa, *Bronnen Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel I*, p. 100 et seq.
In 1616 pepper which had first been brought to London went to Italy, Turkey and Germany (Foster, *Voyage of Thomas Best*, p. 258).
148. *English Factories 1624-1629*, p. 351-353; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1640 I verv., fol. 1309 (26/5 1639).
149. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1640 I verv., fol. 1310 (26/5 1639).
150. In the 17th century only Van den Broecke records the arrival in Mocha of an occasional ship from Achin in 1616 (cf. p. 223, note 135).
151. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1642 I, fol. 400 (12/8 1640).
152. In Jidda, the port of Mecca, trade with non-Moslems was prohibited on pain of death. In Mocha, where no such restrictions were imposed, the volume of trade at the beginning of the 17th century was considered to be much larger than in Mecca (Archives of the States General 7076, letters from Constantinople, Hadji Abraham report, 28th March, 1617).
153. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1641 IV, fol. 168vs (Wurffbain report 12/10 1640); Posthumus Meyjes, *Johann Sigismund Wurffbain II*, p. 43.
154. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1640 I, fol. 1309 (26/5 1639).
155. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1641 IV, fol. 163 (12/10 1640).
Wurffbain estimates that, at the outside, some 5,000 pounds of cloves and 5,000 pounds of nutmegs could be sold, and barely 154 pounds of mace.

156. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1641 IV, fol. 163vs.
 157. Quotation: "goede slach soudens slaen," *Ibid.*, fol. 163vs.
 158. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1707 III, fol. 1303 (13/11 1706, report by Jan Josua Ketelaer).
 159. The importance of the trading centre of Mocha should not be overestimated, however. In comparison with the Indian port of Surat or the Persian port of Gamron, the turn-over of goods in Mocha was small. The Turkish merchants who brought the merchandise from the Red Sea did not possess much capital (according to Wurffbain, a merchant in Mocha with 10,000 reals at his disposal was the equivalent of a merchant in India possessing 2 to 3 lak (200,000 to 300,000 rupees), cf. Wurffbain in V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1641 IV, fol. 168vs. Nor did the Turkish merchants convert their capital into large stocks of one type of merchandise. Instead they laid out their money on small parcels of different sorts of goods. Cf. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, p. 76, 77, who cites Mocha as an example of the primitive character and limited scope of Asian commercial traffic generally. Mocha was, however, of importance as a transhipment port on the route to the Mediterranean area.
 160. *Coen, Bescheiden* VIIb, p. 1198 (26/10 1627); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1624 I, fol. 12 (3/1 1624); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1624 I, fol. 211-211vs (24/12 1623).
 161. *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 489 (4/3 1621).
 162. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 490 (4/3 1621); see also Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade*, p. 103, 104.
 163. *Coen, Bescheiden* V, p. 21 (9/11 1627).
 164. See p. 220.
 165. Colenbrander, *Coen* VI, p. 104.
 166. *Ibid.*, p. 466 (Discours 1614).
 167. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 45 (Sept. 1614).
 168. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 II, fol. 3vs (10/11 1617); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1619 II, fol. 228 (20/8 1618).
 169. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 50vs (18/7 1616).
 170. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 II, fol. 3vs (10/11 1617); *Ibid.*, O.B. 1618 III, fol. 7vs (21/10 1617).
 171. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 100 (31/10 1621).
 172. *Ibid.*, p. 108 (5/11 1621).
 173. Quotation: "'t zo vileyn ende schandelijck hadden gemaect, dat ons schamen 't selvige alhier punctuelijck te verhalen," *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 709 (26/3 1622).
 174. *Ibid.*, I, p. 709 (26/3 1622); *Ibid.*, III, p. 808 (13/1 1622); V.O.C. arch. 452 (23/10 1623).
 175. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 114 (23/11 1621).
 176. *Ibid.*, p. 297 (31/1 1623).
 177. *Ibid.*, p. 297 (31/1 1623).
 178. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 601-609 (resol. 9/12 Oct. 1623).
 179. *Ibid.*, p. 577-601 (Vertooch van de Staat der Vereenichde Nederlanden in de quartieren van Oost Indien - 21 sept. 1623).
 180. Quotation: "d'openbare vijanden ende geveynsde vrienden," *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 598 (21/9 1623).
 181. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 598 (21/9 1623), 617 (Nov. 1623).
 182. *Ibid.*, p. 599 (21/9 1623).
 183. *Ibid.*, p. 607 (21/10 1623).
 184. *Ibid.*, p. 598 (21/9 1623).
 185. *Ibid.*, p. 610-623; Pointen van reglement ende redres van de staet van de Compagnie van Indien, Nov. 1623. See also Colenbrander, *Coen* VI, p. 332-340.
 186. *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 616.
 187. See p. 262.
 188. *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 610-623.
 189. *Ibid.*, p. 634-638.
 190. *Ibid.*, p. 638-641.
 191. Quotation: "daer en gedoocht de Compagnie de Indiaenen niet [zozeer], maer de Indiaenen gedooen de Compagnie," *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 640.
 192. *Ibid.*, p. 639.
 193. *Ibid.*, p. 640, 641.
 194. *Ibid.*, p. 641.
- When it was a question of money loans, interest amounted to 50% to 60% (*Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 641). According to the author of the "considerations," Dutch capitalists could make as much profit by sending about fl. 1,000 to Asia as they could with fl. 10,000 to fl. 12,000 in the Netherlands.

195. Quotation: "daer geldt is, daer valt de neeringe," *Ibid.*, IV, p. 641.
196. *Ibid.*, p. 641.
197. *Ibid.*, p. 610-623, marginal notes.
198. *Ibid.*, p. 614.
199. *Ibid.*, p. 621, 622.
200. Quotation: "Wil men se dootsmijten ofte van honger laten sterven, daermede en waer men oock niet geholpen, want in een ledige zee, op ledige landen ende oock met doode mensen is gantsch geen profijt te doen," *Ibid.*, p. 619.
201. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 660-664.
202. *Ibid.*, V, p. 33 (9/11 1627); *Ibid.*, V, p. 132 (3/11 1628); *Ibid.*, V, p. 649 (8/3 1628).
203. *Ibid.*, V, p. 704 (13/10 1628).
204. Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakkaatboek* I, p. 238.
205. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625 I, fol. 141 (27/1 1625).
206. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1626 II, fol. 25vs (27/10 1625).
207. Coen, *Bescheiden* V, p. 649 (8/3 1628).
208. V.O.C. arch. 453 (23/11 1631).
209. V.O.C. arch., 1631 I, fol. 37 (7/3 1631).
210. *Ibid.*, 1631 I, fol. 37 (7/3 1631).
211. Coen, *Bescheiden* VI, p. 444.
212. Quotation: "de vetste wayen, waer de Compagnie behoorde te grasen," V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 2 (19/7 1633).
213. Quotation: "want als een van beijden moet lijden, ofte de Compagnie ofte de burgerije, soo is het verre beeter, dat de burgerije haer behelpt en lijde laet ons dan doch eenmaal wijs werden en geen verteerde (= teerhartige) barmhartigheyt gebruycken." V.O.C. arch. 453 (23/11 1631).
214. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 3 (19/7 1633).
215. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I, fol. 86 (15/12 1633).
216. *Ibid.*, fol. 87 (15/12 1633).
217. *Ibid.*, fol. 86, 87 (15/12 1633).
218. V.O.C. arch., 1633 I, fol. 12 (1/12 1633).
219. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1634 I verv. fol. 887vs (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
220. Quotation: "om de debile staet van de Compagnie als van de particuliere burgers tot een florissante constitutie te doen herleven," *Ibid.*, fol. 949vs.
221. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1634 I verv. fol. 948.
222. *Ibid.*, fol. 891.
223. *Ibid.*, fol. 916vs.
224. *Ibid.*, fol. 948, 949.
225. *Ibid.*, fol. 949.
226. *Ibid.*, fol. 948vs.
227. *Ibid.*, fol. 948vs, 949.
228. *Ibid.*, fol. 949vs.
229. *Ibid.*, fol. 949vs.
230. For Van Diemen's attitude in respect of the free burghers see also Coolhaas, "Gegevens over Antonio van Diemen" *BKI* CIII, p. 531 et seq.
231. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 92 (27/12 1634).
232. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 46vs (2/9 1634).
233. Quotation: "de aangeboren vrije aard van de Nederlanders soo stricte exclusie van handelingen ende gelimiteerde bepalingen niet verdragen," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 91 (27/12 1634).
234. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 46vs (2/9 1634).
235. Quotation: "omme alle hoecken ende gaten gelijk de Chinesen te doorsnuffelen ende te onderzoeken, wat profijt daer te doen is," *Ibid.*, fol. 348 (5/9 1641).
236. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1636 I, fol. 44 (4/1 1636).
237. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 47 (2/9 1634).
238. Quotation: "van onse vyanden overrompelt te worden," V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 264vs, 265 (12/9 1639).
239. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 265 (12/9 1639); *Ibid.*, fol. 347, 347vs, (5/9 1641).
240. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1641 I, fol. 53vs, 54 (30/11 1640).
241. *Ibid.*, fol. 55 (30/11 1640).
242. See p. 228.

243. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1641 I, fol. 55vs (30/11 1640).
 244. Quotation: "'t is zeker de Portugees deser landen natie beter als wij gouverneren con-nen," *Ibid.*, fol. 55vs.
 245. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 347 vs (5/9 1641).
 246. *Ibid.*, fol. 347vs.

CHAPTER X

1. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 137-140.
2. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 75, 77, 83, 108, 119, 120, 121.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 75; Foster, *The voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas* ("Edm. Scott"), p. 124.
4. Meliapur, south of Madras.
 Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 48.
5. Quotation: "eerst tot Bantam quam en had hij niet van te leven, zoodat hij hem met vile dingen erneerde om de cost te winnen en began daarna met slechte dinghen wat te comenschappen." Yet because he was "arch ende cloeck" etc.
 There is a remarkable parallel here with Tun Mutahir in Malacca, see p. 53, 54.
6. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 49.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
 Although Keuning thinks it far-fetched, in view of the activities of the Gujarati this is nevertheless a very plausible argument.
10. Cf. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 139.
11. *Ibid.*, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 139; Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 88.
 His name is variously reported as Tjési Maloekoe (Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 88), Satra Moluco (Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 62), Sancho Moluco (Keuning III, p. 43 note 115), and Sace Molouke (Keuning II, p. 21).
12. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* II, p. 21; Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 88.
13. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 21.
14. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 88.
15. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 43 note 115.
16. *Ibid.*, I, p. 21.
17. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 108.
18. See p. chapter IV and V.
19. Much rice was shipped to Bantam by Cheribon and Japara. In 1616 the regent of Bantam ordered that every Orang Kaya was to maintain large enough stocks of rice to last a year (Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 216. 10/10 1616).
20. *Ibid.* III, p. 626, 29/7 1620.
21. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 105 et seq.; Satow, *Saris' Voyage to Japan*, p. 213; Foster, *The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas*, p. 168. ("The description of Java Major by Edm. Scott").
22. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1631 I, p. 49, 29/11 1630.
23. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 52, 77.
24. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 119 (illustration).
25. IJzerman, *Buysero in Bantam*, p. 105.
26. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* III, p. 193.
27. De Jonge, *Opkomst* III, p. 29.
28. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 105, cf., however, *Eerste schipvaart* III, p. 193.
29. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 104.
30. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 72, 80.
31. See p. 69, 70.
32. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* III, p. 193; I, p. 121.
33. *Ibid.*, I, p. 121.

34. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 87; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 92.
35. Eredia, "Notes", p. 276.
36. V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 516, 26/11 1616.
37. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* IV, p. 92.
38. Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 77, 3/3 1616.
39. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 121.
40. See p. 56, 62.
41. For Persian influence in the Malay Peninsula, see G. E. Marrison, "Persian influence in Malay life (1280-1650)," *JRASM B* XXVIII (1955), part 1, p. 52 et seq.
42. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 77, 120; *B & V* I, "Warwijck," p. 46.
43. Cf. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 76, 85, 133. Van Leur calls this "rich" peddling trade. The distinction he makes between the important merchants, who sent money in *commenda* but did not undertake trading voyages themselves, and the small-time pedlars does not take these "rich pedlars" - who were undoubtedly an important group financially - enough into consideration.
44. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 48, 49, 74.
45. De Graaf, *De regering van sultan Agung*, p. 119.
46. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 63, 10/11 1614; *Ibid.*, II, p. 293, 30/11 1617.
47. *Letters East India Company* II, p. 16, 31/1 1613, cf. also *Letters* I, p. 75 (Sept. 1610). It is stated in this letter that there was, in fact, a market in Bantam for pintados (painted textiles), although only small quantities could be sold there.
48. *Letters* II, p. 314, 10/2 1614.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 269, 2/1 1614.
50. Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 293, 30/11 1617.
51. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* III, p. 193; *Ibid.*, II, p. 33, 43; *B & V* I, "Warwijck," p. 55.
52. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 121.
53. *Ibid.*, III, p. 193.
54. Gray, *The Voyage of Pyrrard*, IIa, p. 163.
55. Foster, *Journal of John Jourdain*, p. 316.
56. Satow, *Saris' Voyage to Japan*, p. 216.
57. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 65, 10/11 1614.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 65, 10/11 1614.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 67, 10/11 1614; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 42vs, 10/11 1614.
60. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 99.
- According to Dutch estimates, less than a third of all the Chinese who swarmed out of their native land ever returned to it. (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 III, fol. 14, 3/2 1626).
61. Foster, *Voyage of Thomas Best*, p. 66; see also De Jonge, *Opkomst* IV, p. 197.
62. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 121; Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 40; Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 70, 10/11 1614; Foster, *The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas* ("Edm. Scott"), p. 169.
63. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 42, 10/11 1614.
64. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 163, 5/1 1616.
65. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 108.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 122; Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 163, 5/1 1616.
68. *Ibid.*, II, p. 91, 31/3 1616.
69. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 123; *Ibid.*, III, p. 193; Foster, *Journal of John Jourdain*, p. 316. In 1614 5 Chinese junks brought 300 *pikol* of silk (*Letters East India Company* II p. 337, 21/2 1614).
70. *Letters East India Company* I, p. 69.
71. Porcelain was bought mainly by the Dutch. In 1614 practically all the porcelain brought by the Chinese was bought by the Dutch, who, as the only prospective buyers, were in a position to dictate their own prices. (Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 67, 10/11 1614).
72. The Chinese had managed to gain absolute control of the intermediary trade in certain products, for example, in Peguan lac, Baros camphor, and the Moetisalahs and other kinds of beads (Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 149, plaat, 37).
73. *Ibid.*, I, p. 125.
74. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 38, 10/11 1614.
75. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen* I, p. 1.

76. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 56.
 77. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* III, p. 199.
 78. Satow, *Saris' Voyage to Japan*, p. 213.
 79. Foster, *Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton*, p. 176.
 80. In 1598 Bantam's total pepper export amounted to 30,000 bags (see p. 243), 18,000 of which were taken by the Chinese, 9,000 by the Dutch, and 3,000 by the Gujarati.
 In 1603 48,000 bags of pepper were obtained by the Dutch and the English alone (*B & V* I, "Warwijck," p. 69).
 In 1613 there was a total of 30,000 to 32,000 bags (Satow, *Saris*, p. 212).
 In 1614: 130,000 bags (one of the "big" harvests) of which the Dutch obtained 50,000 bags (*Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 114, 22/10 1615).
 In 1616 the harvest was expected to yield 30,000 bags (*Ibid.*, I, p. 163, 5/1 1616).
 In 1617: 120,000 bags (*Ibid.*, I, p. 252, 22/8 1617; *Ibid.*, II, p. 265, 3/8 1617).
 In 1618: about 30,000 bags (*Ibid.*, III, p. 468, 20/11 1618).
 In 1620: about 100,000 bags (*Ibid.*, II, p. 708, 15/5 1620).
 In 1627 the crop still amounted to 50,000 to 60,000 bags (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1628 I, fol. 39vs, 29/7 1627), a large part of which went to Batavia.
 In 1629 the harvest yielded only 15,000 to 16,000 bags (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1630 I, fol. 515vs, 20/11 1629).
 81. *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 64, 10/11 1614; *Ibid.*, p. 163, 5/1 1616.
 In 1604 shipments to Bantam from the pepper areas on Sumatra were already diminishing owing to Dutch purchases at source (Middleton, p. 168). Yet the arrival in Bantam of various proas and junks carrying pepper from Jambi and Cheribon is recorded by Saris as late as 1613 (Satow, *Saris' Voyage to Japan*, p. 213).
 82. *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 163, 5/1 1616.
 83. *Ibid.*, p. 614, 8/1 1621.
 84. In 1608, for example, duties were paid on a parcel of 8,440 bags of pepper shipped in a vessel called "Bantam."
 These duties comprised: A royal tax of 8%, that is to say, with purchase price reckoned at 4 reals per bag, fl. 6346
 Ruba-ruba for the king at the rate of 500 reals per 6,000 bags. . . . fl. 1652
 Ruba-ruba for the shahbandar 250 reals per 6,000 bags fl. 826
 Belibilian (special taxes) 666 reals per 6000 bags fl. 2201
 Pangroro (special taxes) 11½ cash per bag fl. 14
 Writer's duty, per 100 bags fl. 198
 Weigher's duty, per 100 bags fl. 198
 Fee for carrying the pepper out of the weigh-houses fl. 98
 total fl. 11,533
 Thus duties amounting to fl. 11,533 were paid on a total expenditure of fl. 33,760 (V.O.C. arch. 962).
 85. Heeres-Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum* I, p. 29.
 86. *Letters East India Company* III, p. 276.
 87. *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 64, 10/11 1614.
 88. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 202.
 89. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 50.
 90. Quotation: "dit volck thoonde hun zoo valsche en onbeschaemt, lichtvaerdigh gelijk de winden, die daer alsdoen twee oft drie mael des daechs veranderen," Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 59.
 91. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
 92. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
 93. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
 94. In 1599 the price of pepper was 3 reals per bag. Shortly after that the depreciation of the real caused the price to rise to 4 to 6 reals per bag. Prices continued to rise until 1603. Then they dropped. In 1608 pepper was again costing 2½ reals per bag.
 In 1612: 12½ reals per 10 bags.
 In 1614: 15 or 16 reals per 10 bags (*Letters East India Company* II, p. 319, 10/2 1614); 13 or 14 reals per 10 bags (*Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 64, 10/11 1614).
 In 1615: 15 reals per 10 bags (*B & V* II, "Van den Broecke," p. 25); 12 reals per 10 bags (*Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 163, 5/1 1616).

- In 1616: 17 or 18 reals per 10 bags. Pepper bought before the arrival of the Chinese (Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 163, 5/1 1616); 25 to 27 reals per 10 bags (Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 130, 16/6 1616); 2 to 2½ reals per bag (Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 147, 21/9 1616).
- In 1617: 3½ reals per bag (Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 274, 17/9 1617) (large purchases by Asians); 4 reals per bag, increasing to as much as 8 to 10 reals per bag on the arrival of the Chinese junks (Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 329, 30/12 1617); 4 reals per bag, in spite of the big harvest of 110,000 bags and poor buying by Europeans. Chinese purchases were intended for Cambodia and Siam as well as China (IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 102, 18/12 1617).
- In 1618: 10 reals per *pikol* = 2 bags – after the price had been fixed by the government of Bantam and its Chinese advisers. Increased prices in Bantam in connection with the high pepper prices in China. When Coen threatened to remove pepper from Chinese junks the price of pepper dropped to 6 or 6½ reals per *pikol* (Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 382, 11/5 1618; *Ibid.*, p. 379, 17/4 1618). But when the Chinese junks arrived prices rose again to 43 and 48 reals per 10 bags (Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 387, 21/5 1618; *Ibid.*, p. 410, 16/8 1618). The Dutch once more threatened to remove the pepper by force and the price fell to 30 and 32½ reals per 10 bags. When Coen issued instructions to buy at that price, it rose again to 35 reals. In September 1618 the price was 5½ reals per bag and could be expected to rise to 6 or 7 reals (poor crop and little pepper) (Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 450, 19/9 1618). In November 1618 the price was 6½ reals (Coen, *Bescheiden* II, 559, 2/6 1619).
- In 1619: the price had fallen to 2 reals (Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 474, 5/8 1619).
- In 1620: there was a very sharp fall to 7½ and 5 reals per 10 bags (Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 581, 31/7 1620; *Ibid.* I, 609, 8/1 1621).
95. Moreland, *Peter Floris*, p. 23.
 96. *Letters East India Company* III, p. 276.
 97. Foster, *Voyages of Lancaster*, p. XXXI, 109.
 98. Wieder and others, *Spilbergen*, p. 83.
 99. *Letters East India Company* III, p. 274; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 116.
 100. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 59.
 101. Quotation: "dat die lieden veel ghelts verdienden, zonder eenigh peryckel te verbeyden van verlies, oock sonder eenighe moeyten te doen . . . dat die niet alleen de Christenen bedrieghen, maar oock denghenen daer zij als hoofden over ghestelt zijn, die zij met een vaderlijke liefde voor bedrock behoorden te bevrijden," Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* I, p. 59.
 102. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* II, p. 30.
 103. The governor owned junks (*B & V* II, "Van der Hagen," p. 83.) In 1617 a junk belonging to the brother of the pangeran of Bantam is mentioned (Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 304, 18/12 1617). It is not clear, however, whether either of these vessels was a trading junk.
 104. See p. 240.
 105. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 175, 177.
 106. Cf. J. W. IJzerman's introduction about the events in Bantam (which reiterates Buysero's [= Coen's] views on the matter) with F. C. de Haan's account in *Oud-Batavia* I, p. 5-40. The latter testifies to the far greater critical sense of its author.
 107. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 26, 27, 75; Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 243, 10/12 1616.
 108. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 231.
 109. *Ibid.*, p. 26, note 3.
 110. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 69, 10/11 1614; *Ibid.*, VII, p. 858; *Ibid.*, III, p. 421, 22/2 1618; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 232.
 111. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 858; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 231.
 112. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 72, 10/11 1614.
 113. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 231.
 114. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 118, 22/10 1615.
 115. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 232.
 116. *Ibid.*, p. 95, 232.
 117. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

118. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 62, 10/11 1614.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 63, 10/11 1614.
120. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 65.
121. *Coen Bescheiden I*, p. 69, 10/11 1614; *Ibid.*, p. 229, 10/11 1616; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 352, 26/11 1616.
122. *Ibid.*, II, p. 156, 10/10 1616; *Ibid.*, p. 172, 7/11 1616; *Ibid.*, I, p. 243, 10/12 1616; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 26, 27.
123. *Ibid.*, II, p. 172, 7/11 1616.
124. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 243, 10/12 1616; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 26, 27.
125. *Letters East India Company III*, p. 261.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 275, 276.
127. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 103.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 65, 10/11 1614; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 117.
129. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 244, 10/12 1616.
130. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 37.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 102; *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 397, 29/9 1618.
133. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 86; *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 326, 327, 11/3 1618; *Ibid.*, p. 298, 18/12 1617; *Ibid.*, II, p. 307, 2/12 1617; *Ibid.*, I, p. 276, 1/9 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 284, 10/11 1617.
134. *Coen, Bescheiden IV*, p. 452, 24/3 1620.
135. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 75.
136. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 298, 18/12 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 249, 22/8 1617; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 65, 71, 102, 103.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
139. *Coen, Bescheiden III*, p. 518, 18/6 1619.
140. *Letters East India Company III*, p. 274, 275.
141. *Ibid.*, III, p. 275.
142. *Coen, Bescheiden II*, p. 257, 22/6 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 252, 8/6 1617.
143. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 66.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
145. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 484, 5/8 1619.
146. Quotation: "om door die van Bantam niet gedwongen te worden naer haer pijpen te dansen," *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 250, 22/8 1617.
147. V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 263, 15/5 1618.
148. Quotation: "gansch hart ende buyten alle limiten van rechte ende niet alleenlijke daer te lande, maer selfs oock alhier bij de participanten en alle dergenen, die sulcken ter ooren mochten kommen, onlusten ende opsprake soudén mogen causeren." Above all, they were afraid that because of his actions "onlusten bij de naburige coningen soudén mogen ontstaen." For that reason they insisted that in future Coen "(zich met) behoerlijke, wetlycke en geene opsprake subjecte middelen zou moeten behelpen," V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 263, 15/5 1618.
149. *Coen, Bescheiden II*, p. 566, 21/6 1619; *Ibid.*, I, p. 475, 5/8 1619.
150. *Ibid.*, I, p. 249, 22/8 1619; *Ibid.*, II, p. 227, 4/4 1617.
151. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 34; *Coen, Bescheiden II*, p. 222, 4/4 1617; *Ibid.*, I, p. 326, 11/3 1618; *Ibid.*, III, p. 419, 14/2 1618; *Ibid.*, I, p. 501, 7/10 1619; Cf. also *Ibid.*, I, p. 776, 20/6 1623.
152. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 276, Sept. 1617.
153. *Ibid.*, III, p. 419, 14/2 1618.
154. Heeres-Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum I*, p. 149.
155. See, among others, Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge II*, 1, p. 10 et seq; Van der Chys, *De Nederlanders te Jacatra*; De Jonge, *Opkomst IV*, p. XCIV; De Haan, *Oud-Batavia I*, p. 5-40.
156. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge II*, 3, p. 436, 467.
157. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 381, 29/9 1618; *Ibid.*, p. 358, 26/7 1618; *Ibid.*, p. 470, 5/8 1618.
158. *Ibid.*, p. 581, 31/7 1620; *Ibid.*, p. 609, 8/1 1621.
159. *Ibid.*, p. 776, 20/6 1623.
160. Quotation: "Bantam is geruineert en Jacatra sal floreren," *Coen, Bescheiden*, p. 587, 26/10 1620; *Ibid.*, p. 602, 26/10 1620; *Ibid.*, p. 592, 26/10 1620.

161. *Ibid.*, p. 592, 26/10 1620.
162. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 466-467.
163. *Ibid.*, p. 468.
164. *Ibid.*, p. 472.
165. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 776, 20/6 1623.
166. *Ibid.*, p. 581, 31/7 1620.
167. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1624 I, fol. 165, 2/1 1624; Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 472.
168. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 609, 8/1 1621; *Ibid.*, p. 526, 22/1 1620.
Beng Kong, Jan Kong and other Chinese who later became well-known in Batavia, originally came from Bantam.
169. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 475, 5/8 1619; *Ibid.*, p. 501, 7/10 1619.
170. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 232.
171. *Ibid.*, p. 232, 233.
172. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 469.
173. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 592, 26/10 1620.
174. *Ibid.*, III, p. 946, 23/1 1623.
175. *Ibid.*, VIIb, p. 1821, CLXXIII, note 8.
176. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626, II, 27/10 1625.
177. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1624, I, fol. 165, 2/1 1624.
178. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1625, I, fol. 283, 9/7 1624.
179. Coen, *Bescheiden* V, p. 741, 18/4 1629.
180. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 562.
181. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1631 I, fol. 49vs, 29/11 1630.
182. *Ibid.*, fol. 51, 6/12 1630.
183. *Ibid.*, fol. 53vs, 22/12 1630; *Ibid.*, fol. 56vs, 30/12 1630.
184. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1633 I, fol. 242 vs, 9/6 1632.
185. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1635 I, fol. 87vs, 27/12 1634.
186. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 888vs, (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
187. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1624 I, fol. 48, 3/1 1624; *Ibid.*, O.B. 1625 I, fol. 167vs, 27/1 1625.
188. Coen, *Bescheiden* V, p. 75, 6/1 1628.
189. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1628 II, fol. 128vs, 8/7 1627.
190. Coen, *Bescheiden* V, p. 201, 28/11 1627.
191. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 I, p. 203vs, 20/4 1632; *Ibid.*, fol. 242vs, 9/6 1632.
192. Quotation: "opulent en prodigael in haer dagelykse kledinghe, maakte nu een zeer verarmde ende desolate" [indruk], V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 888vs (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
193. *Ibid.*, fol. 883, 883vs, 889.
194. *Ibid.*, fol. 889.
195. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I, fol. 249, 249vs, 17/5 1633.
196. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 889 (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
197. *Letters East India Company* III, p. 167, 21/10 1615.
198. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 172, 26/7 1616.
199. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 148, 17/7 1616; p. 89, 27/5 1616.
200. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 III, fol. 61, 4/3 1624.
201. *Ibid.*, 1634 I verv., fol. 921vs (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
202. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 344, 24/6 1618.
203. For the earliest United Company relations in Jambi see J. W. J. Wellan, Onze eerste vestiging in Djambi. *BKI* 82 (1926), p. 339-383.
204. Quotation: "want wij langhe genoech de varckens hebben geschoren ende andere de schapen," Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 125, 30/6 1616.
205. *Ibid.*, p. 126, 30/6 1616.
206. Wellan, Djambi, p. 355.
207. *Ibid.*, p. 359.
208. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 566.
209. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1630 II, fol. 10, 25/10 1629.
210. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 861.
211. *Ibid.*, p. 898; *Ibid.*, p. 441, 25/7 1619.
212. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1624 II, fol. 349vs, 3/3 1623.
213. Chily = Tjelik = small (Jav.) = Ketjil (Malay).
214. Coen, *Bescheiden* IV, p. 23, 19/11 1620; *Ibid.*, I, p. 610, 8/1 1621.

215. Quotation: "met welke natie toch niets stabiels in 't stuck van negotie te verrichten is, hoe bondige en welgemeende accoorden men oock met haer maectt, als 't schaers met haer gestelt is, uyt vreesse men haer voorby mocht lopen, comen sij met reglement en redres voor den dach, maer so haest een stroohalm breecken connen gaet alles weder overhoop," *Coen, Bescheiden* V, p. 32, 9/11 1627.
216. *Ibid.*, II, p. 241, 23/5 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 224, 24/3 1617.
217. Quotation: "de molestie sal per avontuur, die 't seer niet bekend sijn, vehement schijnen, dan wat leyt daeraen? 't rechte verstant sal ons schut genouch syn," *Coen, Bescheiden*, I, p. 250, 22/8 1617.
218. Jambi had two rulers, a father and son, each of whom received a share of the 10% export duties levied on pepper. The old king received the duties paid by the Dutch, English and Chinese, and the young prince those obtained from the Javanese and Malays. This probably accounts for the antagonism between the two rulers. Neither of them had much power, however, since government was primarily in the hands of the OrangKayas.
219. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 242, 23/5 1617.
220. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 276, 25/9 1617.
221. *Ibid.*, p. 137, 17/7 1616.
222. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 107.
223. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 394, 1/6 1618.
It was not only the Dutch who preyed upon the Chinese junks. Other Europeans represented just as much of a threat. In 1617, for example, 5 Chinese junks were pillaged by the Portuguese and in 1618 the English seized some Chinese junks *en route* to Bantam (*Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 305, 5/12 1617; *Ibid.*, I, p. 381, 29/9 1618).
224. *Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 276, 277.
225. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, p. 307.
226. *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 563, 31/7 1620.
227. *Ibid.*, III, p. 173, 1/5 1622; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 II, fol. 50, 27/2 1626.
228. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1628 II, fol. 129, 8/7 1627.
229. *Ibid.*, fol. 30vs, 20/2 1627; see also *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 666, 19/3 1620.
230. *Coen, Bescheiden* V, p. 339, 16/7 1628; *Ibid.*, p. 392, 14/8 1628; *Ibid.*, p. 112, 3/11 1628; *Ibid.*, p. 523, 22/5 1629.
231. *Ibid.*, p. 547, 9/6 1629.
232. *Ibid.*, III, p. 198, 2/6 1622; *Ibid.*, VIIb, p. 1076, 30/1 1623.
233. *Ibid.*, II, p. 244, 23/5 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 574, 2/7 1619; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626, III, fol. 31, 3/2 1626.
234. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1626 III, fol. 31, 3/2 1626.
235. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1624, II, fol. 68, 11/3 1623.
236. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1627 II, fol. 55, 24/3 1626.
237. For the development of the pepper trade in Banjermasin in the 17th century see J. C. Noorlander, *Bandjermasin en de Compagnie in de tweede helft der 18e eeuw*, p. 3-14. For relations between Banjermasin and the United Company see L. C. D. van Dijk, *Neerlands vroegste betrekkingen met Borneo*, enz. Amsterdam 1862.
238. For events on the Chinese coast, the occupation of the islands off that coast, see W. P. Groeneveldt, "De Nederlanders in China," *BKI* XLVIII (1898).
239. Chaunu, "Le Galion de Manille," p. 450.
240. *Coen, Bescheiden* IV, p. 493, 4/3 1621; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 130vs, 27/12 1634; *Ibid.*, O.B. 1637 I, fol. 54, 28/12 1636; V.O.C. arch., 454, fol. 183vs, 20/3 1638; *Ibid.*, 454, fol. 355, 5/9 1641.
241. For example, V.O.C. arch. 452, Dec. 1624; Gentlemen Seventeen to Surat, shortage of Chinese silk because of failure of expedition to the Chinese coast, demand for Persian silk. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 103, Dec. 1635; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1637 I, fol. 50, 28/12 1636; Turkish invasion of Persia, shortage of Persian silk, demand for Chinese silk provided this does not involve reduction of supplies to Japan (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 183vs, 20/3 1638).
242. Groeneveldt, "Nederlanders in China," p. 59.
243. V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 256vs, 12/9 1639.
244. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 228, 17/4 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 363, 30/3 1618; *Ibid.*, VII, p. 795, 15/10 1621; *Ibid.*, III, p. 60, 11/6 1621; *Ibid.*, p. 203, 19/6 1622.
245. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 58vs, 12/10 1613; *Ibid.*, O.B. 1626 III, fol. 111vs, 3/2 1626; *Ibid.*, O.B. 1627 III, fol. 119, 13/12 1626.

246. Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 55, 25/11 1615; *Ibid.*, III, p. 203, 19/6 1622; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 108, 18/12 1618; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1637 I, fol. 122, 28/12 1636.
247. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 108.
248. Groeneveldt, "Nederlanders in China," p. 53.
249. Only very fragmentary data have been preserved about the number of junks visiting Further India and the Indonesian Archipelago.
In 1615 10 to 12 small Chinese junks went to Cochin China (Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 55, 25/11 1615).
In the same year 3 or 4 junks went to Bantam and 5 or 6 to Jambi, Japara and Jortan, as well as 1 or 2 to Ligor and Bordelon (Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 184, 31/3 1616).
In 1622 the figures were as follows (Coen, *Bescheiden* IV, p. 726, 29/3 1622):
Batavia 3 junks;
Grise 2 junks;
Bima 2 junks;
Patani 1 junk;
Siam 3 junks;
Cambodia 1 junk;
Quinnam and Cochin China 17 small junks.
In 1625 (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 97vs, 13/5 1625):
Batavia 4 junks;
Grise 1 junk;
Siam 4 junks;
Selangor and Bordelon 2 junks;
Cambodia 3 junks;
Comparative figures for Manila were:
1615 20 to 30 junks;
1622 8 junks;
1625 30 small junks;
250. Tiele, "Europeërs" II, p. 24; *Ibid.*, III, p. 265; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 474, 477; *Ibid.*, V, p. 189; Boxer, *South China in the 16th century*, p. XXXIX, XL-XLIV.
251. According to Chaunu (p. 450, 451), the high pepper prices in Europe had an effect upon Legaspi's voyage and the voyage of 1564 was therefore a pepper expedition. That means that the pepper must have been transported from Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula to the Philippines, and in such quantities that a pepper market could come into existence there. It seems more probable that the Iberians came to get the fine spices (cloves, nutmeg and mace) from the Spice Islands, which are situated near the Philippines.
252. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, "On Early Asian Trade," p. 161; Tiele, "Europeërs" V, p. 189.
This trade between New Spain and the Philippines was carried on in two big ships (J. W. IJzerman, *Reis om de wereld Olivier van Noort I*, p. 106).
For the Philippine-America trade see Chaunu, "Le galion de Manille"; W. Schürz's work proved unobtainable in Dutch libraries.
The two galleons which made the voyage annually were each of 300 tons. In connection with the Chinese silk trade, it suited Macao better to cooperate with Manila than with the Portuguese possessions in Asia (Chaunu, p. 456, 457). Once the Dutch had established themselves in Formosa, however, they were able to cut Manila's communications with Macao and China. Supplies diminished considerably because of this, but the trade was not entirely destroyed (Chaunu, p. 460). Chaunu also points out the effect which the reduced production of the American silver mines had upon the galleon trade with Manila. The Dutch, who at first had had far smaller means at their disposal than the Spanish (see Coen's complaints!) came to be in a much more favourable position because of their growing inter-Asian trade. This was what caused the Portuguese Duarte Gomez Solis to propose the development of similar, financially self-supporting, inter-Asian trade (Chaunu, p. 461). The breach between Spain and Portugal in 1640 made the situation still worse.
253. Groeneveldt, "Nederlanders in China," p. 39.
254. Linschoten, *Itinerario* I, p. 85 20 ships
Saris (1613) 40 ships
Matelieff (in Groeneveldt, p. 39) 24 to 30 ships

- 31/3 1616 (*Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 184) 20 to 30 ships
 20/8 1618 (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 254) more than 30 ships
 4/10 1620 (*Coen, Bescheiden VII*, p. 644) 30 ships
 4/11 1620 (*Coen, Bescheiden VII*, p. 673) 33 or 34 ships
 4/3 1624 (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 III, fol. 62vs) 26 ships
 13/5 1625 (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 97vs) 30 small junks
 29/3 1622 (*Coen, Bescheiden IV*, 726) 8 junks
 14/6 1629 (*Coen, Bescheiden VIIb*, 1677) 2 small junks
 (pirates blockading the Chinese coast)
 1/12 1632 (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633, I, fol. 57) 17 small junks
255. Van Leur does not make enough allowance for this, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, p. 186, cf. p. 167.
256. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 III, fol. 127-131.
257. *B & V II* ("Mateleff," p. 69).
258. Quotation: "hare joncken d'onse veel te cloeck int seylen, wenden ende drayen syn," *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 768, 20/6 1623.
259. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 121, 17/7 1625
260. Satow, *Saris' Voyage to Japan*, p. 226.
261. Fruit junks = junks carrying foodstuffs.
262. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 272, 22/8 1617.
263. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 79.
264. *Coen, Bescheiden VII*, p. 783, 789, 12/10 1621.
265. *Ibid.*, I, p. 372, 26/7 1618; *Ibid.*, VII, p. 334, 4/6 1618.
266. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 III, fol. 63, 4/3 1624; Groeneveldt, "Nederlanders in China," p. 267.
267. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 II, fol. 43, 22/12 1615.
268. *Coen, Bescheiden VII*, p. 211, 31/10 1616. This is at variance with a list of percentages of gain made out by the Chinese traders who supplied money and goods:
 to Cochin China, Cambodia and Champa 40 to 45%;
 to Patani, Sangora, Ligor, and Siam 60, 65 to 70%;
 to Borneo, Palembang, Johore, Malabar, Jambi and Pahang 80, 85 to 90%;
 to Bantam, Jacatra, Japara, Jortan (Jaratan) 120, 125, to 130%,
 unencumbered by freights, tolls and other costs (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I verv. fol. 911,
 memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
269. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 94, 108; Satow, *Saris' Voyage to Japan*, p. 227.
Coen, Bescheiden I, 167, 5/1 1616.
270. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 14, 18/7 1616.
271. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 158, 25/12 1615.
272. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 254, 20/8 1618.
273. *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 156, 25/12 1615.
274. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 520, 24/10 1621; *Ibid.*, I, p. 554, 11/5 1620.
275. *Ibid.*, p. 590, 26/10 1620.
276. *Ibid.*, p. 799, 20/6 1623.
277. Quotation: "Noch gelooven de treffelijcke Chinesen niet, dat (wij) oprechte cooplyuden sijn ende een grote Chinese handel soecken te doen, maar (denken dat wij) om buyt uutcomen," *Coen, Bescheiden I*, p. 167, 5/1 1616.
278. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 645, 4/11 1620.
279. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 494, 495, 4/3 1621; *Ibid.*, I, p. 650, 16/11 1621; *Ibid.*, III, p. 58, 11/6 1621; *Ibid.*, I, p. 797, 20/6 1623.
280. Boxer, *Fidalgos*, p. 72.
281. *Coen, Bescheiden II*, p. 233, 23/4 1617; *Ibid.*, I, p. 295, 18/12 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 376, 26/7 1618.
282. *Ibid.*, III, p. 296, 31/1 1623.
283. Quotation: "dese handel is ons bedunckens lang genoch met vrientschap versocht. Wij menen so goeden recht te hebben om haer de handel op andere landen te mogen beletten als zij om ons de handel in haer landt te weygeren. Met alsuicken recht als zij ons uyt China houden, sullen haer daer in doen blijven totdat anders resolveren," *Ibid.*, I, p. 650, 16/11 1621.
284. Quotation: "want so lange d'arme geen peryckel van haer lyff lopen, de rijcke de goede- ren altijd avontuyren sullen," *Ibid.*, I, p. 797, 20/6 1623.

285. *Ibid.*, III, p. 958, 28/1 1623.
286. *Ibid.*, p. 958, 28/1 1623; *Ibid.*, I, p. 799, 20/6 1623; *Ibid.*, p. 725, 6/9 1622.
287. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1624, fol. 72.
288. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625 I, fol. 177vs, 27/1 1625.
289. Quotation "proceduyres, die gantsch China soo seer tegen ons verbittert heeft, dat wij voor moordenaers, geweldenaers ende zeeroovers gereputeert werden" "en souden het gantsche rijcke van China, nochte de coninck zelffs met geen affkeer, nochte wraecke tegen ons ingenomen weesen," Groeneveldt, "Nederlanders in China," p. 494.
290. *Ibid.*, p. 494.
291. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1624, fol. 21vs, 26, 3/1 1624.
292. *Ibid.*, 1624, fol. 54, 3/1 1624.
293. Coen, *Bescheiden* VIIb, p. 1090, 29/1 1624.
294. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1624, fol. 26, 3/1 1624.
295. Coen, *Bescheiden* VIIb, p. 1484, 26/10 1628; *Ibid.*, p. 1677, 14/6 1629; *B & V* II ("Van Rechteren"), p. 75.
296. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 61, 18/3 1625.
297. *Ibid.*, fol. 28vs, 26/7 1625.
298. *Ibid.*, fol. 81, 14/4 1625.
299. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1627 II, fol. 120vs, 5/8 1626.
300. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1628 II, fol. 89, 10/5 1627.
301. Coen, *Bescheiden* V, p. 534, 31/5 1629.
302. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1637 I, fol. 9, 28/12 1636.
303. *Ibid.*, 454, fol. 154, 3/10 1637.
304. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1637 I, fol. 132, 28/12 1636; *Ibid.*, 454, fol. 213vs, 16/9 1638; *Ibid.*, fol. 239vs, 14/3 1639.
305. V.O.C. arch., 454, fol. 204vs, 16/9 1638.

CHAPTER XI

1. Mataram's struggle with the seaports of northern Java has been described by Dr H. J. de Graaf in "*De regering van sultan Agung en zijn voorganger Panembahan Seda-Ing-Krapjak*." It was not Dr De Graaf's intention, however, to devote attention to economic factors. That is the object of the present chapter, which in a certain sense, therefore, attempts to supplement De Graaf's account.
2. Coen, *Bescheiden* VIIb, p. 936. March 1622.
3. Cf. also De Graaf, *Sultan Agung*, p. 17, in which A. A. Cense's version of the Banjer-masin Chronicle is quoted. This fails to supply confirmation of Surabaya's claim.
4. De Graaf takes this to mean Labetaka, on Banda, (De Graaf, p. 17) but why not Lawe, on Borneo?
5. Coen, *Bescheiden* VIIb, p. 936, March 1622; V.O.C. arch., O.B., 1616 I, fol. 73.
6. Pires, *Suma Oriental* I, p. 196.
7. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* II, p. 405.
8. *Ibid.*, II, p. 314.
9. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 535.
10. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 42, 196.
11. IJzerman, *Van Noort* I, p. 141. Van Noort always says Jortan (Jaratan) but obviously means Grise as well.
12. Schrieke, *Bonang*, p. 25.
13. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 24vs, 27/10 1625.
14. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 197.
15. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 101.
16. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 42; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 54.
17. IJzerman, *Van Noort* I, p. 136, 137.
18. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 42, 196.
19. Satow, *Saris' Voyage to Japan*, p. 219.
20. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* III, p. 193, 194; V.O.C. arch., 965, 25/12 16105 *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 I, fol. 73.

21. *Ibid.*, 965, 8/8 1612.
22. *Ibid.*, 25/12 1610.
23. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 96.
24. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 73, 1/7 1615.
25. Coen, *Bescheiden* III, p. 13, 24/1 1621; "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 533.
26. V.O.C. arch. 965, 19/10 1610.
27. B & V I, "Van Spilbergen," p. 60; Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 723, 7/6 1620.
28. B & V II, "Matelieff," p. 63; *Ibid.*, II, "Van der Hagen" p. 83.
29. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 73, 1/7 1615; Coen, *Bescheiden* VII, p. 26, 29/12 1614.
30. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 73, 1/7 1615; V.O.C. arch. 965, 25/12 1610.
31. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 74vs, 22/10 1615.
32. Cf. p. 83-84, 107-110, 150, 151.
33. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 73, 1/7 1615.
34. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1615, fol. 64, 12/8 1614.
35. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 74, 10/11 1614.
36. See III, note 176.
37. V.O.C. arch., 965, 8/8 1612.
38. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 533; Colenbrander, Coen, VI, p. 197.
39. Coen, *Bescheiden* III, p. 13, 24/1 1621. Cf. also V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 II, fol. 53vs, 27/2 1626.
40. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 15, 26/10 1615.
41. Coen, *Bescheiden* III, p. 551, 10/11 1619; *Ibid.*, II, p. 625, 13/12 1619.
42. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 532.
43. V.O.C. arch. 965, 25/12 1610.
44. IJzerman, *Van Noort* I, p. 137.
45. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 43.
46. See p. 151.
47. B & V I, "Warwijck," p. 69.
48. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 42, 204.
49. One *bahar* of nutmegs cost 5 or 6 reals-of-eight, while the price for unsorted nutmegs in Grise was from 10 to 12 reals per *bahar* (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 73, 1/7 1615).
50. IJzerman, *Van Noort* I, p. 138.
51. V.O.C. arch. 965, 8/8 1612; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 74, 22/10 1615.
52. V.O.C. arch. 965, 25/12 1610.
53. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 204.
54. V.O.C. arch. 965, 8/8 1612.
55. *Ibid.*, 8/8 1612.
56. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 75, 10/11 1614.
57. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 74, 22/10 1615; see also V.O.C. arch. 965, 8/8 1612.
58. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 74, 22/10 1615.
59. V.O.C. arch. 965, 22/8 1608.
60. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 71, 22/10 1615.
61. IJzerman, *Van Noort* I, p. 137.
62. V.O.C. arch. 965, 12/10 1608; *Ibid.*, 17/9 1608.
63. B & V II, "Matelieff," p. 62.
64. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 54, 11/7 1613.
65. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1616 I, fol. 72, 22/10 1615.
66. *Ibid.*, fol. 71, 22/10 1615; *Ibid.*, fol. 2, 26/10 1615.
67. *Ibid.*, fol. 71, 22/10 1615.
68. B & V II, "Matelieff," p. 62; *Ibid.*, II, "Van der Hagen," p. 83.
69. V.O.C. arch. 965, 25/12 1610.
70. De Graaf, *Sultan Agung*, p. 21.
71. V.O.C. arch. 965, 8/8 1612.
72. *Ibid.*, 965, 28/10 1610.
73. B & V I, "Warwijck," p. 54.
74. V.O.C. arch. 965, 22/8 1608. In 1604 the mace price in Bantam was 80 reals per *bahar* (B & V I, "Warwijck," p. 55).
75. V.O.C. arch. 965, 28/10 1610.

76. *Ibid.*, 28/10 1610.
77. *Ibid.*, 22/8 1608.
78. Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 50, 24/12 1615.
79. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 II, fol. 61vs, 6/11 1617.
- 79a. "Zeer goede inlantsche winninge soude zijn."
80. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 71vs, 74, 22/10 1615.
81. Quotation: "want daer niet een cleed te minder in Amboina ende Banda door de Javanen zal gebracht werden," V.O.C. arch. 965, 12/10 1608.
82. *Ibid.*, 960, 3/8 1608.
83. *Ibid.*, 3/8 1608.
84. *Ibid.*, 965, 29/12 1608.
85. *Ibid.*, 22/8 1608.
86. *Ibid.*, 26/5 1610.
87. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 23, 1/1 1614; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 234; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 107vs, 1/1 1613.
88. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 65vs, 12/8 1614.
89. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 75, 10/11 1614.
90. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 196.
91. IJzerman, *Van Noort* I, p. 139.
92. Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 356, 19/3 1618.
93. *Ibid.*, I, p. 120, 22/10 1615; *Ibid.*, II, p. 65, 7/1 1616.
94. V.O.C. arch. 965, 25/12 1610; *Ibid.*, 965, 8/8 1612; IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 176, 178; Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 75, 10/11 1614.
95. Quotation: "want wie zou de paus in de ban doen," Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 120, 22/10 1615.
96. *Ibid.*, VIIb, p. 1618, 20/5 1629.
97. V.O.C. arch., 1633 I, fol. 72, 1/12 1632.
98. B & V II, "Van der Hagen," p. 43.
99. Coen, *Bescheiden* V, p. 448, 20/1 1629.
100. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1632 I, fol. 137vs, 5/7 1631.
101. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 531-532.
102. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 234.
103. Coen, *Bescheiden* I, p. 120, 123, 22/10 1615; *Ibid.*, I, p. 156, 25/12 1615.
104. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 179.
105. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 74vs, 22/10 1616.
106. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 102.
107. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 204.
108. B & V II, "Van der Hagen," p. 77.
109. V.O.C. arch., 965, 16/4 1608.
110. *Ibid.*, 12/10 1608.
111. *Ibid.*, 12/10 1608; *Ibid.*, 16/4 1608.
112. *Ibid.*, 22/8 1608.
113. *Ibid.*, 12/10 1608.
114. B & V II, "Verhoeven," p. 64.
115. V.O.C. arch., 965, 28/10 1610.
116. *Ibid.*, 8/8 1612.
117. *Ibid.*, 8/8 1612.
118. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 54.
119. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 74vs, 22/10 1615.
120. Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 90, 31/3 1616.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 329, 30/12 1617.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 356, 19/3 1618.
123. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 567.
124. Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 356, 19/3 1618.
125. V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1616 I, fol. 74vs, 22/10 1615.
126. Quotation: "om haren cost te soecken," Coen, *Bescheiden* II, p. 177, 7/11 1616.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 388, 21/5 1618.
128. *Ibid.*, I, p. 475, 5/8 1619.
129. *Ibid.*, II, p. 388, 21/5 1618.
- 129a. Quotation: "want alle omliggende quartieren onse vijanden zijn, als die van Madura, Bukit, Tuban."

130. Quotation: "met behendicheyt," *Ibid.*, p. 357, 19/3 1618.
131. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 531.
132. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 504, 15/1 1619; *Ibid.*, p. 700, 27/4 1620; *Ibid.*, I, p. 451, 5/8 1619; *Ibid.*, III, p. 581, 17/1 1620.
133. *Ibid.*, II, p. 617, 8/12 1619.
134. *Ibid.*, I, p. 552, 1/5 1620.
135. *Ibid.*, III, p. 505, 13/5 1619.
136. *Ibid.*, I, p. 653, 16/11 1621.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 561, 31/7 1620.
138. *Ibid.*, II, p. 641, 28/2 1620.
139. *Ibid.*, III, p. 428, 15/3 1618.
140. *Ibid.*, II, p. 665, 19/3 1620.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 705, 15/5 1620.
142. De Graaf, *Sultan Agung*, p. 82.
143. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625 II, fol. 500, 10/10 1624.
144. *Ibid.*, fol. 500, 10/10 1624.
145. *B & V* II, "Van der Hagen," p. 43; *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 549, 27/4 1619; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 II, fol. 52vs, 27/2 1626.
146. See p. 241, 247.
147. See p. 105-107.
148. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 34.
149. *Ibid.*, V, p. 98. The Dutch considered the town better fortified than Bantam. It was encircled by a high wall with bastions, built partly of stone, while the *kraton* itself was also protected by a moat and breastworks.
150. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 34, 36.
151. See p. 108.
152. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 184.
153. *Ibid.*, p. 40; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 52.
154. *Ibid.*, III, p. 207.
155. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
156. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
157. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 44vs, 17/5 1613; De Graaf, *Sultan Agung*, p. 51; Keuning *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 36.
158. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* II, p. 313.
159. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* IV, p. 203; *Ibid.*, III, p. 36.
160. Cf. Keuning III, p. 33 note 91, with p. 196 and 203, and especially with Keuning IV, p. 49, where it is stated most emphatically that most of the spice junks were destined for Grise-Jaratan.
161. The author of the journal of the Second Voyage reports on Tuban's pepper exports. According to him, the pepper was taken to Bali and there bartered for poor quality cloth which was a suitable medium of exchange in the Spice Islands for the finer kinds of spices. This is the traditional picture, given in Portuguese and other Dutch sources as well, of the Javanese spice trade in general. As far as Tuban is concerned, the description is not necessarily based on personal observation. At any rate, the Dutch did not find any fine spices there.
162. *B & V* II, "Matelieff," p. 161.
163. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 34, 36.
164. See p. 105-107.
165. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 203.
166. V.O.C. arch. 965, 8/8 1612.
167. Groeneveldt, *Notes*, p. 54; see also p. 280.
168. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* V, p. 171.
169. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 71, 22/10 1615.
170. Keuning, *Tweede schipvaart* III, p. 203.
171. *Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 464, 465, 10/9 1619.
172. De Graaf, *Sultan Agung*, p. 52.
173. De Graaf, *Senapati*, p. 125.
174. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 426; Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 103; "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 543.
175. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 72, 9/1 1616; "Verhaal," *KHG* 1871, p. 543.

176. *Ibid.*, p. 544.
177. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 199, 7/11 1616.
178. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 890, 899, 10/9 1619.
179. *Ibid.*, II, p. 306, 1/12 1617.
180. See p. 291.
181. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 543.
182. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 290, 20/11 1617, presents a clear picture of Japara's export products.
Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 98, 11/5 1616 (yarn); *Ibid.*, p. 428, 12/9 1628 (stone and chalk); *Ibid.*, p. 76, 3/3 1616; *Ibid.*, p. 198, 7/11 1616 (horses); *Ibid.*, p. 289, 20/11 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 277, 13/11 1617 (salt).
183. Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 384. 1 last (2 tons) of rice cost 5 or 6 reals, the most expensive variety 7 or 8 reals. 1 last of beans cost 11 or 12 reals.
184. Rouffaer-IJzerman, *Eerste schipvaart* I, p. 119.
185. *Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 72, 26/12 1615.
186. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 110, 18/12 1617.
187. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 2, 26/10 1615.
188. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 537, 542.
189. *B & V* II, "Van den Broecke," p. 25.
190. *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 7, 8, 1/1 1614.
191. *Ibid.*, p. 74, 10/11 1614.
192. Quotation: "zoals de merct daervan ordinaris was, sulcx dat sij daerop seer goede profijten wisten te behalen," Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 384.
193. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 113, 20/5 1616.
194. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 5, 12/1 1621.
195. See p. 290, 291.
196. Quotation: "spijs camer," V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 11, 26/10 1615.
197. Quotation: "een muysken dat maer een holleken heeft," *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 348, 8/2 1618.
198. *Ibid.*, p. 416, 29/8 1618.
199. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1614, fol. 44vs, 17/5 1613.
200. *Ibid.*, 450, fol. 44, 26/11 1616. Cf. also V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1632 I, fol. 134, 2/7 1631.
201. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1615, fol. 66, 12/8 1614.
202. Pepper which in 1617 could be sold in China for 18 reals was actually said to be capable of fetching as much as 24 reals only a year later (*Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 339, 24/6 1618).
203. See p. 258-262.
204. *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 339, 24/6 1618.
205. *Ibid.*, p. 119, 22/10 1615.
206. Cf. also Van Dam, *Beschrijvinge* II, 3, p. 384.
207. *Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 899, 10/9 1619.
208. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 542.
209. *Dagregister Batavia* 1634, p. 296, 29/4 1634.
210. *Dagregister Batavia* 1631, p. 19, 27/5 1631; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1637 I, p. 8, 28/12 1636.
211. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 147, 21/9 1616; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1628 II, fol. 163vs, 13/9 1627; see also "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 544.
212. *Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 865.
213. *Ibid.*, II, p. 152, 10/10 1616; *Ibid.*, p. 199, 7/11 1616; *Ibid.*, p. 306, 1/12 1617; *Ibid.*, p. 428, 12/9 1618.
214. *Ibid.*, p. 306, 1/12 1617.
215. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 392, 11/9 1618.
216. Quotation: "ende hen werd grote vruntschap bewezen," *Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 393, 11/9 1618.
217. Quotation: "aftrek van Batavia zo veel krenckten als in haer vermogen was," *Coen, Bescheiden*, V, p. 114, 3/11 1628.
218. Quotation: "Italiaanse en Barbarische custen," *Coen, Bescheiden*, II, p. 76, 3/3 1616; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 57, 6/8 1616.
219. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 62, 7/1 1616; *Ibid.*, II, p. 98, 11/5 1616; *Ibid.*, p. 329, 30/12 1617.
220. *Ibid.*, p. 329, 30/12 1617.
221. *Ibid.*, p. 355, 19/3 1618.

222. Quotation: "de aard van alle Chinezen, eerloos, ontrouw, vals en verraderlijk, niet alleen enkel maar dubbel" "als Intche Moeda van die aard niet is, so moet hij geen Chinees wezen. Is hij half slacht, so moet hij notelijk noch boser zijn," *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 428, 12/9 1618.
223. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 392, 11/9 1618.
224. *Ibid.*, I, p. 339, 24/6 1618.
225. *Ibid.*, p. 389, 29/9 1618.
226. "Verhaal oorlogen in Indië," *Kroniek Historisch Genootschap* 1871, p. 540.
227. *Coen, Bescheiden* I, p. 389, 29/9 1618; *Ibid.*, II, p. 411, 21/8 1618; *Ibid.*, II, p. 421, 29/8 1618.
228. De Graaf, *Sultan Agung*, p. 59, 60.
229. Quotation: "een niet aangename combinatie van commercie en justitie," De Graaf, *Sultan Agung*, p. 61.
230. Quotation: "der vijanden slachtanden meest gebroocken waren," *Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 546, 4/5 1620.
231. *Ibid.*, I, p. 419, 14/1 1619; *Ibid.*, II, p. 554, 25/5 1619.
232. *Ibid.*, p. 428, 2/9 1618.
233. *Ibid.*, III, p. 511, 28/5 1619.
234. *Ibid.*, I, p. 420, 14/1 1619.
235. De Graaf, *Sultan Agung*, p. 62.
236. *Coen, Bescheiden* VII, p. 865.
237. See p. 283, 284.
238. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 II, fol. 60, 7/4 1626; *Ibid.*, fol. 109, 18/7 1626.
239. e.g. *Dagregister Batavia* 1636, p. 12, 31, 33, 34, 53, 97, 125, 153, 176, 184, 258, 292, 294.
240. e.g. *Dagregister Batavia* 1636, p. 63, 95.
241. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 798, 16/12 1621.
242. While they were journeying to the Court of Mataram in 1624 the Dutch learned in Demak that all the rice had dried up in the fields because there were no men to irrigate them on account of the expedition to Madura (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625 II, fol. 469vs, 478). The shortage sent prices soaring. In 1624 the price in Batavia varied between 75 and 90 reals per last (2 tons). In Mataram itself the same quantity cost 40 to 50 reals (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625 I, fol. 321, 30/11 1624). There was so little rice in Mataram that year (because practically all the proas were being used for waging war in eastern Java) that the United Company was obliged to send ships itself to Tegal, Demak, Kendal and Japara (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625 I, fol. 162, 27/1 1625, see also De Jonge, *Ophomst* V, p. 89, 90). 1310 tons had come to Batavia in proas, and the United Company brought another 770 tons in its own ships. But in other years as much as 2,000 to 3,000 tons more was exported (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1625 I, fol. 163).
243. There were large-scale deaths on Java in 1626-1627 because of epidemics raging in the island (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 III, fol. 137vs, 13/12 1626). Many rice-fields were abandoned completely (see also *Coen, Bescheiden* V, p. 56, 9/11 1627). The bad state into which the country had lapsed is indicated not only by the great reduction in exports of rice but also by the fact that gold and silver were being exported. This was evidence of great impoverishment and a sign that "the fruits of the country cannot outweigh the necessities it requires from outside" ("de vruchten van het land de gerequireerde behoeften van buyten niet opwegen mogen" - *Coen, Bescheiden* V, p. 56, 9/11 1627).
244. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 931, 31/21 1622; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 600, 21/9 1623. The coastal regents could make quite high profits on these rice exports. In the years 1622-1623 rice which had been bought in Mataram at 2 to 3 reals per ton was sold at 10 to 15 reals per ton in Batavia, where, to be sure, the United Company charged toll duties of 10%. In 1622 the governor of Kendal sent 300 tons of rice to Batavia, where it was purchased by the United Company as well as by the burghers of the town. Although the fact that the inhabitants bartered rice for other products gave rise to great commercial activity, Coen estimated the value of the rice consumed in Batavia at not more than 6 reals per person per year. Therefore he did not consider that it would be imposing too heavily on the burghers of Batavia to raise the toll from the original 5% to 10%. (*Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 932, 31/12 1622) As we have seen, this toll was later reduced to 5% again.
245. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 205, 21/6 1622; see also *Dagregister* 1628, p. 343.

246. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 931, 31/12 1622.
247. Cf. e.g. *Coen, Bescheiden* II, p. 424, 4/9 1618 (preparations for war); *Ibid.*, III, p. 621, 20/7 1620; *Ibid.*, I, p. 653, 16/11 1621 (to prevent the United Company supporting Mataram's enemies); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 II, fol. 25, 27/10 1625 (policy of encirclement); *Ibid.*, fol. 25 (monopoly Kendal). *Ibid.*, fol. 26 (illness and death on Java); *Ibid.*, fol. 83vs, 14/1 1625 (famine); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 III, fol. 31vs, 3/2 1626 (enforcing help against Bantam by stopping supplies of rice); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1626 III, fol. 31vs, 3/2 1626 (exacting gifts from the Dutch and forcing them to pay high prices for rice); *Ibid.*, fol. 31vs (own need of rice because of the contemplated expedition against Balambangan).
248. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 883, 25/6 1622.
249. *Dagregister Batavia* 1633, p. 141.
250. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 883, 25/6 1622.
251. V.O.C. arch., 1633 I, fol. 6vs, 1/12 1632.
252. IJzerman, *Buysero*, p. 108.
253. De Jonge, *Opkomst* V, p. LXXXV-LXXXVI.
254. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I, fol. 307vs, 22/6 1633; *Ibid.*, O.B. 1635 I, fol. 69, 15/8 1634.
255. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I verv., fol. 890 (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).
256. *Coen, Bescheiden* III, p. 5, 12/1 1621; *Ibid.*, p. 621, 20/7 1620; *Ibid.*, II, p. 390, 29/9 1618.
257. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 88vs, 27/12 1634; *Ibid.*, fol. 101vs, 102, 27/12 1634; *Ibid.*, O.B. 1636 II, fol. 479A, 13/11 1635.
258. V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 69, 15/8 1634; *Ibid.*, O.B. 1634 I, fol. 76, 15/12 1633.
259. V.O.C. arch. O.B. 1635 I, fol. 133, 27/12 1634.
260. *Ibid.*, O.B. 1625 I, fol. 163, 27/1 1625.
261. *Ibid.*, 453, 23/11 1631.
262. *Ibid.*, 451, fol. 206, 16/9 1638; *Ibid.*, fol. 263, 12/9 1639.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AESC	<i>Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations</i> (Annals, Economies, Societies, Civilizations).
BEFEO	<i>Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d' Extrême Orient</i> (Bulletin of the French School of the Far East).
BKI	<i>Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (van Nederlandsch-Indië)</i> uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (van Nederlandsch-Indië) (Contributions to [the] Philology, Geography, and Ethnology [of the Netherlands East Indies] Published by the Royal Institute for Philology, Geography, and Ethnology [of the Netherlands East Indies]).
BMHG	<i>Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht</i> (Contributions and Communications of the Historical Society at Utrecht).
B & V	Isaac Commelin, editor, <i>Begin ende voortganch van de Vereenighde Nederlantsche Geotroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie, vervat-(t)ende de voornaemste reysen, bij de inwoonderen der selver provinciën derwaerts gedaen . . .</i> (Beginning and Progress of the United Dutch Chartered East India Company, Containing the Principal Voyages Made Thither by Inhabitants of Those Same Provinces . . .). Two volumes, Amsterdam, 1646.
G	<i>De Gids: Algemeen Cultureel Tijdschrift</i> (The Guide: General Cultural Journal).
JA	<i>Journal Asiatique</i> (Asian Journal).
JRAS	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.</i>
JRASMB	<i>Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.</i>
JRASB	<i>Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.</i>
KHG	<i>Kron(ij)k van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht.</i> (Chronicle of the Historical Society at Utrecht).
MKAWAL	<i>Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde</i> (Communications of the [Dutch] Royal Academy of Sciences, Literary Section).
TBG	<i>Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het (Koninklijk) Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen</i> (Journal of Indonesian Philology, Geography, and Ethnology Published by the [Royal] Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences).
TG	<i>Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, (Land- en Volkenkunde)</i> (Journal for History, [Geography, and Ethnology]).
TP	<i>T'oung Pao: Archives pour servir à l'étude de l'histoire, des langues, de la géographie et de l'ethnographie de l'Asie orientale.</i> (T'oung Pao: Archives for the Study of the History, Philology, Geography, and Ethnology of Eastern Asia).

- VBG *Verhandelingen van het (Koninklijk) Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* (Proceedings of the [Royal] Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences).
- VKI *Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (van Nederlandsch-Indië)* (Publications of the Royal Institute for Philology, Geography, and Ethnology [of the Netherlands East Indies]).
- WHS Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society.
- WLV Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging (Works Issued by the Linschoten Society).

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in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago is preceded by a discussion of some general aspects of Portuguese expansion in Asia. Special attention is given to the economic goal of the Portuguese: the diversion of the stream of Asian merchandise to the Cape route at the expense of Asian and Mediterranean maritime trade. To complement the studies of Braudel and others who take the situation in the Mediterranean as their starting point, the question is here considered from the angle of the market centers of Indonesia.

The arrival of the Western Europeans in Indonesia has led the author to a discussion of the military relationship of the European countries concerned and the conflicts between them, particularly in the economic field and, above all, in connection with their relations with the Asian peoples. The part played by conflicting European views and policies in the survival of an independent Asian trade is clearly demonstrated. Particular attention is paid to the effect of the Dutch United Company's monopoly on the destruction of the spice trade, the most important branch of independent Asian trade in the Malay-Indonesian area, and to its repercussions on the economy of the spice islands, the seaports of Northern Java, Bantam and the ports of Eastern Sumatra. In this connection special reference is made to the part played by foreign Asian merchants, the Western Asians and especially the Chinese traders at the time of the arrival of the Dutch.

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